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Plea Bargaining's Triumph
There is no glory in plea bargaining. In place of a noble clash for truth,
plea bargaining gives us a skulking truce. Opposing lawyers shrink from
battle, and the jury's empty box signals the system's disappointment. But
though its victory merits no fanfare, plea bargaining has triumphed.
Bloodlessly and clandestinely, it has swept across the penal landscape and
driven our vanquished jury into small pockets of resistance. Plea bargaining
may be, as some chroniclers claim, the invading barbarian. But it has won
all the same.
The battle has been lost for some time. It was lost at least by the time
prominent observers of the 1920s first lamented our "vanishing jury," and
in some places it was lost decades before then. In the years since the jury
succumbed in a war few knew it was waging, advancing waves of who-lost-
the-jury scholarship have tried to retrace the path of defeat. Much of this
work has charged that the ever-weightier burden of modem jury trials
overbore the system, which surrendered to the plea bargain's efficiency to
avert collapse. Another, newer collection of studies looks beyond the
courtroom to spy out broader social forces that aided plea bargaining's
cause. But in the breadth of its scope, this work overlooks the first principle
of conflict: that victory goes to the powerful. And so while we can find
many worthy accounts of why the jury fell, we must ask as well why plea
bargaining triumphed.
Like most of history's victors, plea bargaining won in great part
because it served the interests of the powerful. In the battlefield of the
criminal courts, the kind of power that mattered most was the authority to
dictate sentences, which judges held in great measure and prosecutors in a
compromised but still substantial way. To track the course of plea
bargaining's rise, we must discover how prosecutors, who had an almost
inherent interest in plea bargaining, secured the power to make it happen,
and why judges, who inherently had the power to make it happen, began to
see it as in their interest. In this account of plea bargaining's rise, legislators
will play a large role, for their power to allocate sentencing authority
between prosecutor and judge tilted the terms of battle. And criminal
defendants, who held a nominally absolute power to plead or not to plead
but who often found themselves hopelessly undefended, must play a real if
complicated part.
This is not, then, a "social history" of plea bargaining's rise, if by that
we mean a story that highlights the play of social forces and minimizes the
role of human actors. Although recent scholars have put forth appealing
accounts of the electoral pressure of new immigrants or the analogical force
of new industry in the creation of "assembly-line justice," these theories
either stand without evidence or fall beside the point. Plea bargaining's
triumph was manifestly the work of those courtroom actors who stood to
gain from it. To the extent that external actors, especially legislators, played
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a conscious role in the struggle, they mainly took sides with the ultimately
defeated jury trial. And to the extent that broader social forces, such as
immigration and industrialization, influenced the outcome of the conflict,
they did so by increasing the criminal caseload on the one hand and the
civil caseload on the other, thereby altering the interests and options of
prosecutors and judges.
And yet in one striking way, the story of plea bargaining's rise is bigger
than the actors who made it happen. Plea bargaining, once it took hold,
possessed a power of its own. That power derived ultimately from the
individual power of those whose interests plea bargaining served, but in its
collective form that power made plea bargaining a dominant force in the
evolution of modern American criminal procedure. Sometimes, plea
bargaining's influence appears on the face of the historical record. This is
most true in the case of probation, one of the most enduring nineteenth-
century contributions to our penal mechanisms. I will argue that the birth of
probation was in some part, and perhaps in large part, the work of
prosecutors who sought a new way to expand their power to bargain for
pleas. Once in place, probation grew in symbiosis with plea bargaining and
became in time one of the most useful tools of lawyers cutting deals.
Plea bargaining's role in shaping other procedural institutions appears
more subtly in the historical record. But the unmistakable correlation
between those procedural changes that have survived and thrived and those
that aided plea bargaining's cause compels a conclusion that plea
bargaining has so fast a grip on our institutions of justice that antagonistic
institutions cannot survive. The demise of the indeterminate sentence, one
of the most promising of the late nineteenth century's progressive
brainchildren, bears the mark of plea bargaining's malice. A true
indeterminate sentence, in which only prison officials and parole boards
could set the length of criminal sentences, would have stripped both judges
and prosecutors of the power to bargain over the length of terms and would
have hobbled the plea-bargaining regime. But though widely promoted, true
indeterminate sentences never emerged, and even the half-measure that we
have come to know as parole found its development stunted when it
threatened plea bargaining's dominance.
Probation's rise and the indeterminate sentence's fall are but two of
plea bargaining's victories. Before canvassing the rest, we need to follow
the course of plea bargaining's ascent to learn the source of its strength. I
will tell this story as it unfolded in America, for although the earliest
instances of plea bargaining may well have happened elsewhere,' and
1. J.S. Cockbum discovered what is perhaps the earliest clear evidence of plea bargaining
anywhere. He found that between 1587 and 1590, as many as half of the defendants who came
before the assize courts of the English Home Circuit pled guilty. See J.S. Cockburn, Trial by the
Book? Fact and Theory in the Criminal Process, 1558-1625, in LEGAL RECORDS AND I'nlE
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although plea bargaining in time would spread across the common-law
world and beyond, it triumphed here first. Within America, I will focus on
Massachusetts. Massachusetts is the birthplace of probation, and though I
had little suspicion when I set out that plea bargaining and probation would
prove so closely linked, it seemed likely that innovations would find a
common home. Moreover, Massachusetts was among those states that acted
most vigorously in the nineteenth century to suppress the sale of alcohol,
and there was reason to suspect that enforcement of liquor laws played a
part in plea bargaining's early rise.2
Within Massachusetts, I will focus mainly on its largest county-
Middlesex 3 -which spreads south and east from the New Hampshire border
to Boston's western edge, taking in the pioneering mill town of Lowell, the
hamlets of Lexington and Concord, and cosmopolitan Cambridge.
Middlesex's diversity avoids the possible distortions of Boston's
idiosyncrasies, which particularly disrupted that city's enforcement of the
liquor laws.4 Moreover, Middlesex was the practicing ground of Asahel
Huntington, perhaps the first prosecutor in history to be called up on
charges of plea bargaining. And Middlesex is where I practiced as a
prosecutor, an experience that left me familiar with the ways of its courts
and perhaps more aware of the ways in which things have changed.
Within Middlesex County, I will look most closely at the middle tier of
the county's judicial system, which had jurisdiction over all but the most
serious crimes. A succession of courts occupied this middle tier during the
nineteenth century-the Court of General Sessions of the Peace until 1804,
the Court of Common Pleas from 1804 until 1859, and the Superior Court
after 1859.' At the four annual sittings of the Court of General Sessions of
HISTORIAN 60, 73 (J.H. Baker ed., 1978). These defendants seem to have earned two kinds of
rewards for their pleas, both of which Cockburn attributes to judicial action. First. judges
apparently altered indictments to reduce the charges. Second, judges grunted bcncfit of clergy-a
mechanism for avoiding execution-more readily to those defendants who pled guilty. See id.
2. Although one of the first studies of the patterns of plea bargaining recognized the probable
impact of the rush of cases brought on by national prohibition in the 1920s. see I AERICAN LAW
INST., A STUDY OF THE BuSINESS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 31-32, 57 (1934). the first study I
have seen to hint that state liquor laws of the 19th century may have played a role in plea
bargaining's rise is Albert Alschuler's 1979 work. see Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and
Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 6 (1979).
3. Though the ranking of the counties was unstable, Middlesex was the largest during every
census from 1840 to 1870. See A COMPENDIUM OF THE NINTH CENSUS 56 (Washington. D.C.,
Government Printing Office 1872).
4. Roger Lane has detailed the unwillingness of Boston police to enforce the state's liquor-
prohibition laws in the third quarter of the 19th century. See ROGER LA.NE. POUCING TiE CITY:
BOSTON 1822-1885, at 87 (1967) (" It was soon obvious that [the liquor prohibition law of 1852]
would not be enforced in Boston .... -).
5. See Act of Apr. 5, 1859, ch. 196, §§ 1-3, 1859 Mass. Acts 339. 339-40 (establishing the
superior courts); Act of Mar. 9, 1804, ch. 89, §§ 3-4. 1804 Mass. Acts 490. 491 (enlarging the
jurisdiction of the courts of common pleas and transferring the criminal jurisdiction of the Court
of General Sessions of the Peace to the Court of Common Pleas). Catherine Menand's suggestion
that there were several shifts in criminal jurisdiction between 1803 and 1827 results, I think, from
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the Peace, local justices of the peace presided jointly over jury trials. 6 At
both the Court of Common Pleas and the Superior Court, jury trials took
place before professional judges who rode circuit throughout the state,
sitting in each county three or four times a year and ensuring some
statewide uniformity of practice.' These middle-tier courts promise to be
better sites for this study than the courts of the lower tier. The bottom tier of
the state's judiciary' lacked two institutions-jury and prosecutor-whose
role in the criminal system looms far too large for us to think that much can
be explained without them.
My examination of the upper tier, occupied by the Supreme Judicial
Court, will not range as far because the criminal trial jurisdiction of that
court was quite narrow and grew narrower as the nineteenth century wore
on. Like judges of the middle tier, justices of the high court rode circuit
across the state to preside over criminal jury trials. 9 At the century's start,
their jurisdiction included an array of serious crimes, but soon shrank to
include only capital crimes, a category that, in turn, dwindled by mid-
century to include only murder. In 1891, the Supreme Judicial Court lost
even murder trials to the courts of the middle tier.' °
a misreading of the relevant statutes. See CATHERINE S. MENAND, A RESEARCH GUIDE TO THE
MASSACHUSETTS COURTS AND THEIR RECORDS 50 (1987). In any case, my examination of the
records of the Court of Common Pleas and the Court of General Sessions of the Peace for
Middlesex County revealed no shift in criminal jurisdiction after 1804.
6. See Act of July 3, 1782, ch. 15, 1782 Mass. Acts 157, 157 (establishing courts of general
sessions of the peace).
7. See § 10, 1859 Mass. Acts at 342 (establishing the dates and locations of roving civil and
criminal courts in Middlesex County); Act of Feb. 14, 1821, ch. 79, § 2, 8 Mass. Laws 545, 546
(establishing a Court of Common Pleas for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts). Before 1821.
the Court of Common Pleas consisted of separate judges for each county or for small groups of
counties, rather than a corps of judges who rode circuit. See WILLIAM T. DAVIS, HISTORY OF THE
JUDICIARY OF MASSACHUSETTS 201-04 (1900). At various times, Boston (that is, Suffolk
County) had criminal tribunals distinct from this statewide system. See id. at 205-06.
8. In the early years treated in this study, individual justices of the peace presided alone over
trials of the more petty criminal offenses. Their judgments could be appealed to a jury trial before
the courts of the middle tier. See MENAND, supra note 5, at 60. In time, a system of police courts
and finally district courts would succeed to the jurisdiction of the individual justices, but these
courts continued to sit without a jury and without even the regular attendance of a public
prosecutor. See id. at 61-67.
9. See id. at 37-38.
10. See Act of June 6, 1891, ch. 379, § 1, 1891 Mass. Acts 966, 966 (transferring jurisdiction
of capital trials to the superior courts); Act of Oct. 17, 1859, ch. 282, § 1, 1859 Mass. Acts 632,
632 (returning jurisdiction of capital trials to the Supreme Judicial Court); §§ 1, 21, 1859 Mass.
Acts at 339, 344 (establishing the superior courts and briefly transferring jurisdiction of capital
trials from the Supreme Judicial Court to the superior courts); Act of Mar. 14, 1832, ch. 130, 12
Mass. Laws 396 (enlarging the jurisdiction of the Court of Common Pleas in criminal cases,
regulating the appointment and duties of prosecuting officers, and transferring the Supreme
Judicial Court's criminal trial jurisdiction, except in capital cases, to the Court of Common Pleas);
MICHAEL STEPHEN HINDUS, PRISON AND PLANTATION: CRIME, JUSTICE, AND AUTHORITY IN
MASSACHUSETTS AND SOUTH CAROLINA, 1767-1878, at 93 (1980) (noting that by 1852, murder
was the only offense that remained capital in Massachusetts); infra note 95.
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Rarely handling more than a handful of criminal trials a year, the
Supreme Judicial Court would not serve well as a focus for a study of plea
bargaining's rise. Still, it is important to include its business in this study,
both to assure that the practices I observed in the middle tier were not
somehow peculiar to less serious criminal cases and to take advantage of
the sometimes superior records of Supreme Judicial Court business and of
the deeper insights they afford. As we will see, the rise of plea bargaining
before the Supreme Judicial Court tracked roughly the same course as in the
courts of the middle tier. Though it began perhaps a little later, plea
bargaining in capital cases soon caught up with and at times overtook the
development of plea bargaining in the courts below. More importantly, we
will see in both tiers the same dynamic at work: The powers and interests of
individual courtroom actors appear to explain the course of plea
bargaining's rise.
The records of the middle-tier courts for the years before 1859 have
survived in almost full form, and those for the years since have suffered
only minor losses and deletions. I have found no important gap in the
records of the Supreme Judicial Court." Complete as they may be, these
records are hardly expressive of what went on in the courts of nineteenth-
century Massachusetts and are maddeningly silent about the motivations
behind most guilty pleas. The clerk's vacant formulas usually erased the
tracks of any express agreement by prosecutor or judge to grant the
defendant a concession in exchange for a plea. In most cases, therefore, we
must use other methods to distinguish those defendants who pled guilty out
of remorse for their crimes or to shorten their engagements in court from
those who did so as part of a plea bargain, expecting to win some
concession in exchange. We must employ still other devices to distinguish
explicit plea bargains, in which the parties spoke out loud the terms of their
exchange, from implicit bargains, in which the defendant pled guilty for an
unpromised but hoped-for reward. My sampling of some 4000 cases 2 often
permits statistical conclusions about the frequency and nature of plea
bargaining even when individual case reports are mute. And newspapers
and other contemporary sources help decipher the clerk's cryptic codes.
These sources also make plain that the lessons of Middlesex County apply
generally throughout Massachusetts and, with allowances for statutory and
regional variances, in several other jurisdictions as well.
11. As I will explain below, I did not always rely directly on the Supreme Judicial Court's
own records, but often referred instead to the state attorney general's annual summaries of his
business before that court. See infra notes 92, 97, 99 and accompanying text. The Supreme
Judicial Court's records did prove important in filling gaps when the attorney general's reports
were missing or ambiguous.
12. My data set includes 4142 cases heard in the middle-tier courts of Middlesex County
between 1789 and 1910, as well as several hundred cases from the Supreme Judicial Court and the
courts of Essex County. I have described the data set in more detail in Appendix A.
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This story of plea bargaining's rise begins in the opening decade of the
nineteenth century. One could begin earlier, as there is solid evidence of
plea bargaining in earlier centuries, but that evidence is of isolated, episodic
plea bargaining, whereas this is the story of plea bargaining's triumph as a
systemic regime. Told chronologically, the story divides fairly neatly into
two parts. During the first three-quarters or so of the nineteenth century,
plea bargaining in Massachusetts advanced mainly in the realm of liquor-
law prosecutions and murder cases, where for reasons we will explore,
prosecutors had the power to negotiate pleas without any participation by
the judge. These early deals took the form of charge bargaining-that is, in
exchange for the defendant's plea to one or more of several charges, the
prosecutor dropped the others or (in the case of murder) reduced the charge
to a lesser offense. In the last quarter of the century, as judges converted to
the cause, plea bargaining most often took the form of sentence bargaining,
in which the defendant's plea won a reduced sentence. Backed by judges as
well as prosecutors, plea bargaining now broke the narrow hold of liquor
and murder prosecutions and conquered the whole penal territory-so that
by century's close, guilty pleas accounted for some eighty-seven percent of
criminal adjudications in Middlesex County.13
As useful as this simple chronology may be, I at times will stray from
the rather clean story line it provides. My aim is to highlight how the
changing powers and interests of each courtroom actor played dominant
roles in shaping the course of change. These two ways of telling the story
are not always at odds: I will begin with the role of prosecutors, whose
influence emerged most clearly in the liquor-law prosecutions of the
century's first half, and I will conclude with judges, whose changing
behavior in the last quarter of the century assured plea bargaining's
triumph. At times, though, the focus on individual actors will require us to
leap ahead or to fall back.
So I will begin with prosecutors. That prosecutors take up three parts of
this eight-part study is not because their power to bargain was greatest of
all. In fact, the judge held the largest share of the power to dictate sentences
and therefore to plea bargain, while the prosecutor's power was almost
always subordinate to his. I linger on the prosecutor's role precisely
because the prosecutor managed to elude the judge's control only rarely-
and then only by virtue of extraordinary legislative grant or procedural
ingenuity. Part I will address the first of these extraordinary legislative
grants, made in the context of liquor-law prosecutions and, with some
differences, in capital cases. My research in Middlesex County confirms
earlier findings of a strikingly high rate of plea bargaining in Massachusetts
liquor-law prosecutions in the early nineteenth century. Various good
13. See infra note 499.
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theories might explain a link between liquor prosecutions and plea
bargaining, but the evidence overwhelmingly points to one-that the
distinctive penalty scheme that the legislature created for the liquor laws,
which assigned a fixed fine to almost every offense, deprived the judge of
almost all sentencing discretion and put the prosecutor in a position to
manipulate sentences by manipulating charges. Similarly, in capital cases,
the prosecutor had the power to spare defendants mandatory death by
permitting them to plead guilty to a lesser charge. Prosecutors quickly
exploited these narrow grants of sentencing authority and put in place a
very modem practice of charge bargaining for pleas.
Explaining the source of prosecutorial power to plea bargain is the hard
part-it is easy to see why prosecutors wanted to plea bargain. Prosecutors
of the nineteenth century, like prosecutors today, plea bargained to ease
their crushing workloads, made heavier in the nineteenth century both by
their part-time status and utter lack of staff and by a caseload explosion
perhaps set off by newly founded police forces and massive immigration.
And of course they plea bargained to avoid the risk that wanton juries
would spurn their painstakingly assembled cases. Given such clear
incentives, the task of explaining the rise of prosecutorial plea bargaining in
liquor and capital cases should have been complete at the end of Part I-for
as soon as prosecutors had the power to plea bargain, they surely would
have used it. Still, I will need to consider in Part I1 the arguments of those
scholars of plea bargaining who have dismissed the importance of caseload
pressure in explaining the rise of plea bargaining and have put forward
other explanations for the early emergence of plea bargaining. And I will
need to consider why judges were not partners in this early rise of plea
bargaining. For if they had been, plea bargaining would not have been
limited to liquor and murder cases-in which prosecutors had the power to
plea bargain on their own-but could have extended across the criminal
docket.
In Part III, I will step briefly out of the courthouse and into the State
House. Massachusetts legislators reacted sourly when they discovered how
prosecutors were using the power unwittingly bestowed on them by the
liquor law's rigid penalty scheme. At mid-century the legislature eliminated
this power and very nearly succeeded in snuffing out prosecutorial plea
bargaining in liquor cases. The legislature did not, however, disturb the
prosecutor's power to conduct charge bargaining in murder cases, for there
had been relatively few such bargains by mid-century. The result was that
during the third quarter of the nineteenth century, plea bargaining advanced
more dramatically in murder cases than in any other category. Even in
liquor cases, the legislature's efforts to eradicate prosecutorial charge
bargaining failed. After losing formal power to manipulate sentences in
liquor cases, prosecutors retreated to the more covert and informal tactic of
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placing these cases "on file." This procedural maneuver, often done in
exchange for a defendant's guilty plea, allowed prosecutors to elude
altogether the legislature's sentencing provisions. The primitive device of
on-file plea bargaining evolved directly into what we know today as
probation. By the end of the century, probation had become one of plea
bargaining's most dependable foot soldiers.
Turning from the prosecutor's role in early plea bargaining to that of
other actors, I will move on in Part IV to consider the part played by
defendants. It is not hard to see why defendants, given the chance, would
plead guilty for a measure of leniency, but it is far less clear why their
behavior on this score might change over time. Middlesex court records
disclose that during the first half of the nineteenth century, decades before
plea bargaining began its dramatic ascent, there had been a long decline in
the proportion of non-liquor cases that ended in a plea. I will argue that
these early guilty pleas were not plea bargains made in exchange for
leniency, but rather the hopeless gestures of unrepresented defendants who
properly saw that they had little chance of winning if they went to trial on
their own. The gradual increase in the number of defendants who chose trial
during the first part of the century therefore may mean that more and more
defendants had counsel. Then, in the third quarter of the century, a sudden
assault on the power of defendants to take their cases to trial may have
reversed this course and helped to speed plea bargaining's rise. Laws
passed in Massachusetts and elsewhere that gave defendants the right to
testify at trial had the probably unintended effect of discouraging
defendants with criminal pasts from going to trial. Seasoned criminals knew
that if they took the stand to claim their innocence, the prosecutor could
impeach their testimony with their old convictions and thereby destroy any
real chance of acquittal. Yet if they failed to testify, defendants believed,
juries would convict them for their silence. Together with the growing
practice of probation, defendant-testimony laws confronted every defendant
with a good reason to plea bargain. Defendant-testimony laws helped to
persuade accomplished criminals to plead guilty, while the promise of
probation, which was available almost exclusively to first offenders who
pled guilty, served as an incentive for everyone else.
The combined willingness of all prosecutors and many defendants to
bargain for pleas was not, however, enough for the practice to thrive outside
the narrow context of liquor laws and murder cases. The statutory penalty
structure for most crimes gave Massachusetts judges such great discretion
in sentencing that the prosecutor typically could not unilaterally guarantee a
low enough sentence to win the defendant's plea. Plea bargaining's
sweeping triumph during the last quarter of the nineteenth century suggests,
therefore, that judges had entered plea bargaining's ranks. I will argue in
Part V that a caseload explosion on the civil side of Massachusetts
[Vol. 109: 857
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courthouses helped force this change of judicial heart on the criminal side,
for in Massachusetts, as in most American jurisdictions, the same judges sat
on both civil and criminal cases. The industrial boom of the last part of the
nineteenth century-and especially the spread of railroads and street cars-
spawned a whole new strain of personal injury litigation that, case for case,
absorbed far more time than the contractual nonpayment cases that once
had filled the civil dockets. The figures in Massachusetts are clear:. As
judges devoted a hugely increasing proportion of their time to the civil
caseload, they devoted a shrinking proportion to the criminal caseload, and
they resolved more and more criminal cases by guilty plea. Judges
apparently discovered that they had more power to spur pleas in criminal
cases than to coerce settlements in civil cases. After all, a criminal court
judge could credibly promise a reward in exchange for a plea or threaten a
penalty for going to trial, but in civil court, the jury-not the judge-
generally set the loser's penalty.
By century's end, all three of the courtroom's major actors-
prosecutor, defendant, and judge-had found reasons to favor the plea-
bargaining system. For prosecutor and judge, who together held most of the
power that mattered, the spread of plea bargaining did not merely deliver
marvelously efficient relief from a suffocating workload. It also spared the
prosecutor the risk of loss and the judge the risk of reversal, and thereby
protected the professional reputations of each. In fact, by erasing the
possibility of either factual or legal error in the proceedings, plea bargains
protected the reputation and hence the legitimacy of the system as a whole.
In Part VI, I will ask whether these variables of power and interest, which
emerge from the records of Middlesex County and of the Supreme Judicial
Court, can help explain the course of plea bargaining's rise in other
jurisdictions. In England, New York, and California, the evidence suggests
that they can.
I will move on in Part VII to explore the power that plea bargaining as
an institution has amassed by serving the interests of power so well. The
power of the various actors who stood to gain from plea bargaining became,
in a sense, plea bargaining's power. This collective, systemic interest in
plea bargaining encouraged the rise of those institutions of criminal
procedure that helped plea bargaining and hindered those that hurt it. In the
nineteenth century, plea bargaining fostered probation's rise and thereby
created a hugely versatile plea-bargaining tool. In the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, plea bargaining helped stave off the indeterminate
sentence, which had threatened to halt plea bargaining's progress. And in
the twentieth century, plea bargaining played a surprisingly direct role in
assisting the creation of public defenders. In turn, these organizations for
defense of the poor assured that in a majority of criminal cases, the defense
lawyer would share the prosecutor's and judge's interests in maximizing
2000]
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systemic efficiency-and hence in plea bargaining. These examples of plea
bargaining's influence over other institutions of criminal procedure are
merely case studies within a larger trend. In fact, it is hard to think of a
single enduring development in criminal procedure in the last 150 years that
has not aided plea bargaining's cause.
Finally, in Part VIII, I will examine how the power to plea bargain
evolved in the late twentieth century. Before the advent of modem
sentencing guidelines, both prosecutor and judge held some power to plea
bargain without the other's cooperation. The result of their mutually
independent bargaining strength was a certain balance of power, which to
some degree protected defendants from abuses of power by either official.
Today, however, sentencing guidelines have recast whole chunks of the
criminal code in the mold of the old Massachusetts liquor laws. In the
process, they have unsettled the balance of bargaining power by ensuring
that the prosecutor, who always had the strongest interest in plea
bargaining, now has the unilateral power to deal.
And so in time we will arrive again at the Massachusetts liquor laws,
where we now begin.
I. LIQUOR LAWS, MURDER CASES, AND THE PROSECUTOR'S
CHARGING POWER
A. Charge Bargaining in Liquor Cases
In 1807, Samuel Dana took office as the first Middlesex County
attorney. 4 His main forum was the Court of Common Pleas, which
occupied the middle tier of the Massachusetts criminal judicial enterprise.
Dana did not launch his young office with honor. By 1809, he was before
the legislature explaining why he had complained to three of the court's
judges about their "unbecoming impetuosity, and snarling manner." ' He
14. Dana (1767-1835) was appointed by Massachusetts Governor James Sullivan. See 2
WILLIAM T. DAVIS, BENCH AND BAR OFTHE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETrS 33 (Boston.
Boston History Co. 1895). The legislature had created the office of county attorney earlier that
year, probably to relieve the attorney general and solicitor general of the burden of managing
public prosecutions statewide. See Act of June 20, 1807, ch. 18, § 1, 1807 Mass. Acts 172, 172
(delineating the offices and duties of the attorney general, solicitor general, and county attorneys).
Dana had held the role of prosecutor provisionally since 1804. In that year, the Court of Common
Pleas appointed him to prosecute cases for the Commonwealth "until further notice of this
Court." Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book 338 (Sept. 1804). Dana was a lawyer in Groton before his
appointment as county attorney. Later he sat as a judge on the Circuit Court of Common Pleas,
served as president of the Massachusetts Senate, and held a brief tenure as Congressman. See
JAMES DANA, MEMOIR OF THE LATE HON. SAMUEL DANA 5-7, 10-13 (Cambridge, John Wilson
& Son 1877); 2 DAVIS, supra, at 33.
15. MASSACHUSETTS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE
APPOINTED ON THE MEMORIAL OF SAMSON WOODS, COMPLAINING OF CERTAIN CONDUCT OF
SAMUEL DANA, ESQUIRE, IN HIS OFFICE OF COUNTY AT7ORNEY FOR THE COUNTY OF
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had to explain as well why he had billed the court for services to crime
victims that seemed to fall within his official duties"6 -and why he had
represented a crime victim in a civil suit even as he prosecuted the case's
criminal counterpart.'7 Against these well-founded charges, Dana mounted
a pathetic and lawyerly defense.' 8 By the end of 1809, he apparently was
out of office, and the same "snarling" judges had appointed another in his
place.19 Dana won the last hand, though, for when the legislature
MIDDLESEX 10 (1809) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE DANA CoMItTrEE) (on file with the
Massachusetts Historical Society). A legislative committee's report alleged that Dana wrote his
letter of complaint after the judges refused him a continuance. See id. at 7. Dana advised the
judges, "I too often perceive an unbecoming impetuosity, and snarling manner, ill suited to the
soft ermine of justice... ." d at 10.
16. The legislature's investigating committee charged that when Dana helped crime victims
seek reimbursement from the court for the costs of bringing charges, he listed his own five-dollar
fee for providing this assistance as one such cost, but neglected to inform the court that the money
was for him. Then, in his official role, he certified this table of costs to the court, which
reimbursed the victim, who then paid Dana's fee. When alert judges asked the meaning of these
five-dollar charges, Dana "observed that it was well known that [crime victims) were often
obliged to get the professional assistance of lawyers," but he did not observe that he was the
lawyer in question. Id at 2-3.
The act creating the office of county attorney barred public prosecutors from receiving " any
fee or reward from or in behalf of any prosecutor [i.e., crime victim], for services in any
prosecution, to which it shall be his official duty to attend." § 2, 1807 Mass. Acts at 171.
17. See REPORT OF THE DANA COMMITTEE, supra note 15, at 6-7.
18. On the charge that he improperly billed the court for his assistance to crime victims in
filling out reimbursement petitions, Dana argued that because the crime victim's "application for
allowance is not part of the prosecution," his help in filling out the reimbursement forms, while
"professional," was not "official," and it was therefore no violation of the statute for him to bill
for such services. Samuel Dana, Mr. Dana's Answer to the Report of the Committee of the House
of Representatives 2-3 (Feb. 28, 1808) (on file with the Massachusetts Historical Society). As for
his reluctant response to the court's inquiry about the significance of the five-dollar charges, he
protested, "The question was not asked; nor was any inquiry or observation made, which
sug[g]ested to me an idea that the court considered it material to whom the sum was paid." Id. at
7.
To the charge that he handled the prosecution of a certain case even as he represented the
crime victim in a related civil suit, Dana replied that it was not he, but his law partner,
Richardson, who represented the victim--" not on the partnership account, but on that of Mr.
Richardson individually." Id. at 8-9. Finally, with regard to his querulous letter to the court. Dana
wrote that "however incautiously it may be expressed ... it contained my real opinion as to the
correctness of their proceeding in the case." Id. at 10-11. Except for the documents cited in this
note and supra note 15, 1 have found no other source on this dispute and cannot report its outcome
in the legislature.
19. Dana addressed his offending letter to the "Justices of the Court of Common Pleas for the
County of Middlesex, at December Term, 1808." REPORT OF THE DANA COMMITTEE. supra note
15, at 8. Court records show that the same judges who sat in December 1808 (James Prescott.
James Winthrop, and Ephraim Wood) were also sitting in September 1809, when the Court of
Common Pleas appointed Asahel Steams to be Middlesex County attorney. Steams's appointment
permits the strong inference that Dana was out. See Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book 289, 723 (Sept.
1809); Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book 339 (Dec. 1808). That Steams appeared again in the following
session of court strengthens the inference. See Middlesex CL C.P. R. Book 513 (Dec. 1809).
On the other hand, in his rather exhaustive history of the Massachusetts courts. William
Davis reported that Dana was reappointed as county attorney on September 3. 1811: that he was
succeeded by one Timothy Fuller on November 20 of the same year; and that Stearns did not take
office until August 20, 1813. See 2 DAVIS, supra note 14, at 33. The confusion seems traceable to
acts of the legislature. On June 20, 1809, the legislature repealed that pat of the 1807 Act creating
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reorganized the Court of Common Pleas in 1811, those judges lost their
seats, and Dana was named the new court's chief.2"
For our purposes, Dana's most important legacy lies not in his spat with
the judges, but in another aspect of the December 1808 sitting of the Court
of Common Pleas-the term of court that gave rise to the controversies just
noted.21 We find in the records of that term the case of Josiah Stevens of
Tyngsborough, who faced prosecution under the state's 1787 liquor-license
law requiring that alcohol retailers be licensed.2 The Stevens prosecution
was one of Dana's first liquor cases and only the third liquor case to come
before the Court of Common Pleas in Middlesex County after that court had
begun to hear criminal matters in 1804.23 Dana had drawn up a four-count
indictment against Stevens: Count one charged him with being a "common
seller" of alcohol, counts two and three with making particular unlicensed
sales, and count four with selling alcohol and permitting the buyer to drink
on Stevens's premises. The court's clerk narrated the outcome:
the office of county attorney that provided for the means of appointment. See Act of June 20,
1809, ch. 31, 1809 Mass. Acts 37, 37 (repealing the first section of the act respecting the offices
and duties of the attorney general, solicitor general, and county attorneys). In so doing, the
legislature presumably transferred power to appoint county attorneys from the governor to the
court. It then reversed course in 1811 and restored the 1807 Act, returning the appointment power
to the governor. See Act of June 18, 1811, ch. 10, § 1, 1811 Mass. Acts 279, 279 (delineating the
offices and duties of the attorney general, solicitor general, and county attorneys).
20. See Act of June 21, 1811, ch. 33, § 2, 1811 Mass. Acts 424, 424-25 (establishing circuit
courts of common pleas); DAVIS, supra note 7, at 202-04. The court's records show that at the
first three sittings of 1811, Judges Prescott, Winthrop, and Wood still presided. At the December
sitting, Dana presided as chief together with Judges William Wetmore and Stephen Minot. See
Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book 249 (Dec. 1811); Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book I (Sept. 1811):
Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book 1 (June 1811); Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book 1 (Mar. 1811).
21. See REPORT OF THE DANA COMM=ITEE, supra note 15, at 3, 6-8.
22. See Act of Feb. 28, 1787, ch. 68, 1786 Mass. Acts 206, 206; Commonwealth v. Josiah
Stevens, Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book 803 (Dec. 1808).
23. Two earlier cases had come before the Court of Common Pleas. In September 1804,
William Collins Hookway was tried before a jury and convicted and fined as a liquor dealer. See
Commonwealth v. William Collins Hookway, Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book 333 (Sept. 1804). At
about the same time-but apparently shortly afterward-the court appointed Dana to prosecute
cases for the Commonwealth. See id. at 338. In 1805, Dana handled the case of Amos Brown.
charged with keeping an unlicensed tavern. Dana nol prossed the complaint after Brown paid the
costs of prosecution. See Commonwealth v. Amos Brown, Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book 191 (Mar.
1805). This exchange in some ways resembled a plea bargain, but it lacked a critical feature, its
Brown never pled either guilty or no contest.
I studied the work of the court that preceded the Court of Common Pleas-the Court of
General Sessions of the Peace-during 1789-1790 and 1799-1800. That court heard three liquor
cases in these four years. The first, Commonwealth v. William Barker, took an interesting form
that I will discuss in infra note 310. The second and third both concerned the same defendant,
Samuel Brown. Each case charged a single count of unlicensed sale. In each, Brown pled no
contest and was fined and assessed costs. There is no indication in these two cases of any sort of
concession granted to the defendant in exchange for his plea. See Commonwealth v. Samuel
Brown, Middlesex Ct. Gen. Sess. Peace R. Book 532 (Sept. 1800); Commonwealth v. Samuel
Brown, Middlesex Ct. Gen. Sess. Peace R. Book 532 (Sept. 1800).
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[Tihe said Josiah [Stevens] says he will not contend with the
Commonwealth. And Samuel Dana Esquire Atty. for the
Commonwealth in this behalf says that in consequence of the defts.
plea aforesaid he will not prosecute the first third and fourth counts
against him any further.24
Dana and Stevens had struck a deal: In exchange for the defendant's plea of
no contest, Dana dropped three of the four counts of the indictment. On the
remaining count, Stevens paid a fine of $6.67 and $47.12 for the costs of
prosecution. 5
Dana prosecuted only one additional liquor case during the rest of his
brief tenure as county attorney. In March 1809, he brought a four-count
indictment against Nathan Corey, a husbandman of Stow: Count one
charged Corey with being a common seller of alcohol, and counts two,
three, and four with making particular unlicensed sales. The clerk's account
of the result varies from that in Stevens only in that Dana lived up to his
part of the bargain first:
Samuel Dana Esquire Attorney for the Commonwealth in this
behalf says that he will no further prosecute the said Nathan Corey
upon the first second and fourth counts in said indictment and
thereupon the said Nathan Corey by leave of Court says he will not
contend with the Government as to the third count in said
indictment.26
Corey paid a fine of seven dollars together with $19.73 in costs."
These are by no means the earliest guilty pleas I discovered in my
search of the Middlesex court records. In fact, a surprisingly high
percentage of cases in the earliest years of my study ended in pleas of guilty
or no contest. In the Court of General Sessions of the Peace, which heard
criminal cases before criminal jurisdiction passed to the Court of Common
Pleas in 1804, seventy-three percent of adjudicated cases in 1789-1790
ended in a plea,2 and sixty-six percent of those in 1799-1800." In 1809,
24. Stevens, Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book at 804.
25. See id. The odd amount of the fine-$6.67---can be traced to the statute, which set the
penalty for an unlicensed sale at "a sum not exceeding six pounds, nor less than forty shillings
[i.e., two pounds]." 1786 Mass. Acts at 207. In 1820, the records of the Court of Common Pleas
noted that "the sum of five pounds [is] equal to sixteen dollars sixty six cents and six mills."
Commonwealth v. Grosvenor Tarbell, Middlesex CL C.P. R. Book 273 (Sept. 1820). At this
conversion rate, two pounds would equal $6.67.
26. Commonwealth v. Nathan Corey, Middlesex CL C.P. RL Book 380 (Mar. 1809).
27. See id. It appears that the court by then had abandoned the cumbersome fine of $6.67. see
1786 Mass. Acts at 207, and had chosen to round the figure up to seven dollars.
28. See Act of Mar. 9, 1804, ch. 154, §§ 3-4, 1803 Mass. Acts 788. 789 (enlarging the
jurisdiction of the courts of common pleas).
29. Or 16 cases out of 22. By " adjudicated" cases, I mean cases in which the defendant went
to trial or pled guilty or no contest.
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when Nathan Corey stood before the Court of Common Pleas, fifty-eight
percent of adjudicated cases ended by plea.3' These were not merely liquor
cases, but included both felony and misdemeanor cases from across the
broad jurisdiction of the middle-tier courts. But Stevens and Corey are two
of only three cases in these years that appear on the face of the records as
clearplea bargains." That is, these are the only cases in which the clerk's
account discloses a concession made in exchange for the defendant's plea.
Throughout this study, I will use the term "clear plea bargain" to refer to
those cases in which the record makes it clear that the defendant won a
concession by offering a plea. By contrast, I will use the expression "guilty
plea" to refer to cases in which the defendant pled guilty but the record
reveals no compensating concession. Sometimes we can look behind the
silent record of a simple "plea" to discover the terms of a "bargain," but
this is a matter we will take up in time.
Although Stevens and Corey are among the earliest clear plea bargains
to emerge in my survey, they are of a remarkably sophisticated cut. We
cannot know Dana's thoughts as he sought these four-count indictments,
but today we would say that a prosecutor who brought several charges in
the hope of gaining leverage in plea negotiations had "over-charged" the
case. Dana may have had other motives for charging these cases as he did,"
but given the four-count indictments, he was in a position to threaten the
defendants with multiple penalties and then to reward their pleas of no
contest by dropping three of the four counts. Note that Stevens and Corey
chose not to plead plainly "guilty" to the remaining count of the
indictment. Rather, they would "not contend with the Commonwealth,"
and by means of these pleas of nolo contendere, they spared themselves any
admission of fault while giving the court the power to convict and sentence
30. Or 21 cases out of 32.
31. Or 7 cases out of 12.
32. The third case followed the form but lacked the substance of the Stevens-Corey bargains.
In 1790, George Peters faced several indictments for theft, including one that charged that he had
stolen a pair of spectacles and a pair of scissors. To this indictment, he said that he was "guilty of
taking the spectacles but not guilty of taking the scissors." Commonwealth v. George Peters.
Middlesex Ct. Gen. Sess. Peace R. Book 7 (Sept. 1790). A lawyer who acted temporarily for the
government announced that he would "no further prosecute as to the scissors." /d. But unlike
Stevens and Corey, Peters won little benefit from the government's "concession." The charge
remained unchanged because subtraction of the scissors did not alter the grade of the theft. It
altered only the measure of the restitution, set in the usual way at three times the value of the
goods stolen, and now reduced by three times the value of the scissors. See id.
33. The statute did not define the offense of being a "common seller" as charged in count
one, and I have not found elsewhere a definition that governed at this time. In an 1852 law that
established liquor prohibition in Massachusetts, the legislature provided that "three several
sales... shall be sufficient to constitute" the offense of being a common seller. Act of May 22,
1852, ch. 322, § 12, 1852 Mass. Acts 48, 50. Perhaps there is earlier case law, unknown to me,




them. 4 To winnow the excess charges, Dana employed the nolle prosequi,
or nol pros, which the Supreme Judicial Court only recently had declared to
be an exclusively prosecutorial device.35 Gadget for gadget-multiple-count
indictments, nolo pleas, and nol prosses-these early plea bargains rival
some of the best work of modem plea practitioners. And yet they emerged
here, only a year into the tenure of the first county attorney, an almost
instinctual urge of the prosecutorial soul.
Sophisticated as these pleas may have been, it is not immediately
obvious why they worked. Why should Stevens and Corey have pled guilty,
even to a single charge, if the presiding judges had the power to punish
them severely for the one remaining violation? True, one's exposure is
always greater having been convicted on four counts than on one, but many
defendants might prefer to keep their right to seek an acquittal from a jury
rather than to trade it for an uncertain reward. They might even flatter
themselves with the hope that if they went to trial and lost, the judges still
would not punish them severely. And conversely, why should Dana have
dropped three charges and risked the possibility that the judges would, on
the one remaining count, impose an overly lenient sentence? Had the judges
been partners in these plea bargains and had they made their sentencing
intentions clear, then any such reservation on Dana's or the defendants' part
would have dissolved. But the record discloses no reason to think the
judges took part in the deal.
In fact, neither Dana nor the defendants needed to worry that the judges
might disappoint their expectations in the bargain, because the judges had
no power to do so. The liquor law's penalty structure simply left them too
little discretion. On a conviction of being a "common seller," as charged in
count one of both indictments, the law prescribed a fine of twenty pounds
exactly.36 Twenty pounds was a good deal of money, amounting at the time
34. Even in these very early years, the Court of Common Pleas readily accepted pleas of
guilty. In 1789-1790, there were 14 guilty pleas while there were only two pleas of no contest. In
1799-1800, there were nine guilty pleas and 12 pleas of no contest. Until the 1830s, however, all
of the clear plea bargains I saw in liquor cases involved pleas of no contest. Except in sparing
defendants automatic liability in related civil cases, a plea of no contest had the same legal effect
as a guilty plea:
It is only where the party is sued in a civil action for doing the thing for which he was
indicted .... that the distinction between these pleas is material. The plea of nolo
contendere pleaded with a protestation that the party was not guilty, would clearly not
conclude the party in his defence against the civil action.
But so far as the Commonwealth is concerned, the judgment of conviction follows
as well the one plea, as the other. And it is not necessary that the court should adjudge
that the party was guilty, for tha t follows by necessary legal inference from the implied
confession. But the court thereupon proceeds to pass the sentence of the law affixed to
the crime.
Commonwealth v. Horton, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 206. 208 (1829).
35. See Commonwealth v. Andrews, 2 Mass. (I Tyng) 408. 414 (1807) ("The Court never
[enters a nolle prosequi], but at the instance of the counsel for the government.").
36. See Act of Feb. 28, 1787, ch. 68, 1786 Mass. Acts 206. 207.
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to almost sixty-seven dollars,37 or more than the total in fines and costs paid
by either defendant. The common-seller count therefore gave Dana real
strength in any plea negotiation, for if the defendant risked trial and lost on
that count, the court would have had no choice but to impose the statutory
fine-whereas once Dana nol prossed the count in exchange for a plea, the
court had no power to impose it. Although the license law prescribed a
specific fine for almost every offense,38 it did grant judges some sentencing
discretion in cases of single unlicensed sales by providing for a fine of
between two and six pounds.39 Despite the uncertainty injected into the
outcome by this sentencing range, Dana and the defendants were able, if
they chose, to agree in advance on the exact penalty the defendants would
pay. For another statute gave Dana the power to determine the costs of
prosecution, which the defendant had to pay.4" Costs often were several
times greater than the statutory fines, so Dana's discretion to set costs was
more than sufficient to offset any uncertainty about the judges' fines.
By depriving judges of almost all sentencing discretion in liquor-law
cases, the legislature had assured that prosecutors could-by over-charging,
selectively nol prossing, and manipulating the amount of costs-dictate the
defendant's sentence. That is, the legislature had empowered prosecutors to
engage in charge bargaining without fear that the court's noncooperation
might unsettle the terms of the bargain. In no other statute of consequence
to the daily practice of the middle-tier courts had the legislature bestowed
such power on the prosecutor. Excepting only those very serious crimes that
carried mandatory life or death sentences, none of the typical common-law
offenses called for a minimum sentence. The penalty for petty larceny was
zero to one year or a fine of zero to $300; for grand larceny, it was zero to
five years or zero to $600; for breaking a shop at night, it was zero to
twenty years; for forging a bank bill or unarmed robbery, it was zero to
life.
41
37. On the exchange rate, see supra note 25.
38. For being a common victualler, innholder, taverner, or seller, the penalty was 20 pounds.
See 1786 Mass. Acts at 207. For permitting a patron to drink to excess, for serving hard alcohol to
minors or servants, or for serving to those identified by town selectmen as neglecting their
families, the penalty was 20 shillings, or one pound. See id. at 210. For serving to persons
identified by the selectmen as common drunkards, the penalty was 30 shillings, or one and a half
pounds. See id. at 214.
39. See id. at 210.
40. See MASS. REV. STAT. ch. 141, § 8 (Dutton & Wentworth 1836) ("All costs, arising in
criminal prosecutions.... shall be taxed by the attorney general, or by the district or county
attorney, and the allowance thereof shall be certified by the clerk, under the direction of the
court .... ").
41. See id. ch. 125, § 15 (discussing unarmed robbery); id. ch. 126, § 11 (stating the penalties
for shop breaking and entering); id. ch. 126, § 17 (discussing the penalties for petty and grand
larceny); id. ch. 127, § 4 (discussing forgery). These penalties prevailed after 1836. Before then,
there were more crimes that carried mandatory penalties. Robbery, for example, carried
mandatory life in prison. See Act of Mar. 16, 1805, ch. 143, § 7, 1804 Mass. Acts 240, 243.
Prosecutors still could not take advantage of this rigidity, however, because it was not yet clearly
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In non-liquor cases, therefore, the prosecutor could not credibly
threaten defendants with certain and steep punishment if they went to trial
and lost, because the court's potential leniency had no bounds. True, the
prosecutor had some power to limit the defendant's maximum exposure. At
least after 1838, he could use a partial nol pros to reduce a charge of grand
larceny to petty larceny and thereby guarantee defendants who pled guilty a
42maximum one-year sentence. But the records in the earlier half of my
study rarely disclose such behavior, and we may presume that simply
reducing the maximum exposure, when the lowered maximum still
involved substantial prison time, usually was not sufficient to induce a
defendant to plead. It is therefore no surprise that of the forty-nine clear
plea bargains disclosed in the record books of the middle-tier courts during
the years I studied between 1789 and 1849, thirty-three--or fully two-
thirds-took place in liquor cases.43 Put differently, clear plea bargains took
established that prosecutors had the power to enter partial nol prosses. In liquor cases, prosecutors
could bring multiple charges and then nol pros whole counts of the complaint to reduce the
defendant's sentence. As most robberies involved but a single allegation, the only way a
prosecutor could contrive to lower the defendant's sentence was by reducing a greater charge to a
lesser one by entering a nol pros as to part of the charge. It became clear only in 1838 that
prosecutors had this power. See infra notes 107-115 and accompanying text.
42. See Commonwealth v. Tuck, 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) 356, 366 (1838) ("If the attorney
general may enter a nolle prosequi as to the whole of an indictment, or of a count, so he may do it
as to any distinct and substantive part of it."). The power to enter a partial nol pros was uncertain
before this 1838 decision. See infra notes 107-115 and accompanying text.
43. Not all of the 16 non-liquor defendants whose cases ended in clear plea bargains
benefited from pleading guilty in terms of a lower maximum potential penalty. I have already
discussed the 1790 case of George Peters. See supra note 32. Other defendants, like Peters, were
willing to plead, but only if the prosecutor first stnuck specific allegations as to which the
defendant apparently maintained his innocence. Although these partial nol prosses lessened
somewhat the seriousness of each case, there was no change in the formal designation of the
defendant's crimes. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Emerson Elwell, Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book 216
(June 1843) (reporting a breaking-and-entering case alleging the theft of 30 dozen saws, as to two
dozen of which the prosecutor entered a nol pros); Commonwealth v. Benaiah S. Conner,
Middlesex Ct. C.P. R Book 2 (Feb. 1843) (reporting a petty larceny case in which a partial nol
pros extended to some of the allegedly stolen goods); Commonwealth v. Timothy Peterson.
Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book 218 (Nov. 1839) (same).
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place in twenty-four percent of adjudicated liquor cases, but in fewer than
three percent of all other adjudicated cases. 4
As the figures in note 44 show, however, Dana's tactic in Stevens and
Corey did not become a favorite of Middlesex prosecutors until sometime
in the 1840s. Asahel Steams, who succeeded Dana as county attorney and
held the office for some two decades,45 took a somewhat less aggressive
tack in liquor cases. In 1824, for example, Steams indicted twelve persons
for violations of the liquor law. In three of these cases, he alleged multiple
counts and exacted a plea bargain on the Stevens-Corey model. But in each
of the remaining nine cases, he charged a single count of unlawful sale. 6
44. These are my findings for the relevant years:
CLEAR PLEA BARGAINS IN LIQUOR AND NON-LIQUOR CASES:
MIDDLESEX COURT OF COMMON PLEAS AND ITS PREDECESSOR COURT
YEAR NUMBER OF ADJUDICATED NUMBER OF CLEAR
DEFENDANTS PLEA BARGAINS
Non-Liquor Liquor Non-Liquor Liquor
1789-1790* 21 1 1 0
1799-1900* 30 2 0 0
1805-1806* 39 0 0 0
1809-1810* 27 1 0 I
1814-1815* 36 0 2 0
1819-1820* 41 5 1 I
1824 27 12 1 3
1829 18 9 0 0
1834 58 7 0 4
1839 35 1 1 0
1843-1844* 135 42 8 4
1849 167 56 2 20
Total f 634 [ 136 16 33
* Two-year totals
Sources: Middlesex Ct. Gen. Sess. Peace R. Books; Middlesex Ct. Gen. Scss. Docket
Books; Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Books; Middlesex Ct. C.P. Docket Books.
By "liquor" cases, I mean cases brought under the liquor-license law, which I have
described supra notes 22, 36-39 and accompanying text. By "non-liquor" cases, I mean cases in
which the charge does not concern the sale or distribution of alcohol. In Appendix A, I trace out
the line between liquor and non-liquor cases more exactly.
As I noted earlier, see supra note 29, "adjudicated" cases are those in which the defendant
went to trial or pled guilty or no contest. Beginning in 1849, a great many cases at each term of
court were placed "on file." As I will explain in Part III, see infra notes 289-381 and
accompanying text, filed cases present a different aspect of the prosecutorial pleading power and
must be considered separately. I therefore will be careful to note whether my figures for 1844 or
any later year include filed cases. My figures for 1849, listed in the table above, do not.
45. Though perhaps not continuously. See supra note 19.
46. It is often difficult to tell from the face of the record book whether a liquor case involved
multiple counts. The clerk often noted only that the defendant was charged with a violation of
"the License-law." See, e.g., Commonwealth v. John Wilson, Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book 79
(June 1853). The shorthand of the notation leaves one unable to conclude that only a single count
was brought. For the nine cases just noted in the text, I have examined the indictments themselves.
which are retained as part of the file papers and stored at the Massachusetts Archives, to confirm
that there was just a single count. See Commonwealth v. John Wade & Bowen Bucknam,
Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book 405 (June 1824); Commonwealth v. William Rogers, Middlesex Ct.
C.P. R. Book 404 (June 1824); Commonwealth v. Thomas Jameson, Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book
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The defendants in all nine cases readily pled either guilty or no contest,
apparently regarding their seven-dollar fines and modest costs to be
preferable to an expensive trial. In 1829, the next year I studied, Steams
resolved eight out of nine liquor cases in this manner.
I do not consider these cases to be clear plea bargains, for the record
discloses no concession made in exchange for the defendant's plea. They
may be examples of implicit plea bargains, however, in which the
defendant offered a plea expecting that some concession would be made. 7
After all, the law empowered Steams to set the costs of prosecution, and a
trial no doubt would have inflated those costs. Stearns tried only two liquor
cases in the years I studied, only one of which ended in a conviction. In that
case, from 1820, he assessed his defeated opponent costs of $39.85."s In the
other liquor case that arose in the same term of the court, the defendant pled
no contest, and Steams put costs at just $23.2l.' 9 And an assault-and-
battery case Steams prosecuted in 1814 makes even plainer how useful a
plea-bargaining tool the cost-setting power could be: After the first of two
co-defendants, Archibald Mclntire, pled guilty and the second, William
Fletcher, went to trial and lost, -the court fined each five dollars. Spuming
the court's even-handedness, Stearns put Mclntire's costs at $4.76 and
Fletcher's at $39.53.50
There is some reason to think that those liquor defendants who pled
guilty or no contest in 1824 and 1829 had in mind the amount of costs
Steams might assess, for the records show a striking regularity in those
amounts. Of the nine defendants from 1824 who pled either guilty or no
403 (June 1824); Commonwealth v. John Howe. Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book 402 (June 1824);
Commonwealth v. Ebenezer Davis, Middlesex CL C.P. R. Book 401 (June 1824); Commonwealth
v. John Fowle, Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book 401 (June 1824); Commonwealth v. Andrew Cochran.
Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book 400 (June 1824); Commonwealth v. Jacob Butters, Middlesex Ct.
C.P. R. Book 399 (June 1824); Commonwealth v. Isaac Brooks, Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book 201
(Mar. 1824).
47. "Implicit plea bargaining takes place when a defendant pleads guilty without an explicit
promise or deal, but knowing (or assuming) that better deals go to those who 'cooperate' and
spare the public the bother and expense of a trial." Lawrence M. Friedman. Courts over lime: A
Survey of Theories and Research, in EMPIRICAL THEORIES ABOUT COURTS 9. 38 (Keith 0.
Boyum & Lynn Mather eds., 1983). Raymond Moley recognized the phenomenon a good many
years ago. See Raymond Moley, The Vanishing Jury, 2 S. CAL. L. REV. 97, 103 (1928) (noting
that the defendant may plead in exchange for an -expressed or implied assurance" of a
concession).
48. The conviction took place in Conmonwealth v. Josiah Howard, Middlesex Ct. C.P. R.
Book 241 (Mar. 1820). Stearns's other liquor trial ended in an acquittal. See Commonwealth v.
John Houch, Middlesex CL C.P. R. Book 685 (Dec. 1829). Although in some jurisdictions, costs
could be assessed even after an acquittal, that was not the case in Massachusetts during the period
of my study. In a 1799 case resulting in a not-guilty verdict, the records make clear that costs were
to be paid by the county. See Commonwealth v. John Johnson, Middlesex Ct. Gen. Sess. Peace R.
Book 432 (Mar. 1799).
49. See Commonwealth v. Jacob Carter, Middlesex Ct. Gen. Sess. Peace R. Book 244 (Mar.
1820).
50. See Commonwealth v. William Fletcher & Archibald Mclntire, Middlesex Ct. C.P. R.
Book 174 (Mar. 1814).
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contest and won no obvious concession, six were assessed costs of $13.77,
two costs of $14.77, and one costs of $14.97. Of the eight defendants in this
category from 1829, three were assessed costs of $11.49 and two costs of
$18.14." There is little reason to think that Steams manipulated the amount
of costs to induce defendants to plead. Rather, the most likely explanation
for assessing different defendants the same, very specific figures is that
Steams pooled the costs of prosecuting liquor cases from a particular town
and divided them among all the liquor defendants from that town who
offered a plea.52 This practice assured that defendants could know in
advance the amount of costs they faced if they offered a plea. The record
books disclose that in 1824 six of the nine defendants just mentioned had
lawyers-and all but one of them the same lawyer-who no doubt could
have helped the clients predict the consequences of their pleas.53
The power to set the costs of prosecution was perhaps a more potent
plea-bargaining tool in liquor cases than in others. By custom, if not by law,
prosecutors rarely assessed costs when a convict was sent to prison. 4
Because the liquor law did not call for imprisonment except on a second or
third offense before the second half of the century," costs were an almost
invariable part of the disposition. And as a proportion of the total penalty,
costs loomed large in liquor cases, in which the customary fine for making
a single unlicensed sale was seven dollars, and costs were consistently
more. At all events, Steams was able to use cost-setting and, to a lesser
extent, Dana's multiple-charge tactic as well as other stratagems to win
pleas from twenty-four of the thirty-three liquor defendants he prosecuted
in the years I studied. He went to trial only twice and nol prossed charges
without winning pleas in seven cases. In contrast, of 224 non-liquor cases
that Steams prosecuted in these years, he resolved only eighty-one by plea
51. In two cases, the costs were unspecified, and in one, they were set at $9.97.
52. The records bear this theory out. In all of the cases just noted, defendants who paid the
same costs came from either the same or contiguous towns. I have examined Steams's accounting
of costs in the file papers for several of these cases and have noted nothing that seems contrived or
fudged.
53. Throughout the period of my study, it was quite unusual for the record books to disclose
the presence of counsel. The court's docket books regularly recorded counsel beginning only in
1844. I will argue in Part IV that the rate of representation before that time was probably a good
deal less than 50%. See infra notes 435-440 and accompanying text.
54. In the eight years of his tenure that I studied-1809 (second half), 1810, 1814, 1815,
1819, 1820, 1824, and 1829-Steams asked for costs in only four of the 48 cases in which
defendants served time. For examples of the anomalous cases, see Commonwealth v. Nathaniel
Gilson, Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book 515 (Dec. 1809), a theft case in which the defendant was
sentenced to two months in jail and was assessed costs of $29.66, and Commonwealth v. Timothy
Cole, Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book 370 (June 1814), a theft case in which the defendant was
sentenced to 20 days in jail and a fine of $20 and was assessed costs of $39.98. It was certainly
true, however, that for nonpayment of costs, defendants often found themselves locked up. In fact,
the typical sentence commanded that the defendant be committed until costs were paid.
55. The license law of 1832 made second offenders liable to a term of up to 90 days. See Act
of Mar. 24, 1832, ch. 166, § 15, 1832 Mass. Acts 473, 481-82. An act of 1855 made prison time
mandatory even for a first offense. See infra note 289 and accompanying text.
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(and only four by clear plea bargains), took sixty-three to trial, and
abandoned prosecution by entering nol prosses in most of the rest.
If Asahel Huntington, who succeeded Steams in about 1832,m proved
to be even more resourceful in managing his liquor caseload, it was perhaps
because he had to be. In 1834, the first year I studied of Huntington's
tenure, he prosecuted ninety-five cases of all types, more than double the
forty-one cases Stearns handled in 1829. And that was just in Middlesex
County. An 1832 statute had split the state into districts, so Huntington took
on the new title of district attorney and assumed an enlarged realm that
included Essex County, Middlesex's smaller but still substantial neighbor.
Within two years, Huntington had begun to formulate his signature
contribution to plea-bargaining technology: the preprinted, multi-count
liquor-indictment form. He deployed several primitive versions of this
device in 1834. In the case of Samuel Elliot, he used a preprinted
indictment form that alleged four counts of making single unlicensed
alcohol sales. Huntington filled in Elliot's name, the relevant dates and
places, and other information peculiar to Elliot's offense. His use of a
preprinted form suggests that far from tailoring the charges to Elliot's
specific acts, Huntington had embraced a routine practice of charging
multiple counts of unlicensed sales. Facing this four-count indictment,
Elliot chose to plead no contest on two counts in exchange for Huntington's
nol pros of the other two.' In the case of Amos Adams, Huntington pasted
together two of these four-count fonns. Adams pled guilty to count one, and
Huntington nol prossed counts two through eight.58 In several other cases,
Huntington used a preprinted form that alleged one count of being a
common seller and one count of making a single sale, to which he often
appended an additional, handwritten single-sale count.
59
Huntington's multi-count liquor forms grew more sophisticated with
time. Figure 1 reproduces one such form from 1843. In the first of five
counts, it charges the defendants, Henry and Albert Sprague of Cambridge,
with being common sellers of alcohol. Count two alleges a single sale, and
56. Charles Warren reported that Steams served until 1832. See I CHARLES WARREN,
HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL AND OF EARLY LEGAL CoNDmoNs IN AMERICA 313
(1908). I have found no source giving the dates of Huntington's service. He was certainly in place
as of 1834. See Middlesex CL C.P. R. Book 263 (Mar. 1834).
57. See Commonwealth v. Samuel Elliot, Middlesex CL C.P. R. Book 327 (Sept. 1834)
(indictment form on file with the Massachusetts Archives).
58. See Commonwealth v. Amos Adams, Middlesex CL C.P. R. Book 477 (Dec. 1834)
(indictment form on file with the Massachusetts Archives).
59. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Patrick Maurice, Middlesex CL C.P. R. Book 336 (Sept.
1834) (indictment form on file with the Massachusetts Archives). Maurice pled guilty to one
count of making a single sale, and Huntington nol prossed the other two counts. See id.
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counts three through five allege being an unlicensed retailer.6 As revised in
the state's 1836 code, the license law punished the first of these offenses by
a fine of $100 and each of the last four by fines of twenty dollars exactly.
6'
A defendant who dared risk trial on such an indictment could not hope for
leniency if convicted, for the judge had no discretion in sentencing. This
was the sad discovery of Daniel McCrillis, who in 1849 was convicted of
four counts, fined $160, and assessed costs of $88.05.62 Those defendants
who chose instead to fight another day and pled to one or more of the
twenty-dollar counts regularly secured nol prosses on at least the first and
most expensive count and paid moderate costs of between twenty and forty
dollars.63 Huntington had complete discretion to reward defendants in this
way. As the Supreme Judicial Court wrote in 1838, "[Ilt is perfectly clear
that a nolle prosequi may be entered [before trial] at the pleasure of the
prosecuting officer.... The Court has no right to interfere. . . "
However useful Huntington's multi-count forms and liberal nol
prossing practices may have been in managing his liquor caseload, their
virtues did not immediately appear to the legislators who discovered his
doings sometime in 1843 or early 1844. A House investigating committee
summoned Huntington to respond to two sets of charges. The first alleged
simple graft-that Huntington had received fines and court costs from
defendants and failed to pay the whole amount over to the state.6 The
second alleged "mal-administration ... [i]n taking less than might have
been required on the discharge of indictments found and not tried." 66 These
charges, the committee noted, "all relate to [Huntington's] official
administration of the laws of the Commonwealth, against selling spirituous
60. See Commonwealth v. Henry Sprague & Albert H. Sprague. Middlesex C. C.P. R. Book
423 (Oct. 1843) (indictment form on file with the Massachusetts Archives).
61. See MASS. REV. STAT. ch. 47, §§ 1-4 (Dutton & Wentworth 1836). Like the 1787 license
law, see supra notes 22, 36-39 and accompanying text, the 1836 code called for mandatory
penalties throughout the liquor-licensing provisions. It imposed a S5 fine for selling to minors or
servants, a $10 fine (even if licensed) for selling on Sundays. and a $20 fine for selling to persons
cut off by town selectmen. See MASS. REV. STAT. ch. 47. §§ 11, 13. 15-16. Only in the case of
second offenders, whom the court had the discretion to sentence to up to 90 days in the common
jail, did the act create any flexibility in sentencing. See id. § 29. But second-offender prosecutions
were exceedingly rare.
62. See Commonwealth v. Daniel McCrillis, Middlesex Ct. C.P. R Book 521 (June 1849).
63. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Daniel L. Richardson, Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book 611 (Oct.
1849) (reporting a case in which the defendant pled to two $20 counts and was fined $40 and
assessed court costs of $35).
64. Commonwealth v. Tuck, 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) 356. 365-66 (1838).
65. See CASE OF ASAHEL HUNTNGTON: REPORT, H. DOC. No. 4. at 3-5 (Mass. 1845).
Robert Hampel seems to be the first modem scholar to cite the Huntington case. See ROBERT L
HAMPEL, TEMPERANCE AND PROHIBITION IN MASSACHUSETTS, 1813-1852. at 214 n. 11 (1982).
66. H. DOC. No. 4, at 7. The original complaint by Representative Cyrus Washburn of Lynn.
in Essex County, was slightly more pointed: It specifically alleged that Huntington "discharg[ed
the said Defendants on his own responsibility without a trial." ORDER FOR COMMITrEE OF
AsAHEL HUNTINGTON, H. DOC. No. 1499, at 2 (Mass. 1844) (on file with the Massachusetts
Archives).
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liquors without license."67 It appears the committee was reacting in part to
the September 1842 sitting of the Court of Common Pleas in Essex County,
at which Huntington managed to dispose of all eighteen of his liquor cases
without a trial.68
Shocked to find plea bargaining going on in the Commonwealth's
courts, the committee demanded that Huntington appear and explain
himself. He denied the allegations of graft, and the committee ultimately
deemed those charges unsupported. 69 As for the charges of malpractice by
plea bargaining, Huntington stoutly admitted that they "were true in fact,"
and "he claimed the right under the laws of the Commonwealth" to do
exactly as the committee alleged.70 Then he offered the legislators a plea-
bargaining primer for use in liquor-license cases, which began with his
acknowledgment of the practice of multiple charging:
[W]henever a number of penalties had been demanded in different
counts of the same indictment, and the defendant came forward and
proposed an adjustment, [Huntington's] usual course had been-
1st. To require the party to enter a plea of nolo contendere.
2d. To enter into an agreement to abstain from future sales of
liquors without license.
3d. To pay at least one penalty to the Commonwealth, and all
costs which had then accrued. And
4th. That the indictment should then stand continued as
security that the defendant would fulfil his agreement, and
to be further prosecuted in case the defendant still
continued in his course of a wilful violation of the laws.7'
I will return to the significance of steps two and four of this method in Part
III when I take up the origins of prosecutorial probation. In steps one and
three, Huntington merely adopted and institutionalized the plea-bargaining
approach Dana had put to use in 1808.
67. H. Doc. No. 4, at 7.
68. The Committee's report lists 16 witnesses to the allegations of plea bargaining. See id. at
5. I have been able to identify only three. Two were defendants in liquor cases heard in the March
1842 session of the Essex Court of Common Pleas. See Commonwealth v. Joshua Peckham, Essex
Ct. C.P. R. Book 124 (Mar. 1842); Commonwealth v. John N. Martin, Essex Ct. C.P. R. Book 124
(Mar. 1842). One of these and one other appeared as liquor defendants in the September term of
the same court. See Commonwealth v. Joseph Perley, Essex Ct. C.P. R. Book 105 (Sept. 1842);
Commonwealth v. John N. Martin, Essex Ct. C.P. R. Book 105 (Sept. 1842). In the March term.
Huntington had seven liquor cases, and although he consistently charged multiple counts, he was
forced to trial in five of them (the two just cited being the exceptions). In the September term,
when Huntington had 18 liquor cases, his tactics were more successful. He charged all but two
liquor defendants with multiple counts, secured pleas of no contest in all but five cases, entered
nol prosses on payment of costs in four, and nol prossed the last case outright.
69. See H. Doc. No. 4, at 8-10.
70. Id. at 6-7.
71. Id. at 7-8.
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Huntington contended that in light of his crushing workload, this
procedure was "most conducive to the public interest."' The legislature
had eliminated the office of attorney general in 1843,' leaving the various
district attorneys saddled with "the entire direction and management of all
prosecutions and suits in behalf of the Commonwealth. ' 7' And there was
nothing sneaky about his plea-bargaining tactics: "It was very distinctly in
evidence," the committee allowed, "that this course was taken openly and
publicly... and impartially applied to all; that it was known to the Courts,
the Bar, the County Commissioners, and all other persons who had
occasion to take any interest in the administration of this department of the
law."'7 1 In the end, Huntington wholly won over the committee, whose
report overflowed with his "extraordinary zeal and untiring industry"; his
"intelligence, integrity, fidelity and ability"; his "arduous and exhausting"
and "severe and long continued exertions"; and his devotion "even to the
peril of his life" -for Huntington had been sick from overwork--" to the
discharge of his official duties." 76 The committee was barely less florid in
its praise of Huntington's method of plea bargaining in liquor cases, which
it said "tend[ed] more than any other course in the class of cases to which it
was applied, to attain the just end of all punishment, the prevention of the
offence, the reformation of the offender." "
Despite the committee's vindication, announced in January 1845,
Huntington departed from office later the same year because (it was said)
he found his salary inadequate to his labors.78 His successor perhaps took
courage in the legislature's lavish endorsement of Huntington's tactics, for
he dispatched his liquor cases in an even more brazenly public manner.
Hence we find this notice concerning district attorney Albert Nelson in the
Lowell Journal of April 2, 1847:
LICENSE CASES. The Newburyport Advertiser says that Mr.
Nelson, Attorney for the Essex and Middlesex district, states that at
the present term, it is his intention when the parties complained of
plead guilty, and enter into recognizance to observe the law, not to
press for the fines which are incurred, but simply to exact the costs
of Court. At the next term, however, he announces that no more
72- Id. at7.
73. See Act of Mar. 24, 1843, ch. 99, 1843 Mass. Acts 60.
74. H. Doc. No. 4, at 7.
75. Id. at 8.
76. ,-k at 9.
77. Id. at 8.
78. It appears that Albert H. Nelson took office as district attorney in December 1845. The
Lowell Courier noted his appointment on December 10. 1845. See Albert H. Nelson, Esq.,
LOWELL DAILY COURiER, Dec. 10, 1845, at 2. A correspondent to the Lowell Journal is the
source of the supposition that Huntington "felt constrained to resign on account of the inadequacy
of the salary." LOWELL J., Oct. 8, 1847, at 1. On the several district attorneys' disgruntlement
with their workloads and salaries, see infra notes 132-145 and accompanying text.
The Yale Law Journal
settlements of cases will be made; but that full fines will be exacted
in every case where the parties are convicted.79
I will take up in Part III how it was that Nelson could promise not to exact
fines against defendants who pled guilty under a statute that mandated
fines. For now, the significance of this mid-century announcement of a
district attorney's fire sale in liquor-license cases is Nelson's manifest
confidence in his own power to make such promises without concern about
possible interference from the court.
Charles Russell Train, who followed Nelson into office in 1848,80
proved to be the most enthusiastic of Middlesex's early plea-bargaining
practitioners. Train quickly mastered the plea bargainer's art and deployed
the Dana-Stevens-Corey model of charge bargaining and Huntington's
preprinted, multi-count liquor-indictment forms with unprecedented
regularity. In 1849, Train charged multiple counts in eighty-nine percent of
his liquor indictments and managed to resolve twenty of fifty-six
adjudicated liquor cases with clear plea bargains. All but one were built
upon multi-count indictments, the district attorney's nol pros of selected
counts, and the defendant's plea of guilty to the rest."'
79. License Cases, LOWELL J., Apr. 2, 1847, at 2. Lowell is one of the prominent cities of
Middlesex County. Newburyport is in Essex County and, although not large, was the site of one of
the four annual sittings of the Court of Common Pleas in that county. The two counties together
formed the Northern District, of which Nelson was district attorney. Tami Swiger, one of my
research assistants, spotted this notice of Nelson's practice.
80. Nelson made his last appearance in the Court of Common Pleas Record Books in the
October 1847 session; Train made his first in February 1848. See Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book
(Feb. 1848) (on file with the Massachusetts Archives); Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book (Oct. 1847)
(on file with the Massachusetts Archives).
81. The one exception is Commonwealth v. Charles McDermot, Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book
448 (Feb. 1849). McDermot was charged with six liquor counts on a preprinted form. As far as
the records indicate, he offered a general guilty plea, but was sentenced on only two counts and
fined $20 on each. The records do not specify that Train nol prossed the remaining counts. I might
have hesitated to call this case a clear plea bargain, but the court's docket book specifically noted
that the case was disposed of "without costs," id., which was a sufficiently rare concession, taken
together with the other circumstances, that I felt justified to include this case with the other.
Another seven of Train's 1849 liquor cases look very much like clear plea bargains-but not
enough so for me to count them as such. Most took the form of Commonwealth v. Jonathan M.
Marston, Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book 437 (Feb. 1849). Marston was charged with one count of
being a common seller (carrying a $100 fine) and two counts of making single sales (each
carrying a $20 fine). He pled guilty, but the record does not say whether he pled to all counts. i-e
was fined $100 and assessed an unspecified amount of court costs. We may infer Marston was
convicted only of the common-seller count, but there is no sign of what happened to the other
counts. Because the defendant paid a fine on the most expensive count, and because the record
makes no explicit statement that the district attorney nol prossed the other counts, I have decided
not to consider Marston's case or the others like it to be clear plea bargains. I have also excluded
on-file plea bargains from the 20 cases noted in the text. These will be the topic of Part Ill.
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B. Charge Bargaining in Murder Cases
Train was therefore the fifth in a chain of Middlesex prosecutors,
beginning with Dana and running through Stearns, Huntington, and Nelson,
to exploit an extraordinary power to craft deals in liquor cases. He appears
to have been the first Middlesex prosecutor to make use of an analogous, if
less precise, power to cut deals in capital cases. I mentioned earlier that the
legislature abolished the office of attorney general in 1843. - For six years,
before the legislature relented and reinstated the office, 3 the various county
prosecutors took on the task of trying capital cases before the Supreme
Judicial Court. During their six years before the high court, Middlesex
prosecutors conducted three capital trials. In his only murder trial,
Huntington won a manslaughter verdict and a seven-year prison sentence.'
One of Nelson's two trials ended in a conviction and death sentence,' the
other in a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.
Train had a single capital case before the court-in October 1848-and
he avoided trial with a plea-bargaining technique very similar to the one he
used in liquor cases before the Court of Common Pleas. Barney Goulding
stood charged with murdering his wife, Ellen, by beating her about the
head.' He pled not guilty at his arraignment and claimed his right to a jury
trial. Under a Massachusetts law that granted counsel to capital defendants,
the court assigned two prominent members of the Middlesex bar to defend
him. ' The clerk recorded what happened next:
And afterward in this same term the said Barney Goulding,
otherwise called Barnett Goulding, retracts his [not guilty] plea
above pleaded, and says he is guilty of manslaughter. And Charles
R. Train, Esquire, attorney for the Commonwealth in this behalf,
says, he will no further prosecute this indictment as to the malice
aforethought, and the charge of murder. '
82. See Act of Mar. 24, 1843, ch. 99, 1843 Mass. Acts 60.
83. See Act of May 1, 1849, ch. 186, 1849 Mass. Acts 117.
84. See Commonwealth v. William Goldsmith, Sup. Jud. CL R. Book 456 (Middlesex. Apr.
1845).
85. See Commonwealth v. George Hunnewell, Sup. Jud. CL R. Book 102 (Middlesex. Oct.
1847).
86. See Commonwealth v. Alexander Roy, Sup. Jud. Ct. R. Book 103 (Middlescx. Oct.
1847).
87. See Commonwealth v. Barney Goulding, Sup. Jud. CL R. Book 226 (Middlesex. Oct.
1848); LOWELL J., Mar. 24, 1848, at 4.
88. See Goulding, Sup. Jud. Ct. R. Book at 228 (reporting the appointments of Benjamin F.
Butler and Theodore H. Sweetser).
89. Id.
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On his manslaughter conviction, the court sentenced Goulding to two years
in the house of correction.'
Had Goulding insisted on trial and been convicted of murder, he would
have faced the mandatory penalty of death. The legislature did not divide
murder into degrees until 1858, and until then all murder remained capital.
Train's generosity in nol prossing so much of the murder indictment as
charged more than manslaughter shrank Goulding's possible sentence to a
term of between zero and twenty years in prison. The judge, as the clerk
reported, hewed to the bottom of that range.
Train's was not the first clear plea bargain in a capital case in
Massachusetts, though it does appear to have been among the first. As early
as 1804, the Supreme Judicial Court, sitting in its capacity as a trial court,
accepted a guilty plea in a murder case. That plea was far from a bargain,
however, as it merely secured the defendant's compulsory execution-
perhaps explaining the Court's insistence that the defendant reconsider
before it recorded his plea.9 The earliest clear plea bargains I have found in
capital cases took place in 1841.92 Attorney General James Austin
90. See id.
91. See Commonwealth v. Battis, 1 Mass. (1 Will.) 94, 94-95 (1804). I have come across four
other pleas to capital charges in the 19th century. See Commonwealth v. Edwin Ray Snow, listed
in Report of the Attorney Generalfor the Year Ending January 17, 1900, PUB. DOC. No. 12, at xii
(Mass. 1900); Commonwealth v. Daniel Gleason, listed in Report of the Attorney General for the
Year Ending December 31, 1872, PUB. Doc. No. 12, at 5-6 (Mass. 1873); Green v.
Commonwealth, 94 Mass. (12 Allen) 155, 157 (Mass. 1866); Commonwealth v. Edward W.
Green, listed in Report of the Attorney General for the Year Ending December 31, 1864, PUB.
Doc. No. 14, at 12 (Mass. 1865); Commonwealth v. John Roach, Sup. Jud. Ct. R. Book 682
(Worcester, Sept. 1845).
In the Gleason and Snow cases, the governor commuted the defendants' death sentences to
life in prison. The attorney general's report of the Gleason case gave no reason for the
commutation, but in Snow, the attorney general said he had recommended a commutation because
the defendant was only 17 at the time of the murder in question. See Snow, PUB. Doc. NO. 12, at
xii. Although it is possible that Snow pled guilty in exchange for the attorney general's promise to
recommend commutation, this purposeful seems unlikely, because the parties could have
accomplished the same result-life in prison-with a second-degree murder deal, and because the
prosecutor presumably could not guarantee the governor's action.
In the first half of the 19th century, about 20% of state-prison inmates in Massachusetts were
released by governors' pardons. See WILLIAM FRANCIS KUNTZ I, CRIMINAL SENTENCING IN
THREE NINETEENTH-CENTURY CITIES: SOCIAL HISTORY OF PUNISHMENT IN NEW YORK.
BOSTON, AND PHILADELPHIA 1830-1880, at 124-25 (1988). Because I have not seen evidence that
defendants pled guilty in anticipation of such forgiveness, I have not included the pardoning
power in this study. For more on guilty pleas in capital cases, see infra notes 423, 426-428 and
accompanying text.
92. It is quite possible that other plea bargains escaped my notice. The attorney general began
to produce comprehensive accounts of his business before the Supreme Judicial Court in 1832.
My examination of his reports disclosed no plea bargaining in capital cases between 1832 and
1841. I have examined the Supreme Judicial Court's own records of its criminal business in
Suffolk County, which generated far more capital cases than any other county, between 1820 and
1832, as well as the records of its criminal business in Middlesex County during 1799, 1809,
1819, 1824, and 1829. In none of these records did I find any evidence of plea bargaining in




negotiated two such bargains before the Supreme Judicial Court that year.
In one, a murder case, the bargain took much the same form as in Train's
Goulding case.93 In the second, charging rape, the defendant pled guilty to
assault with intent to rape. Austin then nol prossed "the other and further
part of the indictment"-that is, so much of the indictment as charged an
actual rape.94 Rape, like murder, carried mandatory death, while assault
with intent to rape carried any term of years up to life in prison. In this case
the judge sentenced the defendant to five years in prison. Rape soon ceased
to be a capital offense-by 1852, murder was virtually the only crime still
deemed capitalgs-and every other charge bargain I encountered in a capital
case involved the crime of murder.
There was one other capital charge bargain during the 1840s-this one
in a murder case prosecuted by the district attorney of the Southern District,
John H. Clifford, in 1845.96 Together, these four charge bargains by Train,
Austin, and Clifford accounted for ten percent of all adjudicated capital
cases in my survey of Supreme Judicial Court business in the 1840s.' In
the 1850s-when Clifford, now attorney general, handled most murder
proscutions98-seventeen percent of adjudicated murder cases ended in
charge bargains of this sort. Then in the 1860s, the trend turned sharply
upward. Twenty-five of fifty-three murder cases-or forty-seven percent-
ended in charge bargains. Although the rate of charge bargaining retreated
somewhat to forty-three percent in the 1870s and thirty-five percent in the
1880s, the 1890s closed the century with a record sixty-one percent of
93. See Commonwealth v. Susan Boston, Sup. Jud. Ct. R. Book 152 (Bristol. Apr. 1841).
Boston, charged with murdering a man with a knife, pled guilty to manslaughter. Austin nol
prossed so much of the complaint as charged murder, and the court sentenced Boston to three
years in the house of correction. See id.
94. See Commonwealth v. Michael Larry, Sup. Jud. Ct. R. Book 363 (Suffolk, Nov. 1841).
95. It appears that the only other capital crime was an official's voluntary and wrongful
release of a capital prisoner-an offense that the Supreme Judicial Court noted in 1866 had never,
to the court's knowledge, been committed. See Green, 94 Mass. (12 Allen) at 168.
96. See Commonwealth v. John Cunningham. Sup. Jud. Ct. R. Book 46 (Bristol Nov. 1845).
97. Although the office of attorney general was not abolished until 1843. the attorney general
for some reason stopped producing annual accounts of the cases he prosecuted before the high
court in 1839 and did not resume until 1849. For each of the intervening years, I examined the
Supreme Judicial Court's own records of its sittings in the counties of Suffolk. Middlesex. Bristol,
Hampden, Norfolk, and Worcester. Although this survey excluded eight other counties, most of
those eight generated little criminal business.
98. Clifford served as attorney general from 1849, when the office was reinstated, until 1853,
when he left the post to become governor, and then again from 1854 until 1858. See 1 DAVIS,
supra note 14, at 290; DAVIS, supra note 7, at 286.
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murder cases ending in charge bargains." In contrast, the rate of charge
bargaining in all other non-liquor prosecutions never exceeded eleven
percent of adjudicated cases in any one year,'" ° and across all years stood at
just three percent.'
At least three moments in this chronology of plea bargaining in murder
cases seem to require some explanation: Why, first of all, did bargains in
capital cases emerge in 1841 and not earlier? Why did they advance so
dramatically in the 1860s? And why, after some slackening, did they
advance so vigorously in the 1890s? The last question is best left until later,
when we move into the last quarter of the century. I will take up the first
two questions now.
At one level, it is surprising to learn that plea bargaining in capital
cases emerged as early as 1841. It is true that scattered instances of plea
bargaining, even in serious cases, crop up quite early in the historical
record-I will consider these in more detail in Part VI. But Austin's 1841
charge bargains were not two scattered instances, but rather the beginning
of a regular practice of charge bargaining in murder cases that, within three
decades, accounted for nearly half of all murder cases and that persisted
99. These are my findings for the relevant years:
CLEAR PLEA BARGAINS IN MURDER CASES
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
DECADE NUMBER OF ADJUDICATED NUMBER OF CLEAR BARGAINS AS %
MURDER CASES PLEA BARGAINS OF TOTAL
1840s 41* 4 10
1850s 42* 7 17
1860s 53 25 47
1870s 77 33 43
1880s 51 18 35
1890s 67 41 61
* Figures from the 1860s through the 1890s are based on the attorney general's annual
summaries of his work and therefore should include all murder prosecutions. As the
attorney general either did not exist or produced no summary of cases from 1840 to
1848 or in 1853, figures for those years are based on a study of the Supreme Judicial
Court's record books for its sittings in Suffolk, Middlesex, Bristol, Hampden, Norfolk.
and Worcester counties. From 1851 onward, murder accounted for all capital cases. In
the earlier years, rape, arson, burglary, and armed robbery also appeared on the
Supreme Judicial Court's dockets, but the only clear plea bargain involving any crime
other than murder was the rape case noted earlier in the text. See supra notes 94-95 and
accompanying text.
Sources: Annual Reports of the Attorney General; Sup. Jud. Ct. R. Books.
I have found no reported case and no commentary, judicial or otherwise, bearing on these
prosecutorial charge bargains in murder cases. It is the nature of prosecutorial charge bargains that
they require no judicial cooperation and that indeed judges have little power to interfere. Still, the
absence of negative comment by the Supreme Judicial Court, which of course presided over pleas
in murder cases, casts doubt on the general claim that "appellate courts accepted [plea bargaining]
only after almost a century of severe disapproval." Alschuler, supra note 2, at 19 n. 106.
100. In 1844, the figure fell just shy of 10%. The single charge bargain in 1790, see supra
note 32, amounted to 11% of that year's nine adjudicated non-liquor cases. As I noted evrlier. it is
not altogether clear that this case should be considered a charge bargain at all. See supra note 32.
101. I am not including filed cases, the topic of Part III, in this calculation.
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through the balance of the century. This early timetable challenges the
views of some who argue that nineteenth-century courts resisted plea
bargaining and discouraged its rise until at least the late nineteenth or even
early twentieth century. 0 2 But in the context of my arguments here, 1841
seems rather late for the first such bargains to emerge. After all, charge
bargains in liquor cases appeared as early as 1808, only one year after the
appointment of the first county prosecutor, and they took place in some of
the very first liquor cases heard by the Court of Common Pleas."R These
early deals seem to have been the product of a nearly instantaneous reaction
of two chemical ingredients-the existence of a public prosecutor and the
prosecutor's power to bargain, conferred by the liquor law's rigid penalty
scheme.
There are several reasons to expect that charge bargains might have
proved rarer in murder cases than in liquor cases. Perhaps the most obvious
is that prosecutors might have felt that both justice and public opinion
demanded a full measure of punishment in murder cases. Trading the
mandatory death penalty assigned to murder for the uncertain zero-to-
twenty-year prison term assigned to manslaughter might have offended
basic prosecutorial instincts. It is also possible that the attorney general,
who worked full time, felt less caseload pressure than did the part-time
county prosecutors who handled liquor prosecutions-an issue I will take
up more fully in Part II. But such arguments suggest only that charge
bargains in capital cases should have been comparatively rare, whereas my
research has turned up none before 1841.'"
102. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 2, at 5-16, 19-24.
103. See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
104. At least two scholars have reported earlier Massachusetts cases that at first appear to
have involved capital charge bargains. I do not believe, however, that any of the five cases cited in
fact charged a capital offense, and in four of the cases, I am certain that there was no charge
bargain. Adam Hirsch points to a series of "burglary" cases that came before the Supreme
Judicial Court in 1784 and 1785, in which, he writes, "defendants pleaded innocent, and
subsequently entered amended guilty pleas." ADAM JAY HiRscit. THE RISE OF THE
PENITENTIARY: PRISONS AND PUNISHMENT IN EARLY AMERICA 164 n.77 (1992). These four
cases, however, all involved breaking and entering a shop or warehouse rather than a home. See
Commonwealth v. Nero Fanueil, Sup. Jud. CL R. Book 75 (Feb. 1785) (charging a shop break);
Commonwealth v. James Daken, Sup. Jud. CL R. Book 67 (Feb. 1785) (warehouse break);
Commonwealth v. Elijah Austin Smith, Sup. Jud. CL R. Book 263 (SepL 1784) (shop break);
Commonwealth v. Thomas Joyce, Sup. Jud. Ct. R. Book 231 (Aug. 1784) (shop break). I believe
that the use of the word "burglariously" in the charging language in each of these cases indicated
not that these cases involved "burglary," but only that they involved nighttime breaks. In any
event, as the burglary statutes Hirsch cites make clear, capital burglary was restricted to home
invasions. See Act of Apr. 26, 1770, ch. 16, §§ 2-3. 5 Mass. Prov. Acts 43. 43-44 (expanding the
circumstances in which the invasion of a "dwelling-house" shall be deemed a capital offense);
Act of May 25, 1715, 1 Geo. 2, at 253 (Mass.) (defining capital burglary as a nighttime break into
an inhabited "Dwelling House"). In each of the cited cases except Daken, at least one co-
defendant retracted an initial not-guilty plea, pled guilty to the crime charged, and was sentenced
accordingly-that is, non-capitally. (Daken and his co-defendant pled guilty initially.) Retracting
an earlier not-guilty plea in this way was quite common-at least in the 19th century-but such a
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A possible solution to the mystery lies in the peculiar procedural form
of charge bargains in capital cases. In liquor cases, as consideration for the
defendant's plea to one of several counts of an indictment, the prosecutor
would nol pros the remaining counts. Murder cases, in contrast, generally
involved but a single offense, so there was no option to nol pros whole
counts of the indictment. Moreover, as any one count charging murder was
enough to assure the defendant's execution, nol prossing selected counts
would create no incentive for a plea. Instead, the prosecutor's consideration
for the defendant's plea took the form of a partial nol pros that effectively
reduced the charge. In Train's 1848 murder case, for example, after the
defendant pled guilty to manslaughter, Train said "he will no further
prosecute this indictment as to the malice aforethought, and the charge of
murder." 105 Similarly, in his 1841 rape case, Attorney General Austin
responded to the defendant's plea of guilty of assault with intent to rape by
"certif[ying] ... that he will prosecute on the other and further part of the
indictment" -that is, so much of the indictment as charged rape-" no
further." 1o6
Only three years earlier, in 1838, Austin had asked the Supreme
Judicial Court to ratify his power to nol pros part of a single-count
indictment.'0 7 The court declared, "If the attorney general may enter a nolle
prosequi as to the whole of an indictment, or of a count, so he may do it as
to any distinct and substantive part of it." "' Although the court maintained
that earlier cases, "if they are law, are decisive of' the legality of partial
nol prosses, 109 those earlier cases gave only shaky authority for the practice.
In two of the three cases cited by the court, both from 1805, the Supreme
Judicial Court itself had recommended that the prosecutor enter a partial nol
pros to eliminate a possibly defective part of the indictment."' Capital
plea did not manifest a charge bargain (involving a reduction in the charged offense) and perhaps
represented no understood bargain at all. See infra note 157.
David Flaherty reports an apparent charge bargain from 1749 in which the acting attorney
general nol prossed so much of the indictment as charged "burglary." See David H. Flaherty.
Criminal Practice in Provincial Massachusetts, in LAW IN COLONIAL MASSACHUSETTs 1630-
1800, at 191, 220 & n.9 (1984); see also Alschuler, supra note 2, at 17-18 (elaborating on
Flaherty's find). But again, the case in question involved the breaking not of a home, but of a ship.
See Commonwealth v. John Patterson, Super. Ct. Adjudicature R. Book 224 (1747-1750).
Although it was not capital, the case does appear to have involved a charge bargain. The acting
attorney general nol prossed the "Burglary therein charged, [and the defendants] pleaded guilty of
the stealing therein charged." Id. Flaherty reports that "this episode is the only concrete evidence
found on plea bargaining" in his research into criminal practice in colonial Massachusetts.
Flaherty, supra, at 220.
105. Commonwealth v. Barney Goulding, Sup. Jud. Ct. R. Book 228 (Middlesex, Oct.' 1848).
106. Commonwealth v. Michael Larry, Sup. Jud. Ct. R. Book 363 (Suffolk, Nov. 1841).
107. See Commonwealth v. Tuck, 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) 356, 356-57, 359 (1838).
108. Id. at 366.
109. Id.
110. See Commonwealth v. M'Monagle, I Mass. (1 Will.) 517 (1805); Commonwealth v.
Lewis, 1 Mass. (1 Will.) 517 (1805). Only a year later, the court's chief justice wrote that courts
should make no recommendations whatever on the use of nol prosses. See Commonwealth v.
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charge bargains, in contrast, involved the attorney general's independent
use of a partial nol pros. Moreover, these two cases did not consider the
legality of the partial nol pros, as the defendants apparently contested only
the sufficiency of the indictment.
The third case, from 1828, provided useful dictum on the question of
partial nol prosses, but no law. The court wrote that in the usual case,
entering a partial nol pros, at least after conviction, "could be of no
prejudice to the defendant.""' The court ruled, however, that entering a
partial nol pros in the particular circumstances of that case was unfair to the
defendant and therefore granted him a new trial."2 Only in 1838, then, did
the Supreme Judicial Court for the first time uphold the attorney general's
unilateral power to nol pros part of an indictment." 3 It is true that a later
treatise writer would cite the 1828 case as authority for the prosecutor's
power to enter a partial nol pros,"' but the Supreme Judicial Court itself, in
later years, appears always to have relied on the 1838 case, though it
sometimes cited one of the earlier cases as well."' After securing this
affirmation of his powers in 1838, Austin put it to use in carrying out
capital charge bargains as early as 1841. There is therefore no sharp
disjunction between the early history of charge bargaining in liquor cases
and its early history in capital cases. In both contexts, charge bargaining
appeared almost as soon as a public prosecutor found he had the power to
accomplish it.
The second puzzling moment in the chronology of capital charge
bargains-the sudden surge of the 1860s-also finds at least partial
explanation in the prosecutor's expanding bundle of charging powers. In
1858, the legislature separated the crime of murder into first and second
degrees," 6 abruptly granting prosecutors more precise control over
Wheeler, 2 Mass. (1 Tyng) 172, 174 (1806) (Parsons, C.J.) ("Certainly, the court are not legally
competent to give any advice on this subject. The power of entering a nolle prosequi is to be
exercised at the discretion of the attorney who prosecutes for the government, and for its exercise
he alone is responsible.").
111. Commonwealth v. Briggs, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) 177, 179 (1828).
112. See id at 179-80. The prosecutor had sought, after trial, to nol pros so much of the
indictment as charged that the defendant was a repeat offender. The court feared that the
defendant had been prejudiced by the jury's knowledge of his former conviction.
113. It is not a foregone conclusion that the court should have approved partial nol prosses.
They apparently were disallowed in New York. See People v. Porter, 4 Park. 524, 526 (N.Y. Oyer
& Terminer 1860) (reporting the opinion of a single judge of a court of oyer and terminer that.
"[a]s I have before said, a nolle prosequi may be to the whole indictment, or to the whole of any
one or more of several counts, but cannot be to a part of any one count").
114. See EMORY WASHBURN, A MANUAL OF CRIMINAL LAw 205 n.4 (3d ed. 1900).
115. See Commonwealth v. Wakelin, 230 Mass. 567, 572 (1918) (citing the 1838 case and
none earlier); Commonwealth v. Uhrig, 167 Mass. 420, 423 (1897) (citing only the 1838 case);
Commonwealth v. Wallace, 108 Mass. 12, 13 (1871) (citing both the 1838 case and the 1828
case); Commonwealth v. Jennings, 105 Mass. 586, 588 (1870) (citing both the 1838 case and one
of the 1805 cases).
116. See Act of Mar. 27, 1858, ch. 154, 1858 Mass. Acts 126. The new law defined frst-
degree murder as murder committed with premeditation, with extreme atrocity or cruelty, or while
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sentencing and more versatility in charge bargaining. Until 1858, plea
bargains in murder cases could take only one form: the prosecutor's
agreement to reduce the charge to manslaughter in exchange for the
defendant's guilty plea. Unlike the nice calibration of sentences that
prosecutors could manipulate in liquor cases through multiple charging and
selective nol prossing, the penalty scheme in murder was a clumsy tool in
their hands. By reducing the charge from murder to manslaughter, the
prosecutor could spare the defendant the mandatory death penalty assigned
to murder and guarantee him instead a prison term of from zero to twenty
years. This measure of sentencing power is what permitted any charge
bargaining at all in murder cases before 1858. The prosecutor could not
dictate, however, where within this wide-open range the judge would set
sentence. No doubt many conscientious prosecutors shunned such deals
because the defendant's crime, although perhaps not warranting death,
deserved far more than the two years given Barney Goulding for killing his
wife.
The legislature's separation of murder into degrees helped to allay such
qualms. After 1858, in exchange for the defendant's guilty plea, a
prosecutor could agree to reduce a first-degree murder charge that carried
mandatory death to a second-degree charge that carried mandatory life in
prison.'17 The attorney general struck the first two such deals in 1863,' " and
six others followed before the end of the decade. Together they accounted
for just under one-third of all plea bargains in murder cases in the 1860s.
Although these second-degree deals cannot by themselves account for the
striking increase in plea-bargained murder cases in the 1860s, they surely
contributed to the rise. Later, I will return to this story of charge bargaining
in capital cases to consider other reasons for the sharp rise in the 1860s.
Guilty pleas to second-degree murder proved throughout the rest of the
century to be a critical part of the prosecutor's arsenal, consistently
outnumbering guilty pleas to manslaughter as a means to resolve murder
cases.
119
Despite the gulf that would seem to divide a liquor-law violation that
carried a mandatory $100 fine from a murder that carried mandatory death,
these two crimes share a common subplot in the story of plea bargaining's
committing or attempting to commit a life felony. Second-degree murder was all other murder.
See id. §§ 1-2.
117. See id.
118. See Commonwealth v. Edward Owens, listed in Report of the Attorney General for the
Year Ending December 31, 1863, PUB. DOC. No. 17, at 7 (Mass. 1864); Commonwealth v.
Thomas Coyne, listed in PUB. Doc. No. 17, at 7.
119. In the 1860s, guilty pleas to second-degree murder accounted for 32% of all plea
bargains in murder cases, while pleas to manslaughter still made up the majority-68%. In the
1870s, 1880s, and 1890s, pleas to second-degree murder accounted for a steady 61% of all murder
deals and manslaughter pleas for the balance of 39%. These figures are gathered from the attorney
general's reports of the relevant years studied.
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rise. In each case, the legislature's assignment of a mandatory minimum
penalty-almost unique in the Massachusetts criminal universe-gave
prosecutors the power to charge bargain. By using their nol pros power to
reduce either the number of charges (in liquor cases) or the seriousness of
the charge (in murder cases), prosecutors could promise defendants a clear
and certain concession in exchange for their guilty pleas: Liquor defendants
could save money, and accused murderers could save their lives. It is no
wonder, then, that liquor and murder cases together accounted for the great
majority of the clear plea bargains that took place in Massachusetts courts
in the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century. The source of prosecutors'
power to charge bargain in these cases is clear. It is time now to ask why
they wanted to use it.
II. THE PROSECUTOR'S MOTIVES IN PLEA BARGAINING
A. Why Plea Bargain at All? The Role of Caseload Pressure
Asahel Huntington already has told us one answer Prosecutors took up
plea bargaining in part to escape the enormous burdens of their office.
Huntington spoke from experience, for as Figure 2 shows, an
unprecedented wave of cases began crashing upon him during his unlucky
tenure. I noted earlier that the caseload jumped dramatically between the
last years of Steams's tenure and the beginning of Huntington's. After a lull
of only forty-two cases in 1839, Huntington's caseload bounced back to
101 in 1843. In the next six years-as Huntington rounded out his years in
office, Nelson came and went, and Train entered the scene-the caseload
leapt to 443.'" Although the trend turned upward again toward the end of
the century, the Middlesex district attorney never again in our time frame
encountered a caseload calamity of this magnitude. Across the Charles
River in Boston, the Suffolk County prosecutor faced a similar shock to the
system."'
120. This figure represents all cases that came before the Court of Conmon Pleas in 1849,
including those that were listed in merely summary fashion in the record books. Regarding this
class of cases, see supra note 44; and infra notes 292-298 and accompanying text.
121. See THEODORE FERDINAND, BOSTON'S LOWER CRIMINAL COURTS, 1814-1850, at 138
fig.5.1 (1992) (showing the rising caseload in Boston's municipal court, the counterpart to the
Court of Common Pleas, beginning in the mid-1830s and turning more steeply upward in the
1840s). In 1844, the Suffolk County district attorney reported 750 cases for the previous year. See
S. Doc. No. 68, at 6 (Mass. 1844) (petition of Samuel D. Parker). In 1849. the Suffolk County
district attorney reported 1672 cases for 1848. See H. Doc. No. 63, at 4 (Mass. 1849).
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FIGURE 2. CRIMINAL CASELOAD:
MIDDLESEX COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT AND ITS PREDECESSOR COURTS
1780 1800 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920
Year
In part, no doubt, the caseload boom of the 1840s owed something to
the sheer growth of crime that came with an exploding population.1
2
1
Perhaps-though this is not clear-improved policing produced more
arrests,'23 but in any event, more energetic enforcement does seem to have
produced more liquor prosecutions. 124 The legislature caused a good deal of
122. In 1844, the district attorney of Suffolk County (Boston) complained to the legislature
that the county's "criminal business ... has kept equal pace with the increased population of the
city." S. Doc. No. 68, at 6 (petition of Samuel D. Parker). The population of Boston more than
doubled between 1820 and 1845 to about 99,000. See OSCAR HANDLIN, BOSTON'S IMMIGRANTS
239 tbl.xiv (1959). Population growth alone, however, cannot account for the increased caseload.
Michael Stephen Hindus reports that the rate of criminal prosecutions in Massachusetts grew from
169 per 100,000 in 1831-1840 to 277 per 100,000 in 1841-1850. See HINDUS, supra note 10, at
77.
123. We are more likely to see such an impact in Boston, where the legislature authorized the
creation of a police force in 1838, see Act of Apr. 17, 1838, ch. 123, 1838 Mass. Acts 421, than in
the rest of the state, where the legislature did not grant similar authority until 1851, see Act of
May 15, 1851, ch. 162, 1851 Mass. Acts 657.
124. See FERDINAND, supra note 121, at 14 ("The Commonwealth made a concerted effort to
limit the sale of spirits in the late 1830s and 1840s through licensing, and liquor violations grew
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the caseload increase with its decision in 1832 to extend the jurisdiction of
the Court of Common Pleas to all noncapital crimes, many of which the
Supreme Judicial Court formerly had heard.'2 And the caseload grew
because more defendants exercised their right to appeal from lower
tribunals to the Court of Common Pleas 12--perhaps in part a result of more
defendants' having lawyers.'27
by leaps and bounds."); HAMPEL, supra note 65, at 152 ("In each one of the seven years from
1845 to 1851, [liquor] license cases made up between 30% and 40% of the business of the
[Massachusetts] courts."). It is possible that part of the increase in liquor cases is due to a shift of
cases from the lower police courts. Theodore Ferdinand saw such a shift in his study of Boston's
courts. See FERDINAND, supra note 121, at 84 tbl.3.9.
125. The 1832 jurisdictional shift slashed the criminal workload of the Supreme Judicial
Court sitting in Middlesex County to nearly nothing:
MIDDLESEX COUNTY CRIMINAL CASELOAD:
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS AND SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
NUMBER OF CASES










Sources: Middlesex CL Gen. Sess. Peace R. Books; Sup. Jud. CL R. Books (Middlesex
sittings) (on file with the Massachusetts Archives).
126. The caseload was as follows:
APPEALS FROM LOWER TRIBUNALS:
MIDDLESEX COURT OF COMMON PLEAS AND ITS PREDECESSOR COURT
YEAR NUMBER OF NUMBER OF APPEALS APPEALS AS % OF
CASES TOTAL
1789-1790* 23 0 0
1799-1800* 38 2 5
1805-1806* 47 3 6
1809-1810* 34 1 3
1814-1815* 70 5 7
1819-1820* 62 2 3
1824 48 2 4
1829 41 3 7
1834 95 1 1
1839 42 1 2
1843-1844* 224 12 5
1849 443 134 30
Iwo-year toials
Sources: Middlesex CL C.P. R. Books; Middlesex CL Gen. Sess. Peace R. Books; Sup.
Jud. C. R. Books (Middlesex sittings) (on file with the Massachusetts Archives).
127. I will argue in Part IV that the proportion of defendants who had lawyers probably
increased in the early part of the century. See inr notes 435-440 and accompanying text. It is
clear that defendants with lawyers accounted for the great majority of cases appealed to the Court
of Common Pleas from lower tribunals-73% of them in 1849, although only 60% of all
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Daunting as it surely was, the spiking caseload depicted in Figure 2
does not fully capture the pressures Huntington and his successors faced.
The graph does not reflect the addition of Essex County to the district
attorney's duties between 1832 and 1848,121 or the absence of an attorney
general during the legislature's unwise experiment with austerity between
1843 and 1849, which shifted responsibility for prosecution of the most
serious cases onto district attorneys' shoulders.19 All this Huntington and
his successors handled with no apparent assistance, not even so much as a
clerk to help draft their indictments. 3 Little wonder that on leaving office
in October 1845, Huntington resorted to no] prossing 252 Middlesex cases
apparently to avoid saddling Albert Nelson with his backlog. 3'
Even before the caseload boom of the Huntington years, Massachusetts
prosecutors had strong reason to embrace the efficient promise of plea
bargaining. Like most public prosecutors in nineteenth-century America,
they worked part-time, drew (at best) part-time salaries, and therefore held
more than one job. Hence Samuel Dana, who claimed he earned no salary
defendants had lawyers in that year. See Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book (1849); Middlesex Ct. C.P.
Docket Book (1849); infra note 436; cf. F.W. G[rinnell], Legislative Problems in Regard to the
Administration of the Criminal Law and Legislative Progress During the Session of 1923, MASS.
L.Q., May 1923, at 7, 9 (quoting a former Massachusetts assistant district attorney in the early
1920s as writing that "[in a large majority of appeal cases, defendants have counsel").
128. See Act of Feb. 16, 1848, ch. 16, 1848 Mass. Acts 605; Act of Mar. 14, 1832, ch. 130,
§ 9, 1832 Mass. Acts 396, 404-06 (enlarging the jurisdiction of the Court of Common Pleas in
criminal cases and the duties of prosecuting officers). The Essex County caseload was smaller
than that of Middlesex, but not by much. In 1842, for example, 126 criminal cases were addressed
in the Middlesex Court of Common Pleas and 102 cases in Essex. See Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book
(1842) (on file with the Massachusetts Archives); Essex Ct. C.P. R. Book (1842) (on file with the
Essex County Superior Court).
129. Suffolk County District Attorney Samuel D. Parker complained to the legislature in
1844:
The office of Attorney General has been abolished;-capital trials in [my] county have
been added to [my] department, as well as the task of arguing all questions of law in the
Supreme Judicial Court, in which the Commonwealth is a party, formerly the exclusive
duty of the Attorney General.
S. Doc. No. 68, at 6 (Mass. 1844) (petition of Samuel D. Parker); see also id. at 7, 8 (statement of
J.H. Clifford, Jan. 20, 1843) (reprinting the complaint of the district attorney for the Southern
District that by eliminating the attorney general's office, the legislature had "largely increased"
the labors of the district attorneys); LOWELL COURIER, July 15, 1845, at 2 (reprinting an item
from the Salem Register complaining that abolishing the office of the attorney general was
"nothing less than wanton cruelty" to the district attorneys).
130. I have seen no reference to an assistant prosecutor anywhere in Massachusetts before
1852, when one was appointed by the Boston Municipal Court. See FERDINAND, supra note 121.
at 191. In 1875, the legislature provided for a part-time assistant district attorney for the Northern
District (Middlesex) and others. See Act of Feb. 11, 1875, ch. 12, 1875 Mass. Acts 602. 602. An
1873 law permitted appointment of a clerk to assist district attorneys. See Act of May 12, 1873.
ch. 278, 1873 Mass. Acts 707, 707.
131. See Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book 147-50 (Oct. 1845). Nelson, Huntington's successor,
fared little better. At the end of the next year, he nol prossed 229 cases, and as he prepared to
leave office at the end of 1847, he nol prossed another 182. See Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book 323
(Feb. 1848) (indicating the first appearance of Nelson's successor, Charles Russell Train);




at all as county attorney,'3 2 also served as president of the Massachusetts
Senate during the first two years of his tenure. Asahel Steams not only
served in Congress while he was district attorney, he also spent twelve
years as the founding and sole full-time professor of the Harvard Law
School."M Prosecutors with less exalted second jobs felt even more pressure
to resolve their criminal cases quickly: Most supplemented their incomes
with a civil law practice,'35 and because the Court of Common Pleas heard
civil and criminal cases at the same session, these lawyers could do no civil
business until their criminal work was done. Many district attorneys
therefore rushed through their criminal cases to get on with the business of
making money, as one explained to the legislature in 1844:
The call for my attendance upon the grand jury, occasions a very
frequent interference with my engagements in civil cases, and a
consequent pecuniary loss to myself.... The practice to which
[Samuel D. Parker, district attorney of Suffolk County,] alludes, of
making extra exertions in order to dispatch the business before the
grand-jury, is, I believe, common to all the prosecuting officers. I
endeavor, if possible, to have the grand jury dismissed on the
132. See REPORT OF THE DANA COMMITrEE, supra note 15, at 4.
133. See DAVIS, supra note 7, at 219-20. In his response to legislative charges of malfeasance
in 1809, Dana mentioned that he had been "engaged at the Legislature" during the June 1808
sitting of the Court of Common Pleas. REPORT OF THE DANA COMMITrEE, supra note 15, at 5.
134. Steams was county attorney of Middlesex between about 1809 and 1832. See supra
notes 19, 56 and accompanying text. He served in Congress from 1815 to 1817 and as principal
professor at Harvard Law School from 1817 to 1829. See I DAVIS. supra note 14, at 561. Isaac
Parker, chief justice of the Supreme Judicial Court, served as the Royall Professor of Law at
Harvard, but
[flor the twelve years of his incumbency, Judge Parker had no closer direct connection
with the Law School than was afforded by the attendance of the students at his lectures
and a vague understanding that he was occasionally to visit the school and examine the
men. The working member of the faculty was Asahel Steams.
Frank W. Grinnell, Courts and Lavtyers in Metropolitan Boston, in I METROPOLITAN BOSTON: A
MODERN HISTORY 243, 263 (Albert P. Langtry ed., 1929). In 1826, Steams reported on the
burdens of his professorship to the college president:
A large portion of the Professor's time is employed in selecting and preparing suitable
questions and cases for argument at the moot court, and in assisting the students to put
them into this form of judicious action, examining their declarations, pleas,
replications, demurrers, bills of exceptions, motions. etc., and directing them in the
course of their investigations and researches. But of the amount of time thus employed,
and of that also which is devoted to answering the numerous questions, and solving the
doubts which occur to the students, (and which they are encouraged and desired to
suggest with freedom when they occur), it is impossible to make any correct estimate.
1 WARREN, supra note 56, at 357 (quoting Steams).
135. John H. Clifford, who was district attorney of the Southern District during the 1840s,
was said to have maintained "the leading civil practice on the circuit." John H. Clifford Papers,
Box 1845-1851, Jan.-Oct. 1850 Folder (on file with the Massachusetts Historical Society). This
claim appears in a handwritten biography or autobiography of Clifford kept among his papers.
It is likely that most American prosecutors supplemented their incomes with civil practices.
See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN & ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, THE RooTs OF JUSTICE: CRIME
AND PUNISHMENT IN ALAMEDA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA 1870-1910. at 50-51 (1981) (reporting
that Alameda County prosecutors of the late 19th century had civil practices on the side).
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morning of the second day, and I generally succeed. To accomplish
this, it is often necessary to continue the sessions of the grand jury
until late in the evening, and the night is mostly spent in drawing
indictments. I know of no combination of bodily and mental labor
equal to that to which the prosecuting officers subject themselves
on such occasions.
136
The pressure to plea bargain was therefore part and parcel of part-time
prosecuting: No matter how many criminal cases a district attorney had, he
could make more money by handling them with dispatch.
37
Still, the incentive to get through one's cases grew particularly intense
in the 1840s as caseloads leapt higher. In 1843, by the same stroke with
which the legislature wiped out the office of the attorney general, it salted
prosecutorial wounds with a thirty-percent pay cut. 38 The result was a
storm of protest from prosecutors and their supporters, who deluged the
legislature with accounts of their overwork. One district attorney calculated
that his new $700 salary worked out to eighty-eight cents a case. 3 9 Another
detailed the burdens of following the court on circuit within his district:
I reside in Greenfield. I have to travel twenty miles to attend the
courts at Northampton, forty miles to go to Springfield, and
something more than fifty miles by the most direct rout[e] to reach
136. S. DOC. No. 68, at 10, 12 (Mass. 1844) (reprinting the letter of Daniel Wells, district
attorney of the Western District). Wells suggested that he ' could afford to do the duties of the
office for a less compensation, if the business of the court admitted of the establishment of
separate criminal terms." Id. at 12. Whether for this reason or others, the various counties in fact
moved toward separate criminal and civil sessions, a step Middlesex County took in 1839. See
Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book (1839) (on file with the Massachusetts Archives) (recording June
1839 as the first Middlesex sitting of the Court of Common Pleas that held separate civil and
criminal sessions). In other counties, the change came later. See H. Doc. No. 63, at 15 (Mass.
1849) (reporting the complaint of the district attorney for the Eastern District about the "urgent
necessity for the separation of the criminal from the civil business of the Court of Common
Pleas... as in some of the other large districts of the Commonwealth").
137. The same dynamic was at work in New York. See JOHN STANTON GOULD ET AL.,
TWENTY-FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRISON ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK (1866), reprinted
in N.Y. ASSEMBLY Doc. No. 50, at 149 (1866) ("[W]here the district attorney has private
practice in the court, for which he is paid, it is natural that he should attend to that in preference to
the criminal business for which he is not paid otherwise than by salary."). Albert Alschuler
reports that this dynamic was still at work in the 1960s, when he discovered to his surprise that
part-time prosecutors in a downstate Illinois county plea bargained a larger proportion of their
cases than did full-time prosecutors in Chicago. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role
in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 50,59 n.31 (1968).
138. See Act of Mar. 7, 1843, ch. 9, 1843 Mass. Acts 6, 6. This act reduced the salaries of
most of the district attorneys from $1000 to $700 a year. The salary of the Suffolk County district
attorney, whose position was nearer to full-time, was cut from $1800 to $1500. Associate justices
of the Court of Common Pleas earned $1800 during most of the first half of the century, see Act
of Feb 14, 1821, ch. 79, § 10, 1821 Mass. Acts 545, 551, though the legislature also reduced their
salaries in 1843 to $1700, see § 1, 1843 Mass. Acts at 6. "[I]ndustrious laboring men" earned
$300 in the 1830s. Moderate Drinking a Losing Business, LOWELL COURIER, Nov. 29, 1836, at 1.
139. See S. DOC. No. 68, at 7, 9 (memorial of J.H. Clifford). By contrast, the Suffolk County
district attorney was well paid at two dollars a case. See id. at 6 (petition of Samuel D. Parker).
[Vol. 109: 857
Plea Bargaining's Triumph
Lenox. There is no rail-road communication except in passing from
Springfield to Pittsfield. As the public means of communication
between Greenfield and Lenox are very inconvenient, and the
season when the courts are held often renders it hazardous to travel
with a private conveyance, I frequently go and return by the way of
Springfield-which makes the distance travelled about one hundred
miles."4
A third sounded themes from Dickens:
[U]nremitted professional labors, night and day, with no vacation
and no assistance, and perpetual confinement daily and all day,
in badly ventilated court-rooms, will break down the best
constitution .... If [relief] cannot be obtained, I must retire from
an office too onerous to be borne by one unassisted individual. 4'
As for Huntington, a Middlesex County newspaper said his
"inadequate and niggardly" salary was sad thanks for his "fidelity to his
arduous duties," '42 and a Middlesex legislator told his colleagues that if
they "[p]ut the case of Attorney Huntington to the people of Middlesex
county .... nine-tenths of the people would say that he should have at least
$1000 a year salary." '43 Admitting its errors, the legislature restored district
attorneys' salaries in 1845' and in 1849 reinstated the office of attorney
general. 45
Perhaps from pure necessity, and perhaps from necessity tinged with
pique at the legislature's offenses, prosecutors appear to have accelerated
their plea-bargaining practices in the 1 840s. That is when the pattern of
multiple charging that Huntington built upon his preprinted forms first drew
the legislature's attention and when Albert Nelson boldly put abroad the
terms by which he would deal. It is when Charles Russell Train, who felt
the full force of the caseload wave, began to plea bargain his liquor cases
with unprecedented frequency. And it is when Train and two other
pioneering prosecutors first struck plea bargains in capital cases.
140. Id. at 10, 11 (letter of Daniel Wells).
141. H. Doc. No. 63, at 4, 5 (Mass. 1849) (abstracting from the report of Samuel D. Parker.
the county attorney for Suffolk County). Theodore Ferdinand reports that Parker's caseload grew
from 228 cases in 1830 to 1532 in 1850. See FERDINAND. supra note 121. at 67.
142. Letters from the Editor.-No. 6, LOvELL COURIER. Jan. 14, 1845. at 2.
143. Massachusetts Legislature, LowELL COURiER, Jan. 21. 1845, at 2.
144. See Act of Feb. 10, 1845, ch. 36, 1845 Mass. Acts 412. 412 (establishing the salary of
the district attorney for the Northern District of the Commonwealth); Act of Jan. 29, 1845. ch. 14,
1845 Mass. Acts 401, 401 (establishing the salary of the district attorney for the Southern
District). By restoring the district attorneys' salaries to S1000. the legislature by no means
squelched prosecutorial discontent or editorial criticism. In 1847. as Albert Nelson prepared to
leave office apparently because of his low salary, another local paper called the legislature
"niggardly." Mr. Attorney Nelson, LOWELL J., Oct. 1, 1847. at 2.
145. See Act of May 1, 1849, ch. 186, 1849 Mass. Acts 117, 117.
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I do not mean to argue that caseload pressure is sufficient for
prosecutors to engage in plea bargaining. On the contrary, without the
power to make meaningful concessions to defendants, prosecutors normally
cannot induce them to plead. The nearly total lack of prosecutorial power to
constrain the judge's sentencing discretion in non-liquor cases other than
murder probably explains the almost complete absence of clear plea
bargains in such cases during the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century.
Nor is a big caseload a necessary condition of prosecutorial plea bargaining.
Especially when prosecutors were part-time workers, as most American
prosecutors were in this period, there was always some pecuniary incentive
to reduce their criminal workload, however small it was. But as I believe
the Middlesex experience of the 1840s helps to show, an increasing
caseload obviously does increase pressure on prosecutors to plea bargain.
So I do not join the ranks of recent plea-bargaining scholars who reject
"the myth of caseload pressure" told and retold by scholars of the
generation before. 146 Two of the new generation of scholars, Mary Vogel
and Theodore Ferdinand, have based their research in Boston courts in the
nineteenth century, and their arguments against the influence of caseload
pressure therefore seem directly contrary to my own analysis. I will
consider their work in some depth, both on this narrow question of caseload
pressure and, in a few pages, on the larger question of the impulses behind
plea bargaining's rise.
Mary Vogel titles a section of her earliest work on the emergence of
plea bargaining in Boston, "The Myth of Caseload Pressure." ,47 Yet her
evidence of caseload pressure and guilty-plea rates in fact supports a
conclusion that the two are strongly and causally related.48 Vogel's
contrary belief that caseload was unimportant to the growth of plea
bargaining arises not from her evidence, which shows caseload and guilty
pleas rising roughly in tandem, but only from her way of charting these
trends. I have reproduced in Figure 3 Vogel's diagram plotting the increase
146. Mary Elizabeth Vogel, Courts of Trade: Social Conflict and the Emergence of Plea
Bargaining in Boston, Massachusetts, 1830-1890, at 163 (1988) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Harvard University) (on file with the Stanford Law School Library; Univ. of Mich. Microfilmed
Dissertations); see also Milton Heumann, A Note on Plea Bargaining and Case Pressure. 9 L. &
Soc'y REV. 515, 516-17 (1975) (surveying studies that say caseload pressure played a large role
in bringing about plea bargaining's rise).
147. Vogel, supra note 146, at 163.
148. Vogel conducted her research in the Boston Police Court. See Mary E. Vogel, The
Social Origins of Plea Bargaining: Conflict and the Law in the Process of State Formation. 1830-
1860, 33 L. & SOc'Y REV. 161, 176 (1999) (identifying the Boston Police Court as the source of
data on guilty-plea rates through 1866). The records of the police court apparently did not reveal
clear plea bargains, in which the exchange of plea for concession was apparent on the face of the
records. Vogel therefore engages in an elaborate examination of the pattern of concessions across
cases over time. See id. at 180-95. But as this procedure permitted her to draw no firm conclusion
about whether any particular case was a plea bargain or a simple guilty plea, her numerical
comparison of caseload and plea bargaining had to rely on guilty-plea rates. See id. at 219.
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of guilty-plea rates and caseload between 1830 and 1920.'" On the basis of
this diagram, Vogel concludes that "the surge of guilty pleas, which
heralded the rise of plea bargaining during the 1830s, 1840s, and 1850s,
preceded rather than followed the marked increase in caseload seen after
the 1840s"-suggesting that caseload pressure could not have brought on
the rise of plea bargaining.'50 But the chronological ordering of the two
trends is an unintended illusion of the graph's design. The graph plots both
trends-caseload and guilty-plea rate-in terms of percentage increases
over the year before. Both lines therefore start at zero in 1830 and climb
promptly upward. Between 1830 and 1840, the guilty-plea line rises rather
sharply (perhaps because the guilty-plea rate genuinely began near zero'),
while the caseload line rises modestly. This incongruence, if we should call
it that, shifts the line representing caseload to the right and makes it look
chronologically behind the guilty-plea line. In fact, during the next period,
1840 to 1850, both lines rise sharply in nearly equal measure and then,
between 1850 and 1860, both lines rise modestly in roughly equal measure.
Between 1860 and 1870, the caseload line takes a dramatic leap
upward, while the guilty-plea rate rises only modestly. But here we
encounter another illusion of the graph's design: The graph compares
caseload with the guilty-plea rate.5 2 That is, guilty pleas are expressed as a
percentage of all cases. Because caseload can (in theory) expand
indefinitely whereas the guilty-plea rate cannot exceed 100%, the increase
of the guilty-plea rate simply cannot keep up with an exploding caseload. It
appears that between 1860 and 1870, caseload increased by a factor of two
or three, 53 while the guilty-plea rate increased from about forty-five percent
to sixty or sixty-five percent."" That is, both figures rose substantially, even
if one rose more dramatically than the other. It is true that the two trends
plotted on Vogel's diagram moved in opposite directions between 1870 and
1880 and between 1880 and 1890, but these instances were both
exceptional--occurring only twice in the nine time periods shown-and
modest, in the sense that neither trend was moving sharply.
149. See id. at 220; Vogel, supra note 146, at 163-64.
150. Vogel, supra note 148, at 219; see also Vogel. supra note 146. at 163.
151. See Vogel, supra note 148, at 176; Vogel, supra note 146. at 59.
152. The graph is titled "Guilty plea rates and caseload pressure." Vogel. supra note 146. at
220.
153. See Vogel, supra note 148, at 220.
154. See id. at 176; Vogel, supra note 146. at 59.
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FIGURE 3. VOGEL'S DIAGRAM:





Like Vogel, Theodore Ferdinand produces better evidence of a link
between caseload pressure and the rise of plea bargaining than he seems
prepared to admit. His study of the Boston Municipal Court, a jury forum
nearly identical in form and function to the Court of Common Pleas,""5
shows that caseload held steady or even declined through the first third of
the century. Caseload then turned sharply upward in 1836 and had more
155. Ferdinand also studied the Boston Police Court, a non-jury forum from which
prosecutors generally were absent. See FERDINAND, supra note 121, at 50. As I will explain in
more detail below, see infra notes 223-228 and accompanying text, I do not believe that the work
of the police court can shed much light on the operations of a jury forum in which prosecutors
conducted business for the state. With regard to the police court, Ferdinand sometimes endorses
and sometimes dismisses a link between caseload pressure and plea bargaining's rise. Compare
FERDINAND, supra note 121, at 65 ("The Police Court initiated plea bargaining for the same
reason that it was developed in the Municipal Court: to ease the burdens of prosecution."), with
id. at 93 (" inhere was no prosecutor in the Police Court, and little if any relationship between
caseload and plea bargaining.").
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than tripled by 1844.156 Meanwhile, Ferdinand says, plea bargaining arose
in the late 1830s and early 1840s.'
Ferdinand then hesitates to link these two trends in a causal way:
"Whether plea bargaining was a response to burgeoning caseloads," he
says, "is debatable." "' Yet the reason for his reticence seems wrong.
Ferdinand concludes that plea bargaining in this era was "restricted to vice
or regulatory" offenses 59 two categories that either overlapped with the
liquor law or had generally similar penalty schemes."W He hesitates to link
rising caseloads with rising numbers of guilty pleas because in vice and
regulatory offenses, "the sharpest increases [in caseload] were experienced
after plea bargaining took hold." 6' But Ferdinand's concern to match the
rise of plea bargaining in vice and regulatory offenses with the rise in
caseload in those same offenses mistakes the mechanism that linked
caseload pressure with plea bargaining. Caseload pressure generally
increased prosecutors' incentives to plea bargain. Once prosecutors felt a
general incentive to lighten their workload, they struck plea bargains
whenever they had the power to do so-that is, whenever rigid penalty
schemes permitted them to manipulate sentences by manipulating charges.
There is no reason to expect that the category of cases in which prosecutors
found that power-a category I label liquor-law violations and Ferdinand
labels vice and regulatory offenses-should happen also to be the category
that grew the fastest. But of course, my argument that prosecutors under
pressure naturally chose to plea bargain in liquor cases assumes an
156. See FERDINAND, supra note 121, at 138.
157. See id. at 81. Ferdinand reports that between 1832-1840 and 1842-1850, the proportion
of municipal court cases ending in pleas of either guilty or no contest grew by more than half-
from 19.3% to 31.8%. See id. at 100 tbl.4.1. Ferdinand prefers to consider those cases in which
the defendant offered an initial plea of guilty or no contest separately from those in which the
defendant initially pled not guilty and later changed her plea to guilty or no contest. See id. at 100-
01. In fact, if we focus on only the latter cases, then the 1840s look like a true revolution in plea
bargaining: Changed pleas surpassed 17% of all cases after the 1840s. although they never
amounted to three percent before that decade. See id. The starkness of the increase does suggest
that something significant took place, and Ferdinand may well be right that a retracted plea is a
sign that prosecutor and defendant conferred after the initial plea and reached a deal. See id. at 74-
77, 101. The large increase in the number of changed pleas, however, also may have resulted from
a change in record-keeping practices--that is, from a decision to record both pleas when only the
final plea generally had been recorded before. Cf. Lynn M. Mather, Conunens on the History of
Plea Bargaining, 13 L. & Soc'Y REV. 281, 284-85 (1979) (noting that an initial plea of guilty
could result from an explicit charge bargain made before charges were finalized).
158. FERDNAND, supra note 121, at 93.
159. Id. at 81. Of the two categories, regulatory crimes showed the most striking increase in
guilty-plea rates during the 1840s and the highest overall incidence of guilty pleas--55.2%
between 1842 and 1850. See id. at 59 tbl.2.3. The guilty-plea rate in vice offenses never surpassed
35%. See id.
160. See infra Appendix B (analyzing Ferdinand's category of "vice or regulatory-
offenses).
161. FERDNAND, supra note 121,at 93.
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understanding about why plea bargaining arose first in liquor cases. I will
turn to that issue now.
B. Why Plea Bargain in Liquor Cases?
Ferdinand and I agree that plea bargaining in Massachusetts first took
root in cases involving alcohol, but we part ways at the underlying question
of prosecutorial motives. Why did prosecutors choose liquor (and murder)
cases as the medium in which to mold the future? I note murder cases in
parentheses because Ferdinand and Vogel did not extend their research into
the Supreme Judicial Court and so did not discover early evidence of charge
bargaining in murder cases. The discussion that follows therefore refers
primarily to liquor cases, though lessons learned in murder cases inevitably
intrude.
I will begin by setting out my own explanation of plea bargaining's
early emergence in liquor cases. That the liquor law's rigid penalty scheme
gave prosecutors the power to bargain in such cases is of course part of the
answer, but a full answer requires as well an explanation of plea
bargaining's initial failure to spread to those cases in which judges held the
balance of sentencing power. Therefore, I will consider why judges did not
join forces with prosecutors in promoting plea bargaining's cause.
In Section C, I will take up Ferdinand's and Vogel's alternative
explanations of the early rise of plea bargaining. I have chosen to give such
close attention to Ferdinand's and Vogel's work in part because theirs
appear to be the only other full-scale empirical analyses of plea
bargaining's rise and in part because both worked in Boston. But the greater
importance of their work to my study lies elsewhere. In rejecting the
importance of caseload pressure as a motivation in plea bargaining's rise, as
Vogel does entirely and Ferdinand does in a more hesitant way, each has
declared in differing degrees an intention to move beyond an analysis
staked in the personal interests of courtroom actors and to embrace a more
complex vision of the plea-bargaining dynamic. Often-perhaps usually-
taking a broader focus improves the telling of history. I do not believe this
is one of those times. The evidence overwhelmingly suggests that plea
bargaining was the work of those who labored in the criminal courts and
was the product of their personal interests and struggle for power. Though
Ferdinand and particularly Vogel add richness and color to the story of plea
bargaining's rise, and though I could with some ingenuity reconcile my
telling with theirs, any gain in color would be a loss in accuracy.
My own explanation of plea bargaining's early dominance in liquor
cases is therefore brief: Prosecutors plea bargained in liquor cases because
they could. Among all of the most commonly prosecuted crimes, only in
liquor cases did the statutory penalty scheme so tightly bind the judge's
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hands in sentencing that the prosecutor could, by manipulating charges,
dictate the sentence. Not even in murder cases did the prosecutor have such
complete sentencing power, for when a defendant pled guilty to
manslaughter in the course of a prosecutorial charge bargain, the judge's
sentencing discretion spanned a full twenty years.
The peculiar power that prosecutors held in liquor cases stands in sharp
relief against the ineptitude they showed when attempting to charge bargain
in non-liquor cases other than murder. In 1852, for reasons I will discuss
shortly, Massachusetts prosecutors lost their power to charge bargain in
liquor cases. The record books of the Court of Common Pleas for the next
year show that Charles Russell Train handled 482 cases, but secured a clear
plea bargain of the sort we have seen in liquor cases only once: In a two-
count forgery indictment, district attorney Train nol prossed one count after
the defendant pled guilty. 162 When Isaac Morse succeeded Train in 1855,'61
he apparently resolved to find new territory in which to establish a charge-
bargaining regime. He settled on breaking-and-entering cases. Of thirty-
nine indictments Morse sought in 1859"64 for either breaking and entering
or theft from a building, he alleged separate counts for committing the
crime by nighttime and by daytime in all but four of them. In contrast, in
none of the fifty-two cases of this sort that Train had prosecuted in 1849
and 1853-the two years of his tenure that I studied-did he allege separate
nighttime and daytime counts.'65
Despite Morse's cleverness in positioning these cases for charge
bargaining, only four of the thirty-nine ended in the sort of charge bargain
that he apparently had in mind-with his nol prossing one of the two counts
in exchange for the defendant's guilty plea to the other.'" It is not
surprising that the tactic was so weak. The maximum penalty for breaking
and entering in the nighttime was twenty years. For breaking and entering
162- See Commonwealth v. Henry Howard, Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book 193 (Oct. 1853).
163. See 1 DAVIS, supra note 14, at 389; DAVIS. supra note 7, at 289.
164. Two-thirds of the way through the 1859 court year, the Superior Court supplanted the
Court of Common Pleas. But for its new name and new roster of judges, the new court looked
very much like the old, and record-keeping practices continued virtually unchanged. See Act of
Apr. 5, 1859, ch. 196, 1859 Mass. Acts 339, 339 (establishing the superior courts); Middlesex Ct.
C.P. R. Book (1859) (on file with the Massachusetts Archives); HINDUS. supra note 10, at 17.
165. In my study of selected years' records of the first half of the century, I did not come
across any breaking-and-entering or larceny-from-a-building case that charged separate counts for
nighttime and daytime. In unsystematic browsing through other years, I came upon only one such
case-in 1846. See Commonwealth v. Francis Smith. Middlesex Ct. C.P. Docket Book No. 274
(Oct. 1846).
166. Only one of the four deals ended the way one might expect-with the defendant's
pleading guilty to the daytime count and the prosecutor's nol prossing the nighttime count. See
Commonwealth v. Harry Peterson, Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book 94 (Feb. 1859). The other three
took the opposite form. See Commonwealth v. William C. Riley. Middlesex C. C.P. R. Book 209
(June 1859); Commonwealth v. John Petite, Middlesex C. C.P. R. Book 113 (Feb. 1859);
Commonwealth v. Joseph Merrett, Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book 88 (Feb. 1859).
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in the daytime, it was five years. 167 But the judge's sentence in the thirty-
five cases that ended in guilty findings 16 exceeded five years only twice"'
and never exceeded ten years. Because there was no minimum punishment
assigned to either count and because judges were not much inclined to
approach the maximum, Morse conferred little apparent benefit by nol
prossing one count. 7° In fact, as the defendant could not logically be guilty
of both a nighttime and a daytime break, the jury usually convicted the
defendant on only one count. When the jury did return a general verdict of
guilty, Morse often nol prossed one of the two counts in any event. 7 ' It is
little wonder, then, that charge bargaining in breaking-and-entering cases
worked only with unrepresented defendants. Although the defendant had
counsel in thirteen of these thirty-nine cases, the four charge-bargained
cases were not among them.'72 Lacking the kind of control over the
167. See MASS. GEN. STAT. ch. 161, §§ 11-12, 14 (William White 1860). The penalties were
stiffer if the offender was armed or assaulted someone present in the building, see id. §§ 10, 13,
but there was no such allegation in any of these cases. The crime of larceny from a building
carried a five-year maximum, apparently without regard to whether it was committed by day or by
night. See id. § 15.
168. Two of the defendants were found not guilty at trial, and two others were found guilty of
or pled guilty to larceny only. See Commonwealth v. James Smith, Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book
201 (June 1859) (reporting a not-guilty finding after trial); Commonwealth v. Michael Manyer.
Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book 193 (June 1859) (reporting that the defendant was found guilty after
trial, but that the prosecutor then nol prossed that part of the indictment that alleged that the theft
was from a building); Commonwealth v. George W. Giles, Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book 105 (Feb.
1859) (reporting a not-guilty finding after trial); Commonwealth v. Thomas Murray, Middlesex
Ct. C.P. R. Book 92 (Feb. 1859) (reporting that the defendant pled guilty to larceny only and that
the prosecutor nol prossed the balance of the indictment). The number of defendants found guilty
was actually larger than 35, because several cases had more than one defendant.
169. This figure does not include two separate cases involving the same defendant, both of
which ended in five-year consecutive sentences. See Commonwealth v. Angus Mannon,
Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book 86 (Feb. 1859); Commonwealth v. Angus Mannon, Middlesex Ct.
C.P. R. Book 84 (Feb. 1859).
170. It appears that those defendants who entered into a charge bargain with Morse received
more lenient sentences than those who went to trial and lost, but not more lenient than those who
simply pled guilty to the entire indictment. Not all these cases are comparable in terms of
seriousness, but we can isolate for comparison the eight that charge breaking and entering a
residence, since three of the four charge-bargained cases fall in this group. The defendants in the
charge-bargained cases received an average sentence of 36 months. See Middlesex Ct. C.P. R.
Books (Feb., June 1859); Middlesex Super. Ct. R. Book (Oct. 1859). In two cases, which involved
the same defendant, the defendant went to trial, was convicted each time, and received two 60-
month sentences, to be served consecutively. In each of the other cases, the defendant pled guilty
without any form of charge bargain and received an average sentence of 23 months. See
Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Books (Feb., June 1859); Middlesex Super. Ct. R. Book (Oct. 1859).
171. Of the 39 cases, 15 went to trial. Two ended in not guilty verdicts. The jury returned a
split verdict-guilty on one count and not guilty on the other-in eight cases. In three of the
remaining five cases, the jury returned a general guilty verdict, and Morse then nol prossed one
count of the indictment. In the two cases in which the general verdict apparently stood, there is no
sign that the defendant was sentenced on both counts. See Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Books (Feb..
June 1859); Middlesex Super. Ct. R. Book (Oct. 1859).
172. Although Morse did not abandon charge bargaining in breaking-and-entering cases, the
tactic never caught on, and he may have lost enthusiasm for it. In 1864, he charged separate
daytime and nighttime counts in nine of 13 indictments for either breaking and entering or larceny
from a building. In 1870, he did so in only seven of 15 such indictments. None of the 1864 cases
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sentencing decision that could make a charge bargain meaningful, Morse
succeeded in deploying the tactic against only a few defendants-and they
were the most poorly informed.
A difficult question lurks behind Morse's failure to broaden the
frontiers of charge bargaining. I have argued that charge bargaining worked
only in liquor and murder cases because only in those cases was the penalty
scheme rigid enough to allow prosecutors on their own to guarantee
sentencing concessions to those defendants who pled guilty. But why did
prosecutors have to act on their own? The kind of sentencing power that
rigid penalty schemes gave prosecutors mattered only if judges were not
partners in plea bargaining. Had judges cooperated in plea bargaining,
prosecutors could have bargained in almost any sort of case, even those
with wide-open penalty structures.
Two bodies of evidence make it clear that through at least the first
half-and probably the first three-quarters--of the nineteenth century,
judges generally withheld their cooperation from plea bargaining. The first
body of evidence concerns the liquor laws themselves. In 1852, when
Massachusetts followed Maine in enacting statewide liquor prohibition, the
legislature provided that in cases arising under the new law, "a nolle
prosequi shall not be entered by the prosecuting officer, except with the
concurrence of the court." 17 Apparently, the legislature had reconsidered
its vindication of Asahel Huntington's charge-bargaining practices and
reverted to its original, hostile posture. The impact on prosecutorial charge
bargaining was immediate and devastating. In 1849, the last year I studied
before the law change, Charles Russell Train resolved twenty of fifty-six
adjudicated liquor cases with clear plea bargains. In all but one of these, he
charged multiple counts; the defendant pled guilty on one or more counts;
and Train nol prossed the balance. That year Train sought multiple counts
in eighty-nine percent of his liquor indictments-evidence of a concerted
plan to gain leverage in anticipation of a plea bargain.""
By 1853, having been stripped of his unilateral power to enter nol
prosses in liquor cases, Train had abandoned his plan entirely. Not only did
he not engage in a single plea bargain on the old model, it appears that he
did not seek a single multi-count liquor indictment.' As a result, of
and only one of the 1870 cases ended in a charge bargain involving a nol pros of one of the two
counts. See Middlesex Super. C. I Books (Feb.. Oct. 1864; Feb. 1870).
173. Act of May 22, 1852, ch. 322, § 13, 1852 Mass. Acts 257. 257.
174. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
175. The sample size here is small, however. The records in 1853 disclose only seven cases
in which the clerk made it clear both that Train sought an indictment under the new prohibition
law and how many counts he charged. The rest of the adjudicated liquor cases came to the Court
of Common Pleas not via grand jury indictment, but as appeals from lower tribunals. It does not
appear that the district attorney dictated the charging practices in such cases, and they only rarely
involved multiple counts either before or after the law change of 1852. Unfortunately the clerk
often recorded only that a case charged violations of the liquor-license law or of the prohibitory
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twenty-four liquor cases adjudicated in 1853, twenty-one ended in trials.
Only three ended in plea bargains, and all of these involved the somewhat
covert plea-bargaining technique of placing the cases on file, which I will
take up in Part III. By 1859, the volume of adjudicated liquor cases had
grown, perhaps as authorities got used to the new law, but the pattern of
disposition stayed much the same. Forty-three of the sixty-two adjudicated
liquor cases 76 ended in trials; three ended in simple guilty pleas with no
evidence of a concession; 7 and all sixteen plea bargains took the on-file
form. In fact, virtually the only plea bargains that survived in liquor cases
after 1852 were of the on-file variety. Only four of the 602 liquor cases in
the years I studied between 1853 and 1910 ended in a plea bargain of the
sort Train used so extensively in 1849. 7'
It would be hard to attribute the sudden death of multiple-count plea
bargaining in liquor cases to any other aspect of the 1852 prohibition law
than its elimination of the nol pros as a prosecutorial prerogative. The new
law left in place the mandatory penalty scheme that had made the old
license law so conducive to plea bargaining: Being a common seller, for
example, still carried a mandatory $100 fine, and making a single sale
carried a fixed fine of ten dollars.'79 If the 1852 law effectively killed
charge bargaining in liquor cases, it must have been because judges
disapproved of the practice. The law did not ban nol prosses outright, but
banned them "except with the concurrence of the court." That charge
law, without enumerating counts. See Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book (1853) (on file with the
Massachusetts Archives).
176. In 1855, the legislature had broadened the state's criminal nuisance law to embrace the
act of keeping a liquor tenement. See Act of May 19, 1855, ch. 405, 1855 Mass. Acts 803, 803.
Thereafter, "liquor nuisance" cases became quite common. Because the penalty scheme of the
nuisance law was very different from those of the old license law and of the new prohibition law,
it would be wrong to lump the liquor-nuisance cases with the rest. Whenever I refer simply to
"liquor" cases, therefore, I mean either liquor-license cases or prohibition cases, depending on the
governing statute at the time-but not liquor-nuisance cases. Liquor-nuisance cases must languish
in limbo, as neither "liquor" nor "non-liquor" cases. See infra Appendix A.
177. Because the prohibition law, as reenacted in 1855, called for mandatory imprisonment,
these defendants all served time. See Act of Apr. 20, 1855, ch. 215, §§ 15, 17, 24, 1855 Mass.
Acts 623, 630, 631, 635; Commonwealth v. James Campbell, Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book 144
(June 1859) (noting a sentence of 20 days and a fine for a single sale of liquor); Commonwealth v.
John Healey, Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book 22 (Feb. 1859) (same); Commonwealth v. John Healey,
Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book 24 (Feb. 1859) (same).
178. The anomalous cases are Commonwealth v. Richard Barrett, Middlesex Super. Ct. R.
Book 85 (Feb, 1874); Commonwealth v. Edward Riordan, Middlesex Super. Ct. Docket Book No.
510 (Feb. 1864); Commonwealth v. Nicholas Mullen, Middlesex Super. Ct. Docket Book No. 488
(Feb. 1864); and Commonwealth v. Catherine Conley, Middlesex Super. Ct. Docket Book No. 461
(Feb. 1864). In Barrett, the record does not specify that the prosecutor in fact entered a nol pros. I
have included this case in the list, however, because it is clear that Barrett pled to one count
among several, that he was fined only on that count, and that the one count carried only a small
fine. The case therefore had all of the other earmarks of a liquor charge bargain.
179. See Act of May 22, 1852, ch. 322, §§ 7, 12, 1852 Mass. Acts 257, 257. Unlike the old
law, though, the new law provided mandatory prison terms on third offenses and required the
posting of $1000 or $2000 bonds as surety against future violations. See id.
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bargaining in liquor cases died compels one conclusion: Judges withheld
their concurrence.
The second body of evidence of judicial resistance to plea bargaining
concerns the resolution of non-liquor cases in the first third of the century.
The records of the Court of Common Pleas show that from 1789-the
earliest year I studied-through 1829, between forty-eight percent and
seventy-two percent of adjudicated non-liquor cases ended in pleas of guilty
or no contest.180 Despite these very high plea rates (which soon fell
dramatically for reasons I will take up in Part IV), there is no evidence that
plea bargaining was going on. That is, there is no evidence that these
defendants won some understood concession for their pleas. Court records
reflect a near-total absence of the sort of charge bargains I examined in
Part I, in which the clerk's record made the nature of the concession clear.
Outside the liquor-law context, only four such bargains appear in the
fourteen years I studied between 1789 and 1829."' Because the penalty
scheme in non-liquor cases left wide discretion in the judge's hands, the
prosecutor could not dictate the sentence by manipulating charges-so any
effective charge bargain required the judge's participation. The lack of
charge bargaining in non-liquor cases, then, is some evidence that judges
were not yet allies in prosecutors' plea-bargaining designs.
There is, moreover, no evidence of sentence bargaining in non-liquor
cases during these early years. A numerical analysis of sentencing patterns
discloses no sign of a well-understood practice of granting lighter sentences
180. Here are the results of my case counts for the following years:
PROPORTION OF ADJUDIcATED NON-LIQUOR CASES ENDING IN PLEAS OF









Sources: Middlesex CL C.P. R. Books (on file with the Massachusetts Archives).
181. See Commonwealth v. Joseph Jeffrey Jr., Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book 375 (Dec. 1824)
(reporting a case charging damaging a highway in which Steams nol prossed one of two counts
after the defendant pled no contest to the other); Commonwealth v. Simeon Gigger, Middlesex Ct.
C.P. R. Book 34 (Dec. 1820) (reporting a case charging breaking and entering a dwelling house
and committing assault and battery in which the defendant pled guilty to assault and battery only
and was sentenced on that basis); Commonwealth v. Simeon Ford, Middlesex C. C.P. IL Book
450 (June 1815) (reporting a case charging travel on Sunday in which the prosecutor nol prossed
one of two counts after the defendant pled guilty to the other); Commonwealth v. George Peters,
Middlesex Ct Gen. Sess. Peace R. Book 7 (Sept. 1790) (discussed supra note 32). In a fifth case,
there was a clear concession but not precisely a charge bargain. See Commonwealth v. Jonathan
Curtis, Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book 371 (June 1814) (reporting an assault-and-battery case that
Asahel Steams nol prossed upon costs after the defendant's plea of no contest).
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to those defendants who pled guilty. True, any such analysis is risky in this
context. Each case has many unknown sentencing variables, including the
defendant's background, the specific details of the crime, and the judge's
habits and moods. More importantly, even if one had a large enough sample
to smooth out such variations, a systematic bias still might slant the
outcome: Those defendants who faced the heaviest sentences might have
been more likely to go to trial, so even absent any form of plea bargaining,
sentences might have been heavier after trial than after a plea. This risk of
bias means that a pattern of higher sentences after trial would not
necessarily indicate the presence of plea bargaining-but the absence of
such a pattern probably would be evidence of the absence of plea
bargaining.
The only non-liquor crime to appear during the early years of this study
often enough to permit numerical analysis was simple theft. 2 Before 1809,
the punishment of thieves generally involved whippings, restitution, and
sale into servitude, often as alternatives to one another or to incarceration.' 83
Rather than try to compare lashes and bondage with our modem
punishments of prison time and fines, I have chosen to examine only those
theft cases from 1809 or later, and I have excluded the few cases in those
years that still authorized servitude. In the eight years I studied between
1809 and 1829, forty-three cases of simple theft ended in convictions and
sentences of either time or fines. Fortunately, indictments in theft cases
almost always attached an exact dollar figure to the goods stolen, so we
have some way to judge whether the more serious cases tended to go to
trial. As it happened, the average value of the goods stolen was very nearly
the same-$14.02 for cases ending in a plea and $14.08 for those ending in
a conviction after trial. And in fact, the likelihood that the defendant would
go to prison was the same in both sets of cases-eighty-eight percent. But
those accused thieves who pled guilty tended to suffer heavier sentences
than those who went to trial and lost-on average drawing 2.5 months as
opposed to only 1.8 months.
182. I am excluding liquor cases from this portion of the study because in those cases,
prosecutors held the balance of sentencing power. In later years, breaking-and-entering and
assault-and-battery cases were common enough to allow analysis. See infra notes 502-505 and
accompanying text. Between 1789 and 1829, however, I saw only a handful of breaking-and-
entering convictions, and although assault-and-battery cases were more plentiful, far too few (only
six) ended in convictions after trial to permit comparison with convictions by plea.
183. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Daniel Nix, Middlesex Ct. Gen. Sess. Peace R. Book 458
(Sept. 1789) (providing for various sentencing alternatives, including whipping, restitution, sale
into servitude, and incarceration at hard labor).
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TABLE 1. SENTENCE ACCORDING TO MODE OF CONVICTION IN
THEFT CASES: MIDDLESEX COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, 1809-1829
After Plea After Trial
Number 26 17
Avg. Value of $14 $14
Stolen Goods
% Prison 88 88
Avg. Term 2.5 1.8
(months)
% Fine 12 18
Avg. Fine $13 S20
% Assessed 23 18
Costs
Avg. Costs $23 $41
Source: Middlesex CL C.P. R. Books.
I believe this evidence, together with that presented over the last several
pages, is enough to show that judges in the early nineteenth century
generally were not partners in plea bargaining. Prosecutors therefore had to
bargain where they could-that is, in liquor cases. In Part IV, I will ask
what moved so many defendants in the first third of the century to plead
guilty when they won no apparent concession in exchange. Now the
important question is why no concession was forthcoming. Why didn't
judges reward defendants for their guilty pleas? And why didn't they at
least go along with prosecutors' attempts, after 1852, to enter nol prosses in
liquor cases?
The first and most fundamental reason is that judges lacked
prosecutors' incentives to plea bargain: They neither faced the same
workload pressure nor found the same advantage in the certain
(prosecutorial) victory of a plea. Their workload pressure was lower in part
because they earned full-time salaries. In 1821 the legislature set salaries at
$2100 for the chief justice of the Court of Common Pleas and $1800 for
each of the associate judges,"8 as compared to the $1000 that Asahel
Huntington earned'8 until the legislature reduced his salary to $700 in
1843.6 (As late as 1849, a salary of $2500 for the state's attorney general
184. See Act of Feb. 14, 1821, ch. 79, § 10, 8 Mass. Laws 545, 551. This act did not establish
the Court of Common Pleas, but rather the "Court of Common Pleas for the Commonwealth,"
one variant in the institution's evolution. See supra note 7.
185. See Act of March 14, 1832, ch. 130, § 10, 12 Mass. Laws 396,406.
186. See Act of Mar. 7, 1843, ch. 9, § 1, 1843 Mass. Acts 6, 6.
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was considered "a good one." 187) Although there seems to have been no
law that barred judges from receiving outside income, 88 I have seen almost
no evidence that any judge carried on a law practice or other trade."89 It is
true that four of the five judges of the Court of Common Pleas resigned
their posts in indignation after the legislature reduced their salaries to $1700
in 1843.19 But four new judges quickly took their spots,'9 ' and by 1867,
associate judges of the Superior Court were drawing $4200,192 while the
Middlesex district attorney languished at $1200.193
Still, I do not suggest that huge caseload increases, especially those of
the 1840s, did not burden judges. That the legislature expanded the Court of
Common Pleas from four judges to seven between 1843 and 1851 makes it
plain that all parties thought there was stress on the court. 94 But because
judges drew full-time salaries and apparently sought no livelihood
elsewhere, they lacked prosecutors' financial incentives to dispose of cases
as quickly as possible. For them, a day spent trying criminal cases was not a
day's civil income lost. Moreover, the judges profited from the sheer
overwork of the district attorneys: A part-time unassisted prosecutor could
187. Letter from B[enjamin] R. Curtis to John H. Clifford (Apr. 28, 1849) (on ile with the
Massachusetts Historical Society, John H. Clifford Papers, Box 1845-1851, 1848-1849 Folder).
188. A bill proposed in 1811 would have made it a "high misdemeanor" for any Court of
Common Pleas judge to appear as an attorney before a state or federal court or to take part in any
civil case. See Act To Prohibit the Justices of the Court of Common Pleas from Practising as
Attornies or Counsellors (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). This bill does not seem to
have become law and in any event would have fallen under a general repeal provision of the 1821
legislation. See Act of Feb. 14, 1821, ch. 79, § 12, 8 Mass. Laws 545, 551.
189. The only evidence I have seen of a judge's doing legal work on the side appears in the
diaries of Charles Thompson (1827-1894), a lawyer based in Salem who was appointed to the
superior court in 1885. Thompson's diaries note that in May 1886 he "went to Probate Court on
Probate of will of Fitz E. Riggs." 13 Diaries of Charles Thompson (May 8, 1886) (on file with the
Harvard Law School Library). Thompson had handled the Riggs will before his appointment to
the bench. See 13 id. (Feb. 24, 1885) (making reference to the will of Fitz E. Riggs); I I id. (Oct.
14, 1885) (noting his nomination to the Superior Court). There is no reason to believe that
Thompson took on new business after his appointment, but neither did he immediately wrap up
his old business.
Samuel Dana served in the Massachusetts Senate from 1811 to 1813 and in Congress from
1814 to 1815 even while he sat on the Court of Common Pleas. See DAVIS, supra note 7, at 202-
04, 219-20. Perhaps for this reason, the legislature provided that its 1821 salaries were "in full for
[the judges'] services" and that if any judge should accept a legislative seat or federal position,
"his office of the Justice of the Court of Common Pleas shall thereby be vacated." § 10, 8 Mass.
Laws at 551. But as the legislature repealed this restriction four months later, see Act of June 16.
1821, ch. 23, § 4, 8 Mass. Laws 595, 595, it is possible that other judges took multiple posts in
later years.
190. See § 1, 1843 Mass. Acts at 6; ALAN J. DIMOND, THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MASSACHusETTS 78 (1960).
191. See DAVIS, supra note 7, at 244.
192. See DIMOND, supra note 190, at 75-76.
193. See Act of Apr. 6, 1859, ch. 216, § 1, 1859 Mass. Acts 371, 371.
194. See DAVIS, supra note 7, at 244; see also Court of Common Pleas, LOWELL J., Sept. 10.
1847, at 1 ("Something ought to be done to enable our courts to d[ilspatch business, so that




charge and try only so many cases and therefore could put only so much
pressure on a judge. Yet the Middlesex district attorney's salary did not
begin to resemble a full-time salary until 1872, when the legislature raised
it to $2000,191 and I have seen no hint of an assistant district attorney in
Middlesex before 1875.' 96 When the district attorneys found themselves
unable to manage their caseloads, they simply cleaned out their backlog by
entering nol prosses en masse. 97 And if judges were therefore somewhat
protected from the caseload pressures that plagued prosecutors, they felt
perhaps not at all the prosecutor's second incentive to plea bargain-that it
meant a clear victory.
Lacking prosecutors' clear incentives to plea bargain, judges may have
found themselves more troubled than prosecutors by a principled objection
to the practice. In the great majority of cases, the legislature had entrusted
judges with very broad sentencing discretion entirely free from review.
Once a judge chose a sentence of between zero and twenty years for
manslaughter, 98 for example, no higher court could adjust the sentence, nor
could any authority short of the governor release the defendant from it.' 99
The notion of taking part in a plea bargain must have deeply offended any
judge who felt the full weight of this burden. No judge could promise in
good conscience to impose a particular sentence when ignorant of those
facts most critical to the choice of sentence-the details of the crime and
the defendant's character and criminal history. And the judge had no
unbiased source of this information. It is easy to understand in this light a
Michigan judge's affronted response to a defense lawyer's inquiry whether
the judge would impose a certain sentence if the defendant pled guilty: "I
informed him," reported the judge, "that it would be time enough for me to
determine what the sentence should be after the respondent was
convicted." 2 In fact, there seems to have been a widespread if not uniform
195. See Act of May 6, 1872, ch. 353, § 1, 1872 Mass. Acts 320, 320.
196. In 1875, the legislature provided for a part-time assistant district attorney for the
northern district (Middlesex) and others. See Act of Feb. i1. 1875. ch. 12, § 1, 1875 Mass. Acts
602, 602. A law of 1873 permitted appointment of a clerk to assist the district attorneys. See Act
of May 12, 1873, ch. 278, § 1, 1873 Mass. Acts 707. 707. The first indication I have seen of a
possibly full-time assistant prosecutor in Middlesex is in an 1881 county payroll showing S1000
disbursed for an assistant district attorney, raised to S1500 the following year. See MIDDLESEX
COUNTY, STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES OF THE COUNTY OF MIDDLESEX FOR
THE YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1881, at 5 (n.p., n.d.); MIDDLESEX COUNTY, STATEMENT OF
RECEIPTS AND EXPENDrrURES OF THE COUNTY OF MIDDLESEX FOR THE YEAR ENDING
DECEMBER 31, 1882, at 5 (n.p., n.d.).
197. See supra note 131 and accompanying texL
198. See MASS. GEN. STAT. ch. 160, § 18 (William White 1860).
199. This was also true elsewhere. See ARTHUR TRAIN, THE PRISONER AT THE BAR 178
(1906) (noting that sentences in New York as of 1906 "cannot be considered or reversed on
appeal"). Arthur Train was Charles Russell Train's son. See infra note 474 and accompanying
text.
200. People v. Brown, 54 Mich. 15, 20 (1884). After the defendant pled guilty but before
sentencing, the judge told others who approached him on the defendant's behalf "that I would
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nineteenth-century practice of holding a sentencing hearing, perhaps
involving witnesses, even after a defendant pled guilty. 20' Such a hearing
could enable judges to pass a conscientiously well-informed sentence, but
could not become an aid in plea bargaining. As the hearing followed
conviction, it could not assist the judge in determining what concession he
should offer the defendant should she plead guilty.
If the sentencing power became in judges' minds a symbol of their
great authority and esteem, then it would be no surprise if they bristled at
prosecutors usurping any part in the course of striking a plea bargain. Here
we stray from an objection founded on principle to one based on pride. I
have seen no expression of judicial attitudes toward prosecutorial plea
examine into the previous history of the respondent and consider any mitigating circumstances
that there might be in his case, and that I was not prepared to announce in advance what his
sentence would be." Id. at 21. Of course, as the quoted statement comes from the judge's own
account of events supplied to the state's supreme court on the defendant's appeal following his
guilty plea, it perhaps says more about the appropriate response to a defense lawyer's inquiry than
about the actual response.
201. An 1837 issue of the Lowell Courier reported that at the Court of Common Pleas, a
defendant "pleads guilty, and on examination of witnesses is sentenced to common gaol 2 mos."
Court of Common Pleas, LOWELL COURIER, Sept. 14, 1837, at 2. The same report includes
several other cases in which defendants pled guilty and were sentenced without any mention of
further proceedings. See id. I cannot say whether the first case was exceptional or-what seems
just as likely-the reporter simply neglected to mention a similar hearing in other cases. The
court's records never mention sentencing hearings, though they surely took place often.
A superior court judge wrote in an 1867 trial notebook that a defendant "plead Guilty of
assault & Battery-as to sentence Mr W.E Jewett states that it was an accidental struggle."
Charles Devens Notebooks (Norfolk, Apr. 1, 1867) (unpublished and unpaginated document, on
file with the Massachusetts Historical Society). Although it seems likely that "Jewett" was the
defendant's lawyer and not a witness, this entry nevertheless makes it clear that there was a
sentencing hearing at which the judge was paying attention, suggesting no previous agreement on
sentence.
In 1886, a New Bedford lawyer recorded the following charge bargain in his diary: "In
Taunton A.M.... engaged in the trial of John Connerlly for larceny &c. The case was nol pros &
Connelly [sic] plead guilty to receiving stolen goods &c .... 3 Diaries of Edwin L. Barney 26
(Mar. 9, 1886) (unpublished document, on file with the Massachusetts Historical Society). The
next day the lawyer wrote that he had returned to Taunton "about Connlly [sic] sentence." 3 id. at
26 (Mar. 10, 1886). He noted at least one other time that he had addressed the court on the
question of sentence after his client had pled guilty. See 1 id. at 82 (Sept. 22, 1859); see also I I
Thompson, supra note 189 (May 13, 1885) ("At Newburyport--Case of Geo W Colbum[.] He
plead guilty. Spoke as to sentence & matter postponed.").
An Illinois statute of 1845 provided that "[iun all cases where the courts possess any
discretion as to the extent of the punishment, it shall be the duty of the court to examine witnesses
as to the aggravation and mitigation of the offence." Act of Mar. 3, 1845, ch. 300, § 183, 1845 I11.
Rev. Stat. 185, 185. Friedman and Percival report that according to a California statute, see Act of
Apr. 20, 1850, ch. 119, 1850 Cal. Stat. 310, 310, "[alfter conviction, the judge was supposed to
wait at least two days before fixing sentence .... But over one-third of the defendants waived
their rights and were sentenced the day they were convicted." FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra
note 135, at 201.
Arthur Train reported in his 1906 book that a particular defendant pled guilty, after which
"his pedigree [was] taken and a day set for his sentence." TRAIN, supra note 199, at 152-53. At
sentencing hearings, "[aiffidavits, letters, newspaper clippings and memoranda are submitted
tending to show that [the defendant] is of either good or bad character, [and] has had a reputable
or a disreputable past." Id. at 193.
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bargaining during the first half of the nineteenth century, when the practice
first emerged. But around the turn of the century, at a time when one might
have thought judges had grown reconciled to the phenomenon, they bitterly
voiced their resentment. In 1897, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
considered a nuisance case in which the prosecutor had entered a nol pros
on condition of the defendant's payment of $100 plus costs. "We are
aware," the court wrote,
that the custom has obtained, to a considerable extent, for the
attorney-general to compromise or settle this class of cases, as well
as cases arising under the liquor law, upon the payment of a certain
sum of money to the State by the defendant; but the practice is a
vicious one, and meets with our entire disapproval. There is no law
authorizing a sentence or any legal substitute therefor by consent of
parties, without the imposition thereof by the court.'
In 1913, a former chief justice of Maine's Supreme Judicial Court put in
still harsher terms his opinion of the way prosecutors deployed their nol
pros powers:
A reprehensible practice... is said (and I fear with some truth) to
have obtained in some counties for the prosecuting officer, even
after conviction sometimes, to grant a nolle prosequi in
consideration of the defendant's paying into the county treasury
such sum of money as the officer may fix upon .... [This practice]
is a plain, inexcusable usurpation of a power entrusted to the courts,
the power of determining what the penalty should be within the
limits fixed by the legislature.23
The author wondered at the effrontery of prosecutors who imagined "that
they are better judges than the court of what is an adequate penalty for the
offense." 2
Plea bargaining in the early and mid-nineteenth century therefore
encountered at least three obstacles to judicial acceptance: It served judges'
needs less well than those of prosecutors; it met in some judges a principled
aversion to discharging their awesome duty to sentence without full
information; and it offended some judges' pride of power. As a result,
prosecutors could plea bargain only where they could do so on their own,
without judicial cooperation-and that meant only in liquor crimes and
capital offenses. But as I have said, both Ferdinand and Vogel arrive at
202. State v. Conway, 20 R.I. 270, 273 (1897).
203. Ex Chief Justice Emery, The Nolle Prosequi in Criminal Cases. 6 Ms. L REV. 199, 202
(1913).
204. Id. at 202-03.
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different explanations of the early rise of plea bargaining. It is time now to
take up their evidence.
C. Competing Theories
1. The Role of Absent Victims and Savvy Defendants
Theodore Ferdinand's massive survey"0 5 of the court records of Boston,
like my more modest study of Middlesex, produced solid evidence of a
special relationship between liquor-license cases and plea bargaining in the
first half of the nineteenth century. Just over half of the liquor-license cases
in his sample ended in guilty pleas, as compared to only twenty-six percent
of typical common-law crimes such as larceny and felony assault.2'
Moreover, the rate of guilty pleas in liquor cases increased greatly in the
1840s.2 0 7 Although Ferdinand's statistics do not separate simple guilty pleas
from clear plea bargains, as I use the term, he does report a vigorous
practice of multiple charging and suggests anecdotally that the tactic was a
favorite in liquor cases.2 8 Hence, he tells us of Peter Bent Brigham, whose
name survives on a Boston hospital, but who in humbler days in the 1840s
came repeatedly to court to face a raft of liquor-law charges. Brigham pled
guilty each time to one count and paid his modest fine.2"9
In other ways, Ferdinand's account of the early rise of plea bargaining
differs from mine. He argues, for example, that Boston constables
"invented" plea bargaining in the 1830s as a natural spinoff of the
negotiations they conducted with criminals for information about other
crimes or for the return of stolen goods.2  The prosecutor, who "could
readily appreciate [plea bargaining's] many advantages, and ... was in a
position to implement it quickly," then expanded the practice that the
constables had devised. The notion that Boston constables invented plea
bargaining in the 1830s suggests that there was something so complicated
about plea bargaining that constables had to invent it for prosecutors. Yet in
205. Ferdinand reports that his "data collection team" coded over 36,000 cases from the
Boston Police Court between 1826 and 1850 and 9200 cases from the Boston Municipal Court,
the analogue to the Court of Common Pleas elsewhere in the state. See FERDINAND, supra note
121, at 215.
206. See id. at 50 tbl.2.2. Ferdinand concludes that "[t]here is little evidence that common
law crimes or private disputes were regularly plea bargained in either [the Police or the
Municipal] court during the antebellum period." Id. at 92; see also id. at 74-81 (arguing from a
variety of evidence that there was a low incidence of plea bargaining in common-law offenses).
207. See id. at 59 tbl.2.3 (showing a leap in the rate of guilty pleas in "regulatory offenses"
from 24.2% of all cases in 1814-1840 to 55.2% in 1842-1850); see also infra Appendix B
(breaking down "regulatory offenses").
208. See FERDINAND, supra note 121, at 77, 79 tbl.3.6.
209. See id. at 77. Ferdinand does not say what became of the other counts.
210. See id. at 13, 15, 66, 95, 186.
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Middlesex County, Samuel Dana hit upon a very elaborate form of plea
bargaining in 1808;211 Asahel Stearns used Dana's model in the 1820s;
2t2
and by 1834, around the time Ferdinand credits Boston constables with
inventing the practice, Asahel Huntington had refined it with his preprinted,
multi-count indictment forms. 213 As we will see in Part VI, plea bargaining
had appeared in scattered other places long before its invention in Boston.
That two parties might trade concessions in order to trade gains surely was
not a new concept, and it took little inspiration to extend such familiar
tactics to the criminal courts.
It did, however, take power. Unless the prosecutor could guarantee a
sentencing concession in exchange for the defendant's plea, no bargain was
likely to happen. Yet Ferdinand does not ask how it was that prosecutors
were "in a position to implement" plea bargaining in liquor cases. In
seeking to explain the early connection between plea bargaining and liquor
cases,214 he does not speak of the license law's rigid penalty scheme or the
unusual power to craft charge bargains that it bestowed upon prosecutors.
Instead he looks largely to the absence of a victim in liquor cases and to the
presence of savvy, business-wise defendants. These factors have some
appeal in setting liquor cases apart from most others, but perhaps less than
at first appears.
Ferdinand sees two reasons why victimless crimes might have made
fertile ground for plea bargaining. The less important, which he notes only
in passing, is that there was no injured party to agitate for complete
vindication of justice and to resist any proposed plea bargain. 't s Ferdinand
does not lean hard on this argument, perhaps because he realizes that liquor
crimes were not entirely victimless. Townspeople often made angry
demands that prosecutors rid them of their comer tavern-keeper. 1 6 And
211. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
212. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
214. Ferdinand gives a broader label than 'liquor cases" to those violations in which he finds
a high rate of plea bargaining in the Boston Municipal Court for the first half-century. He calls
them "vice or regulatory" cases. FERDINAND, supra note 121, at 81: see also supra note 159 and
accompanying text (illustrating Ferdinand's use of the word "regulatory"). Regulatory offenses
consisted entirely or almost entirely of liquor-selling crimes, while vice offenses included some
that were punishable under the liquor-license law. Demonstrating the affinity between what
Ferdinand refers to as " vice or regulatory" offenses and what I call liquor-law violations requires
some close statutory analysis, which I will defer until Appendix B.
215. See FERDINAND, supra note 121, at 93 ("The complainant in such cases was inevitably
someone who would understand and accept a reduced punishment ...."): id. at 60 (-Since few
victims followed the prosecution of these cases or took note of their resolution, regulatory and
vice cases offered a wide latitude for experimentation.").
216. See infra note 277 (quoting at length from a townsman's letter to Asahel Huntington and
citing a second, similar letter); see also Commonwealth v. Asa B. Cobleigh. Middlesex Ct. C.P.
File Papers, No. 130 (Feb. 1850) (containing a letter to Charles Russell Train from a citizen who
complained of the defendant's gambling activities, and listing witnesses to the defendant's
gambling and liquor selling); infra Appendix B (addressing the connection between the liquor law
and gambling offenses).
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although Ferdinand does not look at the work of the Supreme Judicial Court
and does not write of plea bargaining in capital cases, he surely would not
claim that murder cases lacked victims, though they were a source of
vigorous plea bargaining in the middle of the century.
Ferdinand puts more weight on the argument that victimless crimes
could end up in court only if the authorities actively went out to investigate.
"[T]he investigating official," he notes, "was someone who could also
begin negotiations."217 Yet Ferdinand offers no evidence that liquor
prosecutions in fact inevitably arose from official action, and there is some
reason to think that official instigation was more the exception than the
rule.218 Nor does he ask how so many non-liquor defendants-for example,
burglary suspects, who rarely pled guilty2 9 -managed to find their way
into court without the aid of an investigating official "who could also begin
negotiations."220
As for savvy defendants, Ferdinand argues that those accused of liquor
crimes "were often businessmen... [who] recognized the waste in
seriously contesting minor charges that carried little stigma" and who were
therefore ready to negotiate.2 ' Ferdinand surely is right that unless
defendants saw a comparative advantage in pleas over trials, no plea
bargain could take place. And he may be right that tradespeople were
somewhat quicker than others to see the value of a good bargain. But I
suspect that Ferdinand carries this argument too far when he suggests that it
does much to explain why liquor laws came first in plea bargaining's
chronicles. He does not, after all, consider how burglars and robbers,
streetwise in so many ways, could have been dull to the benefits a plea
bargain could promise. Nor does he consider whether defense counsel
might have helped less savvy defendants to see the value of a good
bargain.222
217. FERDINAND, supra note 121, at 93.
218. Robert Hampel reports that in Taunton, Massachusetts, between 1834 and 1845, [tihe
great majority of the complainants [in liquor prosecutions]... were volunteers" of various
temperance organizations. HAMPEL, supra note 65, at 148. He adds, with regard to the state as a
whole, that "[t]he task of prosecuting sellers and drunkards did not fall on the local police." Id.
Boston was surely a very different place from Taunton, and Hampel does not appear to have
studied Boston in any depth, but his findings counsel caution in reaching conclusions about
Boston.
219. Only 26% of burglary defendants pled guilty over the course of Ferdinand's study. See
FERDINAND, supra note 121, at 50 tbl.2.2.
220. Id at 93.
221. Id. at94.
222. Ferdinand notes almost in passing that "defense attorneys were not common" in the
Boston Municipal Court in the period of his study. Id. at 99; see also id. at 185 (" Defendants were
permitted lawyers .... but most often they were unrepresented ...."). It is possible, though, that
the particular documents he examined would not have disclosed the presence of counsel in most
cases. Ferdinand's appendix on his method, although not quite clear on the point, suggests that he
looked only at the "record books" for the municipal court. See id. at 211, 213, 215. I found in my
work in the Middlesex Court of Common Pleas-a close analogue of the Boston Municipal
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I will not press these points, however, because the lack of individual
victims in liquor cases and liquor defendants' frequent status as
tradespeople probably did accelerate, if not cause, the progress of plea
bargaining in liquor cases. The real shortcoming of Ferdinand's theory of
the evolution of plea bargaining is that its powers of explanation expire
almost precisely at mid-century, when his study ends. Just two years into
the second half of the century, the legislature withdrew the prosecutor's
power to enter nol prosses in liquor cases and, as we have seen, killed
prosecutorial charge bargaining. Whatever may have been the role of absent
victims and savvy defendants in facilitating charge bargaining in liquor
cases, these factors were not sufficient to keep the practice alive. In
nineteenth-century liquor cases, the prosecutor's unilateral power to nol
pros was apparently a necessary condition for charge bargaining to take
place.
And despite Ferdinand's arguments about absent victims and savvy
defendants, the prosecutor's ability to use his nol pros power to shape the
defendant's sentence was also apparently a sufficient condition for charge
bargaining to take place. The history of charge bargaining in murder cases
suggests as much. Murder was hardly a victimless crime, and the victim's
friends and family no doubt pressed for quick and vigorous prosecution.
Nor were murder defendants particularly savvy. Although they almost
always had counsel appointed free by the state, they lacked the commercial
sophistication of liquor dealers. Yet even as charge bargaining in liquor
cases disappeared altogether after the legislature withdrew the prosecutor's
nol pros power in 1852, charge bargaining in murder cases showed huge
gains. The legislature's action had applied only to liquor cases, and
prosecutors in capital cases continued unhindered in their practice of
entering partial nol prosses in exchange for the defendant's plea to a lesser
charge.
2. A Cultural and Political Approach
Mary Vogel's study proceeds from a different body of evidence than do
mine and Ferdinand's and arrives at very different conclusions about the
forces that gave rise to plea bargaining. Vogel conducted her research at the
Boston Police Court, a non-jury forum that usually operated without a
professional prosecutor and occupied the lowest tier of Boston's judicial
Court-that the record books rarely noted defense counsel. Beginning in 1844, howevcr, the
court's "docket books" regularly recorded counsel in criminal cases. As I will report in Part IV,
over half of all defendants in the Middlesex Court of Common Pleas had counsel at the century's
midpoint. See infra note 436 and accompanying text.
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system.223 Liquor-license cases played a very small role in that court's
business,"' and in her latest work, Vogel reports no link between plea
bargaining and alcohol-related cases. 2 Her theories therefore address the
rise of plea bargaining in general.
There is good reason to expect that Vogel's findings in the Boston
Police Court would differ greatly from Ferdinand's and mine in the courts
of the middle tier. In the police court, the only authority with the power to
grant the defendant a concession in exchange for his guilty plea was the
presiding magistrate. That same magistrate would also decide the issues of
guilt and sentencing should the defendant choose trial instead. In such a
setting, the notion of a plea "bargain" surely meant something different
than in a jury court. Once a police court magistrate had told the defendant
what he believed the case to be worth, the defendant knew the magistrate
could achieve that result equally well after trial as after plea. Because there
was no jury, the independent judgment of a jury could pose no obstacle to
the sentence the magistrate intended to impose. In contrast, defendants in
the courts of the middle tier could reject a plea offer in the hope of winning
an acquittal from a jury and so could engage the authorities in a true
bargaining process.
Such concerns about the roles and powers of various courtroom actors,
central to my analysis and important to Ferdinand's as well, draw little of
Vogel's attention.226 She sets her work apart from those who focus on "the
prosecutor, the police, trial complexity, and crowding in the courts"227 and
looks instead to the "social structural and institutional context" of plea
bargaining.228 Having concluded from her data that plea bargaining in
Boston emerged in the 1830s and 1840s, Vogel focuses on the culture and
politics of those decades.
It was a time of riots and unrest, she writes, and Boston's Whig elite
found itself striving to regain social order.229 But it was also a time of
223. See Vogel, supra note 146, at 59 fig.1 (identifying the Boston Police Court as the source
of her data on guilty-plea rates through 1866); Vogel, supra note 148, at 170-72 (same, for the
period from 1830 to 1860); id. at 218 (noting that prosecutors appeared rarely in the police court
before 1850); see also FERDINAND, supra note 121, at 46 (noting the absence of a jury in police
court).
224. See Vogel, supra note 148, at 173-74 tbl.l, 182 n.32.
225. In earlier, unpublished work, Vogel reported that an unusually large proportion of those
charged with drunkenness pled guilty between 1860 and 1890 and that in 1880 they won greater
concessions in exchange for their guilty pleas than did defendants charged with other crimes. See
Vogel, supra note 146, at 155. As I will note shortly, see infra note 236 and accompanying text, in
more recent work Vogel finds no concessions for guilty pleas in drunkenness cases, albeit at an
earlier period in the century.
226. In her most recent article, see Vogel, supra note 148, Vogel devotes little space to
Ferdinand's 1992 book (which in turn seems to have omitted mention of Vogel's related 1988
dissertation).
227. Vogel, supra note 148, at 168.
228. Id. at 165.
229. See id. at 165-66.
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broadened voting rights, "which made it likely that state response [to social
unrest] would take a form attuned to sustaining the popular consent." " The
political elite resolved this tension, Vogel argues, through a pattern of
"episodic leniency."'2' By rewarding guilty pleas with sentencing
concessions, Boston's magistrates (appointed largely by the Whig power-
holders) 32 could secure convictions while dispensing grace and thereby
maintain order while winning the voters' consent.
It is an elegant theory, and Vogel richly details the social conflicts and
political maneuverings of the day. Such factors no doubt influenced in some
ways, great or small, the course of plea bargaining's rise, and at a few
junctures in this study I will bring the role of social forces to bear. 3 In my
analysis, however, social forces always played an indirect role: They were
important to the extent that they helped shape the powers or interests of
courtroom actors. Vogel's analysis, in contrast, simply forgoes questions
about the source of bargaining power and pursues the matter of interests
only abstractly. More importantly, the claim of episodic leniency that
undergirds her theory stands on very shaky evidence.
During the 1830s, 1840s, and perhaps 1850s, Vogel claims, the
magistrates of Boston's police court dispensed leniency in exchange for
guilty pleas and did so noticeably enough to help secure public consent in
their law-enforcement mission. Vogel acknowledges one troublesome
shortcoming in her evidence. Of the five types of cases she analyzes-
drunkenness, common drunkard, nightwalking, larceny, and assault and
battery-drunkenness cases were by far the most likely to end in guilty
pleas. -14 In 1830, when guilty pleas accounted for only 19.1 percent of all
pleas in larceny cases and 10.6 percent of all pleas in assault-and-battery
cases, they accounted for a full three-quarters of all pleas in drunkenness
cases. And although guilty pleas in larceny and assault-and-battery cases
advanced notably in 1840, 1850, and 1860, the highest rate observed in
these cases never matched even the lowest rate observed in drunkenness
cases.235
These facts pose difficulties for Vogel's theory of episodic leniency
because, as she frankly allows, drunkenness defendants appear to have won
230. Id. at 200.
231. Id. at232-33.
232. See id. at 208, 211.
233. See, e.g., infra notes 532-547 and accompanying text (describing the role of
industrialization in indirectly shaping judges' attitudes toward plea bargaining); infra notes 786-
815 (explaining how social reformers with a charitable agenda advanced the cause of public
defenders' offices by arguing that these offices would advance plea bargaining-and how these
predictions had a self-fulfilling quality).
234. I encountered relatively few drunkenness or common-drunkard cases in the courts of the
middle tier. I saw none at all between 1789 and 1843. Only during 1900 and 1910 did
drunkenness and common-drunkard cases together account for as many as 10% of the total.
235. See Vogel, supra note 148, at 179.
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no leniency in exchange for their guilty pleas. In fact, they seem to have
suffered a penalty for pleading guilty, drawing heavier punishments than
those convicted after trial.236 Faced with this discordant evidence, Vogel
simply excises drunkenness cases from her theory of episodic leniency. She
says it is more important to focus on "crimes against property and the
person"-that is, on larceny and assault and battery-because the
authorities who promoted the policy of episodic leniency were most
concerned with "offenses [that] threatened the security of the goods,
buildings, and facilities crucial for growth." 237 But this excision depends on
four implausible facts: first, that the authorities believed that both larceny
and assault and battery threatened the security of goods and buildings more
than did drunkenness and that drunkenness did so little or not at all; second,
that the authorities did not regard drunkenness itself as a threat to economic
growth; third, that episodic leniency resulted in more complete (as opposed
to more popular) law enforcement than did the relative harshness shown to
drunkenness defendants; and fourth, that the point of episodic leniency-to
secure popular consent in law enforcement-was more effectively achieved
by showing leniency to thieves and assailants than to accused drunks.
236. See id. at 185, 190-91. The lack of concessions is perhaps not surprising given the
hopeless position of the typical accused drunk. Vogel reports that virtually all who refused to
plead guilty and chose trial were convicted. See Vogel, supra note 148, at 181 (suggesting a 100%
conviction rate); Vogel, supra note 146, at 80 (same). Ferdinand reports that in the 12 years of
Boston Police Court records he studied between 1826 and 1850, the rate of not-guilty findings in
drunkenness cases only once approached four percent of all cases and otherwise ranged between
zero and two percent. See FERDINAND, supra note 121, at 63. A newspaper's comment decades
later that drunkenness trials "take[], on an average, just one minute to try each" suggests how
perfunctory the proceedings were. Municipal Court-Judge May, BOSTON DAILY GLOBE, Jan. 9.
1879, at 1.
Nursing no fond hope of acquittal after trial, therefore, and down and out and often without
the means for a lawyer, those accused of drunkenness might well have pled guilty without any
inducement from the magistrate. See Vogel, supra note 146, at 81 ("These acquittal rates appear
very likely an important contributor to the high guilty plea rates for drunkenness .... "). Recall
that Vogel was studying a non-jury court, in which the defendant could better assess the
likelihood of acquittal based on the court's past behavior.
A highly anecdotal account of court goings-on in Boston provided this description of a
drunkenness guilty plea in the police court in the early 1850s:
[S]ometimes the clerk will read the complaint to [the defendants), and sometimes he
will omit it, simply holding the document in his hand, and saying to the prisoner:
"You was brought here for being drunk, last night! Was you drunk?"
If the prisoner says "Yes," the Clerk immediately adds, "The court find you
guilty, and sentence you to pay a fine of three dollars and costs, for want of which you
stand committed."
BALL FENNER, RAISING THE VEIL; OR, SCENES IN THE COURTS 27 (Boston, James French & Co.
1856). Robert Hampel's findings in the courts of Salem confirm some aspects of this account. He
reports that the court tried 43.3% of drunkenness defendants on the day of arrest and notes that
"drunks could not afford the legal machinations used by sellers to prevent conviction." HAMPEL,
supra note 65, at 152.
237. Vogel, supra note 148, at 206; see also id. at 191 ("It is also true that [drunkenness.
common-drunkard, and nightwalking] offenses had fewer direct consequences for 'the people's
welfare' that was being shaped by economic growth.").
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Vogel's theory of episodic leniency meets an even larger empirical
obstacle when she attempts to demonstrate its central claim-that the
leniency shown to those who pled guilty in larceny and assault-and-battery
cases was substantial enough to help win popular consent in law
enforcement. Vogel claims that plea bargaining emerged in these cases in
the 1830s and 1840s and that "concessions were most strikingly evident in
1840 and 1860." 238 She seems to acknowledge that her argument must fail
unless the pattern of leniency was striking enough for the public to notice.
The following table reprints her analysis of sentencing concessions in the
relevant years:
TABLE 2. OUTCOMES IN SELECTED CASE TYPES:
BOSTON POLICE COURT, 1840-1860
Larceny Assault & Battery
Pled Guilty Lost at Trial Pled Guilty Lost at Trial
1840
% Imprisoned 80 70 0 7
% Fined 20 30 100 93
Avg. Term of 3.5 4.0 N/A 6.0
Imprisonment
Avg. Fine $3.67 $4.58 $3.36 $3.54
1850
% Imprisoned 31 38 11 18
% Fined 69 63 89 82
Avg. Term of 2.4 2.5 --.
Imprisonment
Avg. Fine $6.25 $6.33 $4.71 $3.63
1860
% Imprisoned 36 38 9 14
% Fined 64 62 91 86
Avg. Term of 4.0 2.5 2.0 3.5
Imprisonment
Avg. Fine $4.67 $9.71 $6.20 $4.46
Source: Mary E. Vogel, Tze Social Origins of Plea Bargaining: Conflict and the Law
in the Process of State Formation, 1830-1860, 33 L. & Soc'Y Ra". 161, 184, 189
(1999).
238. Id at 195.
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The table compares the fates of those who pled guilty and those who
were found guilty after trial along three dimensions: the likelihood of
imprisonment versus fine, the length of any confinement, and the size of
any fine.239 The table indeed shows a pattern of lower penalties for those
who pled guilty in larceny and assault-and-battery cases: Across eighteen
points of comparison (three years times two crimes times three sentencing
variables), the results suggest leniency for guilty pleas in twelve instances
and a premium in only four. But the benefits of pleading guilty were very
small. On average-across crimes and across years, weighing each cell in
the diagram equally-a guilty plea reduced the defendant's chances of
going to prison from thirty-one percent to twenty-eight percent; reduced the
average term of imprisonment from 3.7 to 3.0 months; and reduced the
average fine from $5.38 to $4.81.24 Because serious offenders might have
been more likely to choose trial than were less serious offenders (a
possibility Vogel allows),241 the small margin of leniency shown here might
reflect the relative seriousness of offenses rather than a reward for pleading
guilty. In any event, absent evidence of episodic leniency more perceptible
to the public, Vogel's arguments about its significance in explaining plea
bargaining's rise appear to be moot.
I will, however, pursue one branch of Vogel's analysis further, both
because other scholars have echoed the point and because it has a certain
intuitive appeal. Plea bargaining arose in part, Vogel argues, because the
voting public liked it. Its familiarity and accessibility won it support:
The plea bargain, in its customary simplicity, was more knowable
(or 'cognoscible' in Bentham's term) than the arcana of common
law-and so drew citizens into a relationship with a
comprehensible state by clarifying what the law proscribed, the
239. Vogel claims a significant role for another form of concession-the decision to retain a
case in the police court rather than transfer it to the municipal court, where penalties perhaps were
greater. See id. at 193. But Vogel provides no evidence as to how the decision to transfer a case
was reached-whether it was at the discretion of the court or of the defendant herself or was
reached automatically based on the crime charged or the sentence awarded in the police court. The
only evidence she provides on the question is Barbara Hobson's argument that prostitution
defendants preferred resolution of their cases in the municipal court, where they thought they
could strike more favorable deals. See id. at 191 n.42. Because Vogel conducted her research only
in the police court, she cannot tell us if defendants whose cases were resolved before the
municipal court indeed fared worse. Moreover, she provides no evidence that the public was
aware of whatever significance such transfers had, and public awareness is essential to her theory
of episodic leniency.
240. Even if we focus on the two years in which, Vogel says, "[cloncessions were most
strikingly evident"-1840 and 1860-the concessions seem small. In these two years, pleading
guilty to larceny or assault and battery reduced the chances of going to prison from 32% to 3 1%;
reduced the average term of imprisonment from 4.0 to 3.2 months; and reduced the average fine
from $5.57 to $4.48. See id. at 184, 189, 195.
241. See id. at 185 n.34. Although Vogel refers here to the reluctance of repeat offenders to
plead guilty, the point may apply to more serious offenders, whether or not they had a record.
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menu of costs associated with any breach, and facilitating a grasp
of the consequences of those actions.-4 -
In their study of the rise of guilty pleas in New York, Mike McConville and
Chester Mirsky likewise point to the political popularity of plea bargaining
as a factor in explaining its growth. They write that plea bargaining
"avoided the discontent that imprisonment for convictions of the full
indictment would engender among the immigrant underclass, who, under
the movement for universal suffrage, had become part of the newly formed
electorate." 243
Such arguments about plea bargaining's popularity of course demand
evidence that the public knew about plea bargaining. Though McConville
and Mirsky do not undertake such proof, Vogel does, and she points
specifically to three signs of public awareness. First is a phenomenon Vogel
terms "mirroring": If criminal defendants more readily pled guilty when
authorities more readily granted concessions in exchange-that is, if
defendants "mirrored" concessions with guilty pleas-then "members of
the public [must have been] aware of concessions being granted."' Of
course, evidence of mirroring speaks only to defendants' knowledge of
concessions granted for pleas, and defendants may have known much more
about plea bargaining than the public at large. But more fundamentally,
Vogel's evidence of mirroring is vanishingly thin, consisting only of this
(slightly simplified) table:245
TABLE 3. GUILTY PLEAS AND CONCESSIONS:
BOSTON POLICE COURT, 1840-1860
Larceny Assault & Batter
Year #'of Types of Guilty Plea # of Types of Guilty Plea
Concessions Rate Concessions Rate
1840 4 0.20 3 0.00
1850 1 0.14 2 0.12
1860 2 0.50 3 0.41
Source: Mary E. Vogel, The Social Origins of Plea Bargaining: Conflict and the Law
in the Process of State Formation, 1830-1860, 33 L. & Soc'Y REv. 161, 195 tbl.13
(1999).
242. Id at 234; see also id. at 235-36 (repeating the claim that plea bargaining was
"cognoscible").
243. Mike McConville & Chester Mirsky, The Rise of Guilty Pleas: New York. 1800-1865,
22 J.L. & Soc'Y 443,466 (1995).
244. Vogel, supra note 148, at 194.
245. Vogel's version of the table identifies the various concessions, though not their
frequency or size. See id at 195. I do not believe this additional complexity increases the strength
of her evidence.
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Vogel does not explain this table beyond stating generally that
"fluctuations in concessions are mirrored, for some offenses, by parallel
shifts in the tendency to plead guilty." 24 6 Without her aid, it is very hard to
discern here a pattern of increasing guilty pleas responding to more
liberally granted concessions.
Next, Vogel points to a monograph of court vignettes published in 1837
by the court reporter of the Boston Morning Post.24 7 "While not making too
much of it," she notes that the reporter used the term "bargain" to describe
the practice we know as plea bargaining, and she suggests that this usage
reflects a public awareness of the practice.248 I have read through this 250-
page volume with some care and have come across only three uses of the
term "bargain." Two of these concerned merchandise sales. 249 In the third,
the reporter wrapped up his account of an assault-and-battery case with
these words: "After the case was proved against Toupet beyond all hope of
defence, he retracted his plea of not guilty, paid a fine of $5,00 and costs,
and departed pretty well satisfied with his end of the bargain."" Not only
does the reporter's use of the idiom, "his end of the bargain," fall far short
of proof that the notion of a plea bargain was abroad in the community, but
the timing of the defendant's plea-apparently after the government had put
in its case at trial-removes this case far from the mainstream of plea
bargains.
Finally, citing only the legislature's report on its 1845 investigation into
Asahel Huntington's charge-bargaining practices, Vogel claims that
"public knowledge" of the use of plea bargaining to advance public policy
"was widespread and the practice met with public approval."2 '' Vogel is
surely right that the Huntington inquiry did not escape public notice. But
the only hint in the legislative record that the public (as opposed to the
legislature) knew about Huntington's charge-bargaining practices was this
highly partisan and apparently unpublished claim made in 1844 by
Representative Cyrus Washburn, who first lodged the legislative complaint
against Asahel Huntington for plea bargaining:
[T]here is now and has been for some time past a common &
current report among a large portion of the People of this
Commonwealth that Asahel Huntington ... is and has been guilty
of malpractice... by receiving of Defendants in cases of
246. Id. at 194.
247. See SELECTIONS FROM THE COURT REPORTS ORIGINALLY PUBLISHED IN THE BOSTON
MORNING POST, FROM 1834 TO 1837 (Amo Press reprint 1974) (1837) [hereinafter SELECTIONS].
248. Vogel, supra note 148, at 194-95. Vogel twice notes Gill's use of this word, but neither
time cites a page. See id.; Vogel, supra note 146, at 85.
249. See SELECTIONS, supra note 247, at 78, 171.
250. Id. at 41.
251. Vogel, supra note 148, at 206.
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prosecutions of Commonwealth against violators of laws regulating
the sale of spirituous liquors, and others, sums of money much less
than that which the statute laws fix[] ... and thereby discharging
the said Defendants in his own responsibility without a trial .... .'2
Washburn almost certainly overstated the public's "common &
current" attention to Huntington's plea bargaining. Perhaps he spoke from
his bias against Huntington, or perhaps he spoke as an Essex County
lawyer 1 3 in whose small circle Huntington's doings loomed large. In any
event, Washburn's claim does not square with news accounts of the
Huntington affair, which seem to have avoided the topic of plea bargaining
almost entirely.
The Lowell Daily Courier, one of the most important surviving
Middlesex County newspapers,2 devoted considerable attention to the
Huntington story, but made only the merest mention of plea bargaining.
"Wonders will never cease," began the first of at least nine separate news
items, six of them substantial, that the Courier devoted to the Huntington
affair.s "Who would have thought yesterday that the subject under
discussion in the House to-day would have been upon a grave charge of
official misconduct against the able and distinguished District
Attorney...." The author said nothing of the charges themselves,
however, though he assured his readers that they would "if
true ... seriously affect [Huntington's] standing in the community."'
Another item on the same page summarized the charges in such a way that
the more sensational charge of corruption simply swallowed up any
reference to plea bargaining: Washburn had charged Huntington "with mal-
practice in relation to the law granting licenses for retailing spirituous
liquors, receiving money from prosecutions, from various individuals, and
not accounting for the same, or paying the same into the Treasury of the
Commonwealth, thereby defrauding the Commonwealth." ' A few days
252. ORDER FOR COMMrrTEE OF ASAHEL HUNTINGTON: REPORT, H. Doc. No. 1499, at 2
(Mass. 1844) (on file with the Massachusetts Archives).
253. The committee's report identifies Washburn as an "Esquire" from Lynn. a town in
Essex County, which was within Huntington's jurisdiction. See CASE OF ASAHEI. HUNTNGTON:
REPORT, H. Doc. No. 4, at 3 (Mass. 1845).
254. The Courier claimed to have the largest circulation of any paper printed in Lowell. See
The List of Letters, LOWELL DAILY COURIER, Sept. 30, 1845, at 2.
255. Letters from the Editor.-No. 7, LOWELL DAILY COURIER, Jan. 20. 1844, at 2; see also
The District Attorney, LOWELL DAILY COURIER. July 13, 1844, at 2 (reprinting an article from the
Salem Register); District Attorney Huntington, LOWELL DAILY COURIER. Dec. 26. 1844. at 2;
House, LOWELL DAILY COURIER, Jan. 9, 1845, at 2 (brief notice); In the House, LOWELL DAILY
COURIER, Mar. 14, 1844, at 2 (brief notice); In the Senate, LOWELL DAILY COURIER. Jan. 20,
1844, at 2; Letters from the Editor.-No. 6, supra note 142; Massachusetts Legislature, LOWELL
DAILY COURIER, Mar. 16, 1844, at 2 (brief notice); Singular Proceedings, LOWELL DAILY
COURIER, Jan. 23, 1844, at 2.
256. Letters from the Editor.-No. 7, supra note 255.
257. In the Senate, supra note 255.
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later the Courier reprinted the Salem Register's condemnation of
Washburn's "grave accusations of official misconduct,"258 yet again made
no reference to plea bargaining. Months passed with only two tiny
references to the matter5 9 before the Courier reprinted another attack by the
Register on the "miserable, skulking and groundless" charges against
Huntington, sustained by testimony that "would not convict a dog.""
Though the paper noted that Huntington had "submitted a few remarks in
explanation of his course," it again said not a word about plea
bargaining.26'
Finally, in its third-to-last notice of the affair and almost a year after the
first, the Courier for the first and last time mentioned what is for us the real
object of concern. In an article devoted not to the legislature's inquiry but to
a related grand jury proceeding, a single sentence appears near the bottom:
"These complaints, it is well known, refer to the compromises made by Mr.
Huntington with the liquor-sellers, by which they paid sums of money to
the Commonwealth in order to be relieved from their indictments." '262
Perhaps indeed these charges were "well known," but the balance of the
evidence suggests otherwise. Each of the other news items referred in
hushed tones to scandalous allegations of graft, very much unlike this
matter-of-fact mention of Huntington's self-acknowledged dealings with
liquor merchants. Less than three weeks later, when the Courier printed its
last account of the legislature's investigation, it once again dismissed the
charges as lacking "any foundation in fact" and as a mere "madicious
attempt to injure the character and usefulness of one of the worthiest and
best men in the State" and once again made no reference to plea
bargaining.263
If we back away for a moment from the Huntington affair and search
more generally, we find almost no evidence of public awareness of plea
bargaining. I have cast a very broad net-topically, chronologically,
geographically-in search of public notices about plea bargaining and
related practices. In an extensive newspaper search that skipped across the
century and focused in particular on the 1830s and 1840s-a period that
Vogel, Ferdinand, and I all agree to be critical-I found no prominent
mention of plea bargaining before District Attorney Albert Nelson's 1847
announcement of his pleading terms.2" There was, it is true, the occasional
258. Singular Proceedings, supra note 255.
259. See In the House, supra note 255; Massachusetts Legislature, supra note 255.
260. The District Attorney, supra note 255.
261. Id.
262. District Attorney Huntington, supra note 255.
263. Letters from the Editor.-No. 6, supra note 142.
264. Nineteenth-century newspapers are not generally indexed, so the task of surveying the
century's newspapers for signs of public awareness of plea bargaining was quite labor-intensive.
Several of my research assistants scrolled through dozens of reels of microfilmed newspapers and
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bit of courthouse news that said almost in passing that a slate of liquor
defendants had "submitted, and paid their fines and costs." ' But there was
little to suggest that the public had a real awareness of plea bargaining. Nor
was the Nelson notice the first of many pointed references. On the contrary,
it was one of astonishingly few that I found in print anywhere in the
nineteenth century outside of court reporters and legislative documents2'
Nor have I ever, in any nineteenth-century source, seen the term "plea
bargaining." Even when I have looked specifically for commentary about
particularly notable events in our story, I have found nothing of note. For
example, although the Lowell Journal reported extensively on Barney
Goulding's killing of his wife in Lowell in 1848,2 7 it apparently ignored
made copies of all news items that touched on any of the topics relevant to this study. The search
focused on Middlesex County, but included as well many newspapers from outside the county. As
a survey of the entire century was impossible, I focused the students' efforts on time spans critical
to different parts of this history. The students' efforts produced about 2200 photocopied pages.
which I have read and incorporated here. The newspapers studied include:
Boston Co uonwealth 1889 (whole year)




Boston Globe Jan.-May 1879
Cambridge Hera d Jan.-Mar. 1848
Cambridge Owl Apr.-OCt_ 1848
Cambridge Palladium Jan.-May 1843
Cambridge Tribune 1882-early 1885 (whole years)
Lowell Courier)Daily Courier June 1835-1838; 1840-1842
(whole years); 1843-1845
(selected times)
Lowell Journal 147 (whole year)
1848 (mo t of year)
Salem Gazette Jan.-Aug. 1837
Springb eld Dail Repubican Jan. 1865-May 1866
Voice of ndustry / New Era of May 1845-Aug. 1848
Inlustry (Lowell)II
My research assistants conducted a similar page-by-page search of various 19h-century law
journals.
265. LoWELL COuRieR, Sept. 197,ci at 2 ("We understand .. that nearly all the
individuals indicted at the June Term, for breach of the license law, have submitted, and paid their
fines and costs."); see also SALE GAzETfu Dec. 27, 1836, at 3 ("Several othersa.. who were
indicted for breaches of the License Law, came into Court, and pleaded that they would not
contend with the Commonwealth; and agreed not to sell any more spirits.").
266. Among these few are repeated references made by the Boston Globe's court reporter
during the last quarter of the century to plea bargaining in drunkenness cases. It appears that the
regularity with which accused drunks pled guilty and paid a standard three-dollar line had become
somewhat of a public joke. See, e.g., Municipal Court-Judge May, BOSTON DAILY GLOBE, Apr.
4, 1879, at I ("All the [drunkenness defendants] exhibited a commendable resignation. and took
their little fine of $3 and costs in a beautiful and touching way." ); Municipal Court-Parmenter,
J., BOSTON DAILY GLOBE, Mar. 19, 1879, at I ("EFleven simple drunks compounded for their sins
on the ordinary terms." ).
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altogether his guilty plea and sentencing, yet Goulding's may have been the
first plea-bargained murder case in Middlesex history.
In fact, the blinkered reporting of the Huntington episode highlights
what might seem at first to be an odd incongruity in my evidence: Even
while the public remained largely uninformed about plea bargaining in the
courts, legislators not only knew about it, but acted on it-investigating
Huntington's handling of liquor cases in 1844, barring prosecutorial nol
prosses in 1852, and, as we will see,268 forbidding the filing of liquor cases
in 1865. Perhaps one explanation is that many of the legislators-including
Cyrus Washburn, who first complained against Huntington-were lawyers
and therefore were unusually aware of goings-on in court. Another
explanation may be that newspaper editors thought the public would not
much care about plea bargaining even if legislators did. But the most likely
explanation is that legislative attention to plea bargaining simply was
incidental to its concern with liquor-law enforcement, probably the most
enduring political issue in nineteenth-century Massachusetts. After all, the
temperance movement, unlike plea bargaining, prompted substantial news
pieces-sometimes whole columns long-in almost every issue of almost
every newspaper.2 69 And even as the legislature took up the problem of plea
bargaining in liquor cases three different times, it apparently took no notice
of plea bargaining in murder cases, although almost half of all murder
prosecutions in the 1860s ended in clear plea bargains. The public
surely was concerned about liquor-law enforcement. It simply did not
know as much about the mechanics of that enforcement as did its elected
representatives.
Difficult as it is to find evidence of public awareness of plea
bargaining, it is even harder to find evidence that the public thought well of
the practice. Yet Vogel's theory, like McConville and Mirsky's, depends on
the public's approval of plea bargaining. I have found some evidence of
disapproval of practices related to plea bargaining. In 1841, the Courier
called it "a very miserable piece of business" when a Boston constable let a
thief go in exchange for information about where he had hidden the
goods."' 0 Others apparently agreed, for the constable was indicted for
breach of duty.27' In 1866, a Boston newspaper took to task those crime
267. See Coroner's Inquisition, LOWELL J., Mar. 24, 1848, at 4; Examination of Barney
Goulding on the Charge of Murdering His Wife, LOWELL J., Mar. 31, 1848, at 1; Police Court,
LOWELL J., Mar. 31, 1848, at I.
268. See infra notes 280-282 and accompanying text.
269. Between Monday, October 13, and Friday, October 17, 1845, the Courier printed at
least five substantial items on temperance, two of which were a full column or almost that in
length.
270. Midnight Robber Arrested, LOWELL COURIER, Apr. 3, 1841, at 2. The newspaper added
that the result "was not satisfactory to many people." Id.
271. See LOWELL COURIER, Apr. 10, 1841, at 2. The constable was fined $50 and costs. See
LOWELL COURIER, July 3, 1841, at 2. Roger Lane reports, on the basis of other sources, that
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victims who compromised with criminals for return of their property."
These practices were not plea bargains, however, because the defendants
never pled, and the court never passed judgment. And in New York, where
McConville and Mirsky base their claim of the electoral benefits of plea
bargaining, the practice's press was bad. In 1865, the New York Times
denounced plea bargaining by the local prosecutor's office, especially in
crimes of violence, and suggested plea bargaining was to blame for the
city's high crime rate.273
In defense of Vogel's and McConville and Mirsky's theories, one might
argue that plea bargaining could have won votes even without a broad
public audience if individual defendants left court gratified by their
bargains and prepared to vote or to influence others who would. I have
come across scattered evidence that defendants reacted-or were thought to
react-in this way, though the earliest I have found is from New York and
is dated 1869.274 In any event, while such a theory about satisfied judicial
customers might explain the leniency that Vogel claims to see in Boston's
police court, it does far less well when applied to the charge-bargaining
practices I found in liquor cases in Middlesex County. It is hard to believe
that the liquor-license defendants, whom Huntington or Train snagged with
one of their multi-count indictment forms and who submitted to one or
more charges to escape the full force of the district attorney's volley, left
court eager to throw him their support. Nor is it likely that the district
"there was no outcry" about the constable's actions. ROGER LANE, POLICING THE CITY: BOSTON
1822-1885, at 57 (1967). He adds that "[t]he commonwealth also offered rewards, several of
which went to [the constable]." Id. at 259 n.57. The statutes Lane cites for support, however, have
no relation to the case. See id.
272. See Compromising Crime, DAILY EVENING TRAVELLER (Boston), Apr. 12. 1866, at I
("This is all wrong,-wrong in itself, and wrong because it operates as an encouragement to
crime, and a discouragement to industry, and as a weakener of the rights of property.").
273. It is a growing custom with the District-Attorney to accept a plea of guilty of a
minor offense from a party indicted for a high crime.... We cease to be startled at
the frightful record of bloody affrays or violent robberies which the daily papers
present, when we see that criminals seldom receive the punishment due to their
crimes, but are let loose to tell their comrades how easy it is to escape justice in New-
York.
Crime and Criminals, Law and Justice in New-York, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 7. 1865, at4; see also Eric
H. Monkkonen, The American State from the Bottom Up: Of Homicides and Courts, 24 L &
Soc'Y REV. 521, 529 (1990) (quoting a similar sentiment in a New York Times editorial of 1866):
The O'Hara Tragedy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1873, at 5 (recounting an apparent charge bargain in a
murder case).
274. In 1869, the New York Times suggested that indicted defendants whom the district
attorney never prosecuted might become political assets: "'They naturally feel grateful for this
forbearance, and depraved though they may be, appreciating the purity of [the district attorney's]
motives, testify their gratitude by working for him at elections." WILBUR R. MirLER, COPS AND
BOBBIES: POLICE AUTHoRITY IN NEw YORK AND LONDON, 1830-1870, at 79 (1977) (quoting
from the New York Times); see also Justin Miller, The Compromise of Criminal Cases, I S. CAL
L. REV. 1, 4-5 n.16 (1927) ("It seems to be a customary practice of winning favor with
constituents to save them from the consequences of their illegal acts .... (quoting THE REPORT
OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMITTEE ON MOTOR TRAFFIC, H. Doc. No. 1737 (Mass. 1924),
reprinted in MASS. L.Q., July 1924, at 1, 10)).
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attorney would have traded the goodwill of the defendant's law-abiding
neighbors, who regarded their local speakeasy merchants as pests, 75 to gain
the uncertain and tainted support of the barkeeps he hauled into court-
even if cynical observers occasionally suggested this was his purpose.276 A
district attorney who wished to curry favor with a potential liquor defendant
had a better route-both milder and quieter-than to bring public charges
and then plead them away: He could contrive to avoid an indictment. In
1843, for example, when confronted with the demands of angry neighbors
that he prosecute a local selectman who dealt liquor for his bread,
Huntington dutifully summoned a flock of witnesses before the grand jury,
but the grand jury declined to indict.
77
The theory that plea bargaining was politically popular suffers not only
from a lack of evidence that plea bargaining garnered political support, but
275. See infra note 277 and accompanying text.
276. In 1885, a Boston newspaper printed the complaint of a temperance advocate that "the
district attorney is omnipotent and need not prosecute any liquor dealer... if the defendant can
control a few votes." Massachusetts Temperance Alliance, BOSTON EVENING TRANSCRIPT, Jan.
7, 1885, at 8. After suggesting that the district attorney was cutting deals using the on-file method
of plea bargaining, the writer continued, "District attorney Stevens is efficient against the
friendless, unefficient among politicians." Id.
277. In January 1843, Huntington received the following letter:
Dear Sir,
I wish to trouble you once more with complaints respecting the Licence Laws; we
have now a hard case the chairman of our Board of Select men Capt. Moses Phipps, has
a store in the south part of this town where ardent spirit is continually being sold
without licence, & it is quite a source of annoyance to the neighbourhood & they have
requested me to communicate with you upon the subject.
This may well be termed spirit-ual wickedness in high places. Mr. Phipps is a man
of property & influence, but his influence is not always for good, he was once indicted
for selling without licence & it cost him something, but that did not make him obedient.
& people think it time to try him once more.
I have been furnished with a long list of witnesses, & you will do well perhaps to
summon them all, some are the buyers & drinkers, & some are those who have seen it
put up for them; I know not the tenor of their testimony but it is said that people buy by
the glass & drink at the store, or by the quantity to carry away....
Please keep my name out of sight, & oblige:
Yours truly,
John A. Fitch
Letter from John A. Fitch to Asahel Huntington (Jan. 11, 1843) (on file with the Massachusetts
Archives, contained in Commonwealth v. Moses Phipps & Benjamin Phipps, Middlesex Ct. C.P.
File Papers (June 1843)). Huntington indeed issued subpoenas to most or all of the witnesses Fitch
named, and eight of them testified before the grand jury, which nonetheless returned a no bill. See
Phipps & Phipps, Middlesex Ct. C.P. File Papers.
I have no evidence that a grand jury of the 1840s "would indict a ham sandwich." See Sot.
WACHTLER, AFTER THE MADNESS: A JUDGE'S OWN PRISON MEMOIR 292 (1997) (claiming
credit for one version of the famous quip). But at least as early as 1893, we can find complaints
that "the grand jury is, in practice, mere clay in the hands of the prosecuting officer." Heman W.
Chaplin, Reform in Criminal Procedure, 7 HARv. L. REV. 189, 191 (1893). It is interesting that
another of the very few cases I have noticed in which citizens asked the district attorney to take
action against a local liquor dealer also ended in a no bill. See Commonwealth v. Manley
Richardson, Middlesex Ct. C.P. File Papers (June 1843) (on file with the Massachusetts Archives)
(containing a letter of complaint and a list of witnesses bearing on the rum-selling activities of a
local innkeeper as well as documents suggesting that six witnesses testified before the grand jury).
[Vol. 109: 857
Plea Bargaining's Triumph
also from solid contrary evidence that those who most needed political
support did what they could to kill plea bargaining in liquor cases. The
office of district attorney became elective only in 1856." Yet even as
unelected district attorneys perfected multi-count liquor-indictment
forms as plea-bargaining tools, elected legislators contrived to frustrate
their use. In 1852, as we have seen, the legislature effectively halted charge
bargaining in liquor cases by banning nol prosses except with the approval
of the court. There is little reason to think that the legislature acted without
the specific intent to kill prosecutorial plea bargaining. Although I have not
found reference to this part of the law in the surviving legislative records,
we can gather something of the legislature's intent from its persistence in
maintaining the nol pros ban in its 1855 and 1869 reenactments of the
prohibition law,279 long after it was clear that the ban had snuffed out
prosecutorial charge bargaining of the pre- 1852 variety.
We find clearer proof of the legislature's distaste for prosecutorial plea
bargaining in the steps it took to kill the one form of prosecutorial plea
bargaining in liquor cases that survived the 1852 law. In 1865, after a series
of witnesses disclosed to a legislative committee that prosecutors were
placing cases on file to get around the nol pros ban, '  the legislature
promptly passed "An Act To Prevent Evasions of the Provisions of Section
Fifty-Eight of the Eighty-Sixth Chapter of the General Statutes"-that is,
evasions of the section of the liquor law that banned prosecutorial nol
prosses. The new law provided that no liquor case "shall be laid on file or
disposed of except by trial" without the court's approval. " Thereafter, the
legislature remained vigilant, reenacting its bar against filing liquor cases
in 1869 and 1885922 and in general, throughout the nineteenth century,
278. See Act of May 16, 1856, ch. 173, § 1. 1856 Mass. Acts 98, 98-99 (concerning the
election of district attorneys and other county officers). The office of attorney general apparently
became elective in 1855, see MASS. CONST. art. XVII (ratified May 23. 1855). though Davis put
the date at 1858, see I DAvIS, supra note 14, at 290.
279. See Act of June 19, 1869, ch. 415, § 60, 1869 Mass. Acts 706. 723 (" [T]he prosecuting
officer ... shall not enter a nolle prosequi [in any case arising under this act] except with the
concurrence of the court."); Act of Apr. 20, 1855, ch. 215, § 35, 1855 Mass. Acts 623, 641 (" (A]
nolle prosequi shall not be entered by the prosecuting officer [in any case arising under this act].
excepting with the concurrence of the court."). The 1855 reenactment followed a decision by the
Supreme Judicial Court in 1854 declaring unconstitutional certain search-and-seizure provisions
of the 1852 prohibition law. See Fisher v. McGirr, 67 Mass. (I Gray) I. 21 (1854).
280. See infra notes 330-332 and accompanying text.
281. Act of May 12, 1865, ch. 223, § I, 1865 Mass. Acts 617, 617.
282. See Act of June 19, 1885, ch. 359, § 1. 1885 Mass. Acts 817, 817 (providing that "[no
case in court for the violation of... any... act ... relating to intoxicating liquors shall be placed
on file or disposed of, except by trial," except with the court's concurrence), Act of June 19,
1869, ch. 415, § 60, 1869 Mass. Acts 706, 723-24 (providing that " [n]o case in court for the
violation of... this act... shall be laid on file or disposed of except by trial." except with the
concurrence of the court).
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preventing prosecutors from contriving plea bargains without judicial
participation."'
Although Vogel cannot sustain her claim that plea bargaining in
Massachusetts was politically popular, she does point to another political
mechanism that may have moved Massachusetts prosecutors to plea bargain
when they could. In 1832 the legislature first required local prosecutors to
report the outcomes of their cases. Vogel surmises, no doubt rightly, that
each prosecutor hoped to appear as successful as his peers-a hope made
more urgent when the office became elective in 1856.2 4 In 1844 District
Attorney John H. Clifford of the southern district, who went on to become
attorney general and governor, made a point of telling the legislature that he
had handled 523 cases in the previous year and that "[t]he number of
acquittals by the verdicts of juries [was just] four. 25 Neither here nor in a
similar boast made elsewhere286 did Clifford trouble his audience with the
283. The 1852 ban on nol prosses, reenacted in 1855, as well as the 1865 ban on putting cases
on file, remained in place until both were repealed when the legislature briefly replaced the
prohibition law with a license law in 1868. See Act of Apr. 30, 1868, ch. 141, § 26, 1868 Mass.
Acts 107, 115. Both were reinstated in 1869, when the state returned to a prohibition regime. See
supra notes 279, 282. In 1875, the state reverted to a license-law scheme, and both were repealed.
See Act of Apr. 5, 1875, ch. 99, §§ 1-6, 1875 Mass. Acts 664; Act of Mar. 9, 1875. ch. 43, § I.
1875 Mass. Acts 631, 631. When the legislature reinstated the ban on filing cases in 1885, it made
no direct reference to the prosecutor's nol pros power, but it did provide that no liquor case "shall
be placed on file or disposed of except by triar' without the court's concurrence, seemingly
constraining the nol pros power as well. Act of June 19, 1885, ch. 359, § 1, 1885 Mass. Acts 817,
817 (emphasis added).
Hence, there were two periods between 1866 and the end of the century during which
prosecutors apparently had the freedom to nol pros liquor cases or place them on file-from 1868
to 1869 and from 1875 to 1885. But in both these periods, the governing liquor law granted broad
sentencing discretion to the judge. The 1868 law provided that "[any person convicted of a
violation of any of the provisions of this act, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding ive
hundred dollars, and confinement at hard labor in the house of correction not exceeding six
months." Act of Apr. 30, 1868, ch. 141, § 18, 1868 Mass. Acts 107, 112. By giving judges such
wide sentencing discretion, this law-like most penal provisions in Massachusetts-deprived
prosecutors of the sentencing control that they needed to charge bargain effectively. The 1875
law, however, arguably opened a window for prosecutorial charge bargaining. It provided for a
punishment of "a fine not less than fifty nor more than five hundred dollars, or imprisonment not
less than one nor more than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment." Act of Apr. 5,
1875, ch. 99, § 13, 1875 Mass. Acts 664, 668. By establishing a minimum fine, this law might
seem to have created an opportunity for prosecutors to bring multiple counts to gain leverage for a
charge bargain. But it is unlikely the tactic would have worked without judicial participation.
Most defendants would have been reluctant to plead guilty to a liquor offense that carried up to six
months' imprisonment without some assurance from the judge that he would not impose time.
And in fact, during the October 1880 term of court-the only term of court I studied closely while
this statute was in effect-I observed no charge bargaining in liquor cases. I also observed none in
the June 1885 term, when this law was just being abolished.
284. See Act of May 16, 1856, ch. 173, § 1. 1856 Mass. Acts 98, 98-99 (concerning the
election of district attorneys and other county officers); Act of Mar. 14. 1832, ch. 130, § 8. 1832
Mass. Acts 396, 403-04; Vogel, supra note 148, at 218-19; Vogel, supra note 146, at 136.
285. S. Doc. No. 68, at 7, 9 (Mass. 1844) (reprinting the letter of J.H. Clifford, Jan. 20. 1843
[sic]). Clifford became attorney general in 1849 and governor in 1852. See I DAVIS. supra note
14, at 290.
286. In Clifford's papers, there is a handwritten biography or autobiography presumably
prepared for a run for office. At page six, it reports that "while there were from three to four
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number of trials he risked in amassing so striking a record of success. In
fact, the same feature of county prosecutors' annual reports to the
legislature that makes them almost useless to historians of plea bargaining
made them supremely useful to prosecutors who aimed to impress-for
these reports rarely distinguished between convictions after trial and
convictions by plea.2s7
These reports, therefore, are not evidence of plea bargaining's political
popularity, but of the opposite; not evidence of the public's awareness of
plea bargaining, but of the opposite; and not evidence of the popularity of
extending leniency to some criminal defendants, but of the opposite.' That
prosecutors seem to have found political advantage in reporting high
conviction rates and in obscuring how they won them suggests that the
public preferred severity to leniency and full convictions to bargained deals.
These reports cannot support Vogel's or McConville and Mirsky's claims
of broader social, cultural, or political forces at work in the rise of plea
bargaining. They are instead evidence that individual prosecutors found a
hundred cases yearly, there were just seventeen verdicts of not guilty rendered in the district in
criminal cases, during the entire decade over which his incumbency of the office extended.- John
H. Clifford Papers, 1845-1851 Box, Jan.-Oct. 1850 Folder (on file with the Massachusetts
Historical Society). The biography attributes Clifford's success to his firm course of "abandoning
a prosecution, when he became satisfied that the jury ought to entertain reasonable doubts of the
guilt of the accused." Id.
287. The Massachusetts attorney general began making annual reports to the legislature in
1832. Except for an interruption when the office itself was suspended between 1843 and 1849. see
supra note 129 and accompanying text, these reports appeared throughout the 19th century. Until
1870 they included abstracts of the business of the various district attorneys. From 1832 through
1859, these abstracts made no distinction between convictions after trial and convictions after
plea. A single category, "Convictions," presumably included both phenomena. See, e.g.. S. Doc.
No. 20, pt. 2, at 19-35 (Mass. 1842) (annual report of the attorney general). Between 1860 and
1869, however, the abstracts of the district attorneys' business took on far greater detail and, in
particular, noted the number of guilty and no-contest pleas in each of the various categories of
crime. See, e.g., PUB. DOC. No. 23 app. at 22-26 (Mass. 1860) (annual report of the attorney
general for the year ending Dec. 31, 1860). In 1870, this experiment with full disclosure stopped
as suddenly as it had begun. Throughout the rest of the century, the reports of the attorneys
general excluded altogether the abstracts of the district attorneys' business. See, e.g., PUB. Doc.
No. 12 (Mass. 1871) (annual report of the attorney general for the year ending Dec. 31, 1870).
I have not found the reason for the great candor of the 1860s. Four different men served as
attorney general in that decade, and neither the beginning nor the end of the decade coincided with
a change of office holders. See Lewis W. Morse, Historical Outline and Bibliography of Attorneys
General Reports and Opinions from Their Beginning Through 1936, 30 L LIBR. J. 39, 111-12
(1937).
288. In his original plea-bargaining exposd, Raymond Moley complained of the ambiguity
of prosecutors' reports:
What is much more important to the prosecutor is the fact that in such records as most
prosecutors make of the work which they have performed, a plea of guilty of any sort is
counted as a conviction, and when he goes before the voters for re-election he can talk
in large terms about securing convictions when, in reality, these -convictions" include
all sorts of compromises....
The extent to which this actual, although not formal, misrepresentation of records
is indulged in is indicated by the fact that in practically every state where there are any
records at all, the convictions upon plea are lumped with convictions by jury.
Moley, supra note 47, at 103.
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personal and political advantage in securing the easy victories that plea
bargaining afforded. For all that these reports suggest, prosecutors may
have believed that the more clandestinely they could secure those victories,
the better.
Now we must examine a form of plea bargaining more clandestine than
the rest. On-file plea bargaining, which emerged sometime in the first half
of the nineteenth century, was the only form of prosecutorial plea
bargaining other than charge bargaining in murder cases to survive the
legislature's mid-century assault on nol prosses in liquor cases. No longer
able to charge bargain in liquor cases and lacking judicial support for the
sort of broad-based sentence bargaining that would emerge later,
prosecutors kept plea bargaining alive as an underground resistance
movement sustained by their power to put cases quietly on file. In its
relative secrecy, on-file plea bargaining belies Vogel's claims about the
importance of political popularity in plea bargaining's rise. And in its
versatility, on-file plea bargaining belies Ferdinand's claims about the
victimless nature of liquor crimes and the sophistication of liquor
defendants. These features perhaps made some cases more attractive targets
for plea bargaining, but just as they were not sufficient to keep alive
prosecutorial charge bargaining in liquor cases, so they were not necessary
to successful on-file plea bargaining. For on-file plea bargaining never was
limited to victimless cases or those cases that involved more savvy
defendants. Rather, it spread throughout the lower reaches of the
Massachusetts criminal docket.
III. ON-FILE PLEA BARGAINING AND THE RISE OF PROBATION
Prosecutorial charge bargaining in liquor cases died with the
legislature's ban on unilateral prosecutorial nol prosses in 1852. Three
years later, when the legislature reenacted alcohol prohibition, it turned the
screws even tighter on liquor dealers by attaching a mandatory term of
confinement to every offense under the act.289 The combined effect was that
many more liquor cases went to trial. In 1849, only eighteen of seventy-
eight liquor cases (or twenty-three percent) went to trial, as against forty-
three out of 107 cases (or forty percent) in 1859. But what happened to the
sixty-four liquor cases in 1859 that did not go to trial?
289. See Act of Apr. 20, 1855, ch. 215, § 15, 1855 Mass. Acts 623, 630 (calling for a $10 fine
and a 20- to 30-day term for illegal sale, with mounting mandatory penalties for subsequent
offenses); id. § 17, 1855 Mass. Acts at 631 (imposing a $50 fine and a three-to-six-month term for
being a common seller, with mounting mandatory penalties for later subsequent offenses): id.




A citizen of Middlesex County who chose to investigate liquor-law
enforcement in the courts in that year would have had difficulty even
recognizing this as the proper question to ask. A careful review of the
record book for the Superior Court and the Court of Common Pleas (the
former court succeeded the latter in 1859) '  would have disclosed only
sixty-six liquor cases-forty that went to trial-9' and twenty-six others that
ended in guilty pleas (and prison terms) or nol prosses (approved by the
court) or dismissals. But at various places in this handsome oversized
volume, the citizen might have spied a cryptic heading: "The following
Indictments & Complaints... the Attorney for the Commonwealth in this
behalf orders on fe." 292
The list that followed would not have resolved confusion-it was just a
series of names without charges, case numbers, or places of origin. Hoping
to find out more, the citizen might have turned in two directions. If the clerk
of courts permitted inspection of the file papers for each case, the citizen
would have found the charges as well the cases' progress through court, but
the process of inspection would have been plodding. The alternative was to
ask for access to the clerk's docket book. Unlike the record book, intended
for both posterity and public inspection, 3 the docket book apparently was
for the clerk's eyes only-both the handwriting and the abbreviations ward
off intruders. But with patience, the citizen would have found the answer:
In addition to those sixty-six liquor cases clearly identified in the 1859
record book, there were another forty-one in the docket book, most listed
simply as "L.L." -and all but a few placed "on file." Mixed in with
them were another 122 non-liquor cases, most similarly placed on file.
On the whole, the docket book does not disclose why these cases ended
up on file, though an occasional note will advise that the "Deft. left"'9 or
the principal witness has "gone west. '"% But in fifteen liquor cases in
290. See supra note 5.
291. Three of the tried cases did not appear in the record book, but only in the docket book.
292. See, e.g., Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book (Feb. 1859); Middlesex Super. Ct. R. Book 18
(Feb. 1859).
293. 1 draw this conclusion from the high quality of the volumes themselves and the obvious
care taken in their preparation. It is not clear exactly when the record books were written in
relation to each term of court, but it is clear from both their neatness and their mode of
organization that they were not produced in court as the business was ongoing. I think it is most
likely that the clerk prepared the record book after each term of court.
294. The abbreviation was a throwback to the days before 1852. when the state had a
"license law" as opposed to full-scale alcohol prohibition, but now it signified simply -liquor
law." Even in the docket books, the clerk maintained a distinction between violations of the
prohibition law and violations of the liquor-nuisance statute. My discussion here is limited to the
former, as the nuisance act carried neither the nol pros ban nor (at this time) mandatory prison.
See supra note 176.
295. Commonwealth v. Bridgit Durgin, Middlesex Ct. C.P. Docket Book No. 817 (Feb.
1859).
296. Commonwealth v. Eldridge H. Spinney, Middlesex Ct. C.P. Docket Book No. 112 (Feb.
1859).
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1859, the book adds an important procedural detail-that before the case
was put on file, the defendant had pled guilty. Hence, in Commonwealth v.
Ann Donovan,297 the clerk wrote, "Plea in Court below retracted & now
pleads guilty. [O]n file., 298 Donovan's case and others like it are the focus
of my interest here. When I refer to the on-file mechanism, I mean those
cases that were placed on file after the defendant's plea of guilty or no
contest. In time, I will explain why I think this procedure deserves the name
on-file plea bargaining.
Donovan's case bears no notation concerning either the mandatory fine
or the mandatory prison term that conviction under the liquor law carried.
Apparently, the act of placing the case on file stayed execution of the
sentence. Although Donovan is silent about what happened from that point
on, the record in other cases, including many non-liquor cases, adds more,
as in this "misdemeanor" prosecution of James Quinlan and John Callahan:
"Plea severally guilty--Callahan recogd. on file on probation.' ' 29
Defendant Callahan apparently gave or promised the court an unspecified
sum of money as surety for his future appearance or good behavior-that is,
he "recog[nize]d" for his future good behavior-and was then placed on
probation.
These are not the earliest cases to call to mind modern probation, nor
did such cases emerge first in Middlesex County. As F.W. Grinnell argued
many decades ago, °° the story of probation's rise should begin with the
prosecution of Jerusha Chase in Boston in 1830-for Chase may be the first
reported instance of the on-file mechanism at work.3"' In February 1830,
Jerusha Chase appeared in the Boston Municipal Court to face a charge of
stealing from a residence. The clerk recorded the result:
Feb. 8. Defendant retracts her [not guilty] plea and pleads guilty
and recognized in the sum of two hundred dollars with Benjamin
Salmon, trader, and Daniel Chase, Cordwainer of Marblehead, to
come when sent for and in the meantime to keep the peace .... "
The judge released Chase and charged her two sponsors-Benjamin
Salmon and Daniel Chase-to guarantee her good behavior at risk of
297. Middlesex Ct. C.P. Docket Book No. 789 (Feb. 1859).
298. Id.
299. Commonwealth v. James Quinlan & John Callahan, Middlesex Ct. C.P. Docket Book
No. 664 (Feb. 1859).
300. See F.W. Grinnell, Probation as an Orthodox Common Law Practice in Massachusetts
Prior to the Statutory System, MASS. L.Q. 591, 601-04, 610-12 (Aug. 1917).
301. See Commonwealth v. Jerusha Chase (Boston Mun. Ct. 1831). in REPORTS OF
CRIMINAL CASES, TRIED IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF BOSTON, BEFORE PETER
OXENBRIDGE THACHER 267 (Horatio Woodman ed., Boston, Little & Brown 1845) [hereinafter
REPORTS OF CRIMINAL CASES].
302. Grinnell, supra note 300, at 604 (quoting from the court record).
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forfeiting $200 should they fail. The case itself was placed "on file" (a fact
recorded elsewhere) °3 and would stay there as long as Chase remained on
good behavior. Though Chase's conviction then lay dormant, the prosecutor
had the power to revive it if Chase's behavior later turned worse.
I cannot say exactly when the procedure at work in Chase found its way
into Middlesex County. Before 1844, the county's criminal docket books
contained no information other than what appeared in the record books. The
record books, as I noted earlier, never disclosed much about the on-file
mechanism other than the fact of its existence, and before 1849, they did
not disclose even that.' If we therefore begin looking in the 1844 docket
book, we find something very much like the on-file mechanism already
vigorously in use. The docket book lists seventy-six cases in which the
defendant pled either no contest or (occasionally) guilty. Although almost
all of these involved violations of the liquor law that called for mandatory
fines, the book notes no fines. Instead, it says that the cases were
continued-and then continued again. Eventually, the district attorney nol
prossed several of the cases,"'s thereby canceling the fines.
The docket book for 1847 makes it clear that most such cases were
destined to end in nol prosses. Twenty-four defendants pled either guilty or
(occasionally) no contest to a violation of the liquor law in the February
session of the Court of Common Pleas. All of these cases were continued to
the June session and then again to the October session. At the October
session, district attorney Albert Nelson nol prossed the whole slate of cases
without demanding a single fine. Nelson's frequent use of this mechanism
probably stemmed from his 1847 announcement promising that those liquor
defendants who pled guilty at the next session of court would escape with
no fine.3° 6 That announcement had required that defendants "enter into
303. See Jerusha Chase, in REPORTS OF CRIMINAL CASES. supra note 301, at 267. Grinnell.
supra note 300, at 604.
304. It appears that the record book for the June 1849 session of the Middlesex Court of
Common Pleas was the first to list cases placed on file. See Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book 461 (June
1849).
305. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Joseph Reed, Middlesex Ct. C.P. Docket Book No. 78 (OcL
1844) (noting that the defendant pled no contest to a liquor charge in February 1843. that the case
had been continued until this session, and that the district attorney now nol prossed the case):
Commonwealth v. Elias Messenger, Middlesex Ct. C.P. Docket Book No. 108 (Oct. 1843)
(stating a similar chronology).
306. Nelson made this announcement before a court session in Essex County. also part of his
district, and not in Middlesex, but there is no reason to think that his practice that year would have
varied greatly between the two counties. I have examined the records of the Essex Court of
Common Pleas for the June 1847 session--the next session after Nelson's announcement. The
court's record book, unsurprisingly, makes no mention of cases handled in the way described
above, and the court's docket book appears to be missing. The file papers for individual cases,
however, have survived. I found 10 liquor cases in which the defendant pled guilty or (in two
cases) no contest and then pledged or posted S200 as security for his appearance in the future. No
fines are noted.
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recognizance to observe the law." 307 Although the Middlesex clerk rarely
noted such recognizances in 1847, the clerk in Essex County, where Nelson
also prosecuted, regularly did.308 And in one Essex liquor case from 1847,
opposite the clerk's notation that the defendant pled guilty, Nelson himself
scrawled on the file papers, "Deft to be sentenced if he sells after Sept. 28
1847." 0
This procedure of permitting the defendant to plead to a liquor charge,
continuing the case for two or more court sessions, and then ultimately
entering a nol pros fell somewhat short of the true on-file mechanism.31
Placing a case on file continued it indefinitely3 ' and never called on the
district attorney to exercise his nol pros powers. But this somewhat more
primitive procedure resembled the on-file mechanism both in permitting
defendants who had pled guilty or no contest to escape a mandatory penalty
and in giving the district attorney some control over the defendant's future
behavior.
By the end of 1847, the true "on file" system, so called, had arrived in
Middlesex County,312 but it was rarely used. Two years later, during Charles
Russell Train's second year in office, the on-file mechanism suddenly
became a major and fairly regular component of the district attorney's work
in Middlesex. In the June term of that year, Train placed 108 cases on file.
In thirty-two of these, the defendant pled guilty or no contest before Train
filed the case. Five liquor cases were placed on file after pleas, still falling
307. License Cases, supra note 79.
308. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. David Chandler, Essex Ct. C.P. File Papers No. 279 (June
1847) (on file with the Essex County Superior Court) (noting that the defendant, having pled
guilty to a liquor indictment, pledged or posted $200 to appear in the future and to keep the
peace).
309. Commonwealth v. C. Robinson, Essex Ct. C.P. File Papers No. 394 (Dec. 1847) (on file
with the Essex County Superior Court).
310. I found what might be a surprisingly early example of this mechanism at work in the
earliest liquor case that my research turned up. In 1790, William Barker came before the Court of
General Sessions of the Peace charged with a single unlicensed sale. He pled guilty and then, on
his motion, the court suspended judgment until the next term of court. See Commonwealth v.
William Barker, Middlesex Ct. Gen. Sess. Peace R. Book 4 (Sept. 1790). At the next term, the
court again deferred passing sentence. See Commonwealth v. William Barker, Middlesex Ct. Gen.
Sess. Peace R. Book 16 (Nov. 1790). Finally, at the next term, the prosecutor who appeared on the
case (probably appointed temporarily by the court), "by advice of the Court," nol prossed the
case. See Commonwealth v. William Barker, Middlesex Ct. Gen. Sess. Peace R. Book 26 (Mar.
1791). Although it surely seems.possible that this chain of events manifested the same process
that I have described at work in 1847, I would be reluctant to claim too much of an isolated
example-and I did not see this procedure repeated until the 1840s.
311. As the Supreme Judicial Court wrote decades later, ordering cases on file "dispenses
with the necessity of entering formal continuances upon the dockets." Commonwealth v.
Dowdican's Bail, 115 Mass. 133, 136 (1874).
312. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. David Wheeler, Middlesex Ct. C.P. Docket Book No. 921
(Oct. 1847) (recording that the defendant pled guilty to a liquor charge and entered into
recognizance and that the case then was "[p]laced on file"); Commonwealth v. Bernhard
Moosback, Middlesex Ct. C.P. Docket Book No. 862 (Oct. 1847) (noting the same facts regarding
a larceny case and adding that the defendant was "used as witness").
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short of the nine charge bargains Train conducted that same term in liquor
cases. A striking total of twenty-seven non-liquor cases were placed on file
after pleas, as against only two charge bargains. Most of these non-liquor
cases involved crimes at the low end of the criminal ladder: There were
eleven victimless sex offenses, three larcenies, three minor assault crimes,
two nuisances, and one charge of obstructing an officer. A few crimes stood
a rung or two higher: Four cases, all involving the same defendant, alleged
counterfeiting, and one charged felonious assault. 3 ' We should not be
surprised at Train's sudden, aggressive use of the on-file mechanism. We
saw earlier that his 1849 caseload was more than four times as great as
Huntington's 1843 burden and that Train responded in part by wielding his
power to charge bargain in liquor cases with even more zeal than his
predecessors.314 A prosecutor who had proved so eager and adept when
charge bargaining is not likely to have overlooked the potential of the on-
file mechanism for ending cases quickly and well.
Three years later, when the legislature set out to squelch charge
bargaining in liquor cases by banning prosecutorial nol prosses, Train had
an alternative at the ready. The on-file mechanism proved to be peculiarly
adapted to his dilemma. Because placing a case on file postponed it
indefinitely, the prosecutor never needed to exercise his now-banned nol
pros power. And because cases placed on file were not technically
"disposed," the clerk did not fully record them in the official record books.
The difficulty of discerning what happened to these cases that our citizen of
1859 encountered a few pages back was quite convenient to Train, his
successors in Middlesex, and his counterparts across the state, for it helped
prosecutors evade the legislature's evident wish to end deals in liquor cases.
All this would be but a curious historical footnote if the on-file manner
of resolving cases had grown up and died in the nineteenth century. But this
story of what Ferdinand calls "informal probation"3 5 proves to be of real
moment. For putting cases on file was probation. It was not merely an
ideological forebear of the system of probation that first found expression
in a Massachusetts statute of 1878.316 It was, as a matter of court procedure,
the selfsame thing. Penologically, probation grew more advanced over time
as probation officers came into being, but procedurally, it remained
unchanged until almost the end of the century. For our purposes, the
significance of this identity of probation and the on-file mechanism turns on
these additional facts: Prosecutors had in most cases a unilateral (if not
313. In two cases, the clerk did not name the charge.
314. Ferdinand's figures from Boston also show a greatly expanding use of the on-file
mechanism in the 1840s. Unfortunately, he does not distinguish between cases that also involved
a guilty finding and those in which the defendant defaulted. a witness left town. or the case for
some other reason was abandoned. See FERDINAND, supra note 121. at 60.
315. Id at 69.
316. See Act of Apr. 26, 1878, ch. 198, 1878 Mass. Acts 146, 146.
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exclusive) power to place cases on file. And as we have seen prosecutors do
in other contexts, they converted their power to the purposes of plea
bargaining. By using probation as an instrument of plea bargaining,
prosecutors gave this most famous of nineteenth-century contributions to
criminal procedure much of its initial vigor.
This argument that probation grew up in symbiosis with prosecutorial
plea bargaining breaks into two claims, which are the topics of the next two
Sections: First, the on-file mechanism provided prosecutors with all the
power they needed to invent a new form of plea bargaining, a power they
promptly exploited. And second, this practice of putting cases on file is the
same one that Massachusetts later exported to the nation and the world
under the label "probation." Proving the former claim will tax us with
close readings of statutes and cases to define the prosecutor's power to put
cases on file. Here the very tedium of the work is part of our story. I argued
earlier that nineteenth-century prosecutors had a built-in interest in plea
bargaining, but they achieved the power to satisfy that interest only rarely,
either by extraordinary legislative grant or by procedural ingenuity. In
Part I, I explored the consequences of the extraordinary grant of power that
the legislature unwittingly made by attaching rigid penalty schemes to
liquor laws and capital offenses and by leaving unchecked the prosecutorial
power to nol pros. In the investigation we now begin, I will try to expose
the ingenuity of Massachusetts prosecutors in turning a small procedural
device-the simple formality of moving (or not moving) for sentence-into
the on-file form of plea bargaining.
As intricate as this examination of prosecutorial powers will be, I do
not mean to suggest that the particular array of powers that prosecutors
discovered in the on-file mechanism was essential to prosecutorial plea
bargaining."' Rather, I believe that most nineteenth-century prosecutors
would have devised a means to plea bargain given any constellation of
powers. In this sense, Massachusetts is just a case study. Later I will
examine how prosecutors in other places used the particular powers
available to them. For now, we must explore how Massachusetts
prosecutors crafted a covert plea-bargaining regime from the various
vagaries of Massachusetts practice. In the process, we may see how
prosecutors raised up probation as a sibling of plea bargaining and shaped it
to do plea bargaining's bidding.
317. In 1916, in the course of ruling that federal trial courts had no power to suspend the
imposition of sentence in the absence of federal probation legislation, the United States Supreme
Court canvassed state practice and found Massachusetts to be in the minority of states that
recognized a non-statutory practice of staying sentences indefinitely. See Ex parte United States,
242 U.S. 27, 47 & n.l, 48 & n.1, 50-52 (1916).
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A. The Prosecutor's Powers and On-File Plea Bargaining
Jerusha Chase's business before the Boston Municipal Court on
February 8, 1830, began with a guilty plea: "Defendant retracts her plea [of
not guilty] and pleads guilty .... ,38 Her business ended with a generous
result: Instead of imposing sentence, the court released her into the custody
of her companions on a promise, backed by a pledge of cash, of her future
good behavior. Her case was then placed on file. But can we call this an on-
file plea bargain? Who, if anyone, promised Chase that if she pled guilty,
her case would be placed on file-or from whom did she expect this result?
These questions raise another: Who had the power to grant Chase this
result?
The evidence is strong that Chase was in fact a plea bargain and that
Jerusha Chase's bargaining partner was not the judge, but rather her
prosecutor-James Austin, the Suffolk County Attorney." 9 We have met
Austin before. In 1841, having risen to the post of attorney general, he
engineered the first capital charge bargains that I encountered in
Massachusetts. 2° What we learned about prosecutorial charge bargaining
when studying the work of Austin and others in Part I gives us some idea of
the powers he would have wanted and needed to craft an on-file plea
bargain. In liquor and murder prosecutions, prosecutors needed two sorts of
power to mount a vigorous charge-bargaining practice: the power to protect
defendants against unpleasant surprise at the judge's hands during
sentencing and a corresponding power to protect themselves from the
judge's undue leniency. The question now is whether prosecutors found
these powers in the on-file mechanism.
1. The Power To Protect Defendants from Judicial Severity
In liquor cases, the prosecutor's power to promise the defendant a
specific sentence in exchange for the defendant's guilty plea derived from
the liquor law's fixed penalty scheme and the prosecutor's unreviewable
power to nol pros additional counts of the indictment. In murder cases, the
prosecutor's power to reduce the charge to manslaughter and thereby lift
the threat of death accomplished the same purpose. Although the prosecutor
could not promise the defendant a specific sentence within the zero-to-
318. Grinnell, supra note 300, at 604.
319. See Commonwealth v. Jerusha Chase (Boston Mun. Ct. 1831), in REPORTS OF
CRIMINAL CASES, supra note 301, at 268; 1 DAVIS, supra note 14, at 223; supra notes 92-94 and
accompanying text. It is clear from these sources that Austin served at the relevant times as county
attorney and that he handled at least the later proceedings in Chase. It is possible that he did not
personally conduct every stage of the prosecution.
320. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
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twenty-year range provided for manslaughter, the prosecutor could promise
"not death" and "at most twenty years" -surely enough to convince many
defendants to plead guilty. If the on-file mechanism proved a source of
prosecutorial plea bargaining, then it must in a similar way have given
prosecutors the power to limit the sentence the judge could impose.
In search of this prosecutorial power to limit sentence, I set out to
discover which courtroom actor-prosecutor or judge-had the power to
put cases on file. Like so many other questions I asked in the course of this
study and in others, this question proved to be the wrong one. It turns out
that the power to place cases on file is only a cover for the power that
matters: the power to stay sentence. But though misguided, my question did
not prove fruitless. I went in search of the power to place cases "on file"
because that was the discourse of the day. And just as I was deceived about
where the relevant power lay, so it appears some contemporaries were too.
For while the power to place cases on file migrated into judges' hands,
where some no doubt thought it should be, the power that really mattered
remained in most cases and for a long time firmly in the prosecutor's grip.
The record and docket books of the Middlesex courts give an
intriguingly garbled response to my initial inquiry about the power to put
cases on file. I quoted earlier from the record book for 1859, which says
flatly that "the Attorney for the Commonwealth ... orders [these cases] on
file."32 ' A few years earlier, in 1853, the clerk was even more pointed:
"The following Indictments and Complaints, Charles R Train Esquire,
Attorney for the Commonwealth in this behalf, orders to be placed on
file." '322 But going forward from 1859, we find more mixed meanings.
Between 1860 and 1876, the clerk often attributed the on-file list to the
district attorney (seventeen times) and less often to the court (eight times).
But with interesting frequency, the clerk simply neglected to say who had
ordered that the standard list of cases be placed on file: Seventeen times in
these years, the clerk wrote, "The following Indictments and Complaints, to
wit," and then listed dozens of names-but never finished his sentence.323
Docket books for these years make it clear that the listed cases were placed
"on file," but do not say by whom.324 Then, from 1877 on, the clerk wrote
clearly and consistently that the listed cases were, "by order of the Court,
placed on file."3 25 This variance across the decades is not the only
confusion we encounter. In 1859, for example, some of those cases that
321. Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book (Feb. 1859).
322. Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book 55 (June 1853).
323. See, e.g., Middlesex Super. Ct. R. Book 145-46 (June 1870); Middlesex Super. Ct. R.
Book 1 (Feb. 1870); Middlesex Super. Ct. R. Book 133 (Oct. 1864); Middlesex Super. Ct. R.
Book 2 (Feb. 1864).
324. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jeremiah Dempsey, Middlesex Super. Ct. Docket Book No.
52 (Oct. 1864).
325. See, e.g., Middlesex Super. Ct. R. Book 1-2 (Feb. 1877).
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appear in the record book as having been ordered on file by the district
attorney appear in the docket book as having been ordered on file by the
court.
2 6
Perhaps Ferdinand saw the same sort of confusion in Boston, for he
concludes simply that the decision to put a case on file "may be initiated by
the judge as well as the prosecutor" and that "[u]nfortunately, it was not
possible to differentiate the prosecutor's [decisions] from those of the
judge." 327 I think the best conclusion to draw from this jumble is that the
power to place cases on file shifted haltingly over the third quarter of the
century from the prosecutor to the judge. It is surely possible too that the
clerk himself did not always know who had placed cases on file, or even
that the clerk did know but felt (because it was impolitic to attribute too
much power to the prosecutor?) that it was better not to say.
Statutes are not much more useful than court records in this search.
With some unintended humor, the Supreme Judicial Court wrote in 1874 in
Commonwealth v. Dowdican's Bail that "this practice [of putting cases on
file] has been recognized by statute. Sts. 1865, c. 223; 1869, c. 415,
§ 60." 31 One catches the irony only after looking up the statutes. It turns
out we have seen both of these already: The 1865 citation traces to the "Act
To Prevent Evasions" of the liquor law, which provided that "[n]o [liquor]
case ... shall be laid on file," except with the court's consent, and the 1869
citation leads to the legislature's reenactment of the same ban.3" From the
court's reference and these two statutes, we learn two important facts, each
suggested by negative inference. First, by listing as the only statutory
authority for the practice two laws that greatly restricted the power to put
cases on file, the Supreme Judicial Court implied that formerly there was a
practice without statutory authority. Second, by making a point of writing
and then reenacting a law that barred placing liquor cases on file without
the court's consent, the legislature implied that prosecutors formerly put
liquor cases on file without the court's consent.
The legislature perhaps came to the conclusion that prosecutors were
unilaterally placing cases on file as a result of the 1865 hearings on
326. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Patrick Brady, Middlesex Ct. C.P. Docket Book No. 957
(Feb. 1859) (noting that the case was "ordered on file by Court"). In fact, even within the 1859
Record Book, there is confusion. Although the district attorney is credited with having placed the
long list of cases on file, there are five other cases (none of them liquor cases) to be found
elsewhere in the record book, all of which the court placed on file. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Edward Dyer & Thomas E. Berry, Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book 181 (June 1859) ("The Court
order that the defendants go on probation, and that the indictment be placed on file against
them.").
327. FERDINAND, supra note 121, at 71-72. Ferdinand writes nonetheless that the growing
practice of putting cases on file "represented a clear expansion of [the prosecutor's] powers." Id.
at 69. Elsewhere, he analyzes the municipal court's various judges partly in terms of their
willingness to place cases on file. See id. at 128-33.
328. Commonwealth v. Dowdican's Bail, 115 Mass. 133. 136 (1874).
329. See supra notes 281-283 and accompanying text.
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enforcement of the liquor laws that led later the same year to the Act To
Prevent Evasions.330 Among the witnesses at the hearings was George P.
Sanger, district attorney of Boston's Suffolk County, who said that until his
office recently discontinued the practice, "it was thought, if we collected
the costs, and placed the case on file, it was better, after a verdict of guilty,"
than to press for sentence.33' Whether based on Sanger's admission that
"we" placed cases on file or on some other evidence, several members of
the committee that heard his testimony wrote in their report that "witnesses
said that attorneys evaded the prohibitory law by ... placing cases on
file" -and then added that such "attorneys act upon the same principle as
the liquor dealers, whom they try to shield, and prostitute their honorable
profession to a connivance with vice, regardless of justice and
humanity." 332
By directing such harsh language at lawyers and by enacting soon
afterward a law to prevent prosecutors from putting liquor cases on file
without the court's consent, legislators seemed to declare their belief that
prosecutors were placing cases on file. It is unclear whether the Act To
Prevent Evasions succeeded in preventing prosecutors from placing liquor
cases on file. On the one hand, Middlesex Superior Court record books
show a marked disruption of on-file plea bargaining in liquor cases. In the
two terms of court I studied in 1864-the last year before the law change-
I observed eleven on-file plea bargains in liquor cases. I saw only one in the
single term of court I studied in 1870."'3 And in 1900, the last year I studied
in depth, only twelve of 225 on-file plea bargains took place in liquor
cases.3" On the other hand, some evidence suggests that judges in Suffolk
County readily gave their consent to prosecutors' requests to place liquor
cases on file.335 We need not resolve this uncertainty, for even while the
330. I infer that the hearings led to the Act To Prevent Evasions from the coincidence of two
legislative documents: The minority report of the committee that conducted the hearings, which
complained of the practice of putting liquor cases on file, was issued on the same day that the bill
to prevent evasions was reported by a separate committee. Compare S. Doc. No. 201, at I. 6
(Mass. 1865) (minority committee report), with S. Doc. No. 205, at 1, 1-3 (Mass. 1865)
(reporting the bill).
331. S. Doc. No. 200, at 22 (Mass. 1865) (statement of George P. Sanger). Sanger was
speaking of prosecutions under the liquor-nuisance act, not the prohibition act, but because the
Act To Prevent Evasions applied to both acts, the distinction is unimportant here.
332. S. Doc. No. 201, at 6 (minority committee report). The minority opposed the
recommendation of the committee that the state revert from a prohibition law to a license law. See
S. Doc. No. 200, at 44-45.
333. See Commonwealth v. Joseph Alexander, Middlesex Super. Ct. Docket Book No. 874
(Feb. 1870).
334. I am counting both license law and liquor-nuisance cases, as the 1865 Act and its
successors treated them symmetrically.
335. The clerk's papers for Commonwealth v. Dowdican's Bail, 115 Mass. 133 (1874),
contain the judge's "certificate" that the act requires before a liquor case may be placed on file.
The preprinted form reads, "In this case, No. [blank] of 18[blank], against [blank] I certify that I
am satisfied the cause relied on in the annexed affidavit exists, and that the interests of public
justice require the allowance of the motion to lay the case on file." Judge's certificate (June 5.
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nominal power to place cases on file appeared to be shifting toward the
judge, the real power lay elsewhere.
The language of placing cases "on file" appears so prominently in the
court's docket books that I was blinded at first to the right question, though
it should have been clear all along. For this study of plea bargaining's rise
is not much concerned with those cases that ended up on file because a
defendant or witness left town. Rather, we want to know about those cases
in which the defendant pled guilty and then, just when the judge normally
would have passed sentence, someone instead put the case on file. In these
cases, the important question is not who placed the case on file-that is
merely the mechanism that held the case in abeyance while sentence was
stayed-but rather who stayed the sentence. And the surprising answer to
this question is that the prosecutor did.
To track the prosecutor's power to stay sentence, we have to go back to
1830 and the case of Jerusha Chase. The trial judge, Peter Oxenbridge
Thacher, wrote that after Chase pled guilty, "sentence would have been
pronounced .... but upon the application of her friends, and with the
consent of the attorney of the commonwealth, [the defendant] was
permitted, upon her recognizance for her appearance in this court whenever
she should be called for, to go at large." 336 Thacher has been quite vague
here about the distribution of the power to stay Chase's sentence: Her
"friends" applied for the stay; the prosecutor "consent[ed]" to it; and it
"was permitted" -presumably by the court.337
Compare, now, the reporter's headnote to the case, which appears on
the page before the judge's summary and most likely was written in the
early 1840s: The "defendant pleaded guilty to an indictment, and the
prosecuting officer did not move for sentence, but laid the indictment on
file, and the defendant was permitted to go at large."" The reporter
helpfully has alerted us that the procedure Thacher described was actually
the "on file" mechanism-something Thacher confirmed in noting that the
"indictment has been suffered to sleep upon the files of the court." 339 And
the reporter has clearly named the prosecutor as the actor who filed the
case. More importantly, the reporter suggested that "mov[ing] for
sentence" and "la[ying] the indictment on file" were mutually exclusive-
1867), Dowdican's Bail (No. 2024) (on file with the Supreme Judicial Court Archives, Boston).
The underlying affidavit to which the form refers appears to have been lost, but it is described in
the case notes to the Supreme Judicial Court's opinion as having claimed that the indictments in
question were duplicative of another. See Dowdican 's Bail, 115 Mass. at 134.
336. Commonwealth v. Jerusha Chase (Boston Mun. Ct. 1831), in REPORTS OF CRIMNAL
CASES, supra note 301, at 268.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 267.
339. Id. at 269.
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that is, placing a case on file is what a prosecutor did instead of moving for
sentence. 340
The question now is whether the prosecutor's failure to move for
sentence actually barred the judge from passing sentence. If not, then the
prosecutor's promise to withhold his motion would have enticed very few
defendants to plead guilty. We have seen already some hints that the
prosecutor could in fact block judicial sentencing. Recall that in 1847,
District Attorney Albert Nelson announced "that at the present term, it is
his intention when the parties complained of plead guilty [in liquor-license
cases], and enter into recognizance to observe the law, not to press for the
fines which are incurred, but simply to exact the costs of Court."'" As fines
were mandatory under the liquor-license law, Nelson's failure to "press for
the fines" must have relieved the judge of the obligation to pass sentence,2
though we cannot yet be sure that it barred the judge from sentencing.
Similarly, when the legislative committee I mentioned met in 1865 to
consider enforcement of the liquor laws, it asked whether the district
attorneys had failed "to bring the convicts to sentence, or to enforce the
sentence."34 3 The prohibition law at the time called for mandatory
confinement, so again the district attorney's failure to move for sentence
must have released the judge from the law's directives. But did it prevent
the judge from passing sentence?
One hint that it did is a remark made almost in passing by the Supreme
Judicial Court in 1838: "After a verdict of guilty is rendered, the defendant
is to be sentenced on motion of the attorney general; and we have no doubt
of his authority to enter a nolle prosequi after verdict." 4 The court implied
that the prosecutor had full discretion to choose between passing sentence
and forgoing it and that the prosecutor's motion for sentence was a
prerequisite to passing sentence. But we have to travel several decades
forward to find more conclusive evidence on the point. In 1899, a southern
Massachusetts district attorney, Robert Harris, submitted his report to the
Plymouth County Commissioners. In remarking on the awesome
responsibility of sentencing, Harris wrote, "The District Attorney has a
large judicial discretion. He can decline to ask for sentence, or he can ask
340. Id.
341. License Cases, supra note 79.
342. I think it is fair to assume that Nelson's promise not to "press for the fines" amounted to
a promise not to move for sentence. The only other possibility is that Nelson intended to nol pros
each case on payment of costs after a guilty plea. But because part of the deal he proposed was
that the defendant would "enter into recognizance to observe the law" in the future, id., and
because I have not seen this condition attached to a nol pros, whereas it was, as we will see, often
part of an on-file plea arrangement, I think it more likely that Nelson was promising that the case
would be put on file, see infra notes 382-386 and accompanying text.
343. S. Doc. No. 200, at 5 (Mass. 1865).
344. Commonwealth v. Tuck, 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) 356, 366 (1838).
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for it, and until he asks that sentence be imposed, the court can do
nothing." 3
A shrewd reader might appraise Harris's claim of power warily, as it
surely served his interests. But in two rulings during the next few decades,
the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed that the prosecutor had all the power
Harris claimed. In the later of the two, Commonivealth v. Kossowan' of
1929, the court mildly chastised a trial judge for not passing sentence
despite an 1895 law declaring that "[o]n conviction of any offense not
punishable by death, sentence shall be imposed." "The reasons why
sentence was not promptly imposed do not appear," the court wroteY-ss
"Manifestly the case was not filed or prosecution suspended. The case of
Commonwealth v. Carver is not pertinent." "S9 If we turn now to Carver, we
may expect to find an exception to the statutory command that the trial
judge pass sentence upon conviction. In that 1916 case, a jury had
convicted the defendant on two indictments, one alleging forgery and one
larceny. The trial judge did not pass sentence on the forgery indictment.
"The reason for this," the high court wrote, "presumably is that.., this
case was placed on file." 35 Declining to review the defendant's claims of
error in the forgery case, the court concluded that
the exceptions taken in that case are not properly before us. There
has been merely a suspension of active proceedings in the case, and
as yet no final disposition. Unless and until the prosecuting attorney
shall move for sentence there is no occasion to pass upon the
conduct of the forgery trial."'
It is impossible, I think, to escape the combined force of Harris's claim
and the court's statements in Kossowan and Carver. Even after an 1895 law
required judges to pass sentence upon conviction, Harris still could claim
that "until [the district attorney] asks that sentence be imposed, the court
can do nothing," 352 and the high court could declare that "[u]nless and until
the prosecuting attorney shall move for sentence there is no occasion" for a
case to be finally disposed.353 Moreover, a 1926 commentator on
345. ROBERT 0. HARRIS, REPORT OF DISTRICT ATTORNEY (1898). reprinted in REPORT OF
THE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF PLYMOUTH 116 (Plymouth. Avery Printing
1899). Two pages later, Harris wrote, "We [the district attorneys) can 'continue for sentence.'
'place on file,' or allow the men to go on their own recognizance." Id. at 118.
346. 265 Mass. 436 (1929).
347. Act of June 4, 1895, ch. 469. § 1. 1895 Mass. Acts 532. 532 (discussing the sentences
for certain crimes).
348. Kossowan, 265 Mass. at 438.
349. Id. (citation omitted).
350. Commonwealth v. Carver, 224 Mass. 42,44 (1916).
351. Id.
352. HARRIS, supra note 345, at 116.
353. Carver, 224 Mass. at 44.
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Massachusetts law complained that " [a]nother loophole that should be
closed up is one which permits the District Attorney to delay presenting a
person to the court for sentence who has been convicted."3-4 It is true that
this evidence emerges late in our story. Absent contrary evidence, however,
the most reasonable conclusion is that the prosecutor's power to bar
sentence by failing to move for sentence was more secure before the 1895
law than after. This power would explain Nelson's confident 1847 promise
of a fine-free disposition for liquor defendants who pled guilty,355 as well as
the legislative committee's 1865 complaint that district attorneys had failed
"to enforce the sentence" demanded by the liquor law.356 Note how
unimportant the question I posed at the outset of this search now seems: A
defendant who wanted to negotiate a plea bargain with the prosecutor
would not have cared whether the prosecutor or the judge had the power to
place her case on file, so long as the prosecutor had the power to assure that
the defendant would not be sentenced.
Drawing this confusion of sources together, we may take stock of the
prosecutor's power to bar sentence once the defendant has been found
guilty-and therefore of his power to ensure that the case would be placed
on file. In liquor cases after 1865, the Act To Prevent Evasions disturbed
this power in ways that are difficult to disentangle. In earlier liquor cases
and in cases involving any other charge, the prosecutor's power was largely
a function of his complete discretion to move or not to move for sentence.
Because the court could not pass sentence until the prosecutor so moved,
the prosecutor had a unilateral power to prevent the imposition of sentence,
leaving no other option than to file the case. So our search for the first half
of the bundle of powers needed for prosecutorial plea bargaining is
complete: In prosecutorial charge bargaining, the prosecutor could
guarantee liquor defendants a particular fine and murder defendants a
sentence other than death. In on-file plea bargaining, the prosecutor could
promise the defendant no sentence at all.
We may now return to Jerusha Chase. The court clerk, as I noted at the
outset, recorded her guilty plea and noted as well that she recognized with
sureties in the sum of $200. If we add to this the news supplied by the
headnote to Judge Thacher's opinion-that the prosecutor refrained from
moving for sentence and the case therefore was placed on file 357-we can
reconstruct the course of events that probably lay behind these accounts.
354. Frank A. Goodwin, Community vs. Criminal, MASS. L.Q., May 1926, at 16. The author
continued: "There are hundreds of cases where the machinery of the State, at great expense, has
been used to convict a man and then for months and even years the record reads 'still pending for
sentence."' Id.
355. See supra note 341 and accompanying text.
356. See supra note 343 and accompanying text.
357. See Commonwealth v. Jerusha Chase (Boston Mun. Ct. 1831), in REPORTS OF
CRIMINAL CASES, supra note 301, at 267.
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First, Jerusha Chase pled guilty in exchange for the prosecutor's promise
that he would not move for sentence. Second, because the judge could not
pass sentence without the prosecutor's motion, the case was placed on file.
And third, Chase was permitted to go after she and her sureties pledged
$200 to guarantee that she would "come when sent for and in the
meantime ... keep the peace." "358
It is true that the records do not say in so many words that Chase struck
a deal with the prosecutor. To get from the information that the defendant
pled guilty and the prosecutor failed to move for sentence to the conclusion
that she pled guilty in exchange for his promise, I must make an inferential
leap, but a short one. It is possible that the defendant pled guilty out of
remorse or for some other reason and not because the prosecutor promised
leniency, and it is possible that the prosecutor refrained from moving for
sentence as a simple matter of good (and generous) prosecutorial judgment
after the defendant had pled guilty, but the combined probability of these
two events is rather small.
Moreover, we have seen so far at least two pieces of circumstantial
evidence that cases that look like Chase on the face of the record in fact
involved an explicit deal between prosecutor and defendant. The more
powerful is District Attorney Nelson's 1847 announcement that "at the
present term," he would "not ... press for the fines" for those defendants
who pled guilty in liquor-license cases.359 It is hard to escape the
implication of Nelson's announcement that behind the clerk's reticent notes
of cases placed on file after the defendant's plea, there lay an explicit
agreement between prosecutor and defendant. The second piece of
circumstantial evidence is the surge in use of the on-file technique that took
place in Middlesex under District Attorney Train's watch in 1849.' It is
hard to imagine that so prolific a plea-bargaining pioneer as Train, who not
only raised charge bargaining in liquor cases to a new order of magnitude
but also negotiated Middlesex County's fitrst charge bargain in a murder
case, should have overlooked the potential for plea bargaining in the on-file
mechanism.
2. The Prosecutor's Power To Protect Himselffrom Judicial Leniency
We must search now for the second sort of power essential to
successful prosecutorial plea bargaining-the prosecutor's power to protect
himself from the judge's whim. Again, the forms of charge bargaining we
studied in Part I make the importance of this power clear. The prosecutor's
358. Grinnell, supra note 300, at 604 (quoting the original record).
359. License Cases, supra note 79; see also supra note 79 and accompanying text (quoting
the press account of Nelson's announcement in full).
360. See supra notes 313-315 and accompanying text.
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worry in charge bargaining was that after he had nol prossed several counts
of an indictment, the judge would hand the defendant too lenient a sentence
on the remaining counts. The liquor law's rigid penalty scheme guarded
against this result by requiring the judge to impose a particular fine. The
prosecutor's inability to guard against an inappropriately light sentence on a
manslaughter conviction in fact may have limited charge bargaining in
murder cases and might explain why pleas to second-degree murder, which
carried mandatory life in prison, proved in the end the more popular option.
In on-file plea bargaining, the prosecutor faced no immediate risk of
unfair dealing at the judge's hands because the judge had no immediate
role. By failing to move for sentence, the prosecutor left the judge nothing
to do except (perhaps) to perform the ministerial task of placing the case on
file. The judge's chance to undermine the prosecutor's position in on-file
plea bargains came later, and this brings us to the second half of the bargain
the prosecutor reached with Jerusha Chase-her agreement "to keep the
peace." "6
Chase returned to court in 1831 under indictment for a new larceny.
Although a jury acquitted her of the second crime, prosecutor Austin
apparently believed strongly enough in her guilt to conclude that she had
violated her pledge to keep the peace and therefore moved that she be
sentenced on the original indictment.362 Now we reach the point at which
the judge could have frustrated the prosecutor's well-laid plans either by
refusing to pass sentence or by passing a light one. After all, the prosecutor
until now had shown the defendant great leniency in allowing her to walk
free without ever facing sentence. On-file plea bargains would have held
small allure for a responsible prosecutor if he had been vulnerable to
judicial refusal to act when, following the defendant's later breach of the
peace, he decided to call in the case for sentence.
The question, then, is whether the prosecutor's unilateral power to stay
sentence was also an exclusive power: If the district attorney moved for
sentence, could the court nevertheless place the case on file? And if the
district attorney moved to take a case from the file and have sentence
pronounced, could the court refuse? Judge Thacher's opinion in Chase
suggested that the answer to both questions was no. We already have seen
some hint of this result in Thacher's statement that he had permitted the
defendant to go at large "with the consent of the attorney of the
commonwealth. 3 63 When Thacher turned to the question squarely before
361. Grinnell, supra note 300, at 604 (quoting the original record).
362. See Commonwealth v. Jerusha Chase (Boston Mun. Ct. 1831). in REPORTS OF
CRIMINAL CASES, supra note 301, at 267. Chase's situation was similar to that of the modem
probationer, whose probation can be revoked on a probable-cause showing of a further crime even
if a jury has refused to convict by the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.
363. Id. at 268.
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him-whether prosecutor Austin had the power to return to court and
demand that Chase be sentenced on her original conviction-he first
equivocated, but then by stages grew clear and direct. His first approach to
the problem left considerable ambiguity about whether the court could
refuse a prosecutor's request for sentencing: "I cannot doubt the court may,
on motion, have the party brought in and sentenced at any subsequent
period." 3 But his next sentence appears to erase the court's discretion in
the matter: "For what was the duty of the court to do at any one time,
cannot cease to be its duty by delay." - And a page later, Thacher implied
in striking language that the prosecutor's discretion was complete:
"[Chase's sentence] has been delayed from tenderness and humanity, and
not because it had ceased to be the right of the government to claim the
judgment." 3
The Supreme Judicial Court approved Thacher's reasoning in an
unreported opinion,367 but apparently did not again take up the matter of
filed cases until Dowdican's Bail in 1874. That case, like Chase, examined
the prosecutor's power to remove a case from the files after the defendant
was charged with a later offense. As in Chase, the court began by
remarking on the power to file the case in the first instance. "It has long
been a common practice in this Commonwealth," the court wrote, "after
verdict of guilty in a criminal case," for the trial court to "order" the case
on file "with the consent of the defendant and of the attorney for the
Commonwealth. ' ' 368 Having now seen this reference to the prosecutor's
"consent" twice in the same context, we may fairly conclude that this
consent was a precondition to placing a case on file, at least after a guilty
verdict gave the prosecutor the right to move for sentence.
The Dowdican's Bail court did not, however, adopt Judge Thacher's
pointed declaration in Chase that the prosecutor had the power to have a
case taken from the files and to have sentence pronounced. Instead, the
court noted only that it was "within the power of the court at any time,
upon the motion of either party, to bring the case forward and
pass... judgment therein." " From this we may conclude that the court
had no power to remove a case from the files without a motion from the
prosecutor (or from the defendant, though it is hard to imagine why a
defendant would move for sentence). We may also conclude that the
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 269.
367. In a concluding footnote to Thacher's opinion, the reporter noted that the Supreme
Judicial Court had pronounced the judgment correct in an opinion by Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw
and "that the principles of the above decision have often been recognized in our courts." Id. at
270 n.l. The high court's opinion is apparently missing. See Grinnell. supra note 300, at 603.
368. Commonwealth v. Dowdican's Bail, 115 Mass. 133, 136 (1874).
369. Id.
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prosecutor could bring such a motion no matter how long the case had sat
on file.37 But we cannot be sure that if the prosecutor brought a motion, the
court had to grant it.
I have found just one other reference that might help trace the boundary
of the prosecutor's power to prevent a judge from placing (or from leaving)
a case on file. In 1917, F.W. Grinnell wrote that "doubt... has been
expressed in Massachusetts" about whether a judge could place a case on
file if the district attorney moved for sentence.37" ' He then argued that "the
doubt has been resolved" and that "it is the established practice of the
state... that the District Attorney is not entitled to insist upon sentence." 
3 72
Grinnell apparently based this conclusion on Commonwealth v. Macey, an
unreported decision of a Massachusetts Superior Court trial judge, in which
the judge ruled in favor of his own power to continue a rape case without
sentence even after the jury had convicted the defendant and the district
attorney had moved for sentence.373 But Macey was decided sometime after
1898,' 7' and a statute of that year may have given judges grounds to
construe their powers in this area more generously.3 75 Even if Macey is
representative of the state of affairs after 1898-and we cannot be sure that
it is-we still should give it fairly small weight in assessing who held the
power to stay sentence during the bulk of the nineteenth century.
Once again drawing our confusion of sources together, we may
measure the reach of the prosecutor's power to demand that a case be taken
from the files and sentence imposed. There seems to be no dispute that
timing was not an issue-that is, the prosecutor could move for sentence at
any time in the future. If he did, the court was then required to impose
sentence (Chase, 1831); or might have been required to impose sentence
(Dowdican's Bail, 1874); or was not required to impose sentence (Macey,
after 1898). And if the prosecutor in the first instance moved for sentence
upon conviction, the court had no power to place the case on file instead
(Chase, 1831, and Dowdican's Bail, 1874)-or indeed had this power
(Macey, after 1898).
These conclusions suggest that the answer to our underlying inquiry-
whether the on-file mechanism gave prosecutors the power to protect
370. The time lapse in Dowdican's Bail itself, which the court impliedly approved by
upholding judgment against the defendant's sureties, was six years. See id. at 133-34.
371. Grinnell, supra note 300, at 593. In this sentence and the next, Grinnell was quoting
from a brief he co-wrote with R.W. Hale. Grinnell implies that the brief was largely his work, and
as that seems likely, given the context, I am attributing these quotes to him. See id. at 592 (" It was
in the course of the preparation of that brief that parts of this article were compiled ... .
372. Id. at 593.
373. See id. at 593 & n.*.
374. Grinnell supplied no date for Macey, but he did say that the judge's name was Bell, see
id. at 593 n.*, and the only Bell to sit on the superior court bench (as of 1900) was appointed in
1898, see DAVIS, supra note 7, at 254-55, 267, 417.
375. See infra notes 408, 413-416 and accompanying text.
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themselves against undue judicial leniency--changed as the century wore
on. Early in the century, Judge Thacher's holdings that imposing sentence
"cannot cease to be [the court's] duty by delay" and that sentence was
"delayed from tenderness and humanity, and not because it had ceased to
be the right of the government to claim the judgment"376 protected
prosecutors from judicial refusal to act. Later in the century, prosecutors
had reason to feel more vulnerable to the risk of unjustified judicial
generosity.
But even in the early years, the prosecutor's right to demand judgment
generally did not include the right to demand a particular judgment. Except
in liquor cases and those few others in which the law called for a mandatory
penalty, the judge, called on to pass sentence, could impose a lenient one.
This risk of judicial leniency probably discouraged prosecutors from using
on-file plea bargaining in more serious cases. Of course, even if prosecutors
had been assured of judicial severity when they brought the defendant in for
sentencing, they still would have been slow to engage in on-file plea
bargaining in serious cases. That is because in the first instance, on-file plea
bargaining let the defendant walk free. Prosecutors who took to heart their
duty to protect the public--or, after 1856, those concerned about their
reelection-would not have engaged in on-file plea bargaining with the
more serious criminals before the court.
Yet on-file plea bargaining was not as feeble a tool against criminals as
the modern practice usually known as "pretrial probation." A defendant
who accepts pretrial probation today places herself under the court's
supervision before trial without pleading guilty or no contest. Typically, the
court, the defendant, and the prosecutor agree that if the defendant abides
by the law and adheres to any other condition imposed by the court for a
specified period, the court will dismiss the charges-and in the meantime
the case is simply held in abeyance. In on-file plea bargaining, as I use the
term, the defendant always entered a plea of guilty or no contest before the
case was placed on file. The distinction is important: If a defendant placed
on pretrial probation commits a later offense, the prosecutor still must
convict her of the original charge before the court can impose punishment
on that charge. In on-file plea bargaining, as we saw in Chase, if the
defendant committed a later offense or breached her deal with the
prosecutor in any other way, the prosecutor could move for sentence
without further ceremony.3" On-file plea bargaining therefore gave the
376. Commonwealth v. Jerusha Chase (Boston Mun. Ct. 1831). in REPORTS OF CRIMINAL
CASES, supra note 301, at 268-69.
377. See infra note 384 (quoting contemporary sources emphasizing that the defendant was
always convicted before her case was placed on file and that imprisonment was an -invaiab l[e]"
consequence of reoffending).
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prosecutor a far stronger hand in controlling the defendant's future
behavior.
It is true that as the century wore on, the power of prosecutors to claim
judgment on the defendant's conviction grew less certain. Judges
apparently felt freer to reject prosecutors' demands that a case be taken
from the files and sentence imposed. This trend might have discouraged on-
file plea bargaining had it not been for another judicial change in attitude:
During the last quarter of the century, judges grew more friendly toward
plea bargaining and less likely to act in ways that would discourage it. We
will look in Part V at the reasons for the judges' change of heart. We can
look now at one result.
From the beginning, defendants who went to trial and lost almost never
won the reward of a filed case. In 1849, the first year I studied closely after
the appearance of the on-file mechanism in Middlesex County, thirty-seven
defendants who had pled guilty or no contest walked out of court with their
cases filed. Only two defendants who lost at trial had such luck. In
succeeding decades, the story was the same. In the years I studied between
1853 and 1890,378 166 cases were placed on file after pleas of guilty or no
contest-but only thirteen after convictions at trial. During most of these
years, prosecutors apparently held the balance of power in awarding the on-
file mechanism-and they apparently used this power to encourage pleas by
withholding case-filing from defendants who troubled them with trials. By
the end of the century, as we have seen, judges may have assumed more
power to file cases. If so, then it seems they were just as ready as
prosecutors to use the on-file mechanism to encourage defendants to plead
guilty. In 1900, when 225 cases were placed on file after defendants had
offered pleas of guilty or no contest (accounting for forty-one percent of all
adjudicated cases), only six cases were placed on file after defendants chose
trial and lost.
Here we seem to have another piece of circumstantial evidence that
those cases in which the defendant pled guilty and the case was placed on
file involved a clear deal in which the defendant pled guilty in exchange for
having her case placed on file. Yet the numbers reported in the last
paragraph confront us with two ambiguities. They cannot tell us whether
the defendant was negotiating with the prosecutor or with the judge. And
they cannot tell us whether any deals that took place were spoken or
unspoken. After all, when a course of practice was this clear, it might
simply have been understood by all parties, and defendants might have pled
378. I am including data only from those years for which I studied both the record and the
docket books of the court: 1853, 1859, 1864 (February and October only), 1870 (February only),
1880 (October only), and 1890 (incomplete count of docket entries).
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guilty because they knew that doing so was their only real hope of having
their case placed on file.
One piece of evidence seems to resolve both ambiguities. In 1886 John
Maloney pled guilty to a liquor-related charge in the district court-the
lower trial court-where no prosecutor represented the state."' The trial
court then continued the case indefinitely for sentence on payment of costs
by the defendant.3" When the court later imposed sentence against the
defendant-perhaps because he had violated the terms of his release-he
appealed. In the course of its ruling, the Supreme Judicial Court compared
the case to Dowdican's Bail, which had originated in the superior court:
The postponement [of Maloney's case, granted after the
defendant's guilty plea,] was not, and was not intended to be, a
continuance, but an end of the prosecution, unless the magistrate
should see cause at some future time to notify the defendant that
sentence was to be pronounced. It was obviously an arrangement
between the trial justice and the defendant, like that sometimes
made in the higher courts between the prosecuting officer and a
defendant, with the approval of the court, by which, on payment of
costs by the defendant, an indictment or complaint is "placed on
file. Y381
By "an arrangement," the court appears to have meant a plea bargain,
though a genteel one. And in this passage, the Supreme Judicial Court made
it clear that in the "higher courts" -that is, the superior courts, which then
occupied the middle tier of the state's judiciary-" the prosecuting officer
and a defendant" struck these bargains.
B. Probation's Base-Born Status
At least from the days of Jerusha Chase, prosecutors had embraced the
on-file mechanism and converted it to a form of prosecutorial plea
bargaining. Now it is time to ask whether "on-file plea bargaining" could
as aptly be called "probation." In this inquiry, the significance of the dual
powers we examined in the last Section becomes clear- Prosecutors'
unilateral (and sometimes exclusive) power to stay sentence constituted
their power to plea bargain-it is what enabled them to promise sentencing
concessions without fear of interference from the judge. Prosecutors'
exclusive (and sometimes unilateral) power to take cases from the file and
379. See Commonwealth v. Maloney, 145 Mass. 205.210 (1887).
380. See id. (reporter's statement of the case).
381. Id. at 210 (emphasis added) (citing Commonwealth v. Dowdican's Bail. 115 Mass. 133
(1874)).
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demand imposition of sentence is what gave this particular practice the
name probation.
A modern observer would have no difficulty seeing that Jerusha Chase,
as she left court on February 8, 1830, was on something like probation.
Having pled guilty to her crime, she nonetheless walked free, and "no
sentence will ever be pronounced against [her]," Judge Thacher wrote, "if
[she] shall behave [herself] well afterwards, and avoid any further violation
of the law."382 Should she, on the other hand, break the law again, she may
be "brought in and sentenced at any subsequent period." 38 3 Some forty
years later, Charles Russell Train defended the practice of putting cases on
file by pointing to its probationary benefits. Arguing in his new role as
Massachusetts attorney general, he advised the Supreme Judicial Court in
Dowdican's Bail that "[t]he defendant, in all cases where sentence was thus
delayed. . was put on his good behavior, and under bonds, as it were, to
live honestly." "
Our modern observer might find it somewhat puzzling that those
"bonds" were secured not by a court probation officer, who today acts as
"surety" without its financial connotations, but rather by private parties.
Jerusha Chase, for example, "recognized in the sum of two hundred dollars
with Benjamin Salmon, trader, and Daniel Chase, Cordwainer of
Marblehead," 385 either of whom would have been liable to pay $200 should
Chase have failed to come to court when called for or to keep the peace.
And any spark of recognition might fade away when our observer saw the
prosecutor's heavy hand at work at what is now very much the court's
business. At least in these early years, few or none were admitted to
probation without the prosecutor's favor of withholding a motion for
sentence. And all who were on probation, such as Chase and Dowdican,
knew that their free time tolled when the prosecutor demanded his due. Yet
this same practice emerged by the end of the century under the name
probation and claimed fame as the state's singular contribution to American
criminal procedure.
382. Commonwealth v. Jerusha Chase (Boston Mun. Ct. 1831), in REPORTS Of CRIMINAL
CASES, supra note 301, at 268.
383. Id.
384. Brief for the Commonwealth at 2, Commonwealth v. Dowdican's Bail, 115 Mass. 133
(1874) (No. 2024) (on file with the Social Law Library, Boston). In the Senate's 1865 hearings on
enforcement of the liquor law, witnesses referred to the probationary aspects of putting liquor
cases on file. The assistant clerk of courts for Worcester testified, "It is always made a condition
to promise to go out of the business, before placing a case on file, and there is always a conviction
by plea of guilty, or by a verdict." S. DOC. NO. 200, at 28-29 (Mass. 1865) (statement of William
A. Smith). The Suffolk County district attorney noted that "if the guilty person offended again, he
could be and was invariably sentenced to imprisonment." Id. at 22 (statement of George P.
Sanger).
385. Grinnell, supra note 300, at 604 (quoting from the municipal-court record).
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To see that the on-file mechanism did not merely resemble probation or
foretell it, but rather was probation by another name, we have to focus on
the role of the sureties who guaranteed the defendant's good behavior while
she was on probation and her future appearance should the court call for
her. Jerusha Chase's sureties staked $200 on their faith in her future
conduct. 6 But what of defendants who lacked friends of such means? Here
we encounter the role of John Augustus, Boston bootmaker and penal
reformer, named by himself and others the father of probation.3 Augustus
was in the Boston Police Court one morning in 1841 when he hit upon the
philanthropic formula that would occupy his life: 3 8 He would play the role
of surety to indigent defendants whose cases were placed on file during a
"season of probation." 31
386. See supra notes 302-303 and accompanying text.
387. See JOHN AUGUSTUS, A REPORT OF THE LABORS OF JOHN AUGUSTUS, FOR THE LAST
TEN YEARS, IN AID OF THE UNFORTUNATE 4-5, 7 (Boston, Wright & Hasty 1852); CHARLES L
NEWMAN, SOURcEBOOK ON PROBATION, PAROLE AND PARDONS 14 (1968) (" It was in America
that the combination [of factors that constitute probation] was first set in motion, by the judges of
the Boston Municipal Court in cooperation with John Augustus."). 1 N.S. TIMASHEFF, ONE
HUNDRED YEARS OF PROBATION, 1841-1941, at 7 (1941) (" In this country, the idea of probation
as a distinct method of treating offenders is quite correctly ascribed to John Augustus ... ").
388. See AUGUSTUS, supra note 387, at 4-5.
389. Id. at 34; see also U. at 37 (referring to his role as *'surety"); TIMWSHEFF, supra note
387, at 17 ("[T]he unofficial and benevolent persons who helped the judge in the application of
probation, and who were to oversee the behavior of the probationer [were] commonly
sureties ...."). Augustus was typically obscure about the procedural posture of the cases he
described in his chronicle. I have found only one explicit reference to placing cases "on file" in
his work, and although the context is somewhat ambiguous. I think the most natural reading is that
most of his cases were placed on file. Toward the end of his chronicle, Augustus described a case
involving a seven-year-old boy charged with rape-a case unusual in itself but also more serious
than most of those in which Augustus took part. See AUGUSTUS, supra note 387. at 95-96.
Augustus wrote that the court granted his request to place the case on file before trial. He then
added, "This is the only case where I became bail [i.e., surety] when the indictment was laid on
file on a plea of not guilty, except perhaps, when parties have died." Id. at 95. 1 read this sentence
to mean that most of the rest of Augustus's cases were placed on file after a guilty plea or verdict.
Elsewhere, Augustus refers to a court that "continued [a group of his cases] from term to term for
several months, as a season of probation." Id. at 34. A continuance "from term to term" was
often used by courts as a near synonym for the on-file mechanism, differing only in that it
required a more regular reexamination into the case's status. See supra note 310-311 and
accompanying text.
One of the few clear descriptions of the procedural status of those Augustus helped comes
from an account he reprinted from the Christian World of 1848:
Twelve boys, all of about nine or ten years of age, were brought into the Boston
Municipal Court one afternoon last week, to receive sentences for various criminal
offences. They had been convicted, or had pleaded guilty, and their sentences had been
standing postponed; some for nearly a year;, others for less periods,--manwhile they
had been under bail. Most of them had been bailed by John Augustus .... [The judge]
delayed sentence further ....
AUGUSTUS, supra note 387, at 58. Note that the boys had already been convicted and awaited
only sentencing. This postponement of sentence was the critical feature of the on-file mechanism.
Note also that this reporter omitted any mention of the prosecutor's role and left the
impression that the judge could freely delay sentencing. Another news account reprinted by
Augustus gave a fuller sense of the prosecutor's role, but remained at least ambiguous about
whether the judge had the power to postpone sentence in the face of a prosecutor's motion for
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Augustus therefore added nothing new to the court's procedural
repertoire, which was in place at least since the time of Chase, but merely
filled an existing procedural role on behalf of the poor. His enduring
contribution was to play that role with insight and to good effect. To decide
whether particular defendants were "promising subjects for probation,"9
Augustus inquired into their reputations and the influences of their peers.
While they were on probation, he made sure they were schooled or
employed, and he gave "an impartial report to the court, whenever they
should desire it." 39 ' That the district attorney's opposition to his work
"gradually and rapidly" gave way is little surprise,39 for Augustus's vision
of the reformatory purpose of probation did not include contests about guilt:
"[N]ine out of ten of [those for whom I stood surety] who were guilty have
by my advice, pleaded guilty, and thus saved the Commonwealth the
expense of a trial in each case." "'
Just as Augustus contributed no procedural innovation to the existing
practice of probation, so the 1878 law that introduced the word "probation"
into American criminal codes did little more than perpetuate his role.394 The
act authorized Boston's mayor to appoint a probation officer who was to
investigate defendants, advise the court if they "may reasonably be
expected to be reformed without punishment," and then assist those placed
on probation so as "to prevent their again offending." 3 95 The act consumed
barely more than a page of text and neither defined probation nor pretended
to confer any power or to impose any procedure on any courtroom actor.
As F.W. Grinnell wrote in 1917, the act merely provided new officers to
sentence. The reporter quoted the district attorney as acceding to Augustus's request for a further
continuance of sentence in a petty-larceny case: "We do not wish to punish, except for a purpose
of warning others. I will not urge a sentence now .... ." Id. at 20 (quoting an undated report from
the Morning Post). The reporter concludes, "His Honor listened attentively to the remarks of the
worthy philanthropist, and granted the request." Id. Of course, in a petty-larceny prosecution, in
which the allowable sentence range was zero to one year or zero to $300, see MASS. REiV. STAT.
ch. 126, § 17 (Dutton & Wentworth 1836), the question whether the prosecutor could demand
sentence at a particular time may have been academic, since the judge could pass a sentence of
nothing at all. In any event, the power the prosecutor needed to do on-ile plea bargaining, as I
discussed earlier, see supra notes 322, 336-358 and accompanying text, was the power to block
sentencing by withholding a motion for sentence. The power to demand sentencing was important
but inessential and, as we have seen, was at least uncertain at the time of Dowdican's Bail in
1874. See supra notes 367-370 and accompanying text.
390. AUGUSTUS, supra note 387, at 34.
391. Id. at 35.
392. Id.
393. Id. at 103; see also id. at 37 ("Almost all the cases in which I stood as surety were
settled without being brought to trial; and pleas of guilt being put in, a door was opened for the
mercy of the court ... ").
394. See Act of Apr. 26, 1878, ch. 198, 1878 Mass. Acts 146, 146 (providing for the
appointment of a probation officer for Boston); Grinnell, supra note 300, at 612 (noting that the
act "is reputed to be the first act by any legislative body using the word 'probation"' in the
relevant sense).
395. § 1, 1878 Mass. Acts at 147.
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assist in a "well-established and well-recognized and approved existing
usage." 396
As late as 1903, in fact, the Supreme Judicial Court described
"probation" in a way that explicitly merged the concept with the on-file
mechanism: "The defendant pleaded guilty in the Superior Court," the
court wrote, "and having entered into the usual recognizance with the
probation officer, as surety, he was placed on probation and the complaint
against him was filed."397 It seems that the mechanics of probation had not
evolved much since Chase, except that now a public probation officer
played the role of surety once taken by "Benjamin Salmon, trader, and
Daniel Chase, Cordwainer of Marblehead.""39 And just as Jerusha Chase
lost her freedom when the prosecutor moved for sentence on the original
indictment, so did the defendant in the case just quoted:
Later in the sitting the district attorney moved for sentence, and at
the hearing thereon the judge found that the defendant had not kept
the conditions of an oral agreement made between him and the
Commonwealth, and under which he had been placed on probation,
and that sentence ought to be imposed.39
396. Ginnell, supra note 300, at 614; see also I TIMASHEFF, supra note 387, at 17 (-It is
obvious that this statute introduced nothing essentially new into the conunon-law practice."). I
have relied a good deal on Grinnell's study. Most importantly, he pointed out the strong
connection between the practices described in Chase and probation as it later developed. In two
ways, though, I disagree with his analysis. First, I believe he gave somewhat too much importance
to a law adopted in the Massachusetts 1836 code giving lower tribunals authority to release a
defendant charged with certain minor crimes "upon his entering into a recognizance. ... with
sufficient sureties, for his good behavior for a term not less than six months, nor more than two
years." MASS. REV. STAT. ch. 143, § 9 (Dutton & Wentworth 1836); see also Grinnell. supra
note 300, at 609-10 (quoting the statute and placing it in a chronology of probation's
development). As N.S. Timasheff argued, this law "merely gave statutory sanction to the
common-law practice of replacing punishment by recognizance for good behavior." 1
TIMASHEFF, supra note 387, at 16 n.2. It did not embrace the peculiar procedural posture shared
by the on-file mechanism and modern probation: The defendant is released after conviction but
before sentence, so that the penalty for bad behavior is not merely forfeiting bonds, but being
sentenced on the original indictment.
Second, I believe Grinnell attempted to minimize the degree of prosecutorial control over the
on-file mechanism, especially in the early years. Although he acknowledged that Thacher's
opinion in Chase made it clear that "the practice of suspending sentence was in fact by the
consent of both parties to a case, because the government could move for sentence at any time and
the defendant also," Grinnell, supra note 300, at 631, Grinnell argued that this fact "does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that the power of the Court rests upon the consent of the
parties." Id. But as I argued earlier, see supra notes 363-366 and accompanying text. other
language in Thacher's opinion suggests he thought the government's forbearance from moving for
sentence was essential.
397. Commonwealth v. McGovern, 183 Mass. 238, 239 (1903).
398. Grinnell, supra note 300, at 604; see also Harris, supra note 345, at 120 ("The probation
officer ... becomes [the defendant's] surety for his appearance in court when wanted.").
399. McGovern, 183 Mass. at 239. Although I am not sure, I believe that the court's reference
to an "oral agreement made between [McGovern] and the Commonwealth." id., refers to an
agreement with the probation officer, acting perhaps as a - fiduciary" of the court. id.. rather than
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The near-complete identity of the "old" on-file mechanism and the
"new" system of probation is apparent also in the record-keeping practices
of Middlesex court clerks. As early as 1859, the clerk's docket book entries
often collapsed the concepts with the simple notation, "on file on
probation.''400 And as late as 1900, the clerk exclusively employed the "on
file" formula. Although the record and docket books for that year list 212
cases as placed "on file" after a guilty finding and therefore functionally
involving probation, the word "probation" appears not once. In 1903, cases
that appear in the record book as being placed "on file" appear in the
docket book as involving "probation." 40' By 1910, the clerk had split the
usual list of cases placed "on file" into two lists--one headed "on file,"
which presumably included those cases placed on file because a defendant
or witness was missing, and the other headed "on probation.
'I
Underneath the typewritten words, "on probation," that identified the
second list, someone added in a neat script, "On file." 
403
But in one respect, the clerk's continued use of the term "on file"
perhaps overstated the extent to which the procedures of probation
remained frozen in time. A fair amount of evidence suggests that by the end
of the century, the judge had more power than before to place a case on
probation in the face of the district attorney's opposition. I have presented
some of this evidence already: Over time, the clerk became more likely to
write that "the Court" (rather than the prosecutor) had placed cases on file,
and court rulings became less certain about whether the prosecutor's motion
for sentence could compel the court to pass sentence."° In addition, the
probation statutes of the last quarter of the century tipped the balance of
probationary power toward the court. Hence the 1878 act referred to
"offenders placed on probation by the court" ;405 an 1880 act that extended
this earlier law statewide said that "the court may permit the accused to be
with the district attorney. Elsewhere in the same paragraph, the court refers to both probation
officer and prosecutor by title, so its ambiguous reference to an agreement with "the
Commonwealth" seems odd. But as the court repeats the same ambiguous formula five times in
its short opinion, see id. at 239-40, the word choice cannot have been unintended.
400. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Charles McCannon, Middlesex Ct. C.P. Docket Book No.
656 (Feb. 1859) (on file with the Massachusetts Archives). I noted seven cases in the docket
books of 1859 and two in the record books that explicitly equated putting a case on file and on
probation in this manner.
401. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. George B. Avery, Middlesex Super. Ct. R. Book 316
(1903); Commonwealth v. George B. Avery, Middlesex Super. Ct. Docket Book No. 30 (1903);
Commonwealth v. Thomas H. McNabb, Middlesex Super. Ct. R. Book 316 (1903);
Commonwealth v. Thomas H. McNabb, Middlesex Super. Ct. Docket Book No. 61 (1903).
402. See Middlesex Super. Ct. R. Book 509, 513 (1910) (unpublished document, on file with
the Massachusetts Trial Court).
403. Id. at 513.
404. See supra notes 323-325, 369-376 and accompanying text.
405. Act of Apr. 26, 1878, ch. 198, § 1, 1878 Mass. Acts 146, 147 (providing for the
probation of accused and convicted persons).
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placed upon probation, upon such terms as it may deem best" ;46 an act of
1891 gave lower-court justices the power to appoint probation officers, a
power formerly vested in city officials, and said the court "may place [a
convict] in the care of said probation officer for such time and upon such
conditions as may seem proper" ;' and an act of 1898 extended similar
powers to superior-court judges. 8
One can make too much of this apparent power shift. After all, the
critical power sustaining on-file plea bargaining was the prosecutor's
capacity to protect defendants from being sentenced by the court, which
enabled him to extend a meaningful promise of leniency toward those
defendants who pled guilty. Well into the twentieth century, it remained
clear that without the prosecutor's motion, the court could not pass
sentence.41  Moreover, despite the Supreme Judicial Court's 1908
observation that "the principles which lie at the foundation of the
[probation] legislation... seem to leave the whole matter in the control of
the court," '' there is some fairly weighty evidence that in practice the
prosecutor retained substantial control. I quoted earlier from an 1899 report
of Robert Harris, district attorney for the state's southern district. "' Harris
wrote the report specifically to explain "his doings" under the 1898
probation act, which seemed to place control over probation in the court's
hands. "[T]he superior court may appoint probation officers," the Act
declared, and the "court may place upon probation, under any of said
probation officers, any person charged with a criminal offence." ' 3 Harris
reported that "[i]n 1898, I applied for the appointment of a probation
officer, and my application was granted by his Honor, Mr. Justice
Sherman." '414 Remarkably, Harris continued in the first person: "I was
fortunate in having at hand the man I selected [as probation officer],b 4 5 but
"I made some mistakes, and placed some on probation who should not have
been so treated." '416 That a superior-court judge so readily delivered up to
the prosecutor the powers granted under the 1898 act is a strong hint that
the power of probation up till then had lain in prosecutorial hands and that
406. Act of Mar. 22, 1880, ch. 129, § 4. 1880 Mass. Acts 87, 87. In addition to providing for
the appointment of probation officers, this act created the first parole-like regime in
Massachusetts. See id. §§ 6-10, 1880 Mass. Acts at 88-89; infra note 565 and accompanying text.
407. Act of May 28, 1891, ch. 356, § 3. 1891 Mass. Acts 920. 920 (providing for the
appointment of probation officers).
408. See Act of June 8, 1898, ch. 511, § 1. 1898 Mass. Acts 474, 474-75 (providing for the
appointment of probation officers in the superior court).
409. See supra notes 322, 336-358 and accompanying text.
410. See supra notes 345-357 and accompanying text.
411. Marks v. Wentworth, 199 Mass. 44, 46 (1908).
412. See supra note 345 and accompanying text.
413. § 1, 1898 Mass. Acts at 475.
414. Harris, supra note 345, at 119.
415. Id. at 122.
416. Id. at 119.
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the judge had little inclination to assume the chores that new power
brought.
But parsing power in this way perhaps has little point in the context of
turn-of-the-century probation. We have seen already that 225 of the 231
persons placed on probation in Middlesex in 1900 had pled guilty,417 so
even if the judge had the power to impose probation over the prosecutor's
objection, he was using probation as an instrument of plea bargaining no
less than was the prosecutor. As we will see in Part V, by 1900 judges had
become enthusiastic plea bargainers even outside the probation context. In
California, where a 1903 probation statute gave judges both legal and actual
power to decide which defendants received probation," 8 probation served
as a plea-bargaining tool as clearly as it did in Massachusetts. Lawrence
Friedman and Robert Percival report in their study of Alameda County that
thirty-one of thirty-two defendants who were placed on probation in their
sample had pled guilty. 9 So predictable was the court's practice that one
defendant responded to a judge's inquiries, "I pleaded guilty because you
can't try to get probation otherwise."42 Probation, the authors conclude,
"gave the guilty plea a powerful thrust."42'
It may be that by the turn of the century, the practice of probation in
Massachusetts and California and probably many places in between had
become so predictable that the power of probation as an instrument of plea
bargaining was largely implicit-that is, that no defendant needed to be told
that a guilty plea was the purchase price of the hope of probation. Friedman
and Percival surely suspect as much.422 But as I hope this account of
probation's upbringing in the state of its birth makes clear, probation's
origins were coarser than that. From its first appearance in the opening third
of the century, probation grew in the guise of on-file plea bargaining under
the tutelage of prosecutors who often made quite plain the terms by which
they would deal.
I do not suggest that probation never would have evolved but as the
instrument of prosecutorial plea bargaining. Probation served the system
well in many ways, not least by relieving prison overcrowding and
417. See supra text accompanying note 379.
418. See Act of Feb. 23, 1903, ch. 34, 1903 Cal. Stat. 34, 34 (" [The court shall have power.
in its discretion, to place the defendant upon probation .... "); FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra
note 135, at 227 (quoting from a 1910 sentencing hearing in which it was clear that the judge both
held and wielded the decisionmaking power).
419. See FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra note 135, at 225. They report that between 1900 and
1902, just before the probation law passed, 32.2% of accused felons pled guilty, while 49.4% did
so between 1903 and 1910. See id. at 227.
420. Id. at 227 (quoting from the 1910 sentencing hearing).
421. Id. at 226.
422. They write: "Clearly, a guilty plea opened the doors to probation. Word of this must
have gotten around to defendants and defense. The message-'plead guilty'-rang through loud
and clear." Id. at 181.
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providing an appropriately mild punishment for first offenders, especially
those who could not pay fines. My arguments are both far narrower and
somewhat broader. The narrower argument impelled our recent descent into
the morass of Massachusetts practice: Prosecutors were ready to exploit the
power to plea bargain wherever they could find it. Massachusetts practice
tossed them an unlikely scrap of power in barring judges from passing
sentence until the prosecutor ceremonially moved for sentence. With this
scrap, together with invention and industry, prosecutors built the covert
regime of on-file plea bargaining. The broader argument looks at
probation's rise as the first of several proofs of the larger power of plea
bargaining as an institution. By the last quarter of the nineteenth century,
plea bargaining had become a valued tool not only of prosecutors, but of
judges as well. Serving the interests of all those with real power, plea
bargaining became a dominant power by winning their protection.
Prosecutors and judges protected plea bargaining by nurturing other
procedural forms, such as probation, that helped plea bargaining thrive.
But we will return to the power of plea bargaining later. First we must
examine how the powers and interests of defendants and judges helped to
shape plea bargaining's rise.
IV. THE DEFENDANT'S POWER TO PLEAD
As clear as their interest in plea bargaining may have been, prosecutors'
power to bargain was well-hidden, and tracking it has absorbed a good
many pages. In contrast, criminal defendants had both a clear incentive and
a clear capacity to plea bargain. Their incentive lay in the difference
between the severe sentence that loomed should the jury convict at trial and
the more lenient sentence promised by the prosecutor or judge in exchange
for a plea. At first glance, the intensity of defendants' desire to plead
appears to have been a simple function of the power and inclination of the
prosecutor or judge to widen this difference. And defendants' power to
plead was even clearer and more constant: As the holders of the right to a
jury trial, they held the power to waive it. Even when a defendant pled
guilty to a capital charge and thereby assured his own execution, the "court
ha[d] no power absolutely to refuse" his plea.4"
423. Green v. Commonwealth, 94 Mass. (12 Allen) 155. 176 (1866). Green %was at least the
second time the Supreme Judicial Court addressed guilty pleas in capital cases. In the first.
Commonwealth v. Barris, I Mass. (1 Will.) 94 (1804). the defendant already had been executed at
the time of the court's opinion, and the court did not review the legality of the proceedings. Since
the defendant had pled guilty before the high court, however, and since three justices of that court
must have passed the death sentence, see MENAND, supra note 5. at 37. there is no reason to think
that the court disapproved of the proceedings. The Barris trial court did take great care to give the
defendant a chance to reconsider his self-destructive plea. and in Green the court wrote that "[ilt
is the well settled practice in all courts ... to receive and record with great reluctance and caution
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We therefore might be tempted to dismiss defendants as mathematical
constants to be factored out of our plea-bargaining equation and to
concentrate instead on the variables of prosecutor and judge, were it not for
some stubborn evidence that defendants' inclination to plea bargain was not
constant after all. Defendants' fundamental preference for the mildest
punishment possible remained in place, of course. But their power to win at
trial-or at least their perception of that power-rose in one period and fell
in the next. And as their hopes of walking free after trial first brightened
and then faded, their willingness to plead guilty diminished and grew.
I will focus here on two developments in trial practice that may have
altered defendants' views of their power to win at trial. The first is an
apparent increase during the first half of the nineteenth century in the
proportion of defendants who came before the courts of the middle tier with
counsel. Lawyers probably raised these defendants' chances of victory at
trial and dulled their enthusiasm to plead. The second is the advent of laws
during the second half of the century that gave defendants the right to
testify at trial. These defendant-testimony laws may have had the
unexpected result of persuading some defendants that their odds of victory
were dismal and that a good bargain was their best hope. Unfortunately,
because defendants left behind even sparer records than prosecutors of their
thoughts and fears, reconstructing their motives will require us at times to
take long steps between widely spaced flagstones of evidence.
A. The Power of Representation
The court records of Middlesex County disclose this surprising news:
At the very outset of the nineteenth century, about two-thirds of the cases
that came before the courts of the middle tier ended in guilty pleas. Figure 4
shows the proportion of adjudicated non-liquor cases that ended in a plea of
guilty or no contest in the Court of General Sessions of the Peace, the Court
of Common Pleas, and the Superior Court, each of which in its era had
jurisdiction to try many or most noncapital offenses.424 From an initial high
of seventy-one percent in 1789-1790, the rate of pleas fell sharply if not
a confession of guilt in a capital cause." Green, 94 Mass. (12 Allen) at 175-76. But as I noted in
the text, the court denied itself the power to refuse such a plea.
424. "Adjudicated cases" are those in which the defendant went to trial or pled guilty or no
contest. I have excluded from Figure 4 both liquor cases and cases placed on file to avoid the
distorting impact of the large shifts in prosecutorial plea bargaining power that we saw in Parts I
and HI. Moreover, for comparisons that span the century, it is important to keep the mix of case
types relatively stable. As so-called "filed" cases did not appear until the 1840s, see supra notes
304-312 and accompanying text, and as liquor cases were quite rare in the first decades of the
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steadily until it reached a low of twenty-six percent in 1834. Guilty pleas
remained comparatively rare until the late 1870s, when they began their
long upswing toward the full-fledged plea bargaining regime that closed the
century.
I call the news that the century began with a strikingly high rate of
guilty pleas surprising because most scholarship suggests not merely that
guilty pleas were rare before the middle of the nineteenth century, but also
that courts refused or were reluctant to accept them."z But it appears that
425. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 2, at 5-16, 19-24; Vogel. supra note 146. at 52 (-[T]he
courts, at the beginning of the [19th] century were reluctant to accept a guilty plea under any
circumstances."); Michael Jonathan Millender, The Transformation of the American Criminal
Trial, 1790-1875, at 187 (1996) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University) (on file
with the Stanford Law School Library) ("Even in the North. courts ... at the beginning of the
nineteenth centur... only reluctantly accepted guilty pleas."); see also John H. Langbein.
Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 L. & SOc'Y REV. 261. 264 (1979)
(writing of the early 18th century that not only was there "no particular pressure to ... encourage
the accused to waive his right to jury trial," but "the sources reveal an opposite pressure").
1780
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this reluctance was limited largely to capital cases. As a Massachusetts
defense lawyer argued in 1866 in seeking to undo a guilty plea in a capital
case, such a plea "is suicide, commited under the color of law."42 6 The
Supreme Judicial Court rejected this argument and ratified the defendant's
death sentence, but did acknowledge that courts receive "a confession of
guilt in a capital cause" with "great reluctance."427 In 1877, a former
Massachusetts judge and governor wrote that although courts readily
accepted guilty pleas in most cases, "in Massachusetts ... the court will not
receive a plea of guilty to an indictment for murder until after a full
advisement of the prisoner of the consequences of such a plea." '428 In fact,
guilty pleas to capital charges-with no reduction to a noncapital offense-
were rare. I have found only five throughout the century.4 29
But concerns about judicial suicide had no weight in noncapital cases.
Perhaps we should not be surprised, therefore, by the very high rates of
guilty pleas in the courts of the middle tier, where no capital case was
heard.43 ° Yet the news is surprising for another reason: Even as the rate of
guilty pleas was falling in the first third of the century, the caseload of the
middle-tier courts was rising, sometimes sharply. At the very moment the
rate of guilty pleas fell to its 1834 low, the court's caseload leapt from
forty-one cases in 1829 to ninety-five cases in 1834.131 Lower plea rates and
a larger caseload translated into what must have been a shocking increase in
the number of trials-from six trials of all sorts in 1829 to forty-six in
1834-and as Figure 5 shows, the number of trials continued unevenly
upward.
426. Green, 94 Mass. (12 Allen) at 158.
427. Id. at 176. In the latter half of the 18th century, Blackstone explained the judicial
suspicion toward guilty pleas specifically in the capital context: "Upon a simple and plain
confession, the court hath nothing to do but to award judgment: but it is usually very backward in
receiving and recording such confession, out of tenderness to the life of the subject; and will
generally advise the prisoner to retract it ...." 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *329.
Likewise, in the mid-17th century, Hale suggested that judges encouraged capital defendants in
particular to go to trial rather than plead guilty. See 2 MATTHEW HALE. HISTORY OF THE PLEAS
OF THE CROWN 225 (Philadelphia, Robert H. Small 1847) ("[B]ut it is usual for the court.
especially if [the crime] be out of clergy [i.e., capital], to advise the party to plead and put himself
upon his trial ....").
428. EMORY WASHBURN, A MANUAL OF CRIMINAL LAW at vi, 132 (3d ed. 1900); see also
DAVIS, supra note 7, at 247-48 (providing biographical information about Washburn). After this
quotation, Washburn cited to Commonwealth v. Battis, I Mass. (I Will.) 94 (1804). which
involved a guilty plea in a murder case. Washburn's reliance on Ballis suggests that Battis should
not be interpreted as evidence that Massachusetts judges were suspicious of all guilty pleas.
429. See supra note 91.
430. As an Ohio court wrote in 1892, there is no reason to expect that an old notion that
courts should resist a defendant's desire to plead guilty, which "had its origin at a period in the
history of the law of England when offenses that would now be regarded as comparatively trivial,
were, upon conviction, visited with death," should have much impact in a noncapital American
court of a later age. Craig v. State, 49 Ohio St. 415, 416 (1892).
431. See supra note 126.
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FIGURE 5. NUMBER OF TRIALS:
MIDDLESEX COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT AND ITS PREDECESSOR COURTS
134 ..
1780 1800 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920
Year
I argued in Part II that caseload pressure helped motivate prosecutors to
develop their charge-bargaining techniques in liquor cases, and I will argue
in Part V that caseload pressure helped win judges over to plea bargaining's
cause in the latter part of the century. Still, it is not entirely paradoxical that
rising caseload pressure did not translate into increased plea bargaining in
the first third of the century. I have excluded liquor cases from Figure 4 to
avoid the distorting impact of the prosecutor's unusual power to charge
bargain in liquor cases. In other cases, as I have argued, 32 prosecutors
simply lacked the power to escape a rising caseload by plea bargaining.1
33
432. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
433. Prosecutors did have in all cases the power to set costs, and as I noted earlier, costs
typically were higher after trial than after a plea. See supra notes 41, 47-50 and accompanying
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As for judges, we have seen that the peculiar features that made the
caseload boom of the last quarter of the century so persuasive to them of the
need for plea bargaining were not yet in place during the century's first
decades.4"
The real paradox emerges from these last two facts: If prosecutors
lacked the ability to plea bargain and if judges lacked the interest, then why
did so many defendants plead guilty in the first decades of the nineteenth
century? These pleas were not, after all, plea bargains that involved a
concession made in exchange for the defendant's plea-my analysis of
sentencing patterns in Part II showed as much. To explain these pleas, then,
I suggest we shift our focus from prosecutor and judge and ask what might
have persuaded defendants to plead guilty even when they could expect no
concession in return.
In particular, I suggest that we consider the role of defense counsel. If
very few defendants came to court with counsel in 1789 and an increasing
proportion did so thereafter, that alone could explain both the high rate of
guilty pleas at the outset and the drop in guilty pleas over the first third of
the century. Before fleshing out this hypothesis, I should expose its weakest
joint: None of my evidence discloses how many defendants brought counsel
to court in this period. The record books of the middle-tier courts in
Middlesex County almost never noted counsel, and the docket books began
to do so only in 1844. I have found no other study that reports the rate of
counsel appearances in any Massachusetts court in the early nineteenth
century or before.43
In terms of direct evidence of the prevalence of counsel, therefore, we
have to be content with what the docket books tell us about 1844 and later.
At least at first glance, this information gives only mild support to my
hypothesis that representation by counsel was rising over the first decades
of the century. In 1844, fifty-one percent of defendants came to court with
counsel, a number that advanced modestly to sixty percent by 1849.
Thereafter, the rate of representation varied within fairly narrow bounds
throughout the balance of the century, never again hitting the 1849 high of
text. It is very hard to say how effectively prosecutors could have wielded the cost-setting power
as a plea-bargaining tool in the general run of cases. The court never ordered costs against
defendants who were found not guilty after trial and very rarely did so against defendants
sentenced to serve time. Defendants who went to trial therefore had a good chance of escaping
costs altogether. The prosecutor's power to set costs probably worked best as a plea-bargaining
tool in cases that were likely to be punished by a fine-among them, liquor cases.
434. See infra notes 184-197 and accompanying text.
435. Mary Vogel, who studied lower-tier courts only, see supra note 223 and accompanying
text, where defense counsel probably were rarer, see FERDINAND, supra note 121. at 81, does not
speak much about counsel. Theodore Ferdinand reports that the records of the Boston Municipal
Court do not systematically record counsel, though as I noted earlier, it seems possible that he did
not use the court's docket books as a source. See supra note 222.
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sixty percent, but also never dropping past the 1880 low of forty-one
percent.
436
Still, there are at least two reasons to believe that the rate of
representation was in fact growing through the first third of the century.
The first is that an ocean away, at London's Old Bailey court, the rate of
representation seems to have risen sharply from less than ten percent in
1815 to just shy of fifty percent, or about the same rate as in Middlesex
County, in 1855. The second is the suddenness of the transformation that
took place in Middlesex County between 1829 and 1834, when the caseload
of the Court of Common Pleas more than doubled at the same time that the
rate of pleas fell by almost two-thirds. The most likely explanation for the
leap in caseload is an 1832 statute that transferred the bulk of the Supreme
Judicial Court's criminal trial jurisdiction to the Court of Common Pleas. 3
We can expect that along with more serious cases, this transfer of
jurisdiction brought with it the lawyers who used to handle those cases
before the Supreme Judicial Court.
Unfortunately, that court's record and docket books, like those of the
Court of Common Pleas, do not disclose the proportion of defendants that
had counsel in these early years. But the gravity of both the tribunal and the
crimes charged makes it seem likely that cases heard before the Supreme
Judicial Court typically involved defense counsel. In capital cases, the court
appointed free counsel. When charged with other crimes that called for long
sentences, defendants may have felt it more worthwhile than usual to spend
their own funds.419 If it is true that cases transferred from the Supreme









Sources: Middlesex CL C.P. R. Books; Middlesex Ct. C.P. Docket Books; Middlesex
Super. CL R. Books; Middlesex Super. CL Docket Books.
437. See Malcolm M. Feeley & Charles Lester, Legal Complexity and the Transformation of
the Criminal Process, in SUBJEKTIVIERUNG DES JUSTIZIELLEN BEw.I5VERFAHRENs 337, 355
(Andr6 Gouron et al. eds., 1994). This study provides "tentative" support not only because its
setting is an ocean away, but also because the authors report an anomalously high rate of
representation in 1795-about 40%--that interrupts very low rates that prevailed throughout the
18th century and in 1815. The authors suggest no explanation for their discordant figures in 1795.
See id.
438. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
439. Although Massachusetts law provided for free counsel in capital cases, it made no
provision for indigents accused of lesser crimes, and as late as 1952, appointed counsel were
confined to cases of first-degree murder. See Martin V. Callagy. Legal Aid in Criminal Cases, 42
J. CRiM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 589, 611 (1952). New York apparently provided free
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Judicial Court to the Court of Common Pleas brought a new contingent of
defense counsel with them, then these lawyers probably carried along a
culture in which trials were more the norm and guilty pleas more the
exception. For although the rate of pleas in the Supreme Judicial Court
exceeded one-half in 1799 and one-third in 1824, it generally was much
lower than in the Court of Common Pleas. It stood at just ten percent in
1829, the last year I studied before the jurisdiction shift, when the rate of
pleas in the Court of Common Pleas was a remarkable seventy-two
percent."
Of course, a higher rate of trials in the upper court could be due less to
the presence of lawyers than to the seriousness of the crimes tried there and
the unlikelihood that a defendant would plead guilty in the face of a long
prison term. But statistics from the Court of Common Pleas in 1844 and
later, when the court's docket books permit us to see the presence of
lawyers, suggest that counsel in fact did influence the defendant's choice
between trial and plea. Especially in the middle of the century, defendants
with lawyers were a good deal more likely to choose trial than were
defendants without lawyers."' If we add to this fact three others, we can
counsel to all indigent defendants at least by 1810, and almost all defendants therefore had
lawyers. See McConville & Mirsky, supra note 243, at 454-55.
440. These are my findings for the years before the 1832 jurisdiction shift:
DISPOSITION BY PLEA OF GUILTY OR No CONTEST IN THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
(SITTING IN MIDDLESEX COUNTY)
YEAR NUMBER OF NUMBER OF PLEAS PERCENTAGE OF
ADJUDICATED CASES PLEAS
1799 11 6 55%
1809 22 2 9%
1819 27 8 30%
1824 32 12 38%
1829 20 2 10%
Sources: Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Books; Middlesex Ct. C.P. Docket Books; Middlesex
Super. Ct. R. Books; Middlesex Super. Ct. Docket Books.
After the jurisdiction shift, there were too few cases left in the Supreme Judicial Court to
allow for meaningful analysis. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
441. My findings are as follows:
PROPORTION OF ADJUDICATED DEFENDANTS WHO CHOSE TRIAL OVER PLEA:
MIDDLESEX COURT OF COMMON PLEAS AND SUPERIOR COURT









Sources: Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Books; Middlesex Ct. C.P. Docket Books; Middlesex
Super. Ct. R. Books; Middlesex Super. Ct. Docket Books.
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arrive at a theory about why a rising rate of representation in the Court of
Common Pleas in the first decades of the century might have produced not
only a falling rate of guilty pleas, but also strong pressure to develop a plea-
bargaining regime.
The first additional fact is that defendants who chose trials were
consistently more likely to win if they had lawyers. ' 2 The second is that
defendants who chose instead to plead guilty were usually more likely to
get clear plea bargains-either charge bargains or on-file plea bargains-if
they had lawyers."3 And finally, to cast this last fact in a slightly different
light, defendants with lawyers were far less likely to plead guilty without an
apparent concession, as opposed to either plea bargaining or going to trial,
Some uncertain corroboration for my finding that cases with lawyers were more likely to go
to trial comes from McConville and Mirsky's work in New York. They report both near-universal
representation by counsel at the beginning of the century and a rate of trials that fell just below
80%. See McConville & Mirsky, supra note 243, at 454, 466; see also Clara Foltz. Public
Defenders, 31 AM. L. REV. 393, 393 (1897) (arguing that many unrepresented defendants "are
recorded as pleading guilty and railroaded into jail because too dazed to understand their rights
and legal position").
442. My findings are as follows:
INFLUENCE OF COUNSEL ON TRIAL VICTORY RATE:
MIDDLESEX COURT OF COMMON PLEAS AND SUPERIOR COURT
PERCENTAGE OF DEFENDANTS WHO WON
YEAR ACQUITrTALS OR HUNG JURIES









Sources: Middlesex CL C.P. R. Books; Middlesex Ct. C.P. Docket Books; Middlesex
Super. Ct. R. Books; Middlesex Super. CL Docket Books.
443. My findings are as follows:
PROPORTION OF DEFENDANTS OFFERING PLEAS WHO WON CLEAR PLEA BARGAINS:
MIDDLESEX COURT OF COMMON PLEAS AND SUPERIOR COURT









Sources: Middlesex CL C.P. R. Books; Middlesex Ct. C.P. Docket Books; Middlesex
Super. CL R Books; Middlesex Super. CL Docket Books.
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than were defendants without lawyers4--a pattern Friedman and Percival
found repeated some decades later and a continent away in Alameda
County."5
A theory of the early years now emerges that helps to explain what
came later. Defendants without lawyers, who (I will assume) accounted for
the great majority of defendants in the beginning of our period, correctly
saw that their chances of winning at trial were quite poor-generally no
better than twenty-five percent and in some years worse." 6 Lacking the
shrewdness to press for a sentencing concession in exchange for their guilty
pleas, these unrepresented defendants simply pled to the charges they
faced," 7 hoping, perhaps without reason, that the judge might show
leniency as a reward for their pleas. As defendants grew more likely to have
counsel, they saw their chances of winning at trial increase to more than
forty percent in most years and to more than fifty percent in some. At that
point, they had less regard for the option of throwing themselves on the
court's mercy, and their counsel advised them instead to demand some sort
444. My findings are as follows:
PROPORTION OF ADjUDICATED DEFENDANTS WHO PLED WITHOUT APPARENT
CONCESSION: MIDDLESEX COURT OF COMMON PLEAS AND SUPERIOR COURT









Sources: Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Books; Middlesex Ct. C.P. Docket Books; Middlesex
Super. Ct. R. Books; Middlesex Super. Ct. Docket Books.
445. See FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra note 135, at 174 (noting that "[miost" defendants
who pled guilty at arraignment had waived counsel). Friedman and Percival cite a survey of
inmates at Folsom Prison taken in the late 1880s in which 33.9% of those who pled guilty said
that they did so because they "had neither money nor friends." THE STATE BD. OF PRISON DIRS.
OF THE STATE OF CAL., EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT 88 (Sacramento, J.D. Young 1887), cited in
FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra note 135, at 180 n.77. It is hard to imagine the relevance of the
lack of money and friends except that, without either, one cannot hire a lawyer. As California
defendants were entitled to free counsel in felony trials after 1872, see CAL. PENAL CODE § 987
(Sumner Whitney & Co. 1881), it is a puzzle why a defendant would plead guilty for want of
counsel. But since appointed counsel got no fees, see FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra note 135, at
172, defendants may have been correct in believing that they got what they paid for. See id. at 202
(presenting data suggesting that appointed counsel were less zealous in their work than paid
counsel).
446. Cf Foltz, supra note 441, at 397 ("[The defendant] does know that to go into court
without counsel would be equivalent to an invitation to convict which a jury would readily
accept.").
447. See Langbein, supra note 425, at 269 n.12 ("Where assigned counsel was not readily
available, an indigent accused in nineteenth-century America may have had a considerable
incentive to plead guilty rather than try to defend himself at trial ... against a lawyer-public
prosecutor.").
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of guaranteed concession in exchange for their pleas. Meanwhile,
prosecutors chafed at their increasing trial loads. What was worse, the cases
that they were most likely to lose because of the opposition of defense
counsel were for the same reason the most time-consuming to try."'
Prosecutors badly wanted more cases to plead out, yet they had a hard time
persuading defendants with counsel to plead guilty without guaranteeing
them something in return.
Of course, the power of prosecutors to grant meaningful concessions
extended only to charge bargaining in liquor cases (which happened to have
a substantially higher rate of counsel representation than other cases)"9 and
to their promise not to move for sentence in the course of on-file plea
bargains. Prosecutors lost their power to charge bargain in liquor cases
when the legislature banned nol prosses without the court's approval in
1852." Because on-file plea bargaining involved letting the defendant go
in the first instance, that option was inappropriate for the more serious cases
on the docket. So despite the great pressure put on prosecutors by the large
number of trials in the middle decades of the century, the rate of guilty
pleas remained low for some time.
The records of capital pleas before the Supreme Judicial Court reveal a
similar dynamic of interests and constrained options at work. I noted earlier
that it was unclear until 1838 whether prosecutors had the power to enter
partial nol prosses to reduce, for example, murder to manslaughter or rape
to assault with intent to rape.4 ' In any event, no such reduction appears in
the records before 1841. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that virtually
448. In 1844, while complaining about his recently diminished salary. Suffolk County
attorney Samuel D. Parker noted, "The labor of the trials is increased by the increased attendance
of very eminent counsel in the defences." S. DOc. No. 68. at 7 (Mass. 1844) (petition of Samuel
D. Parker).
449. My findings are as follows:
PROPORTION OF LIQUOR AND NON-UQUOR DEFENDANTS WITH COUNSEL:
MIDDLESEX COURT OF COMMON PLEAS AND SUPERIOR COURT









Sources: Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Books; Middlesex Ct. C.P. Docket Books; Middlesex
Super. Ct. R. Books; Middlesex Super. CL Docket Books.
450. See Act of May 22, 1852, ch. 322, § 13, 1852 Mass. Acts 257. 257.
451. See supra notes 107-115 and accompanying text.
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every capital defendant went to trial, for a guilty plea simply guaranteed
death.452
It is more surprising that even after capital charge bargains appeared in
1841, they remained rather rare for two decades, accounting for only ten
percent of adjudicated capital cases in the 1840s and seventeen percent in
the 1850s. One possible reason for their lingering scarcity emerges from an
examination of the results at capital trials. It appears that in the 1830s and
1840s, the attorney general had a dismal record of success at trial. In the
1830s, there were more than three times as many acquittals or hung juries
as capital murder convictions, and in the 1840s, almost twice as many.
TABLE 4. OUTCOMES OF CAPITAL TRIALS BEFORE
THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT453
Years Number of Percent Percent Percent Percent
Trials Convicted Convicted Acquittals Charge
of Capital of Second- or Hung Bargains
Murder Degree Juries
Murder
1820-1829 16 38 N/A 31 0
1830-1839 45 20 N/A 64 0
1840-1849 37 27 N/A 49 10
1850-1859 35 40 11 29 17
1860-1869 28 39 14 32 47
1870-1879 45 31 24 27 43
1880-1889 34 24 41 24 35
1890-1899 27 33 26 37 61
Sources: Annual Reports of the Attorney General; Sup. Jud. Ct. R. Books- Sup. Jud.
Ct. Docket Books.
With so great a chance of escaping conviction altogether and so small a
chance of going to the gallows (shrunk even further by occasional
commutations), a typical defendant might well have spurned a guilty plea to
take his chances at trial.
The situation changed dramatically in the 1850s. Suddenly, capital
defendants were almost twice as likely to be convicted of some form of
murder as to escape conviction altogether. And suddenly, a manslaughter
plea must have seemed a far more desirable outcome. What brought about
this change in fortunes is not clear. Certainly the option of returning a
452. I found only five such pleas to capital charges throughout the century. See supra note
91.
453. Figures for 1820-1832, 1840-1848, and 1853 are based on surveys of the court's
business. See supra notes 92, 97, 99.
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second-degree murder conviction, available in 1858 and later, must have
reduced the number of hung juries and manslaughter convictions. Improved
policing-the Boston Police Department appointed its first detectives in
1846 4 -and resulting improvements in evidence-gathering must have
helped as well. In any event, these ratios remained largely in place
throughout the rest of the century: The chances of a murder conviction were
always substantially greater than the combined odds of an acquittal or a
hung jury. Although we might not expect that the rate of guilty pleas would
respond immediately to outcomes at trial, we would expect to see such a
response within a few years. Defense counsel, present in every capital case,
must have warned clients of the unlikelihood of winning at trial when
advising them whether to strike a deal. So perhaps as a result of the attorney
general's improved performance at trial, the proportion of charge bargains
in capital cases grew dramatically to forty-seven percent of adjudicated
murder cases in the 1860s and then hovered between thirty-five percent and
sixty-one percent for the balance of the century.
In the courts of the middle tier, however, the rate of guilty pleas
remained low through most of the middle third of the nineteenth century.
Stripped of the power to charge bargain in liquor cases and lacking it in
other cases, prosecutors could not promise the kind of sentencing
concessions that would entice defendants to plead guilty. Yet during the last
quarter of the century, the rate of guilty pleas grew strikingly. Two causes
may have been at work. The first was the legislature's decision to let
defendants testify at trial, which had the ironic result of persuading some
defendants that trial was hopeless and that a guilty plea-even one
unsecured by a promised concession-was their only option. Second, the
weight of an unremitting trial load began to press upon judges, who had far
broader powers than prosecutors to make concessions. This latter
development will be the focus of Part V. The former I take up now.
B. The Impact of Defendant-Testimony Laws
In 1866 Massachusetts became the third state in the nation to grant
defendants the right to testify on their own behalf.5 The next year, Judge
Seth Ames of the superior court scoffed at the idea that the new law would
help defendants. Ames, who would rise to the Supreme Judicial Court in
1869,56 argued that the law left the defendant with two unpleasant
alternatives. First, he could choose silence and face almost inevitable
454. See LANE, supra note 4, at 60.
455. See Act of May 26, 1866, ch. 260, 1866 Mass. Acts 245.245. The first two states to pass
such acts were Maine and California. See Act of Apr. 2. 1866, ch. 644, § 1, 1866 Cal. Stat. 865,
865; Act of Mar. 25, 1864, ch. 280, § 1, 1864 Me. Laws 214, 214.
456. See DAVIS, supra note 7, at 194-95.
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conviction. True, the law declared that the defendant could testify "at his
own request, but not otherwise" and guaranteed that "neglect or refusal to
testify shall not create any presumption against" him,457 but these were
"fallacious and idle" words.458 "[T]he jurors all know," Ames wrote, "that
the defendant has the privilege (as it is called) of making himself a witness
if he sees fit; and they also know that he would if he dared." 459 Therefore,
his silence "will, and inevitably must, create a presumption against him,
even if every page of the statute-book contained a provision that it should
not. The statutes might as well prohibit the tide from rising .... -460 In
short, if the defendant "should decline to make himself a witness, the jury
would convict him without leaving their seats.",461 And so this law
permitting defendants to testify "will inevitably compel the defendant to
testify, and will have substantially the same effect as if it did not go through
the mockery of saying that he might testify if he pleased."462
Yet if the defendant did as he must and took the stand, he faced a
second unpleasant alternative: Those defendants who had criminal records
would be "torn to pieces by cross-examination." 4 63 That is because the law
of evidence permitted lawyers to impeach the testimony of opposing
witnesses by showing they had been convicted of a crime.4" In the days
when defendants could not testify, they rarely had to fear that their past
wrongs would become evidence against them. But having gained the right
to testify, they found themselves subject to the same rules of impeachment
that confronted all other witnesses.465 Ames himself, sitting as a trial judge
457. 1866 Mass. Acts at 245.
458. [Seth Ames], Testimony of Persons Accused of Crime, I AM. L. REV. 443, 444 (1866-
1867); see also DAVID M. GOLD, THE SHAPING OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY LAW 188 n.22 (1990)
(identifying Ames as the author of this work).
459. Ames, supra note 458, at 445.
460. Id. at 445; see also William A. Maury, Validity of Statutes Authorizing the Accused To
Testify, 14 AM. L. REV. 753, 762-63 (1880) (arguing that even those defendant testimony laws
that bar a negative inference from silence "force [the defendant] to take the stand to protect
himself from the inference of guilt which is almost sure to be drawn against him if he fail to do
so"). A century after Ames wrote, Kalven and Zeisel referred to "the common-sense inference of
the defendant's guilt, if he chooses not to talk." HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE
AMERICAN JURY 145 (1966).
461. Ames, supra note 458, at 447.
462. Id. at 444. Kalven and Zeisel reported on the basis of their 1950s sample that 82% of
defendants took the stand at trial. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 460, at 33 n. 1, 144.
463. Ames, supra note 458, at 447.
464. See Act of May 22, 1852, ch. 312, § 60, 1852 Mass. Acts 235, 235 ("And the conviction
of any crime may be shown to affect the credibility of any person testifying."); 3 JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW § 980(l)(a), at 538 (3d ed. 1940).
465. The rule permitting impeachment by evidence of past conviction was more than a
century old. See 3 WIGMORE, supra note 464, § 980, at 539 (citing 17th-century cases). But
because those convicted of any infamous crime were altogether disqualified from testifying, the
impeachment rule probably did not come up often. See Commonwealth v. Gorham, 99 Mass. 420,
421 (1868) (argument of counsel) ("The doctrine of the common law was, that conviction of an
infamous crime, followed by judgment, rendered a witness incompetent."). A Massachusetts act
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shortly after Massachusetts enacted its defendant-testimony law, admitted
evidence that a testifying defendant previously had pled guilty to forgery.'
Ruling on appeal in that case, the Supreme Judicial Court wrote that "[t]he
defendant... offered himself as a witness, and the rules of evidence
affecting the competency or credibility of witnesses were all applicable to
him in that character." 467
The law of evidence no longer lumps criminal defendants together with
ordinary witnesses. Courts now recognize that a testifying defendant who is
impeached with his past crimes suffers a risk that confronts no other
witness: Juries may regard the defendant's past crimes as evidence not
merely that he is a liar-the purpose for which they are admitted-but also
that he is a thief (or rapist or murderer) and convict him on that basis. Most
evidence codes therefore limit impeachment of defendants with past crimes,
though they by no means forbid the practice.' But those defendants who
chose to testify in nineteenth-century Massachusetts enjoyed no such
protection. In 1868 the Supreme Judicial Court reviewed a trial judge's
ruling that admitted evidence of the defendant's past crimes "to affect his
credibility as a witness, but for no other purpose."' The defendant's
counsel complained on appeal "that it is a subtlety beyond the capacity of
jurors" to confine such evidence to its impeachment value rather than
"regarding it as affecting his character generally." 7o To this the high court
curtly replied:
By availing himself of the privilege [to testify, the defendant]
assumed the character of a witness, and subjected himself to the
liabilities incident to that position. The statute does not exempt him
from cross-examination, and impeachment as a witness; and there
is no reason why he should be exempt from it.47t
of 1852 abolished the rule disqualifying felons and at the same time provided that all witnesses
could be impeached with evidence of past crimes. See § 60. 1852 Mass. Acts at 235.
466. See Gorham, 99 Mass. at 420.
467. Id. at 421 (citing Commonwealth v. Bonner, 97 Mass. 587 (1867)).
468. See, e.g., FED. IL EVID. 609(a)(1) (allowing evidence of past crimes to impeach other
witnesses as long as the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the risk
of unfair prejudice, but allowing such evidence against criminal defendants only if its probative
value outweighs the risk of unfair prejudice). In Massachusetts, the governing statute does not
itself distinguish between impeachment of defendants and other witnesses. See MAss. GEN. LAws
ANN. ch. 233, § 21 (Law. Co-op. 1986). But the Supreme Judicial Court has recognized that
"[t]he admission of evidence of prior convictions presents the risk that the fact finder's attention
may be diverted from the question of the defendant's guilt to the question of the defendant's bad
character" and therefore has required trial judges to balance the impeachment value of the
evidence against the "danger of unfair prejudice" before admitting evidence of past crimes
against criminal defendants. Commonwealth v. Fano, 400 Mass. 296, 303 (1987).
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In 1889 the Supreme Judicial Court even permitted the defendant in a
liquor-selling case to be impeached with evidence of a past liquor-selling
conviction despite a real risk that the jury would convict her simply because
she had committed the same crime before.472
Ames did not venture to predict the consequences of a law that
presented accomplished criminals with the options of being convicted on
their silence or convicted on their testimony. And although others of
Ames's day saw the dilemma that he saw,473 the task of explaining its full
impact fell to a New York prosecutor of a later generation who wrote with
the benefit of four decades' experience with these statutes. Arthur Train,
son of Middlesex prosecutor Charles Russell Train,47 4 was serving as an
assistant district attorney in Manhattan in 1906 when he wrote The Prisoner
at the Bar,475 the first of his series of chatty commentaries on the state of
criminal justice. Train confirmed, first of all, the two horns of Ames's
dilemma. On the one hand, those defendants who "do not testify... will
probably pay the usual penalty" :476
Three jurors out of five will convict any man who is unwilling to
offer an explanation of the charge against him. How they reconcile
this with their oath it would be hard to understand, if they were
accustomed to obey it literally in other respects. The writer has
heard more than one talesman say, in discussing a verdict, "Of
course we couldn't take it against him, but we knew he was guilty
because he was afraid to testify."477
472. See Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 150 Mass. 315, 317 (1889) ("The defendant having
testified, the record of her conviction of a crime was admissible to affect her credibility."); cf.
Fano, 400 Mass. at 303 (noting the particular danger of unfair prejudice to a criminal defendant
"if a prior conviction is substantially similar to the crime being tried").
473. In 1869, only months after New York had given criminal defendants the right to testify.
the New York Times wrote:
The moment they become witnesses [criminal defendants] subject themselves, like
other witnesses, to the cross-examination of the District-Attorney, which may extend to
their whole past career, and is sure to bring out facts that prejudice their case. It may be
asked, then, why the guilty should avail themselves of the law and take the
stand? ... The truth is, if they do not take the stand, a strong presumption of their guilt
is inevitable in the minds of the jury; for although the law expressly declares that the
failure on the part of the prisoner to avail himself of its privilege, shall not work any
presumption against him, yet, as was very pointedly stated by Mayor Hall in discussing
the law, "the proviso is like all other attempts to legislate against moral convictions-
an abortion." Juries will draw an inference unfavorable to the man who refuses to take
the stand and declare his innocence... although the law declares they shall not.
The New Law, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1869, at 2; see also Act of May 7, 1869, ch. 678, § I. 1869
N.Y. Laws 1597, 1597.
474. See 14 NATIONAL CYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 427 (1910).
475. TRAIN, supra note 199.
476. Id. at 164.
477. Id. at 161. Train cited the experience of one of his colleagues: "Out of three hundred
defendants tried by the writer's associate, Mr. C. C. Nott, twenty-three failed to take the stand in
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On the other hand, those who do testify, if they have criminal pasts, "are
more than likely to be convicted 'on their records"': ..
The professional criminal usually has a "record" and he knows full
well that in view of his past history, if there be any sort of a case
against him, his own defence, however eloquent or ingenious, will
go for nothing. An affirmative answer to the simple question,
"Have you ever been convicted?" is, in three cases out of five,
equivalent to a plea of guilty.
479
In fact, Train wrote, even defendants who remained silent were likely to be
convicted on their records: An experienced juror "discovers that the district
attorney cannot prove the prison record... of the defendant unless the
latter subjects himself to cross-examination by taking the witness-stand, and
hence is likely to suspect that any defendant who does not testify is an ex-
convict." 4 -
The consequence of the defendant's predicament is "that the jury in the
ordinary run of criminal cases passes upon the guilt or innocence of very
few professional criminals."8' Instead, a defendant with a criminal past,
who therefore has the choice of being convicted on his silence or convicted
on his record, "generally throws up his hands and stolidly takes his
medicine"-and "dickers for the lowest plea he can get."'82 And "when
the jury disband at the conclusion of the term with the thanks of the court,
they have seen few professional criminals, save for a fleeting glance as one
or two are led to the bar to admit their guilt."" The upshot was that a law
that purported to grant defendants a new right to testify at trial instead
deprived those defendants who had criminal records of the right to any
meaningful trial-and left them with little alternative but to seek the best
plea bargain they could get.
What Ames anticipated and Train witnessed was not peculiar to their
part of the country. By the turn of the century, every state but Georgia
permitted defendants to testify. 4 In California, which passed a defendant-
testimony law in 1866 just ahead of Massachusetts,s Friedman and
Percival saw an unexpected second dimension to the link between
defendant-testimony laws and defendants' incentives to plead. They quote a
cases submitted to the jury. Of these twenty-one were convicted, one was acquitted, and as to one
the jury disagreed." Id. at 163.
478. Id. at 164.
479. Id. at 148.
480. Id. at 161.
481. Id. at 148.
482. Id.
483. Id. at 169.
484. See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570. 577 & n.6 (1961).
485. See supra note 455.
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judge at a 1910 sentencing hearing congratulating a defendant on his good
sense in pleading guilty: "You can rest assured if you had gone on the
witness stand and told some perjured tale about this affair, you would have
received a heavier sentence."486 This rationalization brilliantly expands the
versatility of defendant-testimony laws as a spur to plea bargaining. First, it
grants those judges who pretend to shun plea bargaining of a crasser sort a
noble basis for rewarding the defendant's plea. Second, it gives judges an
appropriately principled reason to punish defendants for wasting the court's
time with a trial: After all, the jury's guilty verdict normally conveys its
judgment that the defendant, if she testified, lied.4 87 And most importantly,
the judge's reasoning creates an Ames-like dilemma not just for those
defendants who have criminal histories that might be grounds for
impeachment, but for all defendants. All defendants risked being convicted
for their silence, and when tried before judges intent on punishing them for
their perjury, all of them risked an aggravated penalty for speaking as well.
To the extent that defendant-testimony laws lowered defendants'
perceived chances of winning at trial or heightened their fears of increased
penalties should they select trial, choose to testify, and lose, these laws
made defendants more willing to plea bargain-and perhaps made them
more willing to plead guilty even without a promised concession in the
hope that their plea would win the judge's favor. Of course, other
developments also might have moved defendants to believe that their
chances at trial were hopeless. Some scholars have argued that the rising
efficiency of the police generated more evidence and tighter cases-a
reasonable enough theory, but I have seen no suggestion by contemporaries
that good police work was making it harder for defendants to win at trial. In
any event, Train's report makes it clear that at least some defendants who
might have chosen trial under the old regime declined trial under the new.
There is no reason to expect that this effect would be immediate. The
dynamic that Train described turned on juror expectations: Because jurors
expected defendants to testify, a defendant could not afford to sit quietly
through his trial. Juror expectations presumably would not change
overnight-and only after jurors had internalized the new order, in which
486. Proceedings upon Sentence at 5-6, People v. Schroeder, No. 4025 (Alameda Super. Ct.
1910), quoted in FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra note 135, at 181.
487. See Proceedings upon Sentence, People v. Sullivan, No. 4837 (Alameda Super. Ct.
1910) (quoting a judge who justified a heavy sentence to the defendant by noting that " [ylou were
not only willing to commit the offense, you were willing to go upon the witness stand and state
that which was not true"), cited in FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra note 135, at 214; see also
Heumann, supra note 146, at 526 n.18 (noting the same principle at work in modem-day
Connecticut); The New Law, supra note 473 (relating the complaint of criminal defense lawyers
that when their clients testify under New York's new defendant-testimony law, they often lie.
"and then when they come to be sentenced the Court does not scruple to give them the extreme
penalty of the law, and give as a reason for his severity that they have added to the crime with
which they were charged that of pejury" ).
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defendants could take the stand, would they become suspicious of those
defendants who did not. So the result in Massachusetts might be just about
what we would expect: The dramatic conversion to a plea-bargaining
regime, shown in Figure 4, began just about a decade after defendants first
began to take the witness stand.
That defendant-testimony laws proved to be of such convenient
assistance to plea bargaining's cause was not, I think, a matter of design.
These laws were the culmination of a long legal evolution-one that wiped
out a whole series of old common-law rules that barred the testimony of
certain classes of persons -and not the brainchildren of nineteenth-
century prosecutors or judges intent on squeezing defendants into passing
up their trial right. Even as bitter a critic of the new laws as Seth Ames
failed to mention that the dilemma he set out with such pith would produce
more pleas of guilty. There is no evidence in the early history of defendant-
testimony laws that their backers promoted them either openly or otherwise
as instruments of plea bargaining.
But neither do I think that the quick and durable success of laws that
happened to encourage plea bargaining was pure good (or ill) fortune. We
now have traced two of the nineteenth century's greatest innovations in
criminal procedure-probation and defendant-testimony laws-to plea
bargaining's doorstep. Of these, only probation took form in some measure
as the work of a plea-bargaining regime, but both proved strong allies in the
cause. What's more, they proved to be coordinated allies. Although
defendant-testimony laws helped persuade all defendants to plead guilty,
they worked best, for the reasons we have seen, against defendants with
criminal pasts. And although few jurisdictions barred probation for
defendants with criminal pasts, it quickly developed in Massachusetts and
elsewhere that few but first offenders got probation,4" and some states
made this practice law.4"
488. See George Fisher, 77te Jury's Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575. 656-98 (1997).
489. John Augustus, Boston's pioneering unofficial probation officer. wrote in 1852, "1
confined my efforts mainly to those who were indicted for their first offence .. " AUGUSTUS.
supra note 387, at 19. Boston's (and the nation's) first official probation officer, Edward H.
Savage, wrote in his annual report for 1880 that 341 of 376 probation cases he had disposed of
that year involved first offenders. See EDWARD H. SAVAGE. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PROBATION
OFFICER FOR SUFFOLK COUNTY, FOR THE YEAR 1880, at 1-2, 8 (Boston. Rockwell & Churchill
1881) [hereinafter SAVAGE, ANNUAL REPORT]. Under the heading -First Offences," Savage
wrote that "very few are probated who have once been in prison." Id. He urged courts to give
"mature consideration" to their apparent belief "that there is little hope for a second comer." ld;
see also EDWARD H. SAVAGE, POLICE RECORDS AND RECOLLECTIONS. OR BOSTON BY
DAYLIGHT AND GASLIGHT FOR Two HUNDRED AND FORTY YEARS at xiii (Patterson Smith 1971)
(1873) [hereinafter SAVAGE, POLICE RECORDS AND RECOLLECTIONS] (noting that Savage served
as Boston's first regular probation officer); BOSTON EVENING TRANSCRIPT, Jan. 15, 1880, at I
(reporting that Savage's first annual report said that about 95% of his cases were first offenses).
Eight years later, Savage wrote that "a large majority of the cases recommended are for first and
minor offences." EDWARD H. SAVAGE, PROBATION WORK FOR THE COUNTY OF SUFFOLK: THE
TENTH ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE CENTRAL PROBATION DISTRICT 16 (Boston. Rockwell &
2000]
The Yale Law Journal
I will wait until Part VII to explore the evolutionary principles that
might explain the spread and staying power of institutions that so handily
promoted plea bargaining's cause. For now it is enough to realize that,
going into the last quarter of the nineteenth century, two of the three major
courtroom actors had strong incentives to plea bargain. They lacked only
the power. Prosecutors had lost the power to charge bargain once granted
them by the peculiar penalty structure of the liquor laws. Their power to put
defendants on probation by means of on-file plea bargains could not
reasonably extend to the more serious crimes on the docket. And murder
cases, in which prosecutors retained the power to charge bargain and used it
extensively, made up only a tiny fraction of the docket. Criminal
defendants, who had complete power to fulfill their end of any bargain by
pleading guilty, had of course no power to ensure a reward for their pleas.
The full development and final victory of plea bargaining as a systemic
regime therefore awaited the judge's helping hand. The judge held most of
the power to sentence, but until the last quarter of the nineteenth century, he
had stayed mainly out of the plea-bargaining fray. For the interests of plea
bargaining had not yet touched his own.
V. JUDGES AND THE POWER To SENTENCE
In our journey through the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century,
we have stumbled over no evidence that judges commonly lent their aid in
plea bargaining. The great proportion of defendants who pled guilty at the
beginning of the century do not seem to have done so in exchange for a
reward promised by-or perhaps even expected from-the judge or anyone
Churchill 1889) [hereinafter SAVAGE, PROBATION WORK FOR THE COUNTY OF SUFFOLKj. The
probation officer for the state's central district reported that over seven years, 1129 of 1598
disposed probation cases involved first offenders. See id. at 22.
A generation later, a Chicago lawyer wrote, "It is assumed that a probation system is one
which results in the establishment of the principle that a first offender ... shall be relieved of
punishment .... Albert Kocourek, An Unconsidered Element in the Probation of First
Offenders, 6 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 9, 10 (1915-1916). Lynn M. Mather reports that in Los
Angeles in the 1970s, when the offense was minor, the "lack of prior record indicated the
likelihood that probation would be granted." LYNN M. MATHER, PLEA BARGAINING OR TRIAL?
32 (1979).
490. When New York acted to permit suspended sentences (an elaboration of the probation
procedure) in 1893, it limited the practice to persons not previously convicted of a felony. See Act
of Apr. 4, 1893, ch. 279, § 1, 1893 N.Y. Laws 559, 559. According to a 1905 rule, abandoned in
1918, convicted felons could never be granted probation. See Act of May 6, 1918, ch. 457, § I.
1918 N.Y. Laws 1339, 1339-40; Act of May 29, 1905, ch. 655, § 1, 1905 N.Y. Laws 1664, 1664:
see also TIMASHEFF, supra note 387, at 19, 54. Maryland's 1894 probation act limited the practice
to first offenders found guilty of noncapital offenses. See Act of Apr. 6. 1894, ch. 402. § I. 1894
Md. Stat. 583, 583-84. In 1926, the Massachusetts legislature declared that "no person convicted
of a felony by a district court shall be placed on probation by said court.., if it shall aopear thai




else. Their sentences appear to have been no lighter than those of
defendants who wagered trial and lost. Perhaps they pled guilty in the
hopeless realization that without a lawyer, they had small chance of
prevailing at trial.49 If so, then rising numbers of lawyers in the early
decades of the century stanched this flow of unrewarded pleas. The result,
as we saw in Figure 4,492 Was that through the middle third of the century,
the rate of guilty pleas reached the lowest point in our period.
Though prosecutors suffered under the crushing caseloads of the 1840s
and 1850s, they could do little to lighten their loads, for their power to plea
bargain had strict bounds. Working with what pockets of power they had,
they devised two forms of plea bargaining and conducted each with little or
no judicial assistance: In liquor and murder cases they took advantage of
the law's peculiarly rigid penalty scheme and their initially unsupervised
nol pros power to initiate charge-bargaining regimes. During the
legislature's 1844 investigation into his bargaining practices, Asahel
Huntington laid before the committee his sophisticated practice of multiple
charging and selective nol prossing. That judges played no substantial role
in this scheme must have been clear to the legislators, for when they set out
to restrict such deals in the 1852 liquor prohibition act, they declared that
"a nolle prosequi shall not be entered by the prosecuting officer [in liquor
cases], except with the concurrence of the court." '493 It seems legislators
were right to think prosecutors were the problem, for in 1853, court records
disclose no multiple charging in liquor cases and no more charge
bargains.4' Judges apparently withheld their "concurrence" from charge
bargaining in liquor cases.
Stripped of the unilateral power to charge bargain, prosecutors retreated
to the second form of plea bargaining permitted by their limited powers: By
promising to withhold a motion to sentence in exchange for the defendant's
plea, they engaged in on-file plea bargaining in a broad range of cases. In
liquor cases, the legislature again defeated the tactic simply by making
judges partners in the prosecutors' power. By declaring that "[n]o [liquor]
case.., shall be laid on file.., unless.., upon the certificate of the
presiding magistrate or judge, 495 the 1865 Act To Prevent Evasions largely
ended on-file plea bargaining in liquor cases. For most of the latter half of
the nineteenth century, therefore, the only forms of clear plea bargaining
that appear more than occasionally on the records and dockets of Middlesex
County are those in which the legislature left the prosecutor's unilateral
491. See supra notes 441-442,446 and accompanying text.
492- See supra Figure 4; notes 435-440, 446-449 and accompanying text.
493. Act of May 22, 1852, ch. 322, § 13, 1852 Mass. Acts 257. 264 (emphasis added).
494. See supra notes 173-178 and accompanying text.
495. Act of May 12, 1865, ch. 223, § 1. 1865 Mass. Acts 617, 617 (concerning the prevention
of evasions of provisions of the general statutes regarding liquor cases); see also supra notes 280-
283 and accompanying text.
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power to deal unmolested: charge bargains in murder cases and on-file plea
bargains in non-liquor cases.
Not all plea bargains, of course, appear on the record books as clear
plea bargains, in which the clerk disclosed the concession granted for the
defendant's plea. There may have been many defendants who had quiet
assurances of lighter sentences should they plead guilty and many others
who had real, though unspoken, reasons to believe that their plea would
reap a lenient reward from the judge. The long-depressed plea rates of the
middle third of the century, however, suggest judges did not commonly
dispense such rewards.
Beginning in the 1870s, however, the rate of guilty pleas turned first
mildly and then sharply upward. After a modest retreat in the 1890s, the
rate turned upward again and in 1900 reached its highest point in our
period, where it remained in 1910. It is hard to escape the conclusion that
judges had begun to engage in sentence bargaining. We cannot attribute the
enormous growth in guilty pleas to a change in the power or preferences of
prosecutors. No new law either restored their power to charge bargain in
liquor cases or created in other broad categories of crime the kind of rigid
penalty scheme that first gave prosecutors that power in liquor and murder
cases. In 1890, charge bargains still accounted for only four percent of all
guilty pleas, and the twenty-seven charge bargains I saw in 1900 amounted
to only six percent of all pleas.496
Nor did anything so drastically alter defendants' capacities or
incentives that it could explain the huge rise in guilty pleas at century's end.
As the proportion of defendants with counsel held fairly steady through the
last four decades of the century,"' there is little reason to think that a
growing proportion of defendants pled guilty out of sheer hopelessness. " 's It
496. Moreover, only one of these 27 cases looked like an old liquor charge bargain in that the
prosecutor's manipulation of the charges dictated the sentence. That was a murder case. in which
the prosecutor reduced a charge of first-degree murder, which called for mandatory death, to
second-degree murder, which called for mandatory life imprisonment, in exchange for the
defendant's plea. See Commonwealth v. William H. Kelley, Middlesex Super. Ct. R. Book 368.
No. 26 (1900). The legislature had transferred jurisdiction to try murder cases from the Supreme
Judicial Court to the superior court in 1891. See Act of June 6, 1891. ch. 379, § 1. 1891 Mass.
Acts 966, 966; see also DAVIS, supra note 7, at 254 (reviewing this jurisdictional history).
In almost all of the other cases, the judge's sentence was well below the maximum of the
reduced charge, and so the defendant arguably won only the collateral rewards that might have
come with a lesser crime of conviction. For some defendants, these rewards might have been
substantial, but the very small total number of charge bargains suggests that for most defendants.
they held little allure.
497. See supra note 436 and accompanying text.
498. If anything, those defendants unfortunate enough to come to court without lawyers had
reason to be more hopeful than in years past. In 1900, of 34 defendants with counsel who went to
trial, 20 won acquittals or hung juries-a success rate of 59%. Fifteen of the 39 unrepresented
defendants who risked trial also won acquittals or hung juries-or 38%. Having counsel was still
a benefit, but going to trial alone proved less hopeless than it had at the middle of the century. See
supra note 442 and accompanying text. I cannot explain why unrepresented defendants fared
better at trial in later years.
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is likely that a fair number of guilty pleas grew out of the 1866 defendant-
testimony law, which diminished the power of defendants with criminal
pasts to take a winning case to trial and might have prompted them to plead
guilty without a guaranteed concession. But the booming increase in guilty
pleas during the last quarter of the century must have been due to more. By
1900 the proportion of adjudicated cases resolved by plea had grown
simply too large--eighty-seven percent99-for us to believe that so many
defendants pled guilty without a real and rather certain reward.
In fact, sentencing patterns suggest that judges rewarded defendants for
their pleas. Table 5 reports the sentencing data for four of the most
frequently prosecuted crimes in the last two decades of the century. Only in
theft cases was the benefit to those who pled guilty less than dramatic. In
breaking-and-entering cases, defendants who went to trial and lost spent on
average about twice as long in prison as those who pled guilty. In assault-
and-battery cases, those who lost after trial were almost three times as
likely to go to prison as those who pled guilty. And in liquor cases, not only
were those who lost after trial more than three times as likely to go to
prison, but they also paid far more in fines and costs. I have excluded from
these calculations all cases that were placed on file after the defendant's
plea of guilty because I want to isolate the judge's role in sentencing, and it
is unclear in these decades how the judge and prosecutor divided the power
to place cases on file.5" As the number of on-file plea bargains in these
years was quite large,5 ' had I included them, the "sentencing" advantage
to defendants who pled guilty would have appeared even starker.
499. Figure 4 understates the proportion of defendants who pled guilty at century's end
because I excluded from that diagram liquor prosecutions and filed cases. I did so to avoid the
distorting impact of the prosecutors' power to bargain in those cases, especially in earlier decades.
as well as the distorting impact of changes in the liquor laws and in the rates of liquor
prosecutions. See supra note 424 and accompanying text. By the last third of the century, of
course, prosecutors had lost their power to charge bargain in liquor cases, and by the last two
decades of the century, judges perhaps had assumed more of the power to place cases on file. See
supra notes 367-376 and accompanying text. When I return the excluded cases to the pool. the
proportion of adjudicated cases settled by plea in 1900 rises to 87%.
500. See supra notes 367-376 and accompanying text.
501. In 1880, for example, on-file plea bargains made up 34% of all pleas. By 1900. that
figure had climbed to 48%. See Middlesex Super. Ct. R. Books (1880, 1900): Middlesex Super.
Ct. Docket Books (1880, 1900).
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TABLE 5. SENTENCE ACCORDING TO MODE OF CONVICTION:
MIDDLESEX SUPERIOR COURT, 1880-1900
Breaking and Simple Assault and Liquor
I Entering 5 02  Theft Battery Crimes 53
Plea Trial Plea Trial Plea Trial Plea Trial
Number 66 20 38 10 38 13 84 30
Avg. Value $39 $42 $78 $346 -- -- -- --
of Stolen
Goods
% Prison 100 100 89 100 21 62 15 53
Avg. Term 18.7 38.5 10.7 12.8 5.8 5.5 3.6 3.4
(months)
5 °4
% Fine 0 0 11 0 79 46 99 100
Avg. Fine -- -- $28 -- $20 $21 $67 $106
Avg. Costs50 5  .. .. .. .. $17 $21 $22 $50
Sources: Middlesex Super. Ct. R. Books (Oct. 1880, June 1885, Feb. 1890, Oct. 1896,
1900).
These figures reflect more, I believe, than the impulsive generosity of
judges who were gratified to see defendants admit their guilt. Rather, they
are strong evidence that by the last quarter of the century, judges had
become full partners in a thriving practice of sentence bargaining. I now
face the question of motives: Why would a judiciary that once shunned
taking part in prosecutorial plea bargaining later, in the last quarter of the
century, take up plea bargaining with enthusiasm? In Part II, when we
encountered judges' early resistance to plea bargaining, I suggested that the
practice faced at least three obstacles to judicial acceptance: Judges lacked
502. I have excluded breaking and entering a residence because it is substantially more
serious than other breaking-and-entering crimes.
503. For purposes of this table, liquor crimes include keeping liquor with intent to sell,
making unlicensed sales, and maintaining a liquor nuisance. In this time frame, the first two of
these were punishable by a fine of between $50 and $500 or imprisonment of between one and six
months or both. See Act of Apr. 5, 1875, ch. 99, §§ 1, 13, 1875 Mass. Acts 664, 664. 668
(regulating the sale of intoxicating liquors). Maintaining a liquor nuisance was punishable by a
fine of between $50 and $100 and imprisonment of between three and twelve months. See MASS.
REV. LAWS ch. 101, § 7 (1902).
504. "Avg. Term" refers to the average term of confinement of those defendants sentenced to
serve time. I have excluded from this calculation those defendants sentenced to an indefinite time
at the Massachusetts Reformatory or a juvenile facility. See infra notes 731, 733-735 and
accompanying text (discussing the Massachusetts Reformatory). When the judge specified a
minimum and maximum term in state prison, I have calculated a sentence midway between the
minimum and maximum.
505. Costs were very rarely assessed when the defendant served time. No costs were assessed
in 1896 or 1900. See Middlesex Super. Ct. R. Books (1896, 1900).
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the incentives to bargain that prosecutors found in their crushing workloads
and in their taste for effortless convictions; judges objected on principle to
the idea of passing sentence without full information about the defendant's
crime and background; and proud judges took offense at having to share
sentencing power with prosecutors. Yet by century's end, a form of plea
bargaining that seemed to demand judicial complicity was thriving. Some
things must have changed.
I will argue in the next three sections that some things did change-and
changed in a way that gave judges a real incentive to plea bargain,
weakened their principled resistance to plea bargaining, and protected their
pride from prosecutorial invasion of their sentencing power. The new
incentive came from an exploding civil caseload, brought about by a
revolution in transportation and industry and a resulting wave of tort actions
of unprecedented number and complexity. Judges' principled objections
gave way as newly commissioned probation officers investigated
defendants' crimes and backgrounds and gave judges enough information
to make reasoned sentencing decisions without a trial or sentencing
hearing-and as new parole boards with the power to tailor sentences let
judges feel that they did not need to get sentences exactly right anyway.
And judicial pride found refuge in the development of sentencing
mechanisms that let prosecutors make promises in the course of plea
bargaining without taking sentencing power (or at least without taking it
overtly) from judicial hands.
A. Incentives: The Judges' Caseload Pressure
On October 14, 1885, a Salem lawyer named Charles Thompson made
a note in his diary: "This P.M. news came that I am appointed or nominated
to judgeship of Superior Ct. Several called to congratulate me." 5  Eight
days later, with the anomalous expedition of a slower age, Thompson could
write that he had been "to Boston & was qualified by Governor Geo D
Robinson as Associate Justice of the Superior Court." ' Four days after
that, our fifty-eight-year-old judicial novice was on the road: " Went to
Pittsfield & held Court for a fortnight." From Pittsfield, Thompson went
to Greenfield,509 and from Greenfield, apparently, to Boston, where he held
court until the night before Christmas.10 For the next two years before his
506. 11 Diaries of Charles Thompson, supra note 189 (Oct. 14. 1885).
507. 13 id. (Oct. 22, 1885). Because Thompson kept separate diaries in his two offices.
different volumes sometimes cover the same dates.
508. 13 id. (Oct. 26, 1885).
509. See 13 id. (Nov. 9, 1885).
510. After writing in an entry dated November 9 that he -[w]ent to Greenfield [and) held
Court for a fortnight," Thompson made no further note of his itinerary until this entry-" Monday
December 1885 Went to Greenfield" -which he followed with this vague comment: "Held
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diary came to a close, Thompson set down in staccato half-sentences his
frenetic zigzags across the state,51 1 now and then stopping to punctuate,
"Have been very busy" 512_, [v]ery busy indeed" -, a number of cases
not disposed of." 5
14
Knowing only this much, we could not say that Thompson had a harder
time of it than his predecessors on the Court of Common Pleas. They too
rode circuit, and although Thompson occasionally resorted to horseback,
51
he at least normally had the option of the train. Moreover, there is plenty of
evidence that judges in earlier times sometimes left for their next sitting
before completing the calendar at the last.56 Nor can I argue that the ever-
mounting criminal caseload of the last quarter of the century, when judges
appear to have gone over to plea bargaining's cause, weighed more heavily
upon them than before. Table 6 shows that through the last half of the
century, the number of criminal cases per judge in Middlesex County never
again got so bad as in 1849. It is true that as the district attorney began to
draw a full-time salary and then to take on assistants,1 7 his office was able
to bring a higher proportion of all cases before the court for its attention.
But even when I exclude all those cases that the district attorney
presumably handled on his own or that took up little of the court's time
(those ending in complete nol prosses, whether or not upon payment of
costs, those placed on file without a guilty finding, and those in which the
defendant failed to appear), the middle of the century remains the worst
period I have studied in terms of criminal cases per judge.
Court ... Wednesday Night Dec. 9." Thompson then became more specific, noting that he " w e nt
to Boston and held court till Thursday night 24, 1885." 13 id. (undated entries). He spent the
Christmas week at home. See 13 id.
511. See 13 id. (undated entry following Jan. 5, 1886) (noting that he sat court in Boston and
Barnstable, then in Boston again); 13 id. (May 13, 1886) (noting that he sat in Worcester); 13 id.
(June 30, 1886) (noting that he sat in East Cambridge); 13 id. (Dec. 24, 1886) (noting that he sat
in Bristol, Lowell, East Cambridge, Boston, Plymouth, Dukes County, and Nantucket): 13 id.
(Oct. 4, 1887) (noting that he sat in Springfield and Boston, then in Springfield again, and then in
Boston); 13 id. (Nov. 12, 1887) (noting that he sat in Pittsfield).
512. 13 id. (undated entry following Jan. 5, 1886).
513. 13 id.
514. 13 id.
515. See 13 id. (Oct. 4, 1887) ("Rode with horse [from Springfield] to Beverly.").
516. See Court of Common Pleas, supra note 201 ("No civil action has been tried [at the
present sitting of the Court of Common Pleas], and none will be. The number of new entries is
436, of old about 900."); Criminal Cases Disposed of at the Late Session of C.C.P., LOWELL
COURIER, July 8, 1841, at 2 (explaining that "[m]uch business remained undisposed of, but Chief
Justice Williams... being obliged to hold the Term in Boston ... and the other members of the
Court having engagements in other parts of the Commonwealth," the court was forced to
adjourn); To Our Friend of the Concord Gazette We Send Greeting, LOWELL COURIER, Feb. 20,
1836, at 2 (referring to "the present crowded and overflowing state of the dockets of the C.C.P.").
517. See supra notes 132-145, 195-197 and accompanying text.
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TABLE 6. CRIMINAL CASES PER JUDGE:
MIDDLESEX COURT OF COMMON PLEAS AND SUPERIOR COURT118
Year Total Number of Number of Number of Number




1824 48 4 12 39 10
1829 41 4 10 27 7
1834 95 4 24 65 16
1839 42 4 11 36 9
1843-1844* 112 5 22 93 19
1849 443 6 74 271 45
1853 482 7 69 319 46
1859 415 10 42 257 26
1864** 292 10 29 159 16
1870** 449 10 45 309 31
1880** 486 11 44 330 30
1900 602 18 33 546 30
* Average per year
** Calculated from totals for one or two of the three annual sessions (see
Appendix A)
Sources: Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Books; Middlesex Ct. C.P. Docket Books; Middlesex
Super. Ct. R. Books; Middlesex Super. CL Docket Books.
Of course, cases per judge would be a poor measure of judicial caseload
pressure if the burden of each case had been expanding over time. John
Langbein has argued that the growing complexity of the law of evidence
and "the lawyerization of the trial ... made jury trial so complicated and
time-consuming that they rendered it unworkable as the routine dispositive
procedure" and forced the system to turn instead to plea bargaining. 9 The
argument has enormous commonsense appeal. And in fact, my evidence
suggests that increasing trial length may have played a part in the surge of
plea bargaining in murder cases in the 1890s. But this evidence is uncertain,
and there is little or no evidence of a broader connection between trial
518. See Act of Apr. 5, 1859, ch. 196, § 7, 1859 Mass. Acts 339, 341 (setting the number of
superior court judges at nine); DAVIS, supra note 7. at 243-44 (providing the number of judges
through 1859); DIMOND, supra note 190, at 75, 77, 93. 97 (providing the number of judges from
1859 through 1900). Middlesex was one of 14 counties in the state. To get a real idea of how
many cases each judge handled per year, one would have to repeat this analysis in each of the
others. As Middlesex is large and diverse, there is no reason to think that its patterns of change
were unlike those in Massachusetts as a whole.
519. John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 11 (1978).
20001
The Yale Law Journal
length and plea bargaining that can help explain plea bargaining's early
rise.
We should begin in the upper tier, as the records of Supreme Judicial
Court business give us a somewhat surer footing for conclusions. The
annual reports of the attorney general, which commenced in 1832 and
continued with occasional interruptions throughout the century, often noted
the days consumed by trials before the high court.52" Table 7 reports the
average length of murder trials during the last two-thirds of the century.' 2
Two striking facts emerge from this table, one opposing Langbein's thesis,
one apparently supporting it. The first is the absence of any substantial
increase in trial length between the 1830s, the last decade in which the
records reveal no charge bargaining, and the 1860s, when almost half of all
adjudicated murder cases ended in charge bargains. In fact, in the 1860s,
the average trial length fell to its lowest point in our period. Then, as the
length of trials rose slightly in the next two decades, the proportion of
charge bargainsfell.
TABLE 7. AVERAGE LENGTH OF MASSACHUSETTS MURDER TRIALS522
Year Number of Number of Average % of Trials
Trials Trials with Length of Ending in
Recorded Trials (Days) Charge
Lengths .... Bargains
1832-1839 45 15 3.2 0
1840-1849 41 1 4.0 10
1850-1859 42 11 3.5 17
1860-1869 53 28 3.0 47
1870-1879 77 32 3.8 43
1880-1889 51 23 4.1 35
1890-1899 67 16 6.6 61
Source: Annual Reports of the Attorney General.
520. The attorney general never recorded trial time with any precision. Most often, he noted
the trial as a span-for example, "December 1-9" for an 1868 murder case. See Commonwealth
v. Samuel M. Andrews, listed in Report of the Attorney General for the Year Ending December
31, 1868, PUB. Doc. No. 16, at 17 (Mass. 1869). In such cases. I have assumed that the trial
consumed both the beginning and ending day and every day in between. As I expect-but do not
know-that courts were closed on Sundays, and as I have not determined which dates were
Sundays, I have simply excluded one day in seven whenever the time span noted exceeded six
days. Hence, I have assumed that the Andrews case, quoted above, consumed eight days.
521. I have limited myself to murder trials, rather than considering all capital trials, because
murder cases may have taken more or less time to try than cases involving other capital
offenses-and because, after mid-century, murder was virtually the only capital offense.
522. For my method of calculating the length of trials, see supra note 520. For an explanation
of the incomplete records of the 1840s and 1850s, see supra notes 97, 99.
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On the other hand, Langbein's thesis finds support in the data from the
1890s, when both trial length and the proportion of charge bargains
increased dramatically. But a complicating factor clouds this scene. By an
Act of June 6, 1891, the legislature transferred jurisdiction over murder
trials from the Supreme Judicial Court to the superior courts." As we saw
in Figure 4, the overall rate of guilty pleas in Middlesex Superior Court
turned up sharply during the last quarter of the century. If we exclude on-
file plea bargains, which substantially increased the guilty-plea rate but
never took place in murder cases, sixty-one percent of adjudicated non-
liquor cases in superior court ended in guilty pleas in 1890 and seventy-nine
percent in 1900. Given the dynamic of powers and interests that prevailed
in the superior court and that I believe gave rise to the habit and culture of
plea bargaining in that court, it would not be surprising to find that once
this court adopted custody of murder cases, the rate of plea bargains would
creep toward the overall average. A charge-bargaining rate of sixty-one
percent in murder cases during this decade therefore might be just about
what we would expect. And we might expect charge bargains to increase
this rate even absent any increase in the length of murder trials.
If we look now only at the work of the superior court and court of
common pleas, it is hard to discern any broad support for the thesis that
increasing trial length led to the rise of plea bargaining. It is true that one
prosecutor complained in the 1840s that "[t]he labor of the trials is
increased by the increased attendance of very eminent counsel in the
defences." 24 But it is also true that court records reveal no clear trend
toward substantially longer trials in the last quarter of the nineteenth
century, when the guilty-plea rate in the courts of the middle tier grew
tremendously. Perhaps that is because the proportion of defendants with
counsel-the particular concern of the prosecutor just quoted-stayed fairly
steady over the same time span.
525
The Middlesex court clerk did not record the length of individual trials
in the nineteenth century. Table 8 reports the number of days consumed by
each criminal session of the middle-tier courts in Middlesex County and the
number of cases tried per day.s26 Because the Middlesex Court of Common
Pleas did not begin to hold separate criminal and civil sessions until June
1839, I have no earlier data. The low figures for trials per day in the earliest
years (indicating long trials) probably mean that there were certain "fixed
costs" at each session of the court-routine business that consumed court
523. See Act of June 6, 1891, ch. 379, § 1, 1891 Mass. Acts 966,966.
524. S. Doc. No. 68, at 7 (Mass. 1844) (petition of Samuel D. Parker).
525. See supra note 436 and accompanying text.
526. As the table makes clear, I have measured the number of "judge-days" -that is. if two
or more judges were presiding in separate courtrooms for a span of days. I have multiplied the
number of judges by the number of days.
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time but is not reflected in the number of cases disposed-so that when the
sessions of the court were short, as they were early on, they appear to have
been less efficient. And just as trials were probably faster than they appear
in the earliest years, they were probably faster than they appear in the later
years as well. In the later years, most sessions of the court had to process a
good number of cases that did not go to trial-after all, the vast majority of
cases ended in guilty pleas-but those cases still absorbed some of the
court's time.527
There is little here to suggest a sharp rise in trial length at the close of
the century. The pace of trials in 1900, when the rate of guilty pleas reached
its end-of-century high, just about equaled the pace in 1849, when the
guilty-plea rate reached almost its lowest point.528 In fact the best indication
of a trend toward longer trials emerged after the turn of the twentieth
century. The relatively slow trials of 1910 perhaps foreshadowed the longer
trials of our day, but they cannot explain the plea-bargaining boom that
marked the last decades of the nineteenth century. By 1900, the rate of
guilty pleas had reached a plateau, where it remained essentially unchanged
in 1910.529
527. In this respect, the table slightly understates the efficiency of the later years. Because of
the district attorney's workload, he nol prossed or simply placed on file (without a plea) a higher
proportion of cases in the middle of the century than toward the end, when he became a full-time
official and took on assistants. The bench therefore had to deal with a greater proportion of the
total cases coming into the court as the last half of the century wore on.
528. Friedman and Percival report an average length of trial in Alameda County of 1.5 days
in 1880-1889. See FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra note 135, at 185. Trials in Middlesex were a
good deal shorter. In 1890, the Middlesex Superior Court heard 1.7 trials per judge-day-
suggesting a trial length of about three-fifths of a day, minus enough time to make room for cases
not resolved by trial. Except in murder cases, see supra Table 7 and accompanying text, I did not
see a substantial increase in trial length at century's end. Friedman and Percival, in contrast, report
an average trial length of 2.6 days in 1890-1899. See FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra note 135, at
185.
Probably the most important reason for the immoderate--or at least unmodem-quickness
of these 19th-century trials was that the same two juries sat throughout each session of the court
with only slightly shifting memberships to suit the needs of each trial. The prosecutor had no right
to make peremptory challenges in Massachusetts until 1862, further shortening the time taken in
jury selection. See Act of Mar. 22, 1862, ch. 84, § 1, 1862 Mass. Acts 64, 64. The practice of
keeping the same jury from case to case helps to explain the very fast trial rates that John
Langbein observed in late-17th-century and 18th-century London and that Friedman and Percival
saw in Leon County, Florida, in the 1890s. See FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra note 135, at 194 &
n.97 (reporting that Leon County trials "took, on the average, half an hour at most"); Langbein,
supra note 425, at 262 (reporting an average trial rate at the Old Bailey of between 12 and 20
felony cases a day well into the 18th century).
529. I am not able to draw a perfect comparison between case dispositions in 1900 and
those in 1910 because I could find only the record books and not the docket books for 1910.
Without the docket books, it is impossible to know how many of the filed cases, which appear
simply as long lists of names in the record books, involved guilty pleas. But the record books for
the two years suggest a remarkably similar pattern of case disposition. In 1900, the record book
discloses 313 adjudicated non-filed cases, of which 240-or 77%---were resolved by plea. In




TABLE 8. TRIALS PER DAY AND OTHER CASES PER DAY:
MIDDLESEX COURT OF COMMON PLEAS AND SUPERIOR COURT
Year Judge- Trials Trials per Other Cases Other
Days Judge- Cases per
Day Judge-
..... Day
1839* 17 12 0.7 14 0.8
1843-1844** 117 94 0.8 130 1.1
1849 79 131 1.7 312 3.9
1853 54 93 1.7 389 7.2
1859 78 130 1.7 285 3.7
1864* 34 38 1.1 187 5.5
1870* 33 62 1.9 121 3.7
1880* 19 21 1.1 119 6.3
1885* 26 24 0.9 not measured -
1890* 34 58 1.7 not measured -
1896* 29 60 2.1 not measured -
1900 44 70 1.6 532 12.1
1910 111 66 0.6 not measured -
* Totals for one or two of the three annual sessions (see Appendix A)
** Two-year totals
Sources: Middlesex CL C.P. R. Books; Middlesex Ct. C.P. Docket Books; Middlesex
Super. CL R. Books; Middlesex Super. CL Docket Books.
At bottom, I do not believe that criminal caseload pressure was the
moving force behind the late-century judicial conversion to plea
bargaining.5" To that extent I agree with Vogel and Ferdinand and others
who have sought to debunk the long-accepted wisdom that rising caseload
pressure brought on plea bargaining.53 But the received wisdom turns out
530. But Langbein's thesis might very well help to explain the continued advance of plea
bargaining in the 20th century. See Alschuler, supra note 2. at 38 (citing studies showing that the
length of the average felony trial grew from 3.5 days in 1964 to 7.2 days in 1968 in Los Angeles,
and from 1.9 days in 1950 to 2.8 days in 1965 in the District of Columbia); Langbein, supra note
519, at 9 & n.1 1 (reporting modem American plea-bargaining rates of up to 99%).
531. For studies adhering to the accepted wisdom, see Heumann. supra note 146, at 516-17.
For studies seeking to debunk it, see, for example. Heumann, supra note 146; and McConville &
Mirsky, supra note 243, at 463-64, who argue that New York City courts "absorb[ed]" a fivefold
increase in criminal caseload between 1839 and 1865, when the rate of guilty pleas was rising.
Heumann's is the most sustained attack on the theory that caseload pressure prompted the rise of
plea bargaining, but his analysis is not entirely convincing. He compares trial rates in low-volume
and high-volume superior courts in Connecticut and finds that "trial rates between them varied
minimally, and indeed often the low volume courts tried proportionately fewer cases." Heumann.
supra note 146, at 521-22. Heumann admits that this mode of analysis is "rough" because,
without knowing the number of prosecutors and judges in each court. - we cannot be sure that
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FIGURE 6. LENGTH OF CRIMINAL AND CIVIL SESSIONS:
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to be largely right-it simply focused on the wrong side of the courthouse.
The crucial caseload pressure came not from criminal courtrooms but from
their civil counterparts, a factor that all studies of this era have left out."2
volume reflects pressure." Id. at 520-21. Moreover, Heumann does not say whether the judges of
the Connecticut Superior Court rode circuit over the period of his study or were otherwise shifted
from one court to another when the first court's business was done. If so, then we would expect to
find little variation in caseload pressure between those courts with many cases and those with few,
and hence not much variation in the rates of trials.
532. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra note 135, at 42-43, 48 (failing to mention







Figure 6 depicts judicial workload in its most irreducible form: the number
of judge-workdays consumed each year by the criminal and civil business
of the middle-tier courts.533 The lowest line, representing the total number
of workdays per judge, shows that after the caseload depression of the Civil
War had offset the highs of the late 1840s, judges were able to limit the
share of their time devoted to Middlesex County business"4 to about twenty
days per judge per year throughout the last several decades of the century.
The widening gap between the steeply rising line representing the civil
workload and the jaggedly steady line representing the criminal workload
makes it clear that judges maintained their overall workload only by
devoting a smaller and smaller proportion of their time to criminal business.
The greatly increasing efficiency of the judicial workday on the criminal
side-rising from 3.3 cases per day in 1859 to 12.4 cases per day in
1900 535-therefore served not to increase judges' leisure, but to increase the
attention they paid to their civil caseloads.
The civil caseload phenomenon pictured in Figure 6 was neither a
passing phase nor a Middlesex peculiarity." It represents instead one of the
not... oppressive," although a majority of the court's judges devoted themselves to the civil
caseload); Alschuler, supra note 2, at 34 (addressing the caseload problem only in terms of case
pressure on the U.S. attorney's office); Heumann. supra note 146, at 523 n.10 (noting that the data
would not permit analysis of the impact of civil caseload).
533. Because the court did not begin to hold separate criminal and civil sessions until
partway through 1839, I have begun recording the time devoted to each session in 1840. Although
the court of common pleas underwent a substantial reorganization in 1821. see Act of Feb. 14.
1821, ch. 79, § 1, 8 Mass. Laws 545, 545-46 (establishing a court of common pleas), the
fundamental operations of the court did not change again throughout our period. At least since
1821, each judge of the court of common pleas and the superior court could preside alone over
sessions of the court. See id. Although the record and docket books are not absolutely clear on this
point, I believe that judges always or almost always sat alone. In 1891. when the legislature
transferred trial jurisdiction in capital cases to the superior court from the court of common pleas,
it required three judges to preside at such trials, see Act of June 6, 1891. ch. 379, § 2. 1891 Mass.
Acts 966, 966, but then reduced the figure to two in 1894, see Act of Apr. 5. 1894, ch. 204, 1894
Mass. Acts 186, 186. There were, however, no murder trials in Middlesex County in 1896 or
1900, the two years that I studied after these law changes, so I did not need to figure this change
into my calculations. Occasionally, two or more judges presided in different courtrooms at the
same time, each of them sitting alone. When calculating the number of judge-days for Figure 6-
as well as for Table 8-I multiplied the number of judges sitting by the number of days. See supra
note 526.
534. To figure the judges' total annual workload, we would have to repeat this analysis in
each of the state's other 13 counties. If the business of Middlesex County was proportional to its
population, then it accounted for about 18% of Massachusetts court work in this era. See A
COMPENDIUM OF THE NINTH CENSUS, supra note 3. at 56; 1 COMPENDIUM OF THE TENTH
CENSUS 34 (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office 1883).
535. For these figures, I have divided the number of cases brought before the judges for
resolution (257 in 1859, 546 in 1900) by the number of judge-days in criminal sessions (78 in
1859, 44 in 1900). The former figures exclude from the total caseload those cases disposed of by
complete nol prosses, by being placed on file without a guilty plea, or because the defendant
defaulted. See supra notes 295-296, 518 and accompanying text.
536. See DIMOND, supra note 190, at 93, 96 (citing legislative reports showing a doubling of
civil cases entered on the superior court docket statewide between 1880 and 1900 and continued
increases afterward); MICHAEL STEPHEN HINDUS ET AL. THE FtLES OF THE MASSACHUSETTS
2000]
The Yale Law Journal
great transformations of American law.537 It did not respond simply to the
booming population growth of this era, but rather to the mechanization of
production and transportation and to the human carnage wrought by
massive but still-primitive machinery deployed by industrialists and
railroad barons bent on profit and untethered by government safety
regulations.53 ' Between 1880 and 1900, the number of negligence suits filed
SUPERIOR COURT, 1859-1959, at 193 (1980) (showing an increase in the civil caseload of Suffolk
County from 24,785 cases in 1860-1869 to 52,293 cases in 1890-1899 to 115,784 cases in 1920-
1929). Because both the civil and criminal caseloads of Suffolk County seem to have been several
times greater than those of Middlesex, which apparently was its closest competitor, what
happened in Suffolk probably influenced judges' behavior more than events elsewhere. Two of
the smaller counties actually saw their civil caseloads shrink in this time frame. See id. at 190, 192
(reporting that Berkshire County's civil caseload fell from 4374 to 2202 between 1860-1869 and
1890-1899 and that Hampshire County's fell from 1453 to 1400 after rising as high as 3179 in
1870-1879).
Although I have seen no study that measures the time consumed by civil caseloads in
jurisdictions outside Massachusetts, several studies have measured the number of cases filed. The
results generally do not show so steep an increase in civil filings as in Massachusetts, and some
even show declines. See, e.g., RANDOLPH E. BERGSTROM, COURTING DANGER: INJURY AND
LAW IN NEW YORK CITY, 1870-1910, at 16 (1992) (showing, on the basis of sampling, a decline
in civil filings in the New York City Supreme Court from about 5110 in 1870 to 4740 in 1890 and
then a rise to 6150 in 1910); Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What WVe Know
and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society.
31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 40 (1983) (citing a study showing that the rate of civil filings in Mendard
County, Illinois, measured in terms of cases per thousand people, fell from 16.4 in 1870 to 5.5 in
1890). Galanter often reports the rate of civil cases filed because he examines our society's
litigiousness. For my purposes, however, the important question is the burden on courts, which
might be something very different. For example, Galanter cites a study of St. Louis that shows a
sharply falling rate of civil litigation at a time when the number of civil cases filed was rising
healthily. See id. at 39.
537. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 339 (1973) JAMES
WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 149-50 (1950).
538. See HINDUS ET AL., supra note 536, at 139 ("The rise of tort actions came about in large
measure because of technological changes in the means of transportation."); ROSCOE POUND,
ORGANIZATION OF COURTS 200 (1940) (" I7he transition to a mechanical era [after the Civil
War] led to the rise of the law of torts as one of the great subjects of the law."): ROBERT A.
SILVERMAN, LAW AND URBAN GROWTH: CIVIL LITIGATION IN THE BOSTON TRIAL COURTS,
1880-1900, at 167 n.7, 187 n.14 (1981) (reporting the appearance of such texts as The Law of
Railroad Accidents in Massachusetts (1897) and The Law of Passenger and Freight Elevators
(1896)); id. at 191 n.47 (noting that the number of tort cases filed in Boston's courts against street
railways rose from 15 in 1880 to about 1400 in 1900); id. at 109 (reporting a rise in negligence
cases against gas utilities from "a handful" in 1880 to about 400 in 1900).
The Massachusetts legislature created wrongful-death actions for families of railroad
workers in 1881, see Act of Apr. 12, 1881, ch. 199, § 1, 1881 Mass. Acts 521, 521; permitted
employees or their survivors to sue for work-related injuries due to railroad negligence in 1883,
see Act of June 16, 1883, ch. 243, § 1, 1883 Mass. Acts 532, 532; and extended wrongful-death
actions to all survivors of work-related accidents in 1887, see Act of May 14, 1887, ch. 270, § 2.
1887 Mass. Acts 899, 900.
Not all of the increase in the Superior Court's business arose directly out of technological
change. The number of negligence actions involving a fall or a falling object filed in Boston's
courts rose from about 50 in 1880 to more than 600 in 1900. See SILVERMAN, supra, at 112.
Moreover, the legislature shifted large chunks of judicial business from the Supreme Judicial
Court to the superior court. In 1880, it removed all jurisdiction over torts from the Supreme
Judicial Court, see Act of Feb. 20, 1880, ch. 28, 1880 Mass. Acts 31, 31; in 1882, it gave the
superior court equity jurisdiction concurrent with that of the Supreme Judicial Court. see Act of
May 13, 1883, ch. 223, 1883 Mass. Acts 515, 515; and in 1887 gave the superior court exclusive
[Vol. 109: 857
2000] Plea Bargaining's Triumph 999
in Boston jumped from about 120 to about 3300.539 As personal injury tort
suits began to crowd out the nonpayment contract disputes that had been the
staple of the court's civil diet," a kind of time-intensive litigation that
turned on past events and cumbersome eyewitness testimony displaced the
quick and orderly paper-based litigation of earlier times."' And as lawyers
tempted by large contingency fees began to sling shots at the State Street
law firms that defended the railroads, streetcars, and textile mills, 2 the
ravaging civil warfare so familiar today spread from courthouse to
courthouse, and lawyers multiplied faster than the population.
3
But if the numbers represented in Figure 6 are clear, their lesson is less
so. Why should judges who faced an explosion in civil litigation have
chosen to acquiesce and take part in a prosecutorial invention that served to
limit only their criminal workload? I believe the answer is that judges, like
prosecutors, plea bargained because they could. Just as overworked
prosecutors of the first three-quarters of the century charge bargained in
liquor and murder cases because rigid penalty schemes gave them the
leverage to do so, overworked judges of the last quarter of the century
turned to plea bargaining for relief from their out-of-control civil caseloads,
jurisdiction over divorces and custody actions, see Act of May 31, 1887, ch. 332, 1887 Mass.
Acts, 954, 954. The legislature also tried to relieve the superior court of its civil case burden by
shunting some of its jurisdiction to the lower courts. See Act of May 1I. 1877. ch. 211. § 3. 1877
Mass. Acts 595, 596.
539. See SILVERMAN, supra note 538, at 113.
540. See HINDUS ET AL., supra note 536, at 138, 140 (showing that from 1875 to 1905, the
proportion of tort cases in the civil docket of Suffolk and Hampshire counties rose from 7.1% to
37.4%, with continuing increases thereafter, while the proportion of contract cases fell from
80.6% to 50.5% during the same period); see also BERGSTROM., supra note 536, at 16-17
(reporting findings in New York City showing that tort cases consistently made up a proportion of
"contested cases" roughly four times larger than their proportion of all cases between 1870 and
1910).
541. See HINDUS ET AL, supra note 536, at 139 ("Tort actions were generally more
subjective than the often clear-cut promissory note and simple debt cases that had dominated the
docket in earlier decades."); SILVERmAN, supra note 538, at 135-36 (noting that plaintiffs were
more likely to claim jury trials in personal-injury litigation, expecting "to win sympathy from
their peers"); MOORPIELD STOREY, THE REFORMi OF LEGAL PROCEDURE 51-52 (1911)
(estimating that personal-injury suits took up at least three-quarters of the time allotted by Boston
courts to jury trials).
542. See SILVERMAN, supra note 538, at 115-16 (reporting that at the turn of the century, the
Boston Elevated Railway was the defendant in nearly 30% of all personal-injury suits in Boston
and that a few law firms handled most of the defense work); id. at 118 (citing 1897 Boston Bar
Association minutes expressing concern that contingency fees prompted the poor, in league with
their lawyers, to bring unmeritorious negligence suits).
543. See FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL. supra note 135, at 56 (noting that the American population
grew by 97% between 1870 and 1900, while the population of lawyers grew by 186%); HINDUS
ET AL., supra note 536, at 139 (noting the importance of contingency fees); SILVERM, AN, supra
note 538, at 30 (noting that the membership of the Boston bar "nearly doubled" between 1880
and 1900); see also 1 CENSUS REPORTS: TWELFTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES 24 tbl.4
(1901) (noting that the population of Suffolk County increased only 58% between 1880 and
1900).
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because they had far greater power to coerce pleas on the criminal side than
to induce settlements on the civil side.
In a criminal case, after all, the judge could make the defendant a hard-
to-refuse offer: He could promise the defendant a lenient sentence for her
plea, and he could threaten a harsher sentence should the defendant choose
trial and lose. In the great majority of cases, the judge's nearly wide-open
sentencing discretion gave him the power to make good on both promise
and threat, mediated only by the defendant's power to win acquittal from
the jury.
In a civil case, in contrast, the judge's power to promise a palatable
outcome to a party who agreed to settle extended only so far as his power to
persuade the opposing party to go along. Likewise, his power to threaten an
unhappy outcome to a party who risked trial and lost reached little further
than his capacity to influence the.jury to deliver an unfavorable monetary
award. It is true that the doctrine of remittitur gave judges the power to
order a new trial unless a victorious plaintiff agreed to give up whatever
portion of a jury's award the judge thought excessive.' But Massachusetts
law did not recognize additur in nineteenth-century tort cases, so judges
could wield no similar power against defendants in personal-injury
actions. 45 And even remittitur was not a plenary power to reduce damages,
analogous to the sentencing power in criminal cases, but rather an indirect
power to threaten a new trial unless the plaintiff accepted the reduced
judgment.
Though civil settlements surely were growing over our period-from
15.7% of cases in 1865 to 28.4% in 1895 to 41.9% in 1905 46-no study I
have seen attempts to discern the judge's role in this increase. Even if
judges perhaps had the means to coerce settlement in some civil cases, they
obviously did not succeed in keeping their civil workload within bounds. 7
544. See MASS. REV. LAWS ch. 173, § 112, at 1569 (Wright & Potter 1902); Shanahan v.
Boston & N.S. Ry., 193 Mass. 412,414 (1907). I would like to thank Bob Gordon for pointing out
to me the importance of remittitur in this context.
545. The legislature approved the concept of additur only in 1945. See Act of July 10. 1945,
ch. 578, § 1, 1945 Mass. Acts 590, 590. The word "additur" appears to have been used for the
first time in a Massachusetts case in 1959. See Murach v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co.. 339
Mass. 184, 185 (1959). More than a century before, the state's high court had recognized the
concept of enhancing damages in a contract action, where "the damages are capable of
estimation," but suggested that judges should do so only very rarely in "actions for personal
wrongs." Taunton Mfg. Co. v. Smith, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 11, 12 (1829); cf Rende B. Lettow, New
Trial for Verdict Against Law: Judge-Jury Relations in Early Nineteenth- Century America, 71
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505, 554 (1996) (noting that in the United States in the early 19th century.
"remittitur was more widely accepted than additur" ).
546. See HINDUS ETAL., supra note 536, at 148.
547. In both Suffolk and Hampshire counties, it took twice as long to resolve the average
civil case in 1895 as in 1865, and given the huge increase in the number of cases, there is no way
the settlement rate could keep up with the increasing pressure on the docket. See id. at 150, supra
notes 539, 546 and accompanying text. In 1890, the governor complained to the legislature that
despite a recent addition of two judges to the superior court bench, "the present volume of
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The spiking line in Figure 6 that represents civil workload shows how
essential it was that judges use what means they had to encourage pleas on
the criminal side.
Exactly how judges in criminal cases communicated their desire for
pleas and conveyed their promises and threats to criminal defendants is
something I will take up in a few pages. For now, the important point is that
on the criminal side-and the criminal side only-both the judges'
promises and their threats had the force to work their purpose.
B. Principles: The Effects of Probation and Parole
Even if judges came to feel the caseload pressure long felt by
prosecutors, a principled judge nonetheless might have refused to commit
himself to a particular sentence without first hearing all the information
normally supplied by a trial or sentencing hearing. The legislature may have
resolved any such conscientious objection to plea bargaining, however,
when it institutionalized the public probation officer as a reliable and
arguably impartial source of information about the defendant's background
and alleged offense. The 1878 act that created a probation officer for
Suffolk County charged that person with the "duty ... to attend the
sessions of the courts of criminal jurisdiction.. . , to investigate the cases
of persons charged with or convicted of crimes and misdemeanors, and to
recommend to such courts the placing on probation of such persons as may
reasonably be expected to be reformed without punishment." 'he 1880
act extending probation officers to the rest of the state required them "to
business is so great that it is difficult to obtain a trial of an action until a long time after its
commencement" DIMOND, supra note 190, at 93 (quoting the governor). In 1903, a different
governor made a very similar statement. See id. at 98. In 1909, the legislature was forced to create
a commission "To Investigate the Causes of Delay in the Administration of Justice in Civil
Actions." H. Doc. No. 1050, at 3-4 (Mass. 1910). Studies from other jurisdictions suggest that a
good deal of the growth in civil settlements took place only in the 20th century. See Albert W.
Alschuler, Foreword: The Vanishing Civil Jury. 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1. 2-5 (collecting
studies).
548. I say "arguably" impartial because the earliest probation statute, that of 1878. provided
that the probation officer "shall be under the general control of the chief of police" of Boston. Act
of Apr. 26, 1878, ch. 198, § 1, 1878 Mass. Stat. 146, 147 (relating to probation in Suffolk
County). Both the 1878 act and the 1880 Probation Act envisioned that probation officers might
be appointed from the police force. See Act of Mar. 22, 1880. ch. 129. § 1. 1880 Mass. Stat. 87.
87; § 1, 1878 Mass. Stat. at 146. In fact, Boston's first public probation officer. Edward H.
Savage, was the city's retiring police chief. See SAVAGE., PoucE REcoRDS AND RECOLLECTIONS,
supra note 489, at xiii. The legislature gave the courts, rather than municipal authorities, the
power to appoint probation officers by acts of 1891 and 1898. so that the probation officer perhaps
became "in every way an officer of the Court." Act of May 28, 1891. ch. 356. § 1. 1891 Mass.
Stat. 920, 920 (providing for the appointment of probation officers); see also Act of June 8. 1898.
ch. 511, § 1, 1898 Mass. Acts 474, 474-75 (providing for the appointment of probation officers in
the superior court); Grinnell, supra note 300, at 612-14 (reviewing this history).
549. § 1, 1878 Mass. Stat at 146-47 (relating to placing on probation persons accused or
convicted in Suffolk County).
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carefully inquire into the character and offence of every person arrested for
crime" and assigned them "the special duty... to inform the court, so far
as is possible, whether a person on trial has previously been convicted of
any crime."55 With this information in hand, a judge could settle on a
sentence in good conscience without the court proceedings that once
supplied the same information.
From the beginning, probation officers fulfilled the duties assigned
them by these acts to gather information and relay it to the court. Boston's
first public probation officer, Edward H. Savage, reported in 1881 on his
investigatory activities the year before:
I have visited the City Prison every morning, taken a list of the
names, and offences of those in custody, and the names of arresting
officers, seen the prisoners at their cells, then repaired to the court,
had interviews with officers and others interested, in order to be
prepared to take action in any case that seemed to demand
attention.55'
Several years later, Savage elaborated:
[I]t becomes the important duty of the [probation] officer to make a
thorough investigation into the reputation and true character of the
offender. It is not enough to learn what people say; but the officer
should have a personal interview with the prisoner, study his
disposition, his intentions, his constitutional make-up, and, as far as
possible, learn the probabilities of reform.552
Savage repeated this investigatory course for 698 defendants in 1879 and
for more than 3000 in 1882 and each of several years to follow.55 3
Of course, none of this well-collected information could have helped
the court to reach an appropriate sentence unless the probation officer
passed it on. And although both the 1878 and the 1880 statutes gave
probation officers the duty to "recommend" to the courts which defendants
should be placed on probationS54-and no doubt envisioned that probation
550. §§ 3, 11, 1880 Mass. Stat. at 89.
551. SAVAGE, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 489, at 7-8.
552. SAVAGE, PROBATION WORK FOR THE COUNTY OF SUFFOLK, supra note 489. at 15.
553. See id. at 14. At least one observer from the late 1890s confirmed that Savage and his
colleagues did as he claimed:
[Probation officers] visit the home or place of employment. They search the court
records to see if it be the first offense. If circumstances warrant, they may recommend
to the judge, who is largely guided by their report, that the person be either discharged
at once or be put upon probation.
FREDERICK B. ALLEN, PRISON REFORM IN MASSACHUSETTS 5 (Boston. Christian Soc.
Union 1898).
554. See §§ 3-4, 1880 Mass. Stat. at 87; § 1, 1878 Mass. Stat. at 147.
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officers would convey the results of their investigations at that time-
neither statute made it clear whether probation officers could make those
reports before conviction.55 It would have done little to assist plea
bargaining if the judge heard the needed information only after a trial or
guilty plea. The 1880 law's imposition of a "special duty [on] each
probation officer to inform the court ... whether a person on trial has
previously been convicted of any crime" 5 6 surely seems to require a report
before conviction, but a 1916 probation manual declared it to be "doubtful
if even... [this provision] authorizes such information to be given prior to
a determination of guilt. '557 The manual adds that "[w]ith this doubtful
exception, the probation officer's duty in cases before the court begins after
conviction." 558
The probation manual perhaps protests too much. Why instruct
probation officers to withhold information from the court until after
conviction unless there was pressure on them to do otherwise? An English
observer's 1899 report to the House of Commons on the activity of
Boston's probation officers seems to confirm our suspicions. The observer
quoted from a "statement of the methods employed in carrying out his
duties [that] was prepared for me by Mr. Keefe, the Chief Probat[ion]
Officer," and that was "confirmed" by the presiding judge of the Boston
courts:
The probation officer visits the prison daily at 7 o'clock, a.m.,
talks with each prisoner, ascertaining the facts of his connection
with the offence charged, his address, his former record (if any) and
any information of benefit to the prisoner, keeping in mind the
good of the Commonwealth.
The records of drunkenness are looked over, former arrests
recorded and given to the presiding Judge for reference when the
prisoner is called.
The assistant probation officers (in the cases of drunkenness)
visit the homes each morning, reporting to the Judge, when the
prisoner is called, facts ascertained at the homes. If the prisoner
provides for his family and has steady work, ... [he] is usually
placed on probation....
555. By requiring probation officers to investigate "persons charged with or convicted of
crimes" (the 1878 act) and "every person arrested for crime" (the 1880 act). the acts make it clear
that the duty to investigate arises before conviction, but this language says nothing about the stage
at which the probation officer should "recommend" probation to the court. § 3. 1880 Mass. Stat.
at 87; § 1, 1878 Mass. Stat. at 147.
556. § 11, 1880 Mass. Stat. at 89 (emphasis added).
557. Id.
558. COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., PROBATION MANUAL 17 (1916).
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... In many cases the Judge cannot get at the true facts when
the case is presented to the Court and depends upon the probation
officer's investigation in deciding the case.55 9
Contrary to the probation manual's admonitions, probation officers
apparently disclosed a great deal of information to the court before
conviction-information that might have gone far to ease the qualms of
conscientious judges who thought it wrong to pass sentence with less than
full information. Perhaps, therefore, we have come upon another way,
beyond encouraging first offenders to plead guilty, in which probation
assisted plea bargaining's rise.
The nineteenth century's other distinctive contribution to penal
practices also may have eased judges' principled objections to plea
bargaining. In 1870, a prominent meeting in Cincinnati of the American
Prison Association, chaired by future President Rutherford B. Hayes,
launched the indeterminate-sentencing movement in America. 5' 6 The reality
of the indeterminate sentence, had it ever taken hold in its truest form,
would have done much to wreck the plea-bargaining regime: If the judge
had no other role than to dispatch the defendant to prison and if other
authorities determined the date of release, then the only meaningful promise
the judge could make in exchange for the defendant's guilty plea would
have been to put the defendant on probation rather than send him to prison.
Plea bargaining would not have died in such a setting-we already have
seen that defendants often pled guilty to win a chance at probation-but
neither would it have flourished, for no conscientious judge could promise
to spare serious criminals from serving any time at all. In Part VII, I will
return to this clash between plea bargaining and the indeterminate sentence
to show how the plea-bargaining regime succeeded in putting down this
challenge to its forward march.
559. EVELYN RUGGLES-BRISE, SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE TREATMENT OF CRIME IN
AMERICA 20, 21-22 (London, Darling & Son 1899) (quoting the chief probation officer of
Boston) (emphasis added). On Ruggles-Brise, see 5 LEON RADZINOWICZ & ROGER HOOD. A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION FROM 1750: THE EMERGENCE
OF PENAL POLICY 596-99 (1986).
560. See Edward Lindsey, Historical Sketch of the Indeterminate Sentence and Parole
System, 16 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 9, 18-20 (1925). The Cincinnati meeting, known as the
National Congress on Penitentiary and Reformatory Discipline, helped put indeterminate
sentencing on the political agenda, but it was not the first American encounter with the concept.
As early as 1839, George Combs, a Scottish philosopher, articulated a proposal for a true
indeterminate sentence. See NEWMAN, supra note 387, at 34-35 (quoting Combs). And a half-
century before Combs, Philadelphia's Benjamin Rush had advocated a system in which there
would be fixed penalties for crimes, but prisoners would not be told what they were. See
BENJAMIN RUSH, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE EFFECTS OF PUBLIC PUNISHMENTS UPON CRIMINALS
AND UPON SOCIETY II (Philadelphia, Joseph James 1787). I thank Al Alschuler for pointing me
to this aspect of Rush's work.
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Now, though, it is important to see what sustenance plea bargaining
drew from the principles of the indeterminate sentence. For even as the true
indeterminate sentence fell to history's dust heap,"s the concept survived in
corrupted forms, and its theoretical underpinnings proved more lasting than
the institution itself. Those underpinnings were quite simple: First,
punishment should look to the future and not the past. That is, the critical
concern in arriving at a just sentence was not what the defendant had done,
but when it would be safe again to release him upon the community." The
second underpinning followed from the first: Because the judge, even after
trial, knew little more about the defendant's capacity for reform than what
one could learn from a study of his past behavior, the judge was distinctly
unqualified to pass a fixed sentence. "It is absurd," wrote a former
Massachusetts prison commissioner and a leading advocate of the
indeterminate sentence in 1899, "to suppose that any judge can tell in 1900
whether a criminal will or will not be fit to return to the community in
1905." 563
561. See infra note 730 and accompanying text.
562. See Warren F. Spalding, The Indeterminate Sentence: Its History and Development in
the United States, in THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE AND THE PAROLE LAW: REPORTS
PREPARED FOR THE INTERNATIONAL PRISON COMMISSION, S. Doc. No. 55-159. at 7. 13 (1899);
Charlton T. Lewis, The Indeterminate Sentence, 9 YALE L.J. 17, 20-21 (1899).
563. Spalding, supra note 562, at 14; see also Conlon's Case. 148 Mass. 168, 169 (1889)
(identifying Spalding as the Secretary of the Board of Commissioners of Prisons)- ALLEN. supra
note 553, at 9-10 ("The prevalent system.., is absurd. A convict is usually sentenced for a fixed
period-supposedly determined by his crime. Apart from the difficulty of discriminating as to a
man's guilt [is] the personal equation of the disposition and mood of different judges."); CLAIR
WILCox, THE PAROLE OF ADULTS FROM STATE PENAL INSITULTIONS IN PENNSYLVANIA AND IN
OTHER COMMONWEALTHS 9 (1927) (quoting SJ. May, an 1840s advocate of the indeterminate
sentence, as saying, "One of the greatest improvements in the administration of our penal code
would be to withhold from the judges all discretion as to the time for which convicts shall be
confined."); Lewis, supra note 562, at 17-18 ("Our penal codes ... leave it to the trial judge to
fix the duration of imprisonment within [broad] limits according to his view of the criminal's
deserts. This system has often been exposed as absurd in principle and as grossly wrong and
injurious in practice.").
In 1899, an Ohio judge and advocate of indeterminate sentences expressed in mild terms the
objections of other judges to the drift of the indeterminate sentence movement:
Some learned judges and statesmen hesitate to apply the principles of an indefinite
sentence..., holding that the trial judge can better fix a correct limit of just
punishment... than can the officer who keeps the prisoner. These thinkers seem to be
held by the principle that the confinement and punishment of the criminal must equal
the character of the offense, and that no one but a commissioned judge should limit the
time.
Martin Dewey Follett, Aims of the Indetenninate Sentence, in THiE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE
AND THE PAROLE LAW, supra note 562, at 22, 22. In 1891. the Michigan Supreme Court declared
unconstitutional a state law that had given judges the option to impose indeterminate prison terms.
See People v. Cummings, 88 Mich. 249, 263 (1891). Although judges retained the right to impose
definite sentences instead, the court condemned the statute because it appeared to transfer to a
parole board "judicial power in determining the term of imprisonmenL" Id. at 251. The court
wrote that the trial judge is "the one person best calculated, from his knowledge of all the
incidents and circumstances of the commission of the crime and of the character of the prisoner, to
exercise a discretion in fixing the term of imprisonment." Id. at 253; see also Miller v. State, 149
Ind. 607, 628 (1898) (Jordan, J., dissenting) (" mhe right to assess the punishment. and thereby
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No doubt this assertion of judicial incapacity to fix the right sentence
aroused judges' indignation. Making matters worse, state legislatures in fact
began to carve away at judicial sentencing authority. Massachusetts helped
lead the trend: In 1857 and 1858, long before the Cincinnati Congress, the
legislature provided for "statutory good time" -a fixed reduction from the
judge's sentence that convicts could earn by their good behavior in
prison.56 In 1880, the legislature granted probation officers the power to
recommend the release of any misdemeanant with less than six months left
to serve and required the district attorney, not the judge, to approve the
release under this act of any person sentenced in superior court. 65 An 1884
law" permitted the prison commissioners to release any convict they
deemed "reformed., 567 The legislature created its first almost-genuine
indeterminate sentence in 1886, but as judges could use this sentencing
option or not as they pleased, the balance of sentencing power did not shift
greatly.5 68 Finally, by acts of 1894 and 1895, the legislature put in place the
parole regime that most of us know today as the "indeterminate sentence,"
which required judges to set minimum and maximum terms when they sent
a convict to state prison and gave prison authorities the power to choose a
release date between those bounds. 69
The same English observer I quoted earlier expressed his astonishment
at American parole laws that "violate[d] the fundamental principle that...
fix the term of imprisonment provided, within the limits of the statute [is] a judicial function, of
which the court ... cannot be deprived by the legislature."); NEWMAN, supra note 387, at 35
("The main opposition to the enactment of indeterminate sentence laws came from the judges
who were unwilling to relinquish their traditional privilege of fixing the time prisoners must
serve.").
564. See Act of Mar. 24, 1858, ch. 77, 1858 Mass. Acts 58, 58 (jails and houses of
correction); Act of May 30, 1857, ch. 284, § 1, 1857 Mass. Acts 72, 72 (state prison). Although
New York and Tennessee instituted good-behavior reductions in 1817 and 1836, respectively.
Ohio's 1856 law seems to have sparked the concept's adoption nationwide. See Act of Apr. 15.
1817, ch. 269, §§ 5, 19, 1817 N.Y. Laws 310, 312, 316; Act of Apr. 8, 1856, § 17, 1856 Ohio
Laws 126, 133-34; Act of Feb. 20, 1836, ch. 63, § 4, 1835-1836 Tenn. Pub. Acts 171, 171; see
also FREDERICK HOWARD WINES, MONOGRAPH ON SENTENCES FOR CRIME 15 n.* (Springfield,
Ill., H.W. Rokker 1885).
565. See Act of Mar. 22, 1880, ch. 129, § 6, 1880 Mass. Acts 87, 88.
566. See Act of May 21, 1884, ch. 255, 1884 Mass. Acts 220.
567. See id. §§ 2, 3, 1884 Mass. Acts at 227. The Governor and Governor's Council had to
approve the release of any convict from state prison. See id.
568. See Act of June 24, 1886, ch. 323, § 1, 1886 Mass. Acts 296. The act required that
sentences to the Massachusetts reformatory "not fix or limit the duration" of confinement, unless
they exceeded five years, id., but judges had the choice of other institutions, and reformatory
sentences proved to be much more the exception than the rule, see infra notes 734-735 and
accompanying text. Even reformatory sentences of less than five years were not genuinely
indeterminate by strict notions of the term, for the act capped confinement of such sentences at
either two or five years, depending on the crime.
569. See Act of June 5, 1895, ch. 504, §§ 1-2, 1895 Mass. Acts 624, 629 (requiring judges to
impose minimum and maximum terms to the state prison and providing for release on parole at
any time after the expiration of the minimum term); Act of May 26, 1894, ch. 440, § 1, 1894
Mass. Acts 492, 492 (providing for release on parole from the state prison at the expiration of
two-thirds of the judge's sentence).
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the sentence of the court shall be the final arbitrament of the case."570 He
concluded that they sprang in part from a "want of respect for, and
confidence in, the State's Judiciary." '571 It is hard to imagine that American
judges missed the slight these laws implied. To the extent that the gravity of
their sentencing power had ever held them back from casting it among the
lots of the gaming table, the considered judgment of legislators that the
judges' word should not be the last must have weakened their resistance.
Moreover, the knowledge that another authority would later adjust the
sentences of the court must have made it seem at least a little less important
to get those sentences exactly right.
Hence both probation and the indeterminate sentence eased judges'
principled objections to engaging in plea bargaining's human trade. Even as
probation officers supplied information that let judges set an appropriate
sentence without hearing evidence, the principles of the indeterminate
sentence released judges from their obligation to set that sentence with
precision. With their moral guard down and with alarming civil caseloads
pressing them to cut deals where they could, judges perhaps gave in to
temptation and dealt.
C. Pride: The Plea-Withdrawal Rule
But how-that is, by what mechanism-did judges deal? How did they
communicate to defendants the reward tendered in exchange for their plea?
Several possibilities present themselves. The least offensive to those who
would find repellent any scent of judicial coercion to forgo trial would be
"implicit" plea bargaining, in which the defendant merely guessed, perhaps
relying on the judge's past practice, that the judge's sentence would be
more lenient after a plea than after trial. For an implicit-bargaining regime
to have prompted the very high percentages of guilty pleas that we see in
the last decades of the nineteenth century, judges' sentencing practices
would have had to be highly predictable. It is hard to believe that so many
defendants would have pled guilty without some sound assurance of a
reward. Occasionally, the records reveal a stark pattern of sentencing that
would support the conclusion that an implicit plea-bargaining regime was at
work. The sentencing of defendants convicted of breaking and entering at
the February 1890 session of the Middlesex Superior Court presents
perhaps the best example I have found. Of the twenty defendants who pled
guilty to that crime, eight received three-year sentences, and all the rest
received less time or no time at all. Of the six defendants convicted of that
crime after trial, only one got less than three years (twenty-four months),
570. RuGGLES-BRISE, supra note 559, at 17 (quoting Rush).
571. Id.
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while one got three years, and the four others got substantially more."' It
seems possible that the court adhered to an understood practice that
imposed a three-year cap on breaking-and-entering sentences for defendants
who pled guilty and a three-year floor for defendants who demanded trial
and lost.
573
But although the last decades of the century were marked by very high
rates of guilty pleas across most categories of crime, I have not seen stark
sentencing patterns generally. In 1900, for example, fifty-four out of fifty-
seven persons charged with breaking and entering pled guilty.5 74 Sentences
for those who pled guilty ranged from simple filing and probation (thirty
cases) to indeterminate sentences in the Massachusetts reformatory or
reform school (eleven cases) to house-of-correction time averaging twelve
months (thirteen cases). Of the three defendants who lost after trial, one
found his case placed on file; one was sentenced to an indeterminate term at
the Massachusetts reformatory; and one received twenty months in the
house of correction. These results, more typical than the fairly clear pattern
described in the last paragraph, suggest that something else besides implicit
plea bargaining was probably at work to persuade so many defendants to
plead guilty at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth
centuries.
That additional mechanism might have included an explicit promise by
the judge to impose a certain sentence should the defendant plead guilty,
perhaps combined with an explicit threat to impose a certain-or ominously
uncertain-higher sentence should the defendant lose after trial. That
judges today in many jurisdictions, including Middlesex, bargain for pleas
572. The four others received 48 months, 60 months, 63 months, and 72 months. See
Commonwealth v. Maurice C. McCarthy, Middlesex Super. Ct. R. Book 146 (Feb. 1890)
(reporting a sentence of 48 months after trial and conviction in a breaking-and-entering case);
Commonwealth v. Arthur N. Neil, Middlesex Super. Ct. R. Book 101 (Feb. 1890) (same, 60
months); Commonwealth v. John Heffeman, Middlesex Super. Ct. R. Book 101 (Feb. 1890)
(same, 63 months); Commonwealth v. Cornelius Sheehan, Middlesex Super. Ct. R. Book 101
(Feb. 1890) (same, 72 months).
573. Similarly, all four defendants who pled guilty to assault and battery in the October 1880
term of the Middlesex Superior Court received fines instead of prison sentences, while all three
convicted of that crime after trial went to prison. See Commonwealth v. Michael Hennessy.
Middlesex Super. Ct. R. Book 243 (Oct. 1880) (reporting an assault-and-battery case in which the
defendant pled guilty and was fined but not imprisoned); Commonwealth v. Frederick Measures.
Middlesex Super. Ct. R. Book 244 (Oct. 1880) (same); Commonwealth v. Jeremiah Ahern,
Middlesex Super. Ct. R. Book 245 (Oct. 1880) (same); Commonwealth v. William L. Orcutt.
Middlesex Super. Ct. R. Book 255 (Oct. 1880) (same); Commonwealth v. Christopher Flynn,
Middlesex Super. Ct. R. Book 205 (Oct. 1880) (reporting an assault-and-battery case in which the
defendant was sentenced to serve six months' time after being convicted at trial); Commonwealth
v. Daniel Driscoll, Middlesex Super. Ct. R. Book 227 (Oct. 1880) (same, 18 months);
Commonwealth v. Patrick Ford, Middlesex Super. Ct. R. Book 228 (Oct. 1880) (same, eight
months).
574. As I did earlier, see supra note 502, I am excluding home breaks to avoid the distortion
of that more serious offense.
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directly with defendants or their counsel is beyond dispute."' But although
there is some evidence of judicial plea bargaining in the late nineteenth
century, it is both thin and geographically far-flung. In 1880, the Missouri
Supreme Court reported that a trial judge had spoken with the defendant's
lawyers and had led them to believe "that if the defendant would plead
guilty, he would receive the lowest punishment allowed by law." 6
Similarly, the Michigan Supreme Court in 1884 condemned a trial judge's
"imprudent" statement to defense counsel "that, if the respondent should
plead guilty, I should view his case as one meriting less punishment than I
should feel disposed to impose should he be convicted after a trial by
jury."" 7 Even in that case, the trial judge insisted that he had uttered the
unfortunate words only after firmly rejecting several earlier appeals to
predict what he would do in the event of a plea."'8 And in Maine in the
1890s, there is evidence that the justices of the supreme court, who still sat
as local trial judges, permitted liquor dealers to avoid further prosecution
under the state's prohibition law if they came into court once a year and
paid a fine plus costs.57 9
The absence of much other evidence of explicit judicial plea bargaining
of course does not mean that the practice did not take place elsewhere,
perhaps even in Massachusetts. The condemnation of the Missouri and
Michigan high courts would have encouraged judges to conceal the signs of
such deals, just as they do today.ss Still, lacking all evidence of such a
practice in Massachusetts, not only in court records but also in newspapers
and other contemporary sources, I think it best to conclude that explicit
judicial plea bargaining played no great role in the surge of guilty-plea rates
that marked Middlesex County practice in the last decades of the nineteenth
century.
A third pleading mechanism perhaps proved more potent than implicit
plea bargaining in encouraging defendants to plead and yet spared judges
the demeaning and disfavored role of hawking a deal. In the simpler version
of this deceptively simple technique, the judge merely acceded to the
sentencing recommendation of the parties. Although I have no precisely
575. Mather and others have reported the practice. See MATHER. supra note 489. at 31-32,
58. In my years as a Middlesex County prosecutor, I regularly witnessed judicial plea bargaining.
576. State v. Stephens, 71 Mo. 535, 536 (1880).
577. People v. Brown, 54 Mich. 15, 21, 29 (1884).
578. See id. at 20.
579. See PEREGRINE WHITE, JOHN A. PETERS: A MEIOIR 35-36 (Bangor. n.p., n.d.). I thank
David Gold for this reference.
580. In Middlesex County in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when I served as a prosecutor,
judges in the district (lower) courts often stated the terms of their plea offers openly and on the
record. Superior court judges were more discreet and usually proposed terms in chambers with
only counsel present. Mather reports that Los Angeles judges avoided on-the-record barters and
that lawyers adopted the verb "chamberize" for the process of cutting deals with the judge behind
closed doors. See MATHER, supra note 489, at 31.
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contemporaneous evidence of this process at work, a description given to a
committee of the Massachusetts Legislature in 1923 by a former assistant
district attorney made the practice sound well-worn:
[T]he district attorney and his assistants call in police officers and
government witnesses and get their stories. Then defendants'
counsel are heard, and then, unless a trial is absolutely unescapable,
a crime is disposed of by agreement between counsel and the judge
is asked to rubber-stamp the agreement with his O.K. If there is the
slightest doubt that he will do so the case goes off the list to await
the time when a judge will be presiding who is not likely to be so
independent.... The judge has, of course, the power to upset any
agreed disposition that comes before him and to make his own full
and independent investigation into the case and to use his own
judgment, but if he does so he uses up much precious time and
embarrasses the district attorney exceedingly. Any judge who has
had experience with the administration of the criminal law is likely
to follow unhesitatingly the recommendations of a district attorney
whose judgment he trusts . . . ."'
To modern ears, this plea-bargaining technique perhaps sounds so
obvious as not to merit the label "technique," '582 yet its sheer simplicity
masks its brilliance. It neatly disposed of four impediments to judicial plea
bargaining. First, because all of the haggling over terms took place between
counsel and out of the judge's presence, this technique did not dirty judicial
hands as did explicit judicial plea bargaining. Second, because the
defendant's ability to predict the judge's sentence turned on exactly one
aspect of the judge's sentencing practice-whether he did or did not
habitually follow the parties' sentencing recommendation-this technique
gave defendants far more assurance of a particular sentence in exchange for
their pleas than did implicit plea bargaining. As the passage quoted above
suggests, lawyers quickly learned which judges presented not even "the
slightest doubt" that they would go along. Third, unlike prosecutorial
charge bargaining of the sort that took place in the liquor cases of the first
581. Grinnell, supra note 127, at 8 (quoting from a report of the Massachusetts Judicature
Commission of 1923, which in turn quoted from a letter by the former prosecutor).
Although I have no evidence that Massachusetts judges did (or did not) habitually follow the
parties' sentencing recommendations in the late 19th century, I can at least report evidence that
lawyers made specific sentencing recommendations to the court in this time frame. See Charles P.
Stickney, BOSTON DAILY GLOBE, Mar. 5, 1879, at 1 (reporting a sentencing proceeding in
superior court in which the defense lawyer appealed for a sentence in the house of correction
rather than in state prison, and the prosecutor requested "the full sentence of the law-namely,
five years in the state prison").
582. Albert Alschuler reported in the 1960s that Houston judges generally did not participate
directly in plea bargaining and instead adhered rigorously to prosecutors' sentencing
recommendations. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining (pt. 1), 76
COLUM. L. REV. 1059, 1060-65 (1976).
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half-century, this technique did not deprive judges of any of their cherished
sentencing power-and therefore posed no threat to their pride. As the
prosecutor said in the passage quoted above, "The judge has, of course, the
power to upset any agreed disposition that comes before him. ." 3
Finally-and on the other hand-this technique usually protected
prosecutors from judicial whimsy. I argued earlier that one disincentive to
charge bargaining in murder cases was the prosecutor's lack of dexterity in
formulating a precise sentence. It is likely that prosecutors did not happily
trade the mandatory death penalty assigned to first-degree murder for the
zero-to-twenty-year prison term assigned to manslaughter without some
assurance as to where along this range the court's sentence would fall. And
yet if the defendant refused to plead to the mandatory life penalty assigned
to second-degree murder, there was no other option. A judge's rigid habit of
following the parties' sentencing recommendation should have eased the
prosecutor's mind. Something like this appears to have been at work in the
1892 murder prosecution of Raffaele Scorpio. The attorney general reported
that the defendant's guilty plea to manslaughter "was accepted on condition
that the maximum penalty would be taken without objection" -and the
defendant indeed received the maximum of twenty years.5" Although the
attorney general's use of the passive voice made it unclear who-
prosecutor or judge-" accepted [the plea] on condition" of the maximum
sentence, there is little doubt that he meant the prosecutor. Although in the
last decades of the century, the attorney general tended to write his reports
in the passive, in earlier decades he regularly noted that "I" accepted the
defendant's guilty plea."s
For all its brilliance, the technique of simply ratifying the parties'
sentencing recommendations suffered from real shortcomings. Under such
a regime, few defendants would have offered a plea unless they felt assured
that the judge was among those who consistently "rubber-stamp[ed] the
agreement." Any judge who fell outside this group must have faced a
stream of litigants who wished only to postpone their business until the
judge moved on to another jurisdiction. To preserve his reputation as one
who went along with agreements, the judge had to go along almost all of
the time, and so, despite the formal reservation of sentencing power in the
judges' hands, judges may have felt that the district attorney had stripped
them of that power. The assistant district attorney quoted above saw this
much when he said, "It must irk to be a rubber-stamp." 6 And even if the
583. Grinnell, supra note 127, at 8.
584. Commonwealth v. Raffaele Scorpio (Bristol Super. CL), listed in Report of the Attorney
General for Year Ending January 17, 1893, PuB. Doc. No. 12, at vi (Mass. 1893).
585. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. William McGrath, listed in Report of the Attorney General
for Year Ending December 31, 1868, PuB. Doc. No. 16, at 4 (Mass. 1869) ("°I accepted a plea of
guilty of murder in the 2d degree ... " ).
586. Grinnell, supra note 127, at 8.
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judge had reconciled himself to his rubber-stamp role, some defendants
must have felt too mistrustful of his intentions to relinquish their trial right
for anything less than a guaranteed concession. At bottom, this system
offered the defendant no assurance against unpleasant surprise should the
judge decide to disappoint all parties' expectations.
A small adjustment to the technique of accepting the parties'
recommendation solved these problems without sacrificing the technique's
other virtues. Long after the endpoint of this study, the Massaclusetts Rules
of Criminal Procedure formalized this adjustment by requiring each trial
judge to advise a defendant who pleads guilty under a plea agreement "that
he will not impose a sentence that exceeds the terms of the [prosecutor's]
recommendation without first giving the defendant the right to withdraw his
plea." '587 Note how gracefully this rule can set even the most skittish
defendant at ease without imposing any constraint on the trial judge. A
judge who wants to encourage defendants to plead guilty need not slavishly
bow to the prosecutor's sentencing recommendation. She can follow the
prosecutor's sentencing recommendation-or not, as she pleases. She need
merely permit the defendant to withdraw his plea when she disappoints his
expectations. The rule therefore erases the prideful concerns of judges who
balked at the prospect of sharing sentencing power with prosecutors within
a plea-bargaining regime. At the same time that it gives judges complete
discretion to impose any sentence authorized by law, the rule grants
prosecutors full power to promise defendants an assured concession in
exchange for a guilty plea. In a sense, then, and in violation of the laws of
physics, the rule expands the sum total of sentencing power in the criminal
courtroom.
It is no wonder that this plea-withdrawal rule or rules like it should
have proved widely popular. In 1975 Congress amended Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to provide that although the judge
should not, of course, "participate in any [plea] discussions," the judge
must, if she rejects the plea agreement of counsel, "afford the defendant the
opportunity to then withdraw the plea., 588 Both the American Bar
Association and the American Law Institute previously had recommended
such a rule, and several states besides Massachusetts have taken their
advice.589 There can be little doubt that the plea-withdrawal rule has
contributed to the extraordinary dominance of plea bargaining in modern
American courtrooms, where guilty-plea rates above ninety or even ninety-
587. MASS. R. CRIM. P. 12(c)(2).
588. FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 (e)(1)(C), I I(e)(4).
589. See MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 350.6 (1975); STANDARDS
RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY § 2.1 (1968).
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five percent are common."l A far harder question is whether this rule or
some version of it played a part in pushing the guilty-plea rate in Middlesex
County toward the ninety-percent mark in the closing decades of the
nineteenth century.
There are several reasons to think it did not. The description of practice
from the 1920s quoted earlier surely gave no hint of ready permission to
withdraw one's plea whenever the judge exceeded the district attorney's
sentencing recommendation. Even as late as 1976, just a few years before
Massachusetts adopted the plea-withdrawal rule as part of its new rules of
criminal procedure, the Supreme Judicial Court refused to "break new
ground" by requiring a judge to permit plea withdrawal whenever his
sentence exceeded the district attorney's recommendation.59' More
importantly, I have found very little Massachusetts-based evidence of such
a rule at work during the time frame of this study. The Supreme Judicial
Court repeatedly held in the nineteenth century that plea withdrawal is not a
right, but may be permitted or not at the discretion of the court. -
On the other hand, the absence of contemporary evidence of the rule in
Massachusetts is perhaps not conclusive, as I have found very little
evidence at all of the specific procedures surrounding guilty pleas. None of
the Supreme Judicial Court's several opinions on plea withdrawal
addressed the situation that concerns us here, in which the defendant sought
to withdraw a guilty plea after the court imposed a harsher sentence than
the prosecutor recommended. 93 It may be that the high court rarely saw
such cases because trial courts routinely permitted withdrawal. Moreover,
there is good reason to think that trial court records omitted mention of plea
withdrawals when they took place. A Lowell newspaper reported in 1835
on a plea withdrawal that never appeared in the court's official records.'
590. See Heumann, supra note 146, at 515 n.l (citing studies); Langbein. supra note 519, at 9
n.ll (same).
591. See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 345 N.E.2d 695. 698 (Mass. 1976). Most, but not all.
state courts that considered this issue in the 1960s and 1970s reached a similar result. See
Alschuler, supra note 582, at 1072 n.45.
592. See Commonwealth v. Ingersoll, 14 N.E. 449, 450 (Mass. 1888); Commonwealth v.
Mahoney, 115 Mass. 151, 152 (1874); Commonwealth v. Winton, 108 Mass. 485,485-86 (1871);
Commonwealth v. Hagarman, 93 Mass. (10 Allen) 401,402 (1865).
593. All four of the cases cited in the previous note addressed a different fact scenario: The
defendant pled guilty or no contest in a lower court and then, on appeal for a trial de novo in
superior court, sought to withdraw that plea and plead not guilty. Such defendants often wished
merely to get the best deal that either court would give them on a guilty plea, but of course they
needed to withdraw their earlier guilty pleas in order to have any leverage in the higher court.
Judges often resisted such forum-shopping by refusing to allow plea withdrawal. The judges'
refusal in this context says little about their willingness to permit plea withdrawal when doing so
would facilitate standard (single-court) plea bargaining.
594. On September 26, 1835, the Lowell Courier's summary of the business of the court of
common pleas included this small account: "Martin Murtoy. Lowell-Assault with a shoe knife
and an attempt to kill and murder, Plea, Guilty; sentence-3 days solitary and 5 years in State
Prison. Afternoon, retracted his plea of guilty, pleaded not guilty, and stood for trial." LowEm.L
COURIER, Sept. 26, 1835, at 2. Both the record book and the docket book of the court of common
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Outside Massachusetts, evidence that the plea-withdrawal rule was in
place in the late nineteenth century is compelling, if not conclusive. In
1889, Murat W. Hopkins, an Indiana practitioner, published an article on
plea-withdrawal in the Criminal Law Magazine.95 Hopkins stated the rule
in explicit terms:
If, by reason of any side agreement with the prosecuting officer, a
defendant under a criminal charge enters a plea of guilty, a more
severe sentence than that agreed upon should not be awarded; and
if a sentence more severe than the one indicated be inflicted, the
defendant should be allowed to withdraw his plea of guilty, and
plead not guilty, if he desires.596
The assurance with which Hopkins announced this rule and its nearly
exact echo of the modem form suggest that this was not merely his opinion
of what the rule should be, but rather his observation of what the rule was.
Yet of the three cases from two states that he cited in support of the rule,597
only a single 1888 opinion of the Indiana Supreme Court supplied a clear
precedent.59
pleas omit any mention of the Murtoy case in their reports of the court's September 1835 session.
Murtoy appeared, however, in the records of the court's December session, at which a jury found
him guilty of simple assault and battery but not guilty of acting with intent to kill, and the court
sentenced him to a mere year in the house of correction. See Commonwealth v. Martin Murtoy,
Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book 525-26 (Dec. 1835). For our purposes, the most significant aspect of
the record is the clerk's summary of the case's procedural history, which notes only that Murtoy
had appeared at the previous session of the court and pled not guilty and says nothing of his
earlier guilty plea and sentencing. See id. at 525 ("This Indictment was found at the Court of
Common Pleas holden [in] ... September last, when and where the said Martin Murtoy was set to
the bar, and had this Indictment read to him, he said that thereof he was not guilty, and thence said
Indictment was continued to this time."). The clerk's silence about Murtoy's earlier plea and plea
withdrawal leaves us to suspect that, for all the records of the Middlesex courts disclose,
defendants might commonly have offered guilty pleas only to withdraw them when dissatisfied
with their sentence.
I have found occasional-but only occasional-cases in which the clerk did record the
defendant's withdrawal of a guilty plea. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Henry O'Hapgood,
Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book 309 (Oct. 1847); Commonwealth v. Hosmer Lew, Middlesex Ct. C.P.
R. Book 43 (June 1844).
595. See M.W. Hopkins, Withdrawal of Plea of Guilty, 11 CRIM. L. MAG. 479 (1889); see
also N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1955, at 23 (identifying Hopkins as an Indiana lawyer and providing
his first name).
596. Hopkins, supra note 595, at 480; see also 16 CORPUS JURIS Criminal Law (Plea of
Guilty) § 730 (1918) (noting that if the defendant pleads guilty under the belief, induced by the
prosecutor, "that sentence less severe than the maximum allowed would be given, defendant
should be allowed to withdraw the plea").
597. See Hopkins, supra note 595, at 480 (citing Myers v. State, 18 N.E. 42 (Ind. 1888); State
v. Kring, 71 Mo. 551 (1880); State v. Stephens, 71 Mo. 535 (1880)). Hopkins's statement of the
rule follows immediately upon and within the same paragraph as his discussion of Sanders v.
State, 85 Ind. 318 (1882), but that case seems irrelevant to the rule.
598. In Myers, the defendant pled guilty based on assurances from the prosecutor, relayed by
the sheriff, that "if he pleaded guilty his punishment should not exceed two years
imprisonment .. " Myers, 18 N.E. at 42. The defendant pled guilty and was promptly sentenced
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I have searched extensively (if not exhaustively) through the large
number of plea-withdrawal cases of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries in search of other statements of Hopkins's rule. Although many
courts endorsed a liberal attitude toward plea withdrawal generally," I
discovered only three that considered the specific question at hand: whether
a defendant who pleads guilty on the strength of a prosecutor's promised
sentencing recommendation has the right to withdraw his plea if the judge
exceeds that recommendation. These jurisdictions-Kentucky, Illinois, and
Georgia-hardly constitute an American consensus, but it is notable
nonetheless that all three endorsed the plea-withdrawal rule more or less as
Hopkins stated it.6°
Despite the meager rewards of my search, I hope that something more
than an Eastern bias lies behind my suspicion that an Indiana practitioner's
interpretation of an Indiana court's opinion did not alone give rise to a rule
that grew to have national influence. For now, though, until further
evidence turns up, I must concede that the subtle brilliance of the plea-
withdrawal rule and the ease with which it dispatched several of the
difficulties inherent in judicial plea bargaining may have come into play
only much later in plea bargaining's progress. The point is not critical to
our story, for judges could have achieved much of the benefit of the rule
merely by accepting as a matter of course the sentencing recommendations
of prosecutors. By that simple means, they would have escaped soiling their
own hands in the bargaining process and avoided overtly ceding sentencing
power to prosecutors even as they offered defendants sufficient assurance
to ten years in state prison. See id. at 43. The high court held that the trial judge abused his
discretion in refusing to allow the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. See id. at 44.
In Kring, the Missouri court considered a defendant's claim that he had pled guilty to
second-degree murder based on his agreement with the prosecutor, "apparently sanctioned by the
judge of the criminal court, that the sentence should not exceed ten years imprisonment." Kring,
71 Mo. at 552. The apparent participation of the court in the bargaining process of course makes
this case very much unlike the ideal type envisioned by the rle-and unlike Myers-and would
seem to give the defendant a plausible claim of fraudulent inducement. In fact, the court
announced that this case was "precisely similar" to Stephens, in which the judge clearly had
misled the defendant as to the consequences of his guilty plea, thereby justifying the defendant in
seeking to withdraw the plea. See Hopkins, supra note 595. at 480 (citing Stephens, 71 Mo. at
535).
599. See, e.g., People v. Miller, 114 Cal. 10, 16 (1896) ("The law ... will permit a plea of
guilty to be withdrawn if it fairly appears that defendant was in ignorance of his rights and of the
consequences of his act, or was unduly and improperly influenced either by hope or fear in the
making ofit."); State v. Williams, 14 So. 32. 32 (La. 1893) ("The withdrawal of the plea of guilty
should not be denied in any case, where it is in the least evident that the ends ofjustice will be
subserved by permitting not guilty to be pleaded in its place."); Deloach v. State, 77 Miss. 691,
692 (1900) ("[mhe defendant should be permitted to withdraw his plea of guilty, when
unadvisedly given, where any reasonable ground is offered for going to the jury."); People v.
Joyce, 4 N.Y. Crim. 341, 345 (Sup. CL 1886) ("Where a person accused of crime may,
inadvertently or unadvisedly, plead guilty to an indictment. and afterwards apply for the privilege
to withdraw that plea and plead not guilty, the leave is commonly granted .... ").
600. See Griffin v. State, 12 Ga. App. 615, 624-25, 630-31 (1913): State v. Walker. 250 Ill.
427, 432 (1911); Mounts v. Commonwealth, 89 Ky. 274. 277-78 (1889) (dictum).
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against unpleasant surprise to encourage a great number to plead guilty. As
we saw earlier, at least by the 1920s a practice of ready judicial acceptance
of the prosecutor's negotiated sentences was solidly in place in
Massachusetts. This mechanism perhaps helped judges of the late
nineteenth century overcome their prideful objections to the practice of plea
bargaining just as an avalanche of tort suits threatened to bury their courts.
VI. EXPLAINING PLEA BARGAINING'S PROGRESS ELSEWHERE
As our story turns the corner into the twentieth century, plea
bargaining's victory appears largely complete. The desire to see cases plead
out rather than go to trial, which had infected public prosecutors almost
from their inception, now had spread to judges, whose power to dictate
sentences reached much further. Plea bargaining therefore could break
loose from the narrow bounds to which prosecutorial charge bargaining
once had confined it. Meanwhile, the supposed reform of permitting
defendants to testify at trial had left those defendants who had criminal
histories with little hope of winning at trial and little choice other than to
seek the best plea deal that they could get. With all of the system's power-
holders now sharing a common interest in plea bargaining, trials grew
exceedingly rare. The rate of guilty pleas, which had approached ninety
percent in 1900, showed no sign of falling off by 19 10.6" As we know from
the history books, the rest of the century only advanced plea bargaining's
dominance. 2
Plea bargaining entered the twentieth century with all the staying power
that comes from serving the interests of power-holders. Its course
throughout the century proved to be one of consolidation of power, as
institutions that might have threatened plea bargaining's dominance fell by
the wayside and as others that fed plea bargaining's preeminence took hold.
But before I proceed in Part VII to trace the outlines of plea bargaining's
twentieth-century progress, it is important to reinforce the lessons of its
nineteenth-century rise. For our work in Middlesex County will be of little
use unless we can be sure that the principles of power that steered the
course of plea bargaining's rise there operated in other times and places.
I do not mean that we should expect to find plea bargaining dominant
throughout time or ascending along the same trajectory everywhere. The
particular posture of institutional actors in Massachusetts-the statutes that
constrained their powers and the caseloads they faced-had no exact twin
anywhere else, and for every change to one of these features of our story,
we can expect to find a corresponding change in the plot line. That is, if
601. See supra note 529.
602. See supra note 590 and accompanying text.
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prosecutors lacked the good fortune of a rigid penalty scheme and an
unregulated power to nol pros, then we would not expect to see charge
bargaining of the sort that Massachusetts prosecutors devised in liquor and
murder cases. And if judges lacked the incentive of caseload pressure, then
we would not expect to find them setting aside their principled and prideful
objections to bartering away defendants' rights and sharing sentencing
authority with prosecutors.
In this brief foray into other times and places, therefore, I will ask only
two questions: Who stood to gain from plea bargaining, and did that actor
have the power to make it happen? I hope to learn only whether the
dynamic of powers and interests that we have seen at work in Middlesex
County can help explain plea bargaining's absence where it was lacking
and its success where it thrived. There will be a certain randomness to this
survey, as it depends largely on the empirical research of others, who may
or may not have been concerned to detect plea bargaining and whose
interests may not have raised the questions that for our purposes need
answering. Moreover, there are simply very few in-depth empirical
examinations of court records, and most, like mine, focus on a fairly narrow
swath of time and space-and not all on the same swath. The analysis that
follows consequently must reach across both time and distance to seek out
common elements in the dynamic of plea bargaining.
A. Plea Bargaining's Absence in Earlier Times
We may begin by asking why plea bargaining appeared only recently
on the penal landscape. Of course, we cannot be sure that it did. My figures
from Middlesex County show that guilty pleas were by no means
uncommon in the late eighteenth century, the earliest period I studied. I
argued in Part II that these early guilty pleas probably were not plea
bargains in the sense that the defendant won some understood concession in
exchange for his plea, 3 but rather gestures of remorse or hopelessness or
unsecured bids for judicial mercy. Still, other observers might read the data
differently. As I know of no substantial empirical study of pleading practice
in American criminal courts before the nineteenth century, there is no way
to conclude with assurance that plea bargaining had no American foothold
before then.
The understanding that plea bargaining is a latter-day phenomenon
emerges more from English than American studies and most particularly
from the work of Malcolm Feeley and John Langbein, who are among the
very few to have looked for evidence of plea bargaining in eighteenth-
603. See supra notes 181-184 and accompanying text.
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century English court records. 6 4 Both Feeley and Langbein report that they
found no sign of plea bargaining at London's Old Bailey court. They argue
that the very unmodern brevity of eighteenth-century trials, a handful of
which fit into the average court day, removed modem temptations to
shortcut trial procedures with rough-and-ready plea bargains. 6 5 And in fact,
Feeley's evidence that the length of the average trial at the Old Bailey more
than doubled in the late nineteenth century just as substantial numbers of
criminal cases began to end in guilty pleas' accords with my evidence
from Massachusetts in the 1890s, when both the length of the average
murder trial and the proportion of murder cases ending in plea bargains
increased sharply.
I agree with Feeley and Langbein that there was little or no plea
bargaining at the Old Bailey in the eighteenth century-my own review of
that court's business in 1715 and 1774 confirms as much. I am less inclined
to agree that brevity of trials was the cause. That is in part because, as we
will see shortly, plea bargaining occasionally does turn up in this era, and
when it does, there is no sign of unusually long trials. More importantly,
there is an explanation for the absence of plea bargaining that is so
powerful as to eliminate the need for any other: Except in state trials such
as treason, no public prosecutor took part in eighteenth-century criminal
cases. Not until 1879 did Parliament institute public prosecutors to manage
other felony cases. °7 In the eighteenth century, no matter how serious the
case, the crime victim or her survivors managed the prosecution. And not
until the very end of the century did any substantial proportion of crime
victims even hire private lawyers to manage the proceedings in court."5
604. See Malcolm M. Feeley, Legal Complexity and the Transformation of the Criminal
Process: The Origins of Plea Bargaining, 31 ISR. L. REv. 183 (1997); Feeley & Lester, supra
note 437; Langbein, supra note 425, at 262-65; see also J.M. BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS
IN ENGLAND, 1660-1800, at 336-37 & n.52 (1986) (observing that only about 1.5% of larceny
defendants pled guilty in the courts of Surrey between 1722 and 1802 and concluding that
"[t]here was no plea bargaining in felony cases in the eighteenth century").
605. See Feeley, supra note 604, at 190, 202-05; Langbein, supra note 425, at 262-65. Feeley
reports that through the first half of the 19th century, a single judge and jury in London's Old
Bailey court could hear between two and a half and almost five trials per day. See Feeley, supra
note 604, at 203 fig.5.
606. See Feeley, supra note 604, at 199 fig.3, 203 fig.5. Feeley, however, might object to
setting his findings in this light. Even as he emphasizes the increasing length and complexity of
the average trial, a trend that moved almost in step with the advance of plea bargaining, see id. at
199 fig.3, 202-18, he disclaims any role for "increased case load pressures" in the rise of plea
bargaining, id. at 204. But longer trials surely increased caseload pressure. Feeley's point is
apparently that we should seek out the mechanisms and not merely the motives of plea
bargaining's rise.
607. Even then, they appeared only in a limited form. See Prosecution of Offences Act, 1879,
42 & 43 Vict., ch. 22; Philip B. Kurland & D.W.M. Waters, Public Prosecutions in England.
1854-79: An Essay in English Legislative History, 1959 DUKE L.J. 493, 550-62.
608. See Feeley, supra note 604, at 195 fig. 1. Feeley measured counsel representation at the
Old Bailey at 20-year intervals. Except for the anomalous year 1795, when lawyers appeared for
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My work in Middlesex makes it plain that public prosecutors were the
most important actors in the early days of plea bargaining. They had, first
of all, the incentives to bargain: They wanted to win, and their workload
pressures and part-time status made them want to win quickly. And they
had, in limited contexts, the power to bargain. Whatever their incentives,
crime victims in eighteenth-century English courts simply lacked the plea-
bargaining power of Massachusetts prosecutors. In particular, they lacked
the power to nol pros. The only officer in the kingdom with the authority to
enter a nol pros and terminate prosecution was the attorney general.6 As
the attorney general appeared only in the occasional case of treason or other
offense against the state, there normally was no authority in the courtroom
who could summarily end the prosecution or reduce charges in exchange
for the defendant's guilty plea.
Given the utter lack of prosecutorial bargaining power in most cases,
the absence of plea bargaining perhaps should not surprise us. And yet, the
Massachusetts experience suggests that the will to bargain often led to the
way. Crime victims in eighteenth-century England probably had the will to
bargain, as they had at least three incentives to do so. The first was money.
Crime victims had to front the often considerable cost of transporting
witnesses and lodging them near the court. Even if the court later
reimbursed these expenses, the short-term hardship to many victims must
have been great. The second incentive was time. Even if individual trials
flashed by, victims and their witnesses waited hours and perhaps days for
their cases to be called-and time cost money, both in lost income and in
extra nights' lodging for witnesses. The third was risk of loss. More than
one-third of prosecutions mounted at London's Old Bailey court in the
eighteenth century ended in acquittals."'
the prosecution in over 70% of cases, the figure did not exceed (or often approach) 20% until
1855. See id.
609. See Regina v. Dunn, I C. & K. N.P.R. 730, 731 (Q.B. 1843); Rex v. Cranmer, 88 Eng.
Rep. 1578 (K.B. 1702); 1 JOSEPH CHITTY, A PRACTiCAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW *479
(Philadelphia, Isaac Riley 1819).
610. Thirty-six percent of prosecutions ended in acquittals in 1715 and 43% in 1774. See THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SESSIONS OF THE PEACE, AND OYER AND TERMINER, FOR THE CITY OF
LONDON, & COUNTY OF MIDDLESEX [hereinafter OBSP] (London. Joseph Gurney 1758) (1715;
Apr. & Sept. 1774). I am excluding from these figures cases that ended in acquittal because the
prosecutor'never appeared for trial. I have counted as guilty verdicts those cases in which the jury
convicted the defendant of a lesser crime than that charged in the indictment. Figures cited for
1715 represent every case heard at the Old Bailey that year; those for 1774 represent only two of
the eight sessions for that year (April and September).
These figures and others I cite throughout this Section may differ from seemingly similar
statistics of business at the Old Bailey that I presented in an earlier article. See Fisher, supra note
488, at 638-50. Because my aim there was to focus on the decisionmaking of juries, I excluded
from consideration cases not decided by the jury either because the defendant pled guilty or
because the judge directed a verdict of not guilty (or might have done so). See id. at 640 n.295. In
particular, the rate of acquittals cited in the text here is far higher than that I cited in the earlier
article, see id. at 641 n.299, because in a good many cases that ended in acquittals, it was unclear
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Whether for these reasons or for others, crime victims did bargain in
ways that their limited powers permitted. Even without the nol pros, they
had one way to reward those defendants who chose to bargain: They could
fail to show up for trial and thereby guarantee that the court would find the
defendant not guilty.61' That victims sometimes accepted cash from
defendants in exchange for their nonappearance is clear,61 but measuring
the frequency of such bargains is difficult. Victims abandoned prosecution
in about five percent of cases before the Old Bailey in 1715 and in about
two percent of cases in 1774, but whether they did so in exchange for
payment or for some other reason does not appear in the case reports.
Moreover, any bargains that took place before charges were filed do not
show up in the case reports at all. In any event, this was a clumsy sort of
bargaining, with narrow application. Victims of serious crime presumably
wanted more justice than they could get in cash from often destitute
defendants, and authorities condemned this way of resolving cases as
against the public interest.613 Indeed, settling-or "compounding"-
felonies out of court was itself a crime.6t 4
There was a more nuanced way for crime victims to use the power to
abandon prosecution, but it was not possible in every case-and it required
some sophistication to devise and carry off. The French jurist Charles Cottu
wrote of the "incredible transaction[s]" he witnessed in English forgery
cases in the early nineteenth century.6"5 Cottu explained that lawyers for the
victimized banks would seek two indictments against each alleged forger.
One indictment charged the capital crime of forgery, and the other charged
whether the judge or jury decided the outcome. I therefore excluded these cases from my earlier
study.
611. See, e.g., Regina v. Jeremiah Stamford, OBSP, supra note 610, at 184 (Feb. 23, 1780,
No. 3, Pt. 3) ("The prosecutrixes were called but not appearing .... Not Guilty." ); Regina v.
Sarah Jackson, OBSP, supra note 610, at 4 (Jan. 14-17, 1715) ("But there being no Prosecution.
she was acquitted.").
612. See David D. Friedman, Making Sense of English Law Enforcement in the Eighteenth
Century, 2 U. CHI. L. ScH. ROUNDTABLE 475, 486-92 (1995) (discussing the significance of the
practice of "compounding" felonies, by which prosecutor and defendant essentially settled their
case out of court). Norma Landau recently published the results of her study of the prosecution of
minor assault crimes at the Middlesex (England) quarter sessions in the mid- and late 18th
century. See Norma Landau, Indictment for Fun and Profit: A Prosecutor's Reward at Eighteenth-
Century Quarter Sessions, 17 L. & HIST. REv. 507 (1999). She found clear evidence that in the
great majority of assault cases, the defendant paid cash to "satisfy" the prosecutor, who of course
was the private crime victim. The justices used various means to persuade reluctant defendants to
reach private financial settlements with the prosecutor. After settling with the prosecutor, most
defendants pled guilty, and the court then assessed (though it did not always collect) a token fine.
See id. at 515-29.
613. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 427, at *363-64; George Fisher, Making Sense of
English Law Enforcement in the Eighteenth Century: A Response, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 507, 510-11 (1995).
614. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 427, at *133-34.
615. CHARLES CoTru, DE L'ADMINISTRATION DE LA JUSTICE CRIMINELLE EN
ANGLETERRE, ET DE L'ESPRIT DU GOUVERNEMENT ANGLAIS 99 (Arno Press 1979) (1822). 1
thank Al Alschuler for pointing me to this account.
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the noncapital offense of possessing false notes with the intent to utter.
Cottu reported that defendants who pled guilty to the latter offense were
sentenced by the court to a term of transportation in an Australian penal
colony. When the capital forgery charge then proceeded to trial, counsel for
the bank would announce that he had no witness, and the jury would acquit
the defendant as a matter of course.
The banks' lawyers showed the same kind of ingenuity in their role as
private prosecutors that public prosecutors in Massachusetts showed in
cobbling together plea-bargaining techniques with the unlikely tools at
hand. Just as Massachusetts prosecutors overcame their limited power to
dictate sentences, so the banks' lawyers made the best of the one sentencing
tool they had-abandoning prosecution. But this practice was unlikely to
spread much beyond forgery cases. Not all crimes lent themselves to
multiple indictments, and not all crime victims could afford lawyers to
think up such clever plea-bargaining techniques. Cottu's account suggests
that plea bargaining was rare in this era in England not because there was
no incentive to bargain-for the banks' lawyers apparently thought there
was-but because private prosecutors generally lacked the legal tools and
know-how to devise a plea-bargaining regime.
The absence of public prosecutors in England not only explains the
general absence of prosecutorial charge bargaining of the sort we saw in
Massachusetts, but goes some distance as well toward explaining the lack
of judicial sentence bargaining. Nineteenth-century judges in Massachusetts
rarely if ever took part directly in negotiating plea bargains. Instead, it
appears that they participated in plea bargaining by ratifying the sentencing
recommendations of the parties-a technique that spared them the indignity
of bartering in public. But in England, before the advent of regular public
prosecutors in the late nineteenth century, judges had no such screen behind
which they could pull the levers of power. In London's Old Bailey, the
court that both Feeley and Langbein studied most closely, judges' actions
were particularly exposed to scrutiny, for that court's business was recorded
in sometimes striking detail in the Old Bailey Sessions Paper, which
enjoyed both a popular and an official readership 6 6-and which made
possible Feeley's and Langbein's studies. Even judges who had the power
and the incentive to plea bargain might have hesitated before so publicly
trimming their workdays by trimming the trappings of justice.
In pointing to the absence of public prosecutors, therefore, I perhaps
have said enough to explain the general absence of plea bargaining at the
Old Bailey in the eighteenth century. Still, it is worth noting that the bench
616. See OBSP, supra note 610. On the Sessions Paper, see generally Simon Devereaux. The
City and the Sessions Paper: "Public Justice" in London. 1770-1800. 35 J. BRrr. STuD. 466
(1966); and Langbein, supra note 425, at 267-72.
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of the Old Bailey appears also to have lacked any strong incentive to plea
bargain. Between 1715 and 1774, the Old Bailey's caseload grew only from
495 to 697-a rate of well below one percent per year. Even if one
considers the increasing length of trials, from an average of about one-fifth
of a court day in 1715 to about one-third of a day in 1775,617 the increase in
total case pressure over the course of three generations was rather mild. Nor
does it seem that English judges of the eighteenth century faced an
explosion of civil cases like that encountered by Massachusetts judges of
the late nineteenth century.618 From all that appears, Old Bailey judges in
this era had no particular motive to plea bargain.
If we now travel some 150 miles north from the Old Bailey, we can
examine the business of a court that had a very different caseload profile
and that operated in relative obscurity, far from the glare of the Old Bailey
Sessions Paper or anything resembling it. The magistrates in and near
Manchester presided at that town's court of quarter sessions, where various
minor offenses were tried. Some years back, I studied the business of this
court during the last quarter of the eighteenth century. Though my purpose
at the time was to investigate changing modes of punishment, I stumbled
upon unmistakable evidence of judicial plea bargaining.
The evidence emerges from the sentencing pattern in cases of petty
larceny, which accounted for between seventy and eighty-three percent of
all cases heard.619 By law, the magistrates had discretion to punish petty
larceny with either seven-year terms of transportation or up to two years in
the house of correction. In the years that I sampled between 1774 and 1797,
the magistrates passed sentence on 516 petty larcenists. Of the 369 who had
chosen trial and lost, the justices sentenced 170, or almost half, to
transportation. But of the 147 who had pled guilty, the justices sentenced
not one to transportation and instead incarcerated all but a few.60 As the
average house-of-correction term for petty larceny never much exceeded
nine months,6"' and as the prospect of a dangerous ocean-crossing and
seven years abroad terrified many defendants, the justices' concession in
imposing prison terms rather than transportation must have been more than
enough to induce many defendants to plead guilty.
I have read many accounts of the court's business published in the
Manchester Mercury, one of the leading local papers. The Mercury reported
617. See Feeley, supra note 604, at 203 fig.5.
618. Such an explosion came later-in the 181Os and 1820s. There seems to be little evidence
of sharp growth in civil caseloads before 1800. See C.W. Brooks, Interpersonal Conflict ard
Social Tension: Civil Litigation in England, 1640-1830, in THE FIRST MODERN SOCIETY: ESSAYS
IN ENGLISH HISTORY IN HONOUR OF LAWRENCE STONE 357, 364 (A.L. Beier et al. eds., 1989).
619. See George Fisher, The Birth of the Prison Retold, 104 YALE L.J. 1235, 1252 n.62 tbl.5
(1995).
620. See id. at 1276.
621. See id. at 1265 tbl.7.
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in a summary way on the goings-on in court, supplying none of the factual
or procedural detail of the Old Bailey Sessions Paper.6" Typically, it noted
only the names of those called before the court, whether they were
convicted or acquitted, and the sentence awarded. The magistrates therefore
could feel secure that a bargaining practice that emerges clearly on close
examination of the court's records perhaps escaped public notice and
almost certainly escaped the attention of national authorities.
Unfortunately, the utter lack of public comment on the justices'
bargaining practices means that we, too, lack information about the motive
behind the method. Here again, the court's records shed light. At the same
time that the practice of plea bargaining was advancing dramatically, the
court's caseload was growing at a daunting pace, quadrupling in the course
of a generation.
TABLE 9. GuILTY PLEAS IN CASES OF PETTY LARCENY AT
THE MANCHESTER (SALFORD) COURT OF QUARTER SESSIONS 62
Years Number of Number of Guilty Percentage of
Persons Pleas Guilty Pleas
Convicted
1774-1775 42 3 7%
1781-1782 48 8 17%
1786-1787 109 25 23%
1791-1792 143 31 22%
1796-1797 174 80 46%
Source: George Fisher, The Birth of the Prison Retold, 104 YALE L.J. 1235, 1276
tbl.10 (1995).
Although it seems very likely that Manchester's magistrates began plea
bargaining in petty larceny cases to help relieve the pressure of mounting
caseloads, I do not believe they acted solely for this reason. It is possible
they also had a principled basis for their bargaining. As a group, the
magistrates believed ardently in prison reform and regarded prison as a
place of reform. 4 They may have believed that those defendants who
confessed their guilt were better subjects for a reformatory prison regimen
than those who contested guilt at trial. Such a belief would help account for
622. See, e.g., MANCHESTER MERCURY, Jan. 25, 1791, at 4 (reporting only in summary
fashion on the results of cases heard at a recent sitting of the court of quarter sessions).
623. The Quarter Sessions Order Books, which are the only comprehensive and convenient
record of the business of the Manchester court, present convictions but not acquittals. See Fisher,
supra note 619, at 1249 n.49. Total convictions (including those for petty larceny) increased from
55 in 1774-1775 to 199 in 1796-1797. See id. at 1252 n.62 thl.5.
624. See id. at 1258-67, 1271-76.
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the large jump in the proportion of guilty pleas that followed the opening in
1790 of the magistrates' new house of correction, designed and operated
according to the most modern reforming principles.6 5 The magistrates may
have wanted to fill their new prison with the most promising subjects for
reform. As in Middlesex, then, we find that the bench responded both to
caseload pressure and to more principled concerns about the purposes of
sentencing.
Despite these moments of recognition, this short tour through
eighteenth-century England has taken us past scenes that look quite
different from nineteenth-century Middlesex County. But these differences
do not undermine the lessons that emerged from Middlesex. If plea
bargaining was rare in England before the late nineteenth century, so too
were the conditions that proved in Middlesex to be essential to plea
bargaining's rise. In the Old Bailey, where plea bargaining was wanting, we
find that the relevant actors lacked either the power to bargain or the
incentive to do so. But where plea bargaining does poke through the
historical record-as it does in Cottu's account of forgery prosecutions in
the early nineteenth century-we find behind the record a prosecutor with a
motive to deal who contrived to find the power. And where we can find
magistrates who had an incentive to bargain and the discretion to shape
sentences-as we do in Manchester's busy court-we find them at work
striking deals.
B. Plea Bargaining's Rise Elsewhere in America
Our task now is to examine whether these same principles of power and
interest can help explain the course of plea bargaining's rise in American
jurisdictions outside Massachusetts. Here the inquiry must focus on two
states, California and New York, because I have found no substantial
empirical study of sentencing practices before the twentieth century in any
other jurisdiction. In any event, California and New York provide a useful
sampling-one state far removed from Massachusetts both geographically
and in cultural and economic development, and one state very much the
same. In California, as we will see, plea bargaining progressed more slowly
than in Massachusetts, while in New York it advanced faster. The
information at hand is limited, so my conclusions cannot be certain. But all
signs suggest that both California's late start and New York's
precociousness trace to the different bundles of powers and interests held
by each courtroom actor.
625. See id. at 1260-66.
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1. California
Lawrence Friedman and Robert Percival's study of Alameda County
626
supplies most of what we know about criminal practice in California in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Their critical findings emerge
from a sampling of superior-court case files from between 1880 and 1910.
TABLE 10. INITIAL PLEAS IN CASES IN WHICH DEFENDANTS
ENTERED PLEAS: ALAMEDA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, 1880-19 10
Initial Plea Number
Year Not Guilty Guilty as Guilty of Lesser Offense of
Charged or Fewer Counts Cases
1880-1889 78% 12% 10% 171
1890-1899 75% 19% 6% 1 185
1900-1910 64% 32% 4% 295
Source: LAWRENCE M. FRiEDMAN & ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, THE ROoTs OF JUsTICn
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ALAMEDA COUNTY. CALFORNIA 1870-1910. at 174
tbl.5.12 (1981).
Three aspects of these figures stand out. First, the proportion of guilty
pleas of all sorts was growing steadily and modestly from twenty-two
percent in 1880-1889, to twenty-five percent in 1890-1899, to thirty-six
percent in 1900-1910. Second, all these figures remained considerably
below corresponding figures in Middlesex County Superior Court, where
the guilty-plea rate for all cases was seventy-seven percent in 1880, eighty-
seven percent in 1900, and probably about the same in 1910.617 Third, there
was a "remarkable" increase, as Friedman and Percival call it,' in the
proportion of defendants who pled guilty to the charged offense as opposed
to some lesser crime. At the same time, the proportion who pled to a lesser
offense started small and grew even smaller.
We may begin by asking why the rate of guilty pleas should have been
so much lower in Alameda than in Middlesex. If we look first (as we have
done before) at the power of prosecutors, we come immediately to one
obvious explanation: In 1851, the California legislature abolished the nol
pros" and thereby eliminated the district attorney's power to charge
626. See FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra note 135.
627. As I explained earlier, the surviving records do not permit a complete analysis in 1910.
See supra note 529.
628. FRIEDMAN & PERcIVAL, supra note 135, at 179.
629. See Act of May 1, 1851, ch. 29, § 598, 1851 Cal. Stat. 212, 279 ("Neither the Attorney
General [n]or the District attorney shall hereafter discontinue or abandon a prosecution for a
public offence, except as provided in the last section." ). The previous section provided that -[t lhe
Court may, either of its own motion or upon the application of the District attorney, and in
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bargain in the fashion of Massachusetts prosecutors in liquor and murder
cases. In place of the nol pros, the legislature substituted a procedure for
dismissing indictments, but put the power to dismiss in the judge's hands.
Hence Friedman and Percival recount cases in which the district attorney
and the defendant agreed that the defendant would plead guilty to one of
several counts or to a lesser offense of the crime charged on condition that
the balance of the indictment be dismissed-but the parties still had to
convince the judge to enter the dismissal. "It was very, very rare for a judge
to refuse," they write, but apparently not unheard of, for the authors
mention one case in which the court refused to deal and another in which
the court went along only with difficulty.63°
Despite what Friedman and Percival see as the court's ready
acquiescence in charge bargaining, the rarity of this bargaining technique
suggests that prosecutors and defense lawyers did not like having to submit
their carefully crafted agreements for court approval. After all, as Table 10
shows, the proportion of defendants who pled guilty to a lesser offense or to
fewer counts than those charged stood at only ten percent at the outset of
Friedman and Percival's study and promptly fell to six percent and then to
just four percent-and this at a time when guilty pleas of all sorts were
rising. Perhaps judges resisted participation in a process that so clearly
implicated them in plea bargaining. The authors report one judge's demand
that a defendant deny that he pled guilty as part of a plea bargain. Only after
the defendant complied-" Oh no, sir. No, I would have pleaded guilty
anyway." -- did the judge dismiss the balance of the indictment in strict
compliance with the plea bargain.63" '
But even if California prosecutors had wielded a unilateral power to
charge bargain, they perhaps lacked sufficient incentive to mount a
vigorous plea-bargaining practice. It is true that prosecutors in California,
like prosecutors everywhere, must have valued plea bargaining to the extent
that it delivered certain victory in individual cases. But Alameda
prosecutors apparently carried a far lighter workload than those in
Middlesex and consequently may have felt less time pressure to plead. In
the period of Friedman and Percival's study, the Middlesex County
criminal caseload ranged between four and eight times the size of that in
furtherance of justice, order any action or indictment to be dismissed; but in such case the reasons
of the dismissal shall be set forth in the order, which must be entered on the minutes." Id. § 597.
630. FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra note 135, at 177-78.
631. Id. at 178.
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Alameda.632 Meanwhile, the legal staff of the Middlesex district attorney's
office appears to have consisted of just the district attorney and one
assistant prosecutor as late as 1898.633 In Alameda, although the district
attorney worked alone as late as the 1870s, there were three lawyers on staff
by 1885, six by 1901, and nine by 1910.6" Still, these prosecutors did not
work full-time, and the district attorney and two of his assistants even
joined together in a civil-law partnership in 1893.635 As I argued earlier,
part-time prosecuting inevitably generated financial incentives to dispose of
criminal cases quickly, no matter how small the prosecutorial workload.& '
But lacking the nol pros power, prosecutors who hoped to plea bargain
had to win the cooperation of judges. In Massachusetts at the time of
Friedman and Percival's study, judges were becoming full-fledged partners
in the plea bargaining regime. If California judges were of the same mind,
then we might expect to see far more plea bargaining there than we do. But
in fact, Alameda judges probably felt far less incentive to bargain than did
Middlesex judges. In 1900, when the criminal caseload of Middlesex
County was about eight times that of Alameda,637 there were eighteen
superior-court judges in Massachusetts who rode circuit among the state's
fourteen counties.638 They devoted a total of 325 judge-days to Middlesex
County business-the equivalent of perhaps one and one-half full-time
judges-and only forty-four days to the county's criminal calendar. 9 In
contrast, four full-time superior-court judges sat permanently in Alameda.'
Friedman and Percival do not measure the judges' civil caseload, but
Friedman reports elsewhere that it was quite small: Between 1880 and
632. Our findings are as follows:
CRImINAL CASELOAD IN ALAMEDA AND MIDDLESEX COUNTIES
YEAR ALAMEDA COUNTY MIDDLESEX COUNTY
1880 117 486
1890 78 not measured
1900 75 602
1910 185 not measured
Sources: FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra note 135, at 41 tbl.3.1; Middlesex Super. CL
R. Books; Middlesex Super. CL Docket Books.
The Middlesex figures for 1880 are projected from a study of one of the three terms of the court.
633. The Massachusetts Lawyer's Diary for that year identified Frederick N. Wier as the
Middlesex district attorney and George A. Sanderson as his only assistant. See MASSACHUSETTS
LAWYER'S DIARY 15 (1898). The records of the Middlesex Superior Court for 1910 noted the
appointment of Henry C. Sawyer as "Second Assistant District attorney" of Middlesex. but gave
no hint whether the office was newly created or whether there might also have been a third
assistant district attorney. Middlesex Super. Ct. R. Book 325 (1910).
634. See FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra note 135, at 50.
635. Seeid. at50-51.
636. See supra notes 132-137 and accompanying text.
637. See supra note 632.
638. See supra note 518.
639. See supra note 527 and accompanying text.
640. See FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra note 135. at 46-48.
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1900, there were on average only seventeen personal-injury suits filed each
year in Alameda County Superior Court." Two facts now seem clear:
Alameda courts had about three times the judicial resources of Middlesex
courts and a caseload many times smaller. The conclusion is irresistible that
the pressure to plea bargain weighed far more heavily on the Massachusetts
judges.
Finally, there is good reason to think that California criminal
defendants, like California prosecutors and judges, had milder incentives to
plea bargain than did their counterparts in Massachusetts. We saw in
Massachusetts that two factors-the rate of counsel representation and the
right to testify at trial-influenced defendants' changing inclination to plea
bargain in the nineteenth century. The distinction between California and
Massachusetts defendants did not lie in the right to testify at trial-
defendants in each state won that right at virtually the same moment.62 To
the extent that defendant-testimony laws discouraged some defendants from
opting for trial, therefore, they probably operated similarly in both states.
But while Massachusetts provided free lawyers only for those
defendants charged with capital crimes, 6 3 California provided free counsel
for all indigent defendants facing felony trials." Probably as a result, the
proportion of defendants with counsel in Alameda Superior Court ranged
between eighty-three and eighty-nine percent over the period Friedman and
Percival studied," 5 while in Middlesex County in the same period the figure
hovered below fifty percent. 6  We saw earlier that having a lawyer in
Massachusetts greatly increased defendants' chances of winning at trial and
considerably increased the odds that they would go to trial rather than plead
guilty. 647 It may be true that appointed counsel in California, who received
no fee for their services," 8 were not the best," 9 and it appears to be true that
Alameda County defendants did not always fare better at trial than
641. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Civil Wrongs: Personal Injury Law in the Late 19th
Century, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 351, 359.
642. See supra note 455.
643. See supra note 439 and accompanying text.
644. See FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra note 135, at 170.
645. See id. at 171. Friedman and Percival report that at least one-quarter of the defendants in
their sample had appointed counsel, but they cannot fix the proportion precisely. See id.
646. See supra note 436 and accompanying text.
647. See supra notes 441-442 and accompanying text.
648. See FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra note 135, at 172.
649. See id. at 171 n.60 (quoting a 1926 study concluding that most assigned lawyers were
either young and inexperienced or older and presumably unable to attract better-paying business).
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Middlesex County defendants despite their higher representation rate. 65 But
we nonetheless may expect that defendants with lawyers more commonly
saw their chances of victory at trial as justifying the risk. If so, then the
higher representation rate in California may help explain Alameda's lower
guilty-plea rate.
With California prosecutors lacking the unilateral power to charge
bargain and with all three courtroom actors lacking motives to bargain as
strong as those in Massachusetts, it is probably no surprise that plea
bargaining showed far less vigor in late-nineteenth-century California than
in late-nineteenth-century Massachusetts. We should turn, then, to
Friedman and Percival's "remarkable" finding that over the course of their
study, the proportion of defendants who pled guilty to the charged offense
increased from twelve to thirty-two percent.6' I believe we can find an
explanation in a procedural change that took place at the very outset of
Friedman and Percival's study and that supplied prosecutors with a charge-
bargaining tool that stood in for the abolished nol pros.
In 1880, the California legislature established the "preliminary
examination" as an alternative charging mechanism to the grand jury, and
prosecutors quickly abandoned the grand-jury process. " As over half of all
defendants had counsel at their preliminary examination,6" the examination
gave the prosecutor and defense lawyer a built-in opportunity to meet and
650. Although it is difficult to compare my figures directly with Friedman and Percival's, it
appears that at the beginning of their period, the rate of acquittal at trial was considerably higher
in Alameda than in Middlesex, but that by the end of their period. Middlesex defendants fared
better.
VERDICTS AT TRIAL
ALAMEDA COUNTY MIDDLESEX COUNTY
Years Guilty of Guilty Not Year Guilty of Guilty Not
Charged of Guilty Charged of Guilty
Offense Lesser Offense Lesser
Offense Offense
1880- 36% 15% 39% 1880 64% 5% 23%
1889 1
1890- 33% 17% 40% 1890 60% 5% 33%
1899
1900- 42% 16% 30% 1900 44% 8% 45%
1910
1910 44% 9% 47%
Sources: FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra note 135, at 182; Middlesex Super. C. R.
Books; Middlesex Super. Ct. Docket Books.
Percentages may not add up to 100, because some trials ended in hung juries. My figures for
1880 represent only the October session of the court, and those for 1890 only the February
session.
651. See supra Table 10 and accompanying text.
652. See FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra note 135, at 43. Between 1880 and 1910. only about
eight percent of cases began by way of indictment by a grand jury. See id. at 43-44.
653. See id. at 158.
2000] 1029
The Yale Law Journal
review the evidence before the prosecutor brought charges. Knowing that a
judge who had limited incentives to plea bargain would have to approve
any deal that involved reducing or selectively eliminating charges, the
lawyers now could strike a different sort of deal: In exchange for the
prosecutor's promise to press only certain charges at the preliminary
hearing, the defendant would promise to plead guilty to the face of the
complaint. Researchers in later times have seen a good deal of this sort of
bargaining at preliminary hearings in some (though not all) California
courts and in courts elsewhere."
Another aspect of the penal code added force to this charge-bargaining
technique. In 1872, the California legislature had enacted a harsh penalty
scheme governing repeat offenders that sometimes imposed stiff
mandatory-minimum terms.655 For example, if a person once convicted of a
crime punishable by state-prison time was later convicted of an offense
punishable by a term of more than five years, the law imposed a minimum
ten-year sentence.656 And if a person once convicted of petty larceny was
later convicted of any crime punishable by state-prison time, the law
required the court to impose the maximum term for the new offense. 657 For
many defendants caught in this law's grip, the prosecutor's promise at the
preliminary hearing to forgo the prior offense allegation must have been
more than enough to make a plea bargain seem worthwhile.658
Friedman and Percival's finding that after the 1880s a growing number
of defendants pled guilty to the charged offense now seems natural. The
introduction of preliminary hearings in 1880 gave prosecutors and defense
lawyers a new forum for plea bargaining. The deals these lawyers struck-
that the defendant would plead to the face of the complaint if the prosecutor
brought only certain charges-appeared in court records as pleas to the
crimes charged. As lawyers mastered and internalized this new charge-
bargaining technique, such pleas inevitably became more common. Here,
again, is just another example of lawyers' making do with what they had in
contriving a plea-bargaining regime. And so we see again that although the
scenery in Alameda is quite unlike that in Middlesex, the principles of
power and interest that drove plea bargaining's development appear-at
this quick and distant glance-much the same.
654. See MATHER, supra note 489, at 50 (citing BUREAU OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS, FELONY
DEFENDANTS DISPOSED OF IN CALIFORNIA COURTS: REFERENCES TABLES (1970); LIEF H.
CARTER, THE LIMITS OF ORDER (1974)). Mather notes that at the time of her own study in the
early 1970s, such deals were not common in Los Angeles. See id.
655. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 666, 667 (Bancroft & Co. 1885); Ex parte Gutierrez, 45 Cal.
429,430 (1873).
656. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 666(1).
657. See id. § 667(2).
658. Friedman and Percival make it clear that the prosecutor had the discretion to charge or
not to charge prior offenses. See FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra note 135, at 170.
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2. New York
For New York there is no equivalent of the full-length treatment of the
operations of the local justice system that Friedman and Percival give to
Alameda County. Instead we must work from the scattered bits of evidence
that emerge from Raymond Moley's classic 1928 exposd of the once-
hidden world of plea bargaining 9 and from Mike McConville and Chester
Mirsky's fuller but still brief study.6 These works agree about two critical
facts-the kind of plea bargaining that the authors observed in New York
and the timing of its rise.
McConville and Mirsky, who focus exclusively on New York City
courts, report that the most common form of plea bargaining in the mid-
nineteenth century was charge bargaining. Of the guilty pleas they observed
in an 1865 sample, seventy percent were to lesser offenses and only twenty-
eight percent to the face of the indictment.66' Moley reported that eighty-
five percent of all guilty pleas in New York City in 1926 were to an offense
other than that charged-though the proportion was considerably smaller in
the rest of the state.6 2 These are extraordinary rates of charge bargaining. In
Alameda, Friedman and Percival found that only forty-five percent of all
guilty pleas in 1880-1889 were to lesser offenses and that the figure
dropped to twenty-four percent in 1890-1899 and to a mere eleven percent
in 1900-1910.6 My findings in Middlesex show that after the middle of the
century, when charge bargaining in liquor cases became defunct, charge
bargains never amounted to even nine percent of all guilty pleas in the
courts of the middle tier.' Only in murder cases, in which the mandatory
death penalty gave prosecutors the power to charge bargain effectively, did
charge bargaining dominate, accounting for virtually all guilty pleas.'
The second fact that stands out about guilty pleas in New York is how
early the trend upward began. McConville and Mirsky report a negligible
659. See Moley, supra note 47.
660. See McConville & Mirsky, supra note 243. The authors are in the process of expanding
their research into a book-length study. See Letter from Chester L. Mirsky (Dec. 28, 1998) (on file
with the author).
661. See McConville & Mirsky, supra note 243, at 466. The authors do not report the
corresponding figures for other years.
662. See Moley, supra note 47, at 11l. Moley's categories are -Guilty to offense charged"
and "Guilty to other offense." Id. It is reasonable to suppose that "other offense" refers to a
lesser offense. Moley did not clearly separate statistics for New York City from those for the rest
of the state. See id. Under a column labeled "total for state." he noted that 58% of guilty pleas
statewide were to an offense other than that charged. See id. New York City probably dominates
this statistic, however, as in three other categories-" large upstate cities." "small cities." and
"rural"--the proportion of guilty pleas made to an offense other than that charged was 32%, 27%.
and 22%, respectively. See id.
663. See supra Table 10 and accompanying text.
664. The highest figure I found was a little over eight percent in 1859.
665. See supra notes 87-99 and accompanying text.
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guilty-plea rate from 1800 until about 1830 and then a nearly steady rise to
a high of seventy-five percent of all dispositions in 1890, the last year of
their study. 666 Moley's figures commence only in 1839, but they show that
the guilty-plea rate already had begun to grow and that it passed seventy-
five percent in New York City by 1879 and in rural counties by the late
1890s.667
To explain both the type and the timing of New York plea bargaining,
we are wise to look first at prosecutors. We saw in Middlesex County that
charge bargaining is primarily a prosecutorial device. Only the rare
noncompliance of a grand jury can limit the prosecutorial prerogative to
seek certain charges, and only extraordinary legislative action-such as the
1852 Massachusetts ban on nol prosses in liquor cases and California's
general nol pros ban of 1851--can limit the prosecutorial prerogative to
drop or reduce charges by means of the nol pros. Although neither Moley
nor McConville and Mirsky provide information that would help us assess
how busy New York prosecutors were, it seems plausible to assume that
they were quite busy and, like Middlesex prosecutors, felt strong incentives
to reduce their workloads. 8 That charge bargains were more common in
New York City than in the rest of the state and that the rise of guilty pleas
was steeper in the City than in rural counties"6 might suggest that Gotham
prosecutors were busier than the rest.
The more difficult question is where New York prosecutors got the
power to engage in such a far-ranging charge-bargaining practice. Recall
that in Middlesex County, the power to charge bargain in liquor cases arose
from the peculiar penalty scheme of the liquor-license law, which required
the judge to impose a fixed fine-or a fine within narrowly fixed bounds--
for each conviction and therefore enabled prosecutors to dictate the
sentence by manipulating the charges. In the first three-quarters of the
century, before the mounting pressures of their civil caseloads converted
judges to the cause of plea bargaining, the prosecutors' unilateral power to
control sentencing was essential to charge bargaining's success.
It appears that New York's unusual criminal code of 1829 conferred a
similar power but in a more broad-based way. Before 1829, New York law
established a comparatively clumsy and undifferentiated schedule of
criminal penalties. Persons convicted "of any manner of rape, or
of... burglary; or of... robb[ery]," forgery, or setting fire to a house or
666. See McConville & Mirsky, supra note 243, at 466.
667. See Moley, supra note 47, at 108.
668. McConville and Mirsky do report that the annual caseload of the Court of General
Sessions, New York City's major criminal court, increased from 268 indictments in 1839 to 1323
in 1865. See McConville & Mirsky, supra note 243, at 463. But they do not tell us about the size
of the district attorney's staff and do not say whether prosecutors worked full- or part-time.
669. See supra notes 662, 667 and accompanying text.
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barn were "punished with imprisonment for life."'67' Persons convicted of
any other felony above the grade of petty larceny were imprisoned for "any
term not more than fourteen years." 67'
Various features of the 1829 code,672 which took effect just as the rate
of guilty pleas in the state started steadily upward,67 gave prosecutors
unusually broad power to charge bargain. The code divided several crimes
into different "degrees" that carried corresponding punishments. For
example, first-degree burglary called for a penalty of not less than ten
years; second-degree burglary for not less than five or more than ten years;
and third-degree burglary for not more than five years. 674 Abundant case
law made it clear that prosecutors could use multi-count indictments to
charge several degrees of the same crime67'-a device that gave them, like
prosecutors of liquor-law violations in Massachusetts, the leverage to exact
guilty pleas in exchange for selectively nol prossing separate counts of the
indictment.
When the statute assigned a inininni term of imprisonment to the
higher degrees of a crime-as it did for both first- and second-degree
burglary; first-degree robbery; first- and second-degree forgery; first-,
second-, and third-degree manslaughter; and first-, second-, and third-
degree arson67 6 -it bestowed peculiar power on the prosecutor to bind the
judge's hands in sentencing and hence to persuade defendants to plead
guilty. A defendant charged with first-degree burglary who faced a
minimum ten-year term in state prison might have leapt at the prosecutor's
offer to plead guilty to third-degree burglary with its guaranteed five-year
maximum.6' Likewise, a defendant charged with second-degree burglary
670. Act of Mar. 21, 1801, ch. 58, § 2. 1801 N.Y. Stat. 97. 97 (declaring the crimes
punishable by death or imprisonment in the state prison). A penalty statute of 1813 left intact most
of the scheme laid out in the 1801 law. See Act of Mar. 19, 1813. ch. 29. § 3. 1813 N.Y. Stat. 407.
The 1813 law did complicate the penalties for arson, establishing death as the penalty for burning
an inhabited dwelling house, see id. § 3, at 407. and imprisonment for not more than fourteen
years as the penalty for burning any other house, barn. public building, or mill. see id. § 3. at 407.
And it established differing penalties for several forms of forgery. See id. § 3. at 408-09.
671. § 5, 1813 N.Y. Stat. at 409; § 4, 1801 N.Y. Stat. at 97. Both the 1801 and the 1813
penalty schemes called for life sentences for those convicted a second time of any felony above
the grade of petty larceny. See § 5, 1813 N.Y. Stat. at 409; § 4. 1801 N.Y. Stat. at 97.
672. See 2 N.Y. REV. STAT. pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 3. § i, at 655 (Packard & Van Benthuyscn 1829).
673. See supra notes 666-667 and accompanying text.
674. See 2 N.Y. REV. STAT. pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 3. § 21. at 669.
675. See People v. Adler, 35 N.E. 644, 644-46 (N.Y. 1893): Hawker v. People, 30 N.Y. 487,
489-90 (1878); People v. Rynders, 12 Wend. 425. 429-30 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834); Kane v. People, 8
Wend. 203, 210-11 (N.Y. 1831).
676. See 2 N.Y. REV. STAT. pt. 4. ch. 1, tit. I. § I. at 656; id. tit. 3. § 9. at 668; id. § 21. at
669; id. § 57, at 678; id. § 42, at 675; id. § 20. at 662-63.
677. One hundred forty years later, when the head of a commission to draft a new penal code
for New York was asked whether the need to facilitate plea bargaining had prompted the
commission to split a raft of crimes into multiple degrees, he replied: " Decidedly! Ve were very
conscious of the negotiation process, and that's the reason for our extensive degree structure....
[I]t's very important that one can take the negotiating process right down the line through the
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who faced a minimum five-year term might readily have pled guilty to
attempted second-degree burglary, with its maximum five-year term.678
McConville and Mirsky report that of the seventy-three guilty pleas to
lesser offenses that they observed in an 1865 sample, thirty-four-or forty-
seven percent-involved reducing the charged offense to a mere attempt.679
The Massachusetts penal code simply denied prosecutors the power to
engage in such broad-based charge bargaining. Of all the commonly
prosecuted crimes, only liquor-law violations, murder, and a few other very
serious offenses that called for mandatory life imprisonment or mandatory
death carried minimum penalties. And not until 1974 did the Supreme
Judicial Court deem attempt to be a lesser-included offense of the
substantive charge.611 I did not observe a single nineteenth-century case in
which the defendant pled guilty to attempt as part of a charge bargain.
An additional source of charge bargaining power in the 1829 code was
its harsh treatment of two broad categories of second offenders, whom it
exposed to substantial minimum penalties.6 These provisions precisely
tracked-and therefore must have inspired-the 1872 second-offender laws
in California that I discussed earlier.682 As in California, these mandatory
penalties put the prosecutor in a position to threaten the defendant with a
long prison term that the judge had no power to avoid. But unlike California
prosecutors, who had no power to nol pros prior offense allegations and had
to wait for the institution of preliminary hearings in 1880 to find a forum
for plea bargaining, New York prosecutors could wipe out the prior offense
allegation in exchange for the defendant's guilty plea to the present charge.
In Massachusetts there was no broad-based law that heightened the penalty
for second offenses, and not until 1887 did the state enact severe minimum
penalties for third offenders. 683 Before then, the only similar law I have seen
degrees." Drafting a New Penal Law in New York: An Interview with Richard Denzer, 18 BUFF.
L. REV. 251, 258 (1969).
678. See 2 N.Y. REV. STAT. pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 3, § 21, at 669; id. tit. 7, § 3(2), at 698.
679. See McConville & Mirsky, supra note 243, at 466-67.
680. See Commonwealth v. Gosselin, 309 N.E.2d 884, 887-88 (Mass. 1974) (relying on
holdings of courts of other states and on analogous Massachusetts cases).
681. The first of these provisions imposed a minimum 10-year term on any person who,
having been convicted in the past of a crime punishable by prison time, was later convicted of a
crime punishable by more than five years in state prison. See 2 N.Y. REV. STAT. pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 7.
§ 8(l), at 699. The second provided that any person who once was convicted of either petty
larceny or an attempt to commit any crime punishable by state prison and who then was convicted
of any crime punishable by a term in state prison less than life "shall be sentenced to
imprisonment in such prison, for the longest term prescribed" by statute. Id. § 9(2), at 699-700.
The reference to those once convicted of an attempt is particularly significant in light of the use
prosecutors made of attempt convictions in the course of charge bargaining.
682. See supra notes 655-657 and accompanying text.
683. A habitual-offender law of that year imposed a 25-year term for offenders who twice
previously served prison terms of three or more years. See Act of June 16, 1887, ch. 435, § 1.
1887 Mass. Acts 1098, 1098. In 1890, one of the proponents of the law complained that
prosecutors had used it only three times. See Twenty-Years' Sentence, BOSTON EVENING
TRANSCRIPT, Jan. 18, 1890, at 9 (letter of Clement K. Fay).
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in use, outside the context of the liquor laws, imposed a rather mild
minimum three-year term on those convicted a second time of theft."
The power of New York prosecutors to enter nol prosses leads us to the
one real mystery surrounding the state's vigorous charge-bargaining
practice. The penal code of 1829 said nothing of the nol pros power. In
1836, however, the legislature stripped the state's district attorneys of the
power "to enter a nolle prosequi upon any indictment, or in any other way
to discontinue or abandon the same, without the leave of the court having
jurisdiction to try the offence charged."" I have not been able to trace the
legislature's motivations in making this change and have found but a single,
cryptic clue to the law's purpose in an 1841 opinion of the state supreme
court, then an intermediate appellate court. In People v. McLeod,' the
court pointed out that the state's attorney general and its several district
attorneys formerly shared the nol pros power and that the legislature had
chosen to leave the attorney general's power unimpaired even as it
withdrew power from the district attorneys. Apparently, the court surmised,
the legislature had found the nol pros power in too "many hands, and
fear[ed] its abuse." ' What sort of abuse the court did not say. It is fair to
infer that the legislature would not have acted had district attorneys not
made frequent use of nol prosses-a phenomenon that would square with
McConville and Mirsky's and Moley's figures showing a strong increase in
the rate of guilty pleas beginning by the late 1830s."
It is harder to explain why the 1836 law did not halt the apparent
progress of charge bargaining in New York. After all, when the
Massachusetts legislature imposed a similar restriction on prosecutors' use
of nol prosses in liquor cases in 1852, prosecutorial charge bargaining in
these cases came to an abrupt stop.68 9 The most likely explanation for the
New York law's failure to squelch charge bargaining is that the law did not
by its terms forbid the practice. A charge bargain did not require the
prosecutor "to enter a nolle prosequi upon [the] indictment," or "to
discontinue or abandon the same," but merely to nol pros one count of the
indictment-hence the usefulness of the multi-count charging practice I
noted earlier. Given that the nol pros power traditionally had lain with the
684. See Act of Mar. 16, 1805, ch. 143, § 3, 1804 Mass. Acts 240. 241-42.
685. 2 N.Y. REv. STAT. pt. 4, ch. 2, tit. 4, § 54, at 609. The cited section seems to have been
adopted as part of the statutory revision of 1836. I have not found any session law between 1829
and 1836 that prescribes this change.
686. 1 Hill 377 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841).
687. Id. at 405.
688. See McConville & Mirsky, supra note 243, at 466 fig.3; Moley, supra note 47, at 108.
Moley's chart presents data for 1839 and later. The rate of guilty pleas seems already to be
increasing as of 1839. See Moley, supra note 47, at 108.
689. See supra notes 173-179 and accompanying text.
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prosecutor, trial courts may have been reluctant to deprive him of that
power absent a more precise legislative command.
Alternatively, one could surmise that the 1836 law failed to slow charge
bargaining because New York judges, unlike those in Massachusetts,
readily gave their consent to the necessary nol prosses. The course of later
legislation in New York, however, suggests that judges remained unfriendly
toward prosecutorial charge bargaining for some time to come. When
David Dudley Field, David Graham, and Arphaxed Loomis reported a code
of criminal procedure to the New York legislature in 1849,6 0 they proposed
to abolish the noi pros altogether. The Graham Code (as it came to be
known) flatly declared that "neither the attorney general, nor the di[sltrict
attorney shall hereafter discontinue or abandon a prosecution" '69 and
instead bestowed on judges an exclusive power to dismiss criminal actions
either "of [their] own motion, or upon the application of the district
attorney." 692
The authors at first gave no reason for proposing a wholesale shift of
the power to terminate prosecutions. They claimed simply that several
components of their code, including this one, "are sufficiently explained by
the provisions themselves. 693 But in a revision of the proposed code
submitted the following year, they suggested that the court's 1841 ruling in
McLeod had prompted their action. The court had held that the nol pros law
of 1836, which by its terms gave trial courts the power to veto prosecutorial
nol prosses, gave them no power to enter a nol pros "unless by consent or
on motion of the district attorney."694 The code's authors argued that the
court thereby had made "the power of the district attorney, in this
respect, .. . greater than that of the court." 695 Far better, they wrote, that the
nol pros power rest "where it should alone rest, in the hands of the
court."
69 6 The authors never explained why, if they sought merely to
remedy the inability of judges to end criminal prosecutions on their own
motion, they proposed to take all such power from prosecutors.
Nonetheless, we may infer two things from their proposal: First, they
believed that the 1836 law had not sufficiently restricted district attorneys'
690. See 4 REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADINGS: CODE OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (Albany, Weed, Parsons & Co. 1849) [hereinafter FOURTH REPORT OF
THE COMMISsIONERS]. The proposed code of criminal procedure apparently was primarily
Graham's work and became known as the Graham Code. See People v. Willis, 52 N.Y.S. 808, 809
(Sup. Ct. 1898).
691. FOURTH REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS, supra note 690, § 754, at 196.
692. Id. § 753, at 196.
693. Id. at lxix.
694. THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK: REPORTED
COMPLETE BY THE COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADINGS 343 (Albany, Weed, Parsons
& Co. 1850) [hereinafter CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE].
695. Id.; see also People v. McLeod, 1 Hill 377, 405-06 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841) (announcing
the holding to which the code authors referred).
696. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 694, at 343.
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nol pros power. Second, they did not believe judges had connived in
whatever abuses district attorneys had wrought with that power-for if they
had suspected judicial complicity, they surely would not have handed all
power to judges.
This complete ban on prosecutorial nol prosses did not become law for
some time, and in the meantime, by whatever mechanism, prosecutors
appear to have retained their nol pros power despite the 1836 ban. In 1869,
the New York Times printed a front-page discourse on the ills of the state's
criminal justice system. While pointing out the dangerous concentration of
power in the prosecutor, the anonymous but seemingly well-informed
author claimed that the prosecutor "can without question enter a nolle
prosequi in any case where an indictment has been found." 6 "He may go
further and accept a plea from a prisoner guilty of an offence many degrees
lower in grade than that charged in the indictment by the Grand Jury."'
Where the prosecutor got these powers the author did not say. At about the
same time, though, a somewhat jaded observer commented that a district
attorney's "motion for leave to enter a nolle prosequi is granted by courts
almost invariably, their assent being well nigh a matter of form."' " Of
course, by this time, or not long afterward, Massachusetts judges as well
had begun to soften their resistance to plea bargaining.
In any event, between 1850 and 1880, as the Graham Code languished
unenacted, the proportion of cases ending in guilty pleas reached and
surpassed seventy-five percent."° Most of these pleas took the form of
charge bargains.70' In 1881, the legislature finally put in force the entire
proposed code, including the nol pros ban. 0 - Whether it gave any attention
to the parts of the code that concern us now, which were only two
provisions in a code that contained hundreds, is not clear. What is both
clear and unsurprising is that if the legislature had intended to end charge
bargaining in New York by depriving prosecutors of the power to enter nol
prosses, it failed in its mission. Moley's figures show that the rate of guilty
pleas in New York City, where charge bargains were most common,
dipped barely perceptibly after enactment of the code and then climbed to a
new high."M That this result is unsurprising is a consequence of what
697. Concerning Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1869, at 1. Alexis Hailer, one of my research
assistants, found this important evidence.
698. Id.
699. TWENTY-FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRISON ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK
reprinted in ASSEMBLY Doc. NO. 50, at 134 (N.Y. 1866).
700. See Moley, supra note 47, at 108.
701. See supra notes 661-662 and accompanying text.
702. The legislature made only minor modifications to the Graham Code which are not
important here. See Act of June 14, 1881, ch. 504, §§ 671-672, 1881 N.Y. Laws 164. 164-65;
People v. Willis, 52 N.Y.S. 808, 809 (Sup. CL 1898).
703. See supra note 662 and accompanying text.
704. See Moley, supra note 47, at 108.
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Middlesex County's history has taught: By 1881, judges were confronting
an onslaught of new civil litigation. No doubt New York judges, like their
Massachusetts counterparts, abandoned whatever antipathy they once might
have borne toward prosecutorial charge bargaining and lent it what aid they
could. As Moley observed in 1926, New York judges dismissed cases about
as often as prosecutors in other states entered nol prosses. "The practice [of
nol prossing] exists," he wrote, "although the name is gone." 
705
In New York, then, as in California and England, the principles that
emerged from our study of Middlesex County go far toward explaining the
course of plea bargaining's rise. If plea bargaining in New York more often
took the form of prosecutorial charge bargaining than did plea bargaining in
California or Massachusetts, it is because New York law gave prosecutors
more leverage to manipulate sentences by manipulating charges than did
California or Massachusetts law. And if plea bargaining got an earlier start
in New York than in California or Massachusetts, it is in part because the
legal framework to support prosecutorial charge bargaining was in place by
1829 and in part because the frenzy of life in the Metropolis perhaps taxed
prosecutorial resources more heavily than did the relative quietude of
California or even Middlesex County.
VII. THE POWER OF PLEA BARGAINING
We have seen that both within and outside Massachusetts, we can
explain a good deal of plea bargaining's progress by asking who held the
power to bargain and who had the incentive. Now we can move ahead to
explore the broader consequences of plea bargaining's amassed power. By
"plea bargaining's power," I mean of course its derived power, for the
power of plea bargaining is the power of the courtier-the influence it has
gained by serving well the interests of those in high places. I will begin,
therefore, by sorting the several ways plea bargaining has served the
interests of those who hold power in the criminal courtroom. I will then
consider how plea bargaining's amassed power has helped or hindered the
progress of other institutions of criminal justice.
A. The Sources of Plea Bargaining's Power
We have seen already that one of plea bargaining's great attractions for
prosecutors and judges was its efficiency. When Middlesex prosecutors of
the 1840s found themselves staggering under rapidly growing caseloads,
they multiplied charge bargains in liquor cases and employed on-file plea
bargains in a whole range of cases. And when Massachusetts judges of the
705. Id. at 101.
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last quarter of the century faced hugely increasing demands from their civil
calendars, they threw their considerable power behind the cause of plea
bargaining by engaging in sentence bargaining on an ever greater scale. The
sheer efficiency of plea bargaining as a means of clearing cases to some
extent has frozen it in place. When prosecutors and judges manage to keep
pace with fast-growing workloads either with no increase in staffing or with
increases that lag behind the growth in case numbers, any appeal they might
make to the legislature for more personnel will fall short.
But the efficiency of plea bargaining is not the only benefit it extends to
power-holders. It is obvious that prosecutors like plea bargaining because it
secures victory in the case. What is less obvious is that plea bargaining
confers almost the same advantage on judges. True, most judges have no
personal or professional stake in seeing the defendant convicted, but a plea
bargain still means that the judge "wins" to the extent that it guards against
the reputational blow of a reversal: Without a trial, after all, the judge
cannot commit a trial error. 6 It is not clear when trial judges first began to
regard reversals with dread and therefore to view this aspect of plea
bargaining as a virtue. Massachusetts district attorneys first had to report
their win/loss statistics to the attorney general in the 1830s, and at least one
district attorney made a point of bragging about his conviction rate as early
as 1844."0 What evidence I have of judicial concern for reversal rates arises
later and hence accords with other evidence that judges came around to the
cause of plea bargaining only decades after prosecutors had put in place the
equipment of charge bargaining in liquor and murder cases.
It is no surprise that judges of the first half of the nineteenth century did
not concern themselves much with reversal rates---there simply were too
few appeals. Theodore Ferdinand reports that between 1814 and 1822,
defendants appealed in only three percent of municipal-court cases in
Boston, a figure that declined through the first half of the century to just
over one percent between 1844 and 1850.708 By the end of the century,
however, the pace of appeals was growing. According to one study,
criminal appeals in Massachusetts increased from about 2200 in the early
1890s to about 3500 in 1900-with larger increases to follow.7 In
California at about the same time, Friedman and Percival saw only slight
growth in the overall frequency of appeals, which generally occurred in
about two or three percent of all cases, but at times reached as high as six
706. Friedman and Percival break down the grounds for appeal of Alameda County cases
between 1870 and 1910. Two-thirds of claimed errors can be traced to judicial rulings on evidence
or law or to the judge's jury instructions. See FRIDMAN & PER CivAL, supra note 135, at 265
tbl.8.4.
707. See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
708. See FERDINAND, supra note 121, at 128, 130.
709. See Wilfred Bolster, Criminal Appeals, MAss. L.Q., Aug. 1922, at 16, 16a [i.e.,
unnumbered page opposite page 16].
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percent.1 ' But when they measured appeals as a proportion of convictions
after trial, rather than as a proportion of all cases, Friedman and Percival
found that appeals more than doubled from 8.4% in the 1880s to 17.7% in
the I 890s and fell off only slightly between 1900 and 1910.71'
One can find occasional anecdotal evidence of trial judges' concern
with the possibility of reversal on appeal. In 1879, for example, the
Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the actions of a trial judge who had
coerced a plea bargain apparently to avoid the risk of appeal. As the high
court recounted the case, after the judge had rejected the defendant's
pretrial motion to dismiss and the jury had returned a guilty verdict,
"[s]ome very extraordinary proceedings followed. The defendant was given
by the judge to understand that he must submit to a severe sentence or else
withdraw his plea of not guilty, enter a plea of guilty and immediately pay
$400 and estop himself from bringing error."7"2 But the earliest evidence
that I have found of a more generalized desire among judges to avoid the
risk of reversal dates to the 1920s. A Massachusetts district attorney wrote
in 1926 of trial judges' "[f]ear of reversal," though he drew no connection
between that fear and judges' attitudes toward plea bargaining." 3 It was left
to Raymond Moley to make this connection in his 1928 indictment of the
newly "discovered" practice of plea bargaining: The prosecutor "does not
run the risk of losing" when the case ends in a plea bargain, he wrote, and
"the judge escapes the danger of being reversed on some point of law." 
714
As the twentieth century wore on and expanding procedural protections
generated more criminal appeals,715 three sets of actors felt the growing
710. See FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra note 135, at 262 tbl.8.2.
711. See id.
712. O'Hara v. People, 3 N.W. 161, 161 (Mich. 1879) (emphasis added). The only similar
case I have seen arose in the Lowell, Massachusetts, police court in 1841. Catherine Fitzgerald.
charged with liquor-selling, objected that she could not be held responsible for a misdemeanor
committed in her husband's presence. "Of this His Honor was not quite certain," the Lowell
Courier reported, "but would not pass sentence till she would agree not to appeal... but would
hold her to answer further, and her liege lord also. Kate paid the fine, rather than her 'man' should
go to the Grand Jury .... Lowell Police Court, LOWELL COURIER, May 1. 184 1, at 2. That is.
the magistrate gave the defendant the option of paying a fine on the charged offense and forgoing
her right to appeal or being bound over together with her husband to face higher charges before a
grand jury. True, this was a proceeding in police court, and the defendant's appeal right consisted
of a de novo proceeding in superior court rather than an appeal on questions of law. But as the
magistrate apparently was worried that a higher tribunal would spy his mistake on a legal
question, this case perhaps is an example of judges' general aversion to reversals.
713. Thomas C. O'Brien, Crime and Criminal Law, MASS. L.Q., May 1926, at 33. 34 (" Fear
of reversal in the Supreme Court compels trial judges to resolve doubtful questions as to the
admission of testimony and instructions to the jury in favor of the defendant, for the Government
has no right of appeal.").
714. Moley, supra note 47, at 103.
715. See Alschuler, supra note 2, at 38-39. The defendants' new procedural protections fall
into two categories: those that expanded the substantive rights that may become the basis for
appeal, including cases that required state courts to exclude illegally seized evidence; and those
that directly expanded the opportunity for appeal by guaranteeing indigent defendants appellate
counsel. See id. at 39.
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allure of plea bargaining. For prosecutors, more appeals inevitably meant
both more time-consuming prosecutions and more reversals on appeal, and
so the usefulness of plea bargaining both to secure efficient dispositions and
to assure victory in the case grew larger.71 6 As trial judges saw the greater
potential for reversals and the reputational damage that they brought,
personal interests bound them ever tighter to plea bargaining's cause. And
as appellate judges suffered under the weight of their growing dockets, they
too began to know the efficient promise of plea bargaining. It is little
wonder, perhaps, that the United States Supreme Court's definitive
affirmation of the legality of plea bargaining-rendered as though "any
other course would be unthinkable" 717-- came amid a period of
overwhelming growth of criminal appeals in the federal courts." 8
The pressure of criminal appeals on appellate judges, like the pressure
of criminal trials on trial judges, is to some extent a function of the judges'
civil workloads. In Part V, I argued that the civil-litigation revolution of the
late nineteenth century had confronted trial judges not only with more civil
trials, but with a more complex brand of negligence trials that absorbed far
more time than the old nonpayment disputes that had typified their civil
docket. 719 Likewise, appeals in negligence cases, as Roscoe Pound
recognized in 1939, "require an exceptionally critical consideration of
details of evidence in voluminous records."7 2' The nature of today's civil
appellate caseload, then, creates even greater incentives to limit the criminal
appellate caseload.
At least three influential participants in the criminal justice system-
prosecutor, trial judge, and appellate judge-therefore see plea bargaining
as a means toward efficient management of overgrown workloads. At least
two-prosecutor and trial judge-see it as a means to guard their
reputations from the scent of fecklessness or incompetence. And criminal
defendants, lest we forget them, may see plea bargaining as a means to
avoid uncertainty and to elude the most severe allowable sentence. But
beyond these advantages that plea bargaining confers on individual
participants in the justice system, it confers another on the system as a
716. See id at 38-39 ("By increasing the likelihood of appeal, these decisions [granting
defendants greater procedural protections] encouraged prosecutors to magnify the concessions
granted to defendants in exchange for guilty pleas that would effectively foreclose appellate
review of most issues.").
717. Id. at40.
718. The most important of the Supreme Court's early decisions on plea bargaining appeared
in 1970 and 1971. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971); North Carolina v. Alford,
400 U.S. 25 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397
U.S. 759 (1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). Between 1960 and 1980, the
number of appeals filed in federal courts of appeal almost quintupled-with criminal appeals
rising faster than civil appeals-while the number of judges merely doubled. See Galanter. supra
note 536, at 38.
719. See supra notes 540-541 and accompanying text.
720. Roscoe Pound, The Judicial Office Today, 25 A.B.A. J. 731. 732 (1939).
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whole: To the extent that a plea bargain delivers a verdict that onlookers
acknowledge to be truthful, 2 it protects the jury and the system that
sponsors it from the risk of issuing the wrong verdict--or to be precise, a
verdict the public will perceive to be wrong. That is, despite all the
criticism heaped upon plea bargaining by those who think that it deprives
defendants of their trial right or the public of its right to uncompromised
punishment, when it comes to the apparent accuracy of outcomes, plea
bargaining helps protect the system's legitimacy.722
In fact, plea bargaining may do an even better job of protecting the
system from the perception of wrongful verdicts than at first appears. Harry
Kalven and Hans Zeisel concluded in their monumental study, The
American Jury, that plea bargaining tends to remove from the jury system
those cases in which the defendant faces the clearest evidence of guilt:
If all controversies of criminal law were placed on a continuum
from the weakest to the strongest in terms of the prosecution's case,
the guilty plea... would be likely to withdraw cases from the
strong side of the continuum, leaving the weaker cases for jury
trial.
The upshot is that, out of the great universe of criminal
controversies, those surviving to jury trial... are likely to be the
more controversial cases where, in the nature of things, the chances
of disagreement are increased.72 3
As we might expect, when defendants regard their odds of conviction to be
all but certain, they are more likely to seek a deal to cut their losses. If they
sense freedom within their grasp, they are more likely to insist on trial.724
Hence "the higher the chances for acquittal, the less likely the guilty plea,
and vice versa." 
7 25
The usefulness of this division of labor between plea bargaining and
jury trial, in which the bargaining process handles the easy cases and the
jury the hard ones, becomes clear when we reflect on the consequences of
the jury's returning a "wrong" verdict in a "clear" case. The system's
legitimacy suffers its greatest strain when the public feels sure that the jury
721. Of course, an Alford plea, in which the defendant adheres to her claim of innocence even
while allowing that the government has enough evidence to prove her guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, see Alford, 400 U.S. at 38, does not meet this condition. But Alford pleas represent a tiny
proportion of all plea bargains.
722. By the system's "legitimacy," I mean the public's perception that the system is, on the
whole, doing justice.
723. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 460, at 30-31; see also id. at 20-22 (presenting data to
support the quoted conclusions).
724. See id. at 21-22.
725. Id. at 21.
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has erred.726 But because defendants who face overwhelming evidence of
guilt typically bargain for the best deal they can get, the jury rarely faces a
clear case and rarely risks being clearly wrong. Instead, as Kalven and
Zeisel said, the jury gets "the more controversial cases where, in the nature
of things, the chances of disagreement are increased." ' These are the cases
that the jury cannot as easily get "wrong." Even if the jury convicts the
innocent or acquits the guilty, the uncertainty of the evidence will help keep
the public from seeing the error. Precisely because these cases are
controversial, and precisely because they present a greater chance of
disagreement, the jury's verdict can settle all controversy and resolve all
disagreement.
Plea bargaining and jury trial, then, have joined in a task of erasing all
apparent error from the criminal justice system. Little clear error can escape
from the black box of the jury's deliberation room as long as only
controversial cases enter. And plea bargaining by its very nature hides both
factual and legal error: By admitting guilt, the defendant eliminates any
formal doubt of guilt. By renouncing trial and all right to complain of
pretrial error, the defendant normally bars any court from declaring error on
appeal. We should not wonder at the staying power of plea bargaining. Not
only does it ease the workloads and protect the reputations of the two most
powerful courtroom actors-judge and prosecutor-it also protects the
reputation of the system as a whole.
726. The two clearest examples of this phenomenon in recent American history are the first
Rodney King trial and the OJ. Simpson criminal trial. In the King case, videotape captured the
defendant police officers as they beat a handcuffed King with clubs. In the Simpson case, a tight
web of circumstantial evidence, including DNA tests, bound the defendant to the crime. In each,
the jury's acquittal prompted broad (though not universal) public indignation and demands for
systemic reform. In both instances, however, the failure was not merely with the jury system, but
also with the plea-bargaining system. In most normal cases that presented such overwhelming
evidence of guilt, defendants would have cut their losses by striking the best deal available. The
sheer celebrity of these prosecutions made such a result politically impractical. The officers'
actions in the King case so outraged the public, and particularly the African-American
community, that any perceived compromise by the prosecution would have invited a firestorm.
Nor could the Los Angeles district attorney, who would soon face a reelection battle, have shown
weakness in the Simpson case, in which his deputies claimed to have a "mountain of evidence."
David Margolick, Judge Ito To Open Files on 10 Dismissed Jurors, N.Y. TLMEs, June 24. 1995, at
6 (quoting deputy prosecutor Lisa Kahn). True, one of Simpson's defense lawyers later said that
the district attorney did offer a deal, see JOHNNIE L. COCHRAN, JR. wrrH TM Rrr7N, JOURNEY
TO JUSTICE 253 (1996), but the district attorney denied the claim, see Randall Kennedy, Playing
to the Crowd: Journey to Justice, L.A. TImES, Oct. 13, 1996, at 4 (reviewing COCHRAN WITH
RUT'EN, supra). Only because the plea-bargaining system failed did these cases go to trial. And
only for that reason was the system exposed to humiliation when the juries got such clear cases
wrong."
It is true that by withdrawing easy cases from the jury's consideration, plea bargaining
(when working normally) both protects the jury from getting a clear case wrong and deprives it of
the chance to get a clear case right. My argument assumes what to me (but perhaps not others)
seems obvious: that the damage done to the jury's legitimacy when it delivers a clearly mistaken
verdict overwhelms the legitimacy benefits of getting an easy case (or even many easy cases)
right.
727. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 460, at 31.
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B. The Consequences of Plea Bargaining's Power
Plea bargaining has used its enormous power, gained by promoting the
interests of power, to help or hinder those procedural institutions that help
or hinder plea bargaining. Here I return to the image of plea bargaining as a
courtier. Though plea bargaining has no power of its own, the judges and
prosecutors who dictate what goes on in our criminal courtrooms do have
power-and they have strong interests in seeing plea bargaining thrive. I do
not suggest that they act in concert or even that they always know the
consequences of their actions, but only that they try to make plea bargains
happen. And in so doing, they raise up those procedural institutions that
help plea bargaining thrive and beat down those that threaten it.
I argued in Part III that the steady and vigorous growth of probation
was one consequence of this derivative power of plea bargaining. Probation
stands as an especially clear case of the symbiosis that can develop between
plea bargaining and a friendly procedural innovation: Because prosecutors
who sought a new method of plea bargaining made use of the same
procedural device that later took the name of probation, plea bargaining
helped invent probation. In the case of the two procedural innovations that I
take up now-indeterminate sentencing and public defenders 28 -the
formative influence of plea bargaining has been less direct. One can assign
various causes for the failure of the indeterminate sentence, which arose
with apparent promise at the close of the nineteenth century. But a good
deal of the evidence surrounding its demise traces to plea bargaining's door,
and the supporters of plea bargaining indeed had a motive to wish the
downfall of the indeterminate sentence. That is, those judges and
prosecutors who found benefits in plea bargaining had reason to shun the
indeterminate sentence and to limit its growth. There are also various ways
to explain the introduction and success of organizations for the defense of
the poor. Still, the evidence seems clear that public defenders emerged at
least in part because they promised to ease the course of plea bargains. We
therefore must examine the possibility that they have thrived in part
because they fulfilled that promise.
1. The Indeterminate Sentence
When examining the interplay between the indeterminate-sentencing
movement and the plea-bargaining system, we have to separate the
principles of the indeterminate sentence from its reality. Its principles, as I
728. Not all lawyers for poor defendants were "public" defenders when these officials first
appeared in the early 20th century. I use the term because it is more familiar to modem ears than
the arguably more accurate "institutional defenders."
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argued in Part V, perhaps actually aided plea bargaining. By suggesting that
punishment should look forward and not backward, advocates of the
indeterminate sentence relieved judges of the strict obligation to learn all
they could about the defendant's past crime before imposing sentence-an
obligation that they once had met by hearing evidence at trial. Moreover,
the belief that, because judges could not predict when a convict would be
reformed, prison and parole authorities should decide the actual release date
meant that judges did not have to struggle to get the defendant's sentence
exactly right. If the rough-and-tumble of the bargaining process produced a
sentence that was other than ideal, prison and parole authorities could tailor
it to fit more suitably.
The reality of the indeterminate sentence, however, if ever enacted
according to the highest ideals of its advocates, would have shrunk plea
bargaining to insignificance. The purest adherents of the indeterminate
sentence thought that its indeterminacy should be complete. Once the judge
sentenced the defendant to incarceration, prison and parole authorities
would release him when he had "reformed," neither earlier nor later, with
no constraint imposed either by judge or by statute.7" Even in such a
system, some amount of plea bargaining might have persisted as defendants
offered to plead guilty to secure probation rather than indeterminate
incarceration. But those defendants whose crimes demanded that they serve
time would have had no incentive to plead, because both judges and
prosecutors would have lacked the power to promise a shorter term.
It is probably significant, then, that no state ever enacted a true
indeterminate sentence. 730 At the very least, "indeterminate" sentencing
laws imposed a statutory maximum on the length of incarceration, so that
even an unreformed inmate at some point had to go free. The Massachusetts
indeterminate-sentencing law of 1886, the nation's second, provided that
729. See, e.g., Samuel J. Barrows, Introduction to THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE AND THE
PAROLE LAW, supra note 562, at 5 ("The value of the indeterminate sentence as a protection to
society lies in the fact that the prisoner is not released until it is deemed safe to discharge him.");
Seth Cooley Cary, Prison Reform-7he hidetenninate Sentence, 8 ALPHA 1.2 (1889-1890) (- [I]f
it be right to restrain one class [such as the idiotic or insane] so long as the disability continues, it
must also be legitimate to restrain all dangerous classes while the disability remains. Therefore, it
is the right and also the duty of the State to confine the criminal so long as he remains vicious."):
Lewis, supra note 562, at 17 (maintaining that "the principle of what is inexactly called the
indeterminate sentence" is that "no man be imprisoned unless it is clear that his freedom is
dangerous to others, and that, when once imprisoned, no man be freed until the danger has
ceased" ).
730. See, e.g., WtLcox, supra note 563, at II (*" [Ain absolutely indeterminate sentence...
has never anywhere been enacted into law."); Report of the Committee of the American Bar
Association, in THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE AND THE PAROLE LAW, supra note 562, at 24.26
("Strictly speaking, the right to impose [indeterminate] sentences does not exist in any State.
Statutes permitting what are commonly called indeterminate sentences are such only in degree.");
Legislation-Indeterminate Sentence Laws-The Adolescence of Penocorrectional Legislation,
50 HARV. L. REV. 677, 678 (1937) ("The titles of (today's indeterminate sentence laws] are
somewhat misleading because none of them provides for a truly indefinite sentence.").
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inmates convicted of certain less serious crimes must go free within two
years and all others within five years unless the sentencing judge specified a
longer term."' Even such imperfect indeterminate-sentencing provisions
could have hobbled plea bargaining because they took a great deal of the
power to dictate the length of sentence from judges' hands. But another,
more substantial departure from complete indeterminate sentencing left
largely intact judges' power to promise shorter sentences to defendants who
pled guilty: Those states that enacted indeterminate sentencing (of the
imperfect sort just mentioned)732 simply made it an additional sentencing
option. Some states explicitly gave judges the choice to impose an
indeterminate sentence or not, as they pleased. Others required sentences to
certain institutions to be indeterminate, but imposed no such requirement on
sentences to other institutions.
The 1886 Massachusetts law, for example, provided in seemingly
mandatory terms that "[w]hen a convict is sentenced to the Massachusetts
reformatory, the court or trial justice imposing the sentence shall not fix or
limit the duration thereof."733 But the law by no means required judges to
send convicts to the reformatory instead of the state prison or county house
of correction or any one of several other possible places of confinement. In
1890, in an editorial titled "Indefinite Commitments," the Boston Evening
Transcript complained that "[s]ome change in the right direction was made
by the legislature of four years ago, but the law has not accomplished what
was hoped. It is said that the reform has not been carried out by the judges
to the full extent which it was expected .. . ."" The paper was right to
claim that judges did not often make use of the indeterminate sentence. The
records of the Middlesex Superior Court show that in 1890, judges chose
the reformatory for barely ten percent of convicts who served time-a
figure that rose to twenty-two percent in 1896 before falling back to
eighteen percent in 1900 and only twelve percent in 19 10."' These numbers
731. See Act of June 24, 1886, ch. 323, §§ 1-3, 1886 Mass. Acts 296, 296. New York's
indeterminate sentencing law of 1877 was the nation's first substantial experiment with the
concept, though Michigan had attempted a small-scale experiment in 1869. See Act of Apr. 3,
1869, No. 145, §§ 4-5, 1869 Mich. Acts 264, 265-66 (providing that convicted adult prostitutes
shall be punished by three years' imprisonment, but that they may be released "upon reformation,
or marked good behavior" by the inspectors of the house of correction); infra note 736.
732. To avoid this parenthetical in the future, and to avoid always putting "indeterminate
sentence" in quotes, I will simply use the term indeterminate sentence with the understood
qualification that there was no such thing in its pure form in American law.
733. § 1, 1886 Mass. Acts at 296.
734. Indefinite Commitments, BOSTON EVENING TRANSCRIPT, Jan. 30, 1890, at 4.
735. In 1898, the legislature extended the reformatory's indeterminate-sentencing structure to
the Bridgewater State Farm. See Act of May 20, 1898, ch. 443, § 1, 1898 Mass. Acts 395, 395. In
1900, the state farm accounted for an additional six percent of all incarcerations and in 1910 for
an additional 10%. As virtually every sentence I saw to the state farm was for drunkenness.
defendants sent there perhaps fell into a special class. Judges may have seen more sense in the
ideal of the indeterminate sentence when the point of confinement was to cure the convict of an
addiction.
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are perhaps especially low given that the state reformatory was
conveniently nearby-in Concord, at the heart of Middlesex County.
Although rarely used, the Massachusetts reformatory perhaps in its
small way proved useful to the plea-bargaining regime. In his 1906
commentary on the operations of the criminal justice system in Manhattan,
Arthur Train recognized the complicated relationship between New York's
reformatory at Elmira, on which the Concord reformatory was modeled,'
and the plea-bargaining system. On the one hand, Train wrote, because "the
Elmira sentence is indeterminate, the defendant has nothing to gain by
pleading." '737 On the other, court officers who wanted to encourage guilty
pleas sometimes told defendants of the "joys of Elmira."' Despite the
uncertain length of a sentence to Elmira, therefore, some defendants
perhaps preferred that option because they feared worse conditions
elsewhere. Other defendants may have had geographical preferences-the
reformatory at Elmira (or Concord) might have been closer to family and
friends than the state prison at Auburn (or Charlestown). In any event, as
long as judges had no obligation to send convicts to Elmira or Concord,
then by adding this option to the mix, the legislature simply added one more
axis along which judge, prosecutor, and defendant could cut a deal. In fact,
although Middlesex judges exercised the Concord option only rarely, the
great majority of defendants who received a reformatory sentence had pled
guilty. Only thirteen percent of those who went to the reformatory in 1890
had gone to trial and lost-a figure that rose to thirty-one percent in 1896,
but then shrank to eight percent in 1900 and a mere five percent in 1910.
The corresponding figures for other institutions were almost always
between two and five times as great.739
From Train's description of Elmira and this evidence of sentencing
practices in Middlesex, we may conclude three things: First, because
indeterminate sentences generally did not appeal to defendants, judges and
prosecutors rarely found the reformatory option helpful in the plea-
bargaining process, and the great majority of convicts served their time
elsewhere. Second, when defendants did happen to prefer a sentence to the
736. In 1877, the New York legislature provided that judges would not set the length of
sentences to the new reformatory at Elmira, but that convicts could not be held beyond the
maximum term specified by law for their crime. See Act of Apr. 24, 1877. cl. 173. § 2. 1877 N.Y.
Laws 186, 186.
737. TRAIN, supra note 199, at 165.
738. Id. at 173 ("Court officers ... anxious that the particular [courtroom] to which they are
assigned shall make as good a showing as possible in the number of cases disposed of...
[contrast the] joys of Elmira... with other places of confinement ....").
739. In 1890, 46% of those sent to the house of correction and 44% of those sent to state
prison had lost at trial. In 1896, these figures stood at 34% and 86%. respectively; in 1900, at 16%
and 19%, respectively; and in 1910, at 16% and 26%. See Middlesex Super. Ci. R. Books (Feb.
1890, 1900). The numbers in all categories declined between 1896 and 1900 as trials became rarer
and guilty pleas more completely dominated dispositions. See supra Figure 4.
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reformatory over one to another institution, judges were pleased to
accommodate them in the interests of gaining a plea. And third, when
defendants instead refused to plead guilty, insisted on their trial right, and
lost, judges rarely sent them to the reformatory. That is, judges generally
did not delegate the measure of punishment to the authorities who
controlled release from the reformatory, for those authorities might not
sufficiently tax the defendant for having burdened the court with a trial.
Instead, judges usually punished defendants who lost after trial by imposing
a more definite sentence: They sent them for a specified term to another
institution.
With the reformatory enjoying but small popularity among
Massachusetts judges, the legislature tried to advance the ideal of the
indeterminate sentence in other ways-first by instituting parole for state
prisoners in 1894 and then by requiring judges to specify minimum and
maximum terms to the state prison in 1895. The 1894 law made state
prisoners eligible for release on parole at the discretion of a parole board
after serving two-thirds of their term.74' Advocates of the true indeterminate
sentence dismissed parole regimes as poor imitations because they merely
permitted a limited reduction of an otherwise fixed sentence. Yet of all
regimes that approached true indeterminacy, parole surely was the most
significant: By 1900, twenty states had adopted some form of parole, but
only eleven had put in place a more nearly indeterminate sentence along the
lines of the Concord/Elmira model. 4
With the 1895 law, the Massachusetts legislature tried to advance the
simple parole system one step closer to true indeterminacy. The law
provided that "the court imposing the sentence [to state prison] shall not fix
the term of imprisonment, but shall establish a maximum and minimum
term for which said convict may be held in said prison."742 It then provided
that the convict would be eligible for parole at any time after completing
the minimum term.743 Again, the law by no means achieved true
indeterminacy: Not only did the judge dictate both a floor and a ceiling for
every sentence, but the maximum terms defined by statute still constrained
the judge's discretion. T4 But again, laws following this model spread across
the nation, taking hold in twenty-three states by 1925. 745
740. See Act of May 26, 1894, ch. 440, § 1, 1894 Mass. Acts 492, 492.
741. See Lindsey, supra note 560, at 40.
742. Act of June 5, 1895, ch. 504, § I, 1895 Mass. Acts 624, 624.
743. See id. § 2.
744. See id. § 1.
745. See Lindsey, supra note 560, at 102-05. In what seems to be a comprehensive review of
indeterminate sentence laws, Edward Lindsey listed 23 states in which the judge determined a
sentencing range (subject to a statutory maximum) within which the convict could receive parole.
Although the range of discretion given the judge varied from state to state, I have excluded from
my count one state (Indiana) that required the judge to set minimum and maximum sentences at
the minimum and maximum defined by statute. See id.
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Even the limited indeterminacy introduced by these two laws might
have inhibited plea bargaining's progress to the extent that they lessened
the judge's power to promise defendants a particular sentence. As it was,
however, the laws lost much in the translation from theory to practice and
soon proved to be no more an obstacle to plea bargaining than was the
reformatory at Concord. As with the reformatory, Middlesex judges made
little use of these new indeterminate sentences. Although the state prison
was the destination for nineteen percent of incarcerated convicts in 1890,
before the laws took effect, that figure fell to ten percent in 1896 and eight
percent in 1900 before recovering somewhat to eleven percent by 1910.'
In their reluctance to impose minimum and maximum terms to the state
prison, Massachusetts judges followed New York judges, who reportedly
spurned a similar sentencing option enacted in that state in 1889."
When Middlesex judges did impose state-prison sentences under the
new parole regime, they very rarely did so in connection with plea bargains.
In 1890, before enactment of the new laws, fifty-six percent of state-prison
sentences followed guilty pleas. In 1896, with the laws in place, only
fourteen percent did so. These figures go some distance toward explaining
the odd retreat in the overall rate of guilty pleas that I found in 1896.748 Yet
by 1900, the rate of guilty pleas not only had recovered, but had advanced a
good distance. Eighty-one percent of state-prison sentences that, year
followed guilty pleas. Something must have changed.
The change appears in the statute book. In 1898, three years after the
legislature had required judges to specify minimum and maximum terms to
the state prison, it amended the parole law to provide that state-prison
inmates "shall be entitled to release from said prison upon the expiration of
the minimum term" if they have observed all prison rules and were not
punished for prison misconduct.749 For any state-prison inmate who
behaved behind bars, the judge's sentence now dictated the exact date of
release. Notwithstanding the claimed indeterminacy of sentences to the
Massachusetts state prison, parties engaged in plea negotiations therefore
could predict the date of release with near certainty. My search has
uncovered no evidence of the legislature's motives in changing the law, but
the results of the change were both predictable and immediate: With all the
indeterminacy boiled out of the state-prison sentencing scheme, plea
bargaining returned and advanced apace.
746. Even in absolute terms, the number of convicts sent to the state prison fell sharply
between 1890 and 1900. For both 1890 and 1896, I studied only one term of court (of three). In
the February 1890 term, the Middlesex Superior Court handed down 16 state-prison sentences. In
October 1896, it imposed only seven. There were 16 such sentences in all of 1900 and 19 in all of
1910.
747. See RuGG IEs-BRIsE, supra note 559, at 16; Lindsey, supra note 560. at 36.
748. See supra Figure 4.
749. Act of Apr. 25, 1898, ch. 371. 1898 Mass. Acts 312, 312.
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Evidence from many other states reveals a similar aversion to any
parole scheme that approached true indeterminacy. Like Massachusetts,
New Hampshire required automatic release at the end of the minimum term
for prisoners who had not misbehaved behind bars.75 Pennsylvania's parole
statute did not directly require release at the end of the minimum term, but
by commanding the relevant authorities to explain any decision not to
release "in writing... in detail," the law probably achieved the same
result."' In other states, even absent such statutory commands, decisions of
parole boards became very easy to predict. In New York in 1906, Arthur
Train reported that a convict sent to Elmira to serve a supposedly
indeterminate sentence "will be released in fourteen months if his conduct
appears to warrant it" 75 -a figure he repeated a few pages later. 53 The
Prison Association of New York claimed in 1916 that more than ninety
percent of parolees in that state won parole either immediately upon
completing their minimum term or within one month afterward.754 Next
door in New Jersey, a report of the following year put the point more
directly:
In actual practice parole is granted as a matter of course at the
expiration of the minimum term, except in those cases in which the
applicant has had his minimum term extended as a penalty for
misconduct in prison....
Thus, in all the state institutions[] is the aim of the
indeterminate sentence defeated by the policy of the paroling
authority.755
In 1937, the Harvard Law Review complained in general terms that "[t]he
correctional benefits which should result from imprisonment under an
indeterminate sentence have often been lost by the mechanical application
of parole." '756 And a modern scholar has concluded that "release at the
earliest possible date was [in these early years] a right rather than a
privilege." 757
The significance of such predictability is clear: "Indeterminate"
sentences would have posed no great obstacle to plea bargaining if
negotiating parties could say with confidence when such sentences would
750. See Act of Apr. 6, 1909, ch. 120, § 2, 1909 N.H. Laws 460, 460.
751. Act of June 19, 1911, § 11, 1911 Pa. Laws 1055, 1058.
752. TRAIN, supra note 199, at 165.
753. See id. at 179 (noting that at Elmira, a convict "may reasonably expect to be discharged
in fourteen months").
754. See PRISON ASS'N OF N.Y., SEVENTY-SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRISON
ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK: PRISON PROGRESS IN 1916, at 79 (1916).
755. 1 STATE OF N.J., REPORT OF THE PRISON INQUIRY COMMISSION 62-63 (1917).
756. Legislation-Indetenninate Sentencing Laws-The Adolescence of Penocorrectional
Legislation, supra note 730, at 683.
757. NEWMAN, supra note 387, at 37.
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end." 8 In fact, in an odd way, a parole system that embraced automatic
release dates might have been the best of all possible worlds for plea
bargaining: Such a scheme permitted the parties to agree upon a sentence
that sounded long enough to satisfy the public's desire for harsh
punishment, but in reality was short enough to entice the defendant to
plead."9
Still, it is not clear why parole boards should so quickly have
abandoned the principles of parole and adopted a practice of nearly
automatic release dates. Sheer overwork must have played a part: A New
York review committee found that during a twelve-month period in 1917
and 1918, the state's parole board met forty times to consider 1411 parole
applications-or about thirty-five applications per day.7" At a quarter-hour
per case, the board could hardly make an intelligent individualized
judgment about each prisoner's fitness for parole. Parole boards in
Massachusetts and Illinois and probably many other places faced similarly
overwhelming dockets. T6 Perhaps such boards felt that the only fair
758. As one observer wrote in 1925, "If prison and parole authorities tend to regard an
indeterminate sentence with maximum and minimum expressed as practically equivalent to a
definite sentence for the minimum period, it is not surprising that the prisoner should take it that
way." Lindsey, supra note 560, at 77.
During my time as an assistant district attorney in Middlesex County between 1987 and
1991, all parties understood that the defendant's release at the earliest eligibility date was a near
certainty. A typical part of the plea-negotiation process was therefore to calculate that date--often
a difficult process given the various complicated and overlapping parole statutes. I recall one
bargaining session that took place among the lawyers and the judge in the judge's chambers
during which the judge phoned an official of the parole board to confirm our understanding of the
defendant's first eligibility date if a contemplated sentence was imposed. Our doubts settled, the
case quickly pled out. Cf Alschuler, supra note 137, at 108-09 (citing 1960s trial lawyers who
explained that predictable release on the earliest parole-eligibility date facilitated plea bargaining).
759. In Massachusetts, before the "truth-in-sentencing" reform movement of the early 1990s,
the disparity between a sentence's "face value" and its true meaning often was enormous. The
most extreme examples were sentences to the reformatory at Concord, which remains in operation
today. What was then known as a "Concord 20" -a sentence officially expressed as "twenty
years' confinement, to be served at the Massachusetts reformatory at Concord"-provided for
parole eligibility and almost certain release after two years. MASS. REGs. CODE tit. 120, § 202.01,
at 27 (1990); cf. Alschuler, supra note 137, at 109 (citing a trial lawyer who explained the
advantages of a parole system in which lenient sentences appeared harsh to the public).
760. See REPORT OF THE PRISON SURVEY COMMITrEE 248 (1920). The committee concluded
that "[there is obviously a defect in the system of reporting to this board adequately the conduct
and working history of these inmates, or it would be impossible for any such number of
applications to be heard in any such time." Id.
761. In Massachusetts in the early 1920s, it was "impossible" for the two full-time members
and one part-time member of the state's parole board "to make a careful personal investigation
into the merits of each prisoner's claim to parole." Sam B. Warner, Factors Determining Parole
from the Massachusetts Reformatory, 14 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 172. 174 n.l (1923-1924).
In Illinois, between 1917 and 1927, four persons reviewed every parole case in the state. " It
soon became apparent that [they] were unable to hear enough cases to unburden the prisons of
their congestion, even through the parole of such prisoners who were good parole prospects....
mhose who were paroled were little short of having been 'guessed out' of prison." Albert J.
Harno, The Workings of the Parole Board and Its Relation to the Court, in THE WORKINGS OF
THE INDETERMINATE-SENTENCE LAW AND THE PAROLE SYSTEM IN ILLINOIS 67, 67 (photo.
reprint 1979) (1928).
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alternative in the circumstances was to adopt a rigidly defined early release
date. Or perhaps prison overcrowding demanded release at the earliest
eligibility date. In either case, we see at work the same impulse toward
efficiency that helped power the plea-bargaining system.
Judges did not depend entirely on early release dates and the
cooperation of parole boards to maintain the determinacy of supposedly
indeterminate sentences. In Massachusetts, after the 1898 law change
ensured release at the end of the minimum term for prisoners who did not
misbehave in prison, judges attempted to keep control of the release dates
even of those inmates who broke prison rules and had to serve out their
maximum terms. In 1900, the average state-prison sentence in Middlesex
County called for a minimum term of four years and a maximum term of
5.2 years. The judges therefore rejected the advice of Warren Spalding, an
advocate of the indeterminate sentence and a former secretary to the state
board of prison commissioners, who wrote in 1895 that to accomplish the
goals of the indeterminate sentence, judges should leave a margin of at least
three years between the minimum and maximum terms of short state-prison
sentences and a margin of at least five years in longer sentences.76 By
compressing the gap between minimums and maximums, judges deprived
the parole board of almost all discretion in setting release dates. In 1910,
Middlesex judges approached closer to Spalding's target and imposed an
average state-prison sentence of 5.8 to 8.2 years. Still, commentators in
Massachusetts and elsewhere continued to press demands that judges not
squeeze all the indeterminacy out of minimum/maximum sentencing
schemes.7 63 As the Harvard Law Review wrote in 1937, " [Tihe history of
indeterminate sentence legislation is not without attempts by judges to
762. See WARREN F. SPALDING, INDETERMINATE SENTENCES FOR PENITENTIARY
PRISONERS: A PAPER PREPARED FOR THE NATIONAL PRISON CONGRESS 1895, at 10 (n.p. 1895).
Spalding wrote:
The court will undoubtedly consider the two purposes which led to the establishment of
this form of sentence, viz., the effect on the convict in prison, and the effect upon him
after he is discharged. The maximum should be enough longer than the minimum to
induce the prisoner to make a hard struggle for his liberty. The pressure of the
reformatory system cannot be brought to bear upon him, successfully, unless he has this
inducement. There should certainly be a margin of three years upon the shorter
sentences, and of five years on the longer ones, to enable the administration to make a
successful appeal to the prisoner for his co-operation.
Id.; see also Conlon's Case, 148 Mass. 168, 169 (1889) (identifying Spalding as secretary of the
Board of Commissioners of Prisons).
763. See, e.g., HARRY ELMER BARNES, THE EVOLUTION OF PENOLOGY IN PENNSYLVANIA
322-23 (1927) (advocating more broadly spaced minimum and maximum sentences in
Pennsylvania); Winthrop D. Lane, A New Day Opens for Parole, 24 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
88, 107 (1933) (presenting the view of a New Jersey parole director that "[s]entences should be
indeterminate... [with] real differences between the minimum and maximum"); see also
WILCOX, supra note 563, at 18 (noting that "[alt times the spread between the maximum and
minimum limits of the sentence imposed is so small that boards of parole are given little
discretion with regard to the time at which prisoners may be released" -though at other times, the
spread was sufficiently generous).
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defeat the purpose of these acts by fixing the minimum term at slightly less
than the maximum." 7 Several states in fact legislated specifically against
this judicial avoidance tactic.765
It is of course possible that judges resisted the indeterminacy of the new
sentencing schemes merely because they resented the legislature's invasion
of their sentencing power.? Plea bargaining perhaps benefited, therefore,
from the fortuity that judges' pride happened to prefer a more definite
sentencing structure. And for that matter, it is possible that the nation's
parole boards regularly released inmates at their earliest eligibility date only
because it was efficient to do so and not because such predictable practices
facilitated plea bargaining. It is possible, in other words, that the link
between plea bargaining and the downfall of the indeterminate sentence is
causal only in the sense that both served the interests of judges and both
served the interests of efficiency. Other evidence, however, suggests a more
direct and purposive connection between plea bargaining and the receding
ideal of the indeterminate sentence.
We begin to see a glimmer of such a causal link in a report on
the Massachusetts parole board written by Professor Sam Warner of
the Oregon Law School in the early 1920s.767 Warner focused on parole
from the Massachusetts reformatory.76 As we have seen, sentences to the
reformatory came rather close to true indeterminate sentences.' Judges
imposed no minimum or maximum term, and hence no law required release
upon expiration of the minimum term. Warner found that in the exercise of
its very broad discretion to set the date of release, the parole board gave a
clear if modest preference to those convicts who had pled guilty rather than
go to trial. Although about eighty percent of those granted parole had pled
764. Legislation-Indeterminate Sentencing Laws-The Adolescence of Penocorrectional
Legislation, supra note 730, at 681; see also EDWIN H. SuTHERLAND, PRINCIPLES OF
CRIMINOLOGY 482 (1934) ("When the court was given authority to fix limits within the limits
fixed by the legislature some judges who were opposed to indeterminate sentences abused their
authority by making the minimum almost identical with the maximun").
765. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 9, 1911, ch. 200, § 1, 1911 Idaho Sess. Laws 664, 664 (providing
that minimum term shall not exceed one-half of the statutory maximum term); Act of June 7,
1905, ch. 184, § 2, 1905 Mich. Acts 268, 268 (providing that the minimum term shall not exceed
one-half of the statutory maximum term); Act of Feb. 10, 1917, ch. 16, § I, 1917 Mont. Laws 16,
16 (providing that the minimum term shall not exceed one-half of the maximum imposed); Act of
Apr. 21, 1911, ch. 191, § 2, 1911 NJ. Laws 356, 356 (providing that the minimum term shall not
exceed one-half of the statutory maximum term); Act of May 4, 1909, ch. 282, § 1. 1909 N.Y.
Laws 511, 512 (providing that the minimum term shall not exceed one-half of the maximum
imposed); Act of June 29, 1923, ch. 397, § 6, 1923 Pa. Laws 975, 976 (providing that the
minimum term shall not exceed one-half of the maximum imposed).
766. Friedman and Percival report that Alameda County judges imposed longer prison terms
after the legislature enacted a good-time law and a parole law. The judges apparently wanted to
keep sentences at their old length. See FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra note 135, at 215-16.
767. The Massachusetts Department of Correction commissioned the study. See Sanford
Bates, Preface to Warner, supra note 761, at 172.
768. See id. at174 & n.l.
769. See supra note 733 and accompanying text.
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guilty, only sixty-seven percent of those not granted parole had done SO.770
These numbers suggest that one reward for pleading guilty may have been a
readier release on parole.
A far stronger causal link between plea bargaining and early release on
parole emerges from a 1928 report on the Illinois parole system written by
Dean Albert J. Harno of the University of Illinois Law School.77 ' Harno and
fellow members of a review committee "found that occasionally serious
problems arise between the [Parole] Board and the state's attorney and even
the trial judge over representations made to a prisoner when his plea of
guilty is secured."772 Harno condemned the practice of making "a promise
to the [defendant] or [giving] an intimation to him that if he pleads guilty he
will be released, or is likely to be released, after a specified period of
confinement., 73 Harno quoted one prosecutor who frankly wrote the
superintendent of the state's reformatory in reference to three young
inmates:
Prior to sentence Judge... and I agreed that on a plea of guilty we
would recommend parole on the minimum time, providing, of
course, that the boys, or any one or more of them, had conducted
themselves in a manner to warrant parole.7
Other letters to the parole board followed-from the judge, defense
counsel, police chief, and (again) the prosecutor-all relating or suggesting
the same deal.775 One defense lawyer noted that the judge and prosecutor
"advised me they had never known of any case wherein the Parole Board
had disregarded a joint recommendation from the State's Attorney and the
Presiding Judge." 7 6 He added that "the State of Illinois will do these boys
a great injustice if they do not admit them to parole now."777 Another
lawyer on the same case wrote that "the State should in good faith try to
carry out that to which the State's Attorney and the Trial Judge pledged
them in so far as they had the power to pledge them." '778 Although Harno's
study did not extend beyond Illinois, and although I have found no clear
evidence of "parole bargaining" in Massachusetts or other states, I suspect
nonetheless that the practice was widespread. After all, by the time of
770. See Bates, supra note 761, at 202. Warner did not provide the statistic that would have
been most useful for my purposes: the proportion of those who pled guilty (versus those who lost
at trial) who won parole. See id.
771. See Harno, supra note 761.
772. Id. at 89.
773. Id.
774. Id. (quoting a letter without attribution by name).
775. See id. at 89-90.
776. Id. at 90 (quoting an unnamed lawyer).
777. Id.
778. Id. (quoting an unnamed lawyer).
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Hamo's report, guilty-plea rates in the vast majority of American cities
exceeded seventy percent and almost every state had a parole law."
There is one last piece of evidence-this one of a more modem
vintage-that suggests that the indeterminate sentence's demise may have
proceeded directly from judges' and prosecutors' determination to
persevere in plea bargaining. Around the turn of the twentieth century, at
least six states, including California, adopted parole laws that approached
close enough to a true indeterminate-sentencing scheme to raise a genuine
challenge to the vitality of plea bargaining. In a certain range of cases, these
statutes deprived the judge of all power to measure the term of confinement
to state prison.7"' Instead, when a judge sent a convict to state prison, the
parole board unilaterally set the date of release, constrained only by the
minimum and maximum terms imposed by law. Such a regime raised
obvious obstacles to any plea-bargaining scheme: Not only did it leave
judges powerless to promise a particular release date to defendants who
pled guilty, but it also disabled them from imposing a certain and harsher
penalty on defendants who risked trial and lost. That is, even to the extent
that judges or prosecutors could have persuaded parole authorities to release
convicts who pled guilty at their earliest eligibility dates-an action that
might have suited the boards' interests in avoiding prison overcrowding or
in developing an easy rule of thumb for the treatment of most prisoners-it
might have been far more difficult to persuade those same boards to
penalize those convicts who did not plead guilty by keeping them beyond
their first release dates. In contrast, under a typical parole system, judges
could punish recalcitrant defendants who burdened the court with a trial by
imposing harsh minimum terms that, even when reduced by the amount the
parole law permitted, still penalized defendants for their poor choices.
Despite these obstacles, California judges, prosecutors, and defense
lawyers adapted their plea-bargaining tactics to this regime too-and in
ways that once again frustrated the goals of the indeterminate sentence.
Lynn Mather's study of the operations of the Los Angeles County courts in
the early 1970s shows that by that time, only six percent of accused felons
ultimately convicted of a crime ever went to state prison. Instead, the vast
majority of convicts originally charged with felonies secured a mere
misdemeanor conviction and either received probation or served time in a
779. In Moley's sampling of 24 American urban jurisdictions, all but three had guilty-plea
rates of 70% or more. See Moley, supra note 47, at 105. Edward Lindsey reported that in 1922, 44
states had some form of parole law. See Lindsey, supra note 560, at 69.
780. See Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 527, § 1, 1917 Cal. Stat. 665, 665-66; Act of June 28,
1919, § 3, 1919 111. Laws 436,437; Act of Mar. 15, 1897, ch. 143. §§ 1.3. 5, 1897 Ind. Laws 219,
219-221; Act of Mar. 13, 1903, ch. 375, § 1, 1903 Kan. Sess. Laws 571. 571-75; Act of Mar. 3,
1911, ch. 169, § 1, 1911 S.D. Laws 209, 209; Act of Feb. 11, 1903, ch. 45, §46, 1903 W. Va.
Acts 138, 149-50.
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lesser institution, or both."' The most important axis along which plea
bargaining took place became the distinction between a state-prison term
and no state-prison term. Mather reports that when the charged offense
called for mandatory state-prison time, plea bargaining often took the form
of prosecutorial charge bargaining, for without a prosecutor's motion, the
judge could not reduce the charge to one that permitted a lesser penalty.7"2
But when the judge had the discretion to choose between imposing and not
imposing state-prison time, plea bargaining tended to take place directly
between the judge and defense counsel by a process known as
"chamberizing": The judge and lawyers would meet in the judge's
chambers, where the judge could spell out or hint at the sentence she would
impose should the defendant plead guilty.783
Albert Alschuler reports another means of evading the California parole
authorities' power to dictate the length of sentence. In the 1960s, when
Alschuler observed court business in San Francisco, defendants often pled
guilty and were then sentenced to an indeterminate term in state prison.
Instead of putting that sentence into effect, however, the judge would
suspend it and impose probation during the term of suspension. Then, as a
condition of probation, the judge would impose a county-jail term."' By
judicial sleight of hand, a seemingly illegal jail term took the place of a
seemingly mandatory state-prison term-and all in accord with the law.
Thanks to such ingenious devices, by the time California officially
abandoned its experiment with the indeterminate sentence in 1976,785 there
was very little indeterminacy left.
This brief sketch of the indeterminate sentence's slide from prominence
suggests that several different causal strands may have tied plea
bargaining's continued rise to the indeterminate sentence's demise. Judges,
prosecutors, and defense lawyers, first of all, may have evaded the
indeterminacy imposed by the new laws by bargaining for definite
sentences at certain institutions rather than indefinite sentences at others.
Second, some state legislatures acted to require or encourage release on
parole at the earliest opportunity and thus restored the predictability that
plea bargaining needed to thrive. Third, judges may have erased the
781. See MATHER, supra note 489, at 5, 28, 30.
782. See id. at 30. Mather reports a toothless policy put in place by the district attorney in
1974, purportedly to limit plea bargaining:
Interestingly, in the one exception allowed by the new policy, district attorneys could
still agree (with prior written approval from their superior) to a sentence bargain of "no
state prison." This particular sentence commitment... was crucial in "serious" cases
and was one of the most common bargains before the policy change.
Id. at 153 n.4.
783. See id. at 31-33.
784. See Alschuler, supra note 137, at 101-03 & n.126.
785. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1168(a)(1) (Legal Book Corp. 1976), repealed by Act of Sept.
20, 1976, ch. 1139, § 272.5, 1976 Cal. Stat. 5140.
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indeterminacy from minimum and maximum sentences by setting the
minimum term close to the maximum and thereby contriving predictable
sentences that could lure defendants into pleading guilty. Fourth, parole
officials may have rewarded those convicts who pled guilty with earlier
release dates and hence may have created a direct incentive for defendants
to strike plea bargains. Fifth, some judges and prosecutors appealed to
parole authorities to stand by promises made in the course of plea
negotiations that the defendant would walk free on a certain date. Finally, a
single cause-overcrowding in the criminal justice system-may have
promoted both the efficiency of plea bargaining and the nearly automatic
decisions of some parole boards to release convicts at their earliest
eligibility date, a practice that in turn facilitated plea bargaining by making
release dates more predictable. This multiplicity of mechanisms, each
supported by evidence from separate sources, makes it highly unlikely that
the historical correlation between plea bargaining's rise and the
indeterminate sentence's fall was simple coincidence. By various devices,
those forces that impelled plea bargaining's progress also compelled that
the indeterminate sentence make way.
2. Public Defenders
Moving from the indeterminate sentence to public defenders, we
change focus from an institution that threatened plea bargaining and was
defeated by it to an institution that fostered plea bargaining and was
fostered by it. At the moment of their founding, public defenders' offices
and other organizations for the defense of the poor owed a direct debt to
plea bargaining: The advocates who promoted these institutions in the early
decades of the twentieth century staked their case in part on the claim that
public defenders would be good for plea bargaining and therefore good for
the justice system. Whether these advocates indeed believed or hoped that
public defenders would encourage more guilty pleas is not so clear-it is
clear only that they perceived a strategic advantage in claiming that this
result would follow. They therefore borrowed from plea bargaining's
prestige in the echelons of legal power to promote the cause of their pet
reform. That the institutions that resulted in fact have helped plea
bargaining consolidate its position may not have been the reformers' intent,
but it was the nearly inevitable result of their actions.
Not all early advocates claimed that public defenders would facilitate
guilty pleas,786 but one of the most prominent did so frankly. In 1915 Mayer
Goldman saw his proposals for a public defender fail before the New York
786. See infra notes 803-808 and accompanying text.
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legislature.7 7 In a defense of his bills published two years later, 788 Goldman
seemed at first to promise that under a public defender system, there would
be fewer guilty pleas. He complained that the lawyers who were assigned to
represent indigent defendants under the system that then prevailed in New
York persuaded even their innocent clients to plead guilty,789 and he
claimed the public defender system would "minimize[]" guilty pleas.79 In
several passages in his short book, however, Goldman made it clear that he
wished to minimize guilty pleas only by innocents, and that his proposed
public defender would strive to secure guilty pleas from the guilty:
His function would not be to defeat justice-but to promote it. He
should co-operate with the district attorney, whenever not
inconsistent with his duty to his client, and wherever possible, in
order to bring about an ideal administration of the law. His duty
should be to protect the innocent-not to acquit the guilty. He
should see that the guilty is fairly punished-not over-punished.79'
"The law would not require nor expect a public defender to endeavor to
acquit a guilty person," Goldman continued later, "any more than that the
prosecutor is expected to convict an innocent person." 792 To corroborate his
view of the public defender's role, Goldman quoted a New York judge who
predicted that
[i]f the public defender's office were well and honestly conducted,
I think... that a large number of perjured defenses would be
eliminated and honest defenses or pleas of guilty substituted which
787. See MAYER C. GOLDMAN, THE PUBLIC DEFENDER: A NECESSARY FACTOR IN THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE at vii-viii (1917).
788. See id.
789. [A]ssigned counsel, whose retained clients are his chief concern, easily convinces
himself that he has done his duty to his pauper client if the prosecutor will accept a
plea of guilty to a lesser form of crime or be content to recommend a moderate
sentence.... That such a system results in innocent men being branded and punished
as criminals admits of no doubt.
Id. at 21-22 (quoting from an address of Samuel Untermeyer); see also id. at 70 ("How many
innocent men have pleaded 'guilty' at the suggestion of assigned counsel, because of the latter's
indifference or desire to escape the burden of trial, it is impossible to state; their number must be
legion."); REGINALD HEBER SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR 114 (1924) ("If not paid, [the
professional assigned counsel] is perfectly willing to betray his client by neglecting the case, or
forcing him to plead guilty, or deserting him altogether.").
790. GOLDMAN, supra note 787, at 35, 49.
791. Id. at 8.
792. Id. at 40. Goldman repeated this view at least twice more. See id. at 45-46 ("The
indigent defendant, who is innocent, would be the only one really benefited by the services of the
public defender-except that the guilty would be saved from over-punishment."); id. at 67 ("A
district attorney is not expected to, nor should he, prosecute a person whom he knows or believes
to be innocent. Why, therefore, should a public defender be criticized for a failure to defend one
whom he believes to be guilty?").
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would not only be conducive to good public morals but would save
much time and labor in the courts and would reduce the calendar 93
Perhaps taking their cue from Goldman's advocacy, the nation's
fledgling public defenders declared it to be their goal to win guilty pleas
from guilty clients. In a 1918 report, the Los Angeles public defender took
unabashed pride in his office's pursuit of efficient and truthful outcomes:
We have not felt that it was our duty to oppose the district attorney,
but rather to cooperate with him in setting all the facts before the
courts.... Our office has tried to keep uppermost the idea that
justice should be done and even in criminal cases attorneys should
not try to get the defendants "off' regardless of the merits. We
have not asked for unnecessary delays and have not resorted to
technicalities.... In cases where there is no question of the guilt of
the accused, it is the established rule of the office that no trials
should be held but that pleas of guilty be entered, thereby saving
the county the expense and delay of trials.7 9
In New York, the Voluntary Defenders' Committee795 announced in its
1917 prospectus that " [w]hen a voluntary defender finds that he has a
guilty man on his hands he will not set out to acquit him." 79 Rather, "[t]he
first essential step towards improvement is a confession of guilt." ' A few
years later, the Committee added that "counsel's duty does not require that
the state be compelled to prove the guilt of a defendant confessedly
guilty." 
7 98 And in Omaha, the newly established public defender likewise
emphasized his attitude of cooperation and not confrontation with the
district attorney: "The examination by the county attorney and public
defender in all alleged crimes, results in many judgments by the court
793. Id. at 41 (quoting Judge Charles C. Nott). It is possible that Judge Nott was a former
prosecutor, which perhaps would make his views on the proper role of the public defender
somewhat suspect. See TRAIN, supra note 199, at 155 n.* (identifying Charles Cooper Nott. Jr. as
a New York prosecutor as of 1905).
794. Walton J. Wood, The Annual Report of the Los Angeles County Public Defender, 9 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 289, 289-90 (1918) (emphasis added).
795. The Voluntary Defenders' Committee was founded in 1917 and soon became part of the
Legal Aid Society of New York, a private organization that provided legal services to the poor.
See Michael McConville & Chester L. Mirsky, Criminal Defense of the Poor in New York City, 15
N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 581, 614, 617-18 (1986-1987). New York did not introduce
public funding of criminal lawyers for the poor until 195 1. See id. at 633.
796. Notes and Abstracts: The Voluntary Defenders Committee, 8 J. CR5I. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 278,282 (1917-1918).
797. Id.
798. LEGAL AID Soc'Y, 45TH ANNUAL REPORT, VOLUNTARY DEFENDERS' CoMMTrEE 69
(1920).
2000] 1059
The Yale Law Journal
satisfactory to both the state and the accused, thus saving Douglas County
considerable sums that would otherwise be expended in useless trials." '
The Omaha defender's claim of cost efficiency, echoed by both the Los
Angeles and New York defenders," ° raises suspicions that these various
declarations by fledgling defenders were more public-relations gestures
than expressions of honestly held views. After all, defenders' offices relied
on public or donated funds to provide a service often seen as subversive of
effective law enforcement. Just as claims of cost efficiency went far to win
public acceptance, so too perhaps did eager denials of hopes to gain
freedom for the guilty. It is not easy at this distance to disentangle the
beliefs of early public defenders and their sponsors from their rhetoric.
After reviewing the many studies and commentaries that accompanied the
rise of New York's Voluntary Defenders' Committee, Michael McConville
and Chester Mirsky emerged convinced that these declarations were
genuine: "The primary goals of the indigent defense system have been and
remain to make the criminal law a more effective means for securing social
control at minimal expense"-a goal achieved by "minimiz[ing]
adversarial advocacy, and therefore the cost of criminal defense, by
compelling guilty pleas and by other non-trial dispositions.""0 '
I am less sure. In the heated atmosphere of the early days of the public-
defender movement, as state legislatures and private bar associations balked
at the expense of these new organizations and fretted about their potential to
empower the guilty poor,8 °2 disavowals of zealous advocacy made too much
strategic sense to be taken at face value. It is worth noting that one of the
more temperate and establishment-bound of the early backers of the public
defender system, Reginald Heber Smith of the Boston law firm Hale and
Dorr,s°3 made it plain that he believed even confessedly guilty clients
799. GOLDMAN, supra note 787, at 53 (quoting an Omaha public defender). Albert Alschuler
reports a strikingly similar boast by a more modem public defender. See Albert W. Alschuler, The
Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1207 (1975) (quoting a
California public defender's claims in 1969 that the establishment of his office cut the rate of
felony trials in his county by almost half and that the court's presiding judge praised his program
as "materially assist[ing] the court in the administration of justice ... at considerable savings to
the taxpayers of Santa Clara County").
800. See LEGAL AID Soc'Y, 51ST ANNUAL REPORT, VOLUNTARY DEFENDERS' COMMIITEE
64 (1926) (" If the Committee had not been so successful in arriving at dispositions without trials.
it might have been necessary to try several hundred cases, at an enormous expense to the
community."); Walton J. Wood, Necessity for Public Defender Established by Statistics, 7 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 230 (1916-1917) (arguing that because the public defender raises
fewer technical obstacles than private counsel, trials are quicker and therefore cheaper).
801. McConville & Mirsky, supra note 795, at 877; see also id. at 631 (stating similar
conclusions). Though I disagree with some of their analysis, I am grateful to McConville and
Mirsky for leading the way through the voluminous materials documenting the rise of the New
York Voluntary Defenders' Committee.
802. See Foltz, supra note 441, at 401 & n.2.
803. See McConville & Mirsky, supra note 795, at 596.
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should have a trial and a defense if they wanted one.' And although Smith
reported with no apparent disapproval the success of public defenders in
persuading their guilty clients to plead guilty,'s he did not hail the promise
of increased guilty pleas as a reason to embrace the new institutions. Clara
Foltz, an earlier and more radical advocate of the public defender, avoided
even the pretense of promising that a good defender would encourage guilty
pleas. Instead she lamented that defendants without counsel and those
represented by inadequate assigned counsel had little choice but to plead
guilty6--and she insisted that "one-half of those arrested and charged with
crime are actually innocent, and in the eyes of the law all of them are so."'
But Foltz's words, written in 1897, moved no legislature to establish a
public defender. By the second decade of the next century, when Goldman
wrote his defense and the first cautious legislatures dared take up the
experiment,0s8 supporters had grown savvier and now promised cost
efficiency and ready plea bargaining. It is perhaps a bit of a paradox that
this new advocacy frankly recognized the importance of plea bargaining,
which the exposes of the next decade pretended to reveal to the world.
Apparently, while the world was waiting for a series of law professors to
discover the prevalence of plea bargaining," those lawyers and other
804. See SMITH, supra note 789, at 121 (" It is the strongly prevailing present opinion of the
bar that [when a client who has confessed guilt to her lawyer refuses to plead guiltyl it is the
lawyer's duty to defend.... requiring the state to prove fairly the truth of its charges.").
805. See id. (noting that "[i]n practice this issue [of defending the guilty at triall has not
presented itself' because "[in New York, all defendants who have admitted guilt have been
persuaded to be honest with the court and plead guilty" (citations omitted)); id. at 119 (reporting
that the Los Angeles public defender "instructs more of his clients to plead guilty than did
assigned counsel under the former rdgime, and ... tries only cases where he has faith in the
defendant").
806. Innumerable innocent boys and girls and men and women are recorded as pleading
guilty and railroaded into jail because too dazed to understand their rights and legal
position. Hundreds of men and women plead guilty because advised to do so by some
court or police officer and fear makes them obey. Others plead guilty and suffer
punishment by fine because it is cheaper than counsel and they can better stand the
disgrace than the money loss ....
[Assigned lawyers] are often caught up without a moment's notice and
compelled to go to trial without adequate time to prepare on the law or to secure
testimony. The defense is almost of necessity inadequate, and about the wisest course
for a pauper prisoner caught in the mesh of misunderstanding or circumstantial
evidence is to plead guilty, earn consideration by "saving the county expense," and
throw himself on the "mercy of the court."
Foltz, supra note 441, at 393, 399 (footnote omitted).
807. Id. at 402 (footnote omitted).
808. Goldman reported that Oklahoma established the nation's first public defender in 1912,
but that the first of the sort he envisioned took office in Los Angeles in 1914. See GOLDMAN,
supra note 787, at 81-82.
809. The four authors and editors of the threc most prominent studies of the 1920s all were
law professors-Roscoe Pound and Felix Frankfurter at Harvard, see CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN
CLEVELAND (Roscoe Pound & Felix Frankfurter eds.) (1922), Raymond Moley at Columbia. see
Moley, supra note 47, at 97, and Justin Miller at the University of Southern California, see
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officials who were more familiar with the day-to-day work of the courts
already understood how useful it could be to claim that the public defender
would spread plea bargaining even further.
Having come into being on a promise, however strategically and
insincerely made, that they would facilitate plea bargaining, public
defenders apparently proceeded to do just that. Figures comparing the work
of early public defenders with that of other criminal lawyers are rare, but
they do exist for Los Angeles in 1913-1914. The public defender reported
that his office resolved seventy percent of its cases by guilty plea-as
opposed to sixty-two percent for private counsel assigned to represent
indigent defendants and a mere forty-nine percent for paid lawyers.8"' A
few years later, both the Los Angeles public defender and the New York
Voluntary Defenders' Committee claimed they had persuaded every client
who confessed guilt to counsel to do so in court."'1 A 1923 report of the
New York committee disclosed that staff lawyers confronted clients with
evidence of their guilt to persuade them to plead guilty.812 That these offices
in fact promoted plea bargaining is not surprising given their promises to do
so. Whether public or charitable, institutional defenders had to report on
their operations and constantly justify their continued funding. Regular
boasts that high guilty-plea rates were yielding the promised cost savings-
the New York Voluntary Defenders' Committee made such claims almost
annually t3---constituted a centerpiece of their survival strategy.
But broader institutional pressures no doubt also played a role in
generating high guilty-plea rates. Because public defenders did all of their
lawyering within a single county before a limited set of judges and against a
fixed group of prosecutors, they were apt to be more concerned than more
mobile lawyers with earning and keeping the goodwill of those judges and
prosecutors. Their reasons were not necessarily selfish. If judges became
MILLER, supra note 274, at 1. Miller, it is true, formerly was a district attorney of Kings County,
California. See Miller, supra note 274, at 1.
810. See Wood, supra note 800, at 230.
811. See LEGAL AID SoC'Y, REPORT OF VOLUNTARY DEFENDERS' COMMITTEE 3 (1917):
William W. Clary, The Public Defender, 7 POMONA C. Q. MAG. 49,56 (1918).
812. The notable feature of our work is the large number of persons who plead
guilty .... These pleas are not always the immediate and open confession of guilt
which the figures might imply. We have often been compelled to make extensive
investigations into facts, which when revealed to our clients, have resulted in their
admissions of guilt.
LEGAL AID Soc'Y, 48TH ANNUAL REPORT, VOLUNTARY DEFENDERS' COMMITTEE 73 (1923).
813. See, e.g., LEGAL AID SOC'Y, supra note 800, at 64 ("If the Committee had not been so
successful in arriving at dispositions without trials, it might have been necessary to try several
hundred cases, at an enormous expense to the community."); LEGAL AID SOC'Y, 52D ANNUAL
REPORT, VOLUNTARY DEFENDERS' COMMITTEE 70 (1927) (reporting that 283 defendants pled
guilty in 1927 and claiming that "[b]y so doing they secured material advantages to themselves,
and the community was saved enormous expense"); LEGAL AID Soc'Y, 53D ANNUAL REPORT.
VOLUNTARY DEFENDERS' COMMITIrEE 83 (1928); LEGAL AID SOC'Y, 55TH ANNUAL REPORT.
VOLUNTARY DEFENDERS' COMMITTEE 66 (1930).
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disaffected with the public defenders and refused to appoint them to
represent indigent defendants, then clients would suffer as well as lawyers.
And good relations with the district attorney could be good for the clientele.
An early official of the New York Voluntary Defenders' Committee wrote
in 1928 that when a defender's client was innocent, the lawyer would lay
the evidence of innocence before the district attorney, who would
"recommend to the Court the immediate dismissal of the charge.""" The
claim implied that the credibility that defenders gained by advising their
guilty clients to plead guilty proved useful when they advocated on behalf
of the innocent. The reports of public defenders consequently brag in a
decidedly non-adversarial way about how their high guilty-plea rates won
praise and cooperation from their courtroom counterparts."'
Beyond securing the support of their financial sponsors and the
approval of prosecutors and judges, defenders had a more selfish interest in
seeing their clients plead guilty: They were overworked." 6 Unlike private
lawyers who earn more when they work more and can adjust their
workloads to their needs, public defenders have only limited power to
moderate their labors." 7 They are in fact in nearly the same position as
prosecutors and judges, whose ranks only the legislature can expand,
though the legislature shares none of their workload and faces instead only
the constant pressure to cut costs. The imperative of efficiency that moved
both prosecutors and judges to embrace plea bargaining therefore now
works to ensure that a large proportion of the defense bar shares in the same
cause.
C. Principles of Procedural Change
If plea bargaining's symbiotic relationships with probation and public
defenders and its unhappy encounter with the indeterminate sentence
had been three disconnected stories, then we would have a trilogy of
evolutionary tales but no theory of evolution. I believe, though, that a fairly
simple evolutionary thread runs through these stories. To find it, we should
814. William Dean Embree, The Voluntary Defenders, 28 LEGAL AtD REv. 1. 4 (1928).
815. See LEGAL AID Soc'Y, supra note 798, at 69 (reporting that the committee's policy of
refusing to take cases to trial of defendants who admitted their guilt "had the approval of judges
in the Court of General Sessions"); see also Louis Fabricant, The Voluntary Defender in Criminal
Cases, 124 ANNALS 74, 77 (1926) ("We never try to dodge the facts of a case. Pleas of guilty are
not withheld where the facts given us by our clients warrant such a plea. Confidence is thus
inspired both in the court and the prosecutor.").
816. See McConville & Mirsky, supra note 795, at 627 ("The first forty years of the
existence of the Defenders' Committee were marked by moderate increases in staff size and a
great expansion of its caseload.").
817. See, e.g., Cooper v. Fitzharris, 551 F.2d 1162, 1163 n.l (9th Cir. 1977) (recounting a
public defender's account of her collapse under the weight of 2000 cases per year in a case
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel), modified en banc, 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978).
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not focus on the ways these three institutions helped or hurt plea
bargaining. Those mechanisms were as different as the institutions
themselves. Hence probation aided plea bargaining both by offering a new
penalty for which minor offenders could bargain and by supplying an
officer who told the court about the crime and criminal, making it possible
to pass a well-informed sentence without trial. Public defenders helped plea
bargaining by funneling many defendants into an advocacy institution so
chronically overburdened that it had little recourse but to join prosecutors
and judges in a regular practice of plea bargaining. And the indeterminate
sentence endangered plea bargaining by threatening to deprive judges and
prosecutors of the power to promise fixed concessions that could tempt
defendants to plead guilty.
The theme that unites these three stories is not their impact on plea
bargaining, but rather plea bargaining's impact on them. In each case, two
fairly simple causal mechanisms ensured that those institutions that helped
plea bargaining would thrive and any that hurt it would wither. The first
was the sheer exercise of power by judges and prosecutors who stood
united in a common preference for bargains over trials. The second was the
pressure of business and the consequent imperative of efficiency, which
both impelled judges and prosecutors toward their common preference for
pleas and operated directly on other actors in the system to move them to
assist in plea bargaining's rise.
In the case of probation, we saw the first mechanism most clearly at
work. I argued in Parts II and III that during the second quarter of the
nineteenth century, when the practice of on-file plea bargaining took root,
part-time prosecutors felt enormous pressure to lighten their workloads.
Judges felt this pressure less keenly, however, and they had other objections
to plea bargaining as well, so prosecutors had to seek out plea-bargaining
methods that required no participation by the judge. The on-file technique
served this purpose by permitting prosecutors to promise a fixed
concession-that no sentence would be imposed unless the defendant again
broke the law-without any endorsement by the court. More versatile than
prosecutorial charge bargaining, which relied on the fortuity of a rigid
penalty scheme, on-file plea bargaining became more popular as the
century wore on. Eventually it won the favor of judges, who gradually took
it over. By the last quarter of the century, when the civil-caseload
revolution demanded that judges sharply limit their criminal workloads, the
on-file technique had become arguably the most important weapon in plea
bargaining's arsenal. In 1900, on-file plea bargains accounted for forty-one
percent of all case adjudications, and the number of defendants who insisted
on trial and still secured the favor of a filing approached zero. As this same
technique-putting cases on file and staying sentence unless the defendant
again misbehaved-eventually took the name probation, it is fair to say that
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prosecutors and judges fashioned probation as an instrument of plea
bargaining.
In the case of the public defender, both evolutionary mechanisms took
part in ensuring that this new friend of plea bargaining would find fortune.
The early-twentieth-century advocates of the public defender thought it
wise to claim that defenders would encourage guilty pleas. That claim was
sure to please the judges and prosecutors who sponsored plea bargaining,
and their good opinion no doubt influenced the legislatures and private
legal foundations that established the first public defenders. Once in place,
the new defenders found that staying in the judge's favor was essential to
survival because the judge dictated who would represent an indigent
defendant. Staying in the prosecutor's favor was important because the
prosecutor's cooperation could ensure the quick and certain release of
innocent clients. The wages of such favor, of course, were taking part in
plea bargaining and not contesting the guilt of the guilty. Though the ethics
of such devil's deals might have troubled some defenders, sheer overwork
perhaps eased their consciences. Here the second evolutionary
mechanism-the imperative of efficiency--came into play. Unable to
represent more than a fraction of their clients at trial, public defenders must
have felt justified in allocating scarce trials to those who seemed innocent
and in negotiating the best possible deals for the rest.
The case of the indeterminate sentence likewise revealed both
evolutionary mechanisms at work, though the first mechanism, in which
judges and prosecutors protected plea bargaining's viability by directly
discouraging the indeterminate sentence, operated most prominently. Many
judges spumed broad use of their new indeterminate-sentencing options. In
Middlesex County and elsewhere, they rarely imposed indeterminate
sentences to the state reformatory, made less use of the state prison once
sentences to that institution became less determinate, and contrived to
defeat the purpose of minimum/maximum sentencing laws by squeezing
out the gap between minimum and maximum terms. Occasionally, judges
or prosecutors compromised the parole process by promising parole release
on a certain date as part of a deal and then asking parole authorities to go
along. We see the second evolutionary mechanism at work in the decisions
of parole boards to avoid thousands of individualized decisions by adopting
automatic or nearly automatic release dates. Automatic release not only
eased the boards' workloads and helped relieve prison overcrowding, but
also restored enough certainty to the length of confinement to permit plea
bargaining to carry on.
In the end, though, the best evidence that plea bargaining has held
evolutionary sway over its sibling institutions of criminal justice may not be
our ability to spell out evolutionary principles that link the success of those
institutions to the interests of plea bargaining, but our inability to name a
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single important procedural innovation of the last 150 years that threatened
to choke off plea bargaining and flourished. I have considered already all of
the most prominent innovations in this period except the due process
revolution of the Warren Court. The Court's sweeping guarantees of a
variety of rights to the criminal accused, both time-consuming in
themselves and time-consuming to enforce, surely threatened the systemic
efficiency that plea bargaining served so well, but they did nothing to
threaten plea bargaining itself. Precisely because these rights added so
much time to the processes of trial and appeal," 8 advocates and judges had
even greater incentives to achieve compromise. And efficiency aside, the
due process revolution deepened the concerns that trial judges and
prosecutors had for the apparent legitimacy of their acts. Facing a trial
minefield littered with exploding error, they were even readier to bargain
than before." 9
Fortunately, the same new rights that created these incentives to plea
bargain also created the opportunity to do so, for every new right supplied a
new axis along which a bargain could be struck. By sacrificing the chance
of freedom promised by a sloppy search warrant, a defendant could win an
extra concession on a plea. 820 Fortunately, too, the Supreme Court
considered few of its newly guaranteed rights nonwaivable and declared
without embarrassment that the defendant could relinquish virtually all of
them in a plea bargain to escape the full force of the prosecutor's threatened
sentence. 2'
In only one, largely insignificant way has the due process revolution
cramped plea bargaining's progress. I argued in Part IV that the defendant-
testimony laws of the latter half of the nineteenth century, which gave
defendants the right to offer sworn evidence at trial, moved many of the
most accomplished criminals to plead guilty instead. Because juries would
regard the silence of a defendant who had the right to speak as a sign of
guilt, and because prosecutors could impeach those who spoke with
818. Albert Alschuler speculates that the due process revolution contributed to greater trial
lengths. In Los Angeles, the average felony trial grew from 3.5 days in 1964 to 7.2 days in 1968.
See Alschuler, supra note 2, at 38. One could argue, in contrast to those who have claimed that the
increasing procedural complexity of our modem trials made plea bargaining inevitable by making
trials too cumbersome and expensive, see id. at 40-41; Langbein, supra note 519, at 3, 9-11, that
the causal chain ran largely the other way. That is, the Supreme Court might not have dared lavish
time-consuming trial rights on criminal defendants if plea bargaining had not already eliminated
all but a tiny proportion of trials.
819. See Alschuler, supra note 2, at 39.
820. See id. at 38 ("In the words of an Oakland public defender, 'rights are tools to work
with,' and rather than insist on a hearing on a motion to suppress illegally obtained evidence, a
defense attorney was likely to use a claim of illegality to exact prosecutorial concessions in plea
bargaining.").
821. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363-65 (1978); North Carolina v. Alford,
400 U.S. 25 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397
U.S. 759 (1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
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evidence of their past convictions, defendants who carried the burden of a
criminal record found themselves trapped in a procedural catch-22. The
situation was worst in those states that permitted prosecutors to comment to
juries on the defendant's silence and thereby stir up their natural
suspicions.8 2 In 1965, however, the Supreme Court ruled that such
comment violated a defendant's right against self-incrimination. '
Moreover, the law of evidence has evolved to make judges somewhat
slower to admit evidence of past crimes to impeach criminal defendants.'
Although these developments operate against plea bargaining's
interests by making trials more viable for defendants who otherwise might
have felt compelled to strike a deal, they have had no far-reaching impact.
Defendant-testimony laws appear to have played a smaller role in plea
bargaining's rise than, for example, the civil-caseload revolution of the
same period or the rise of probation. Moreover, prosecutorial comment on
silence probably added little to the power of defendant-testimony laws to
discourage trials. As Arthur Train wrote in 1906 in a state that barred such
comment,8 "The writer has heard more than one talesman say, in
discussing a verdict, 'Of course we couldn't take it against him, but we
knew he was guilty because he was afraid to testify."' - Such sentiments no
doubt continue to discourage trials among defendants with bad records
except when defendants are able to persuade judges to keep evidence of
their records out. That is, if a ruling that bars comment on the defendant's
silence constitutes the only procedural advance of the last century and a half
that challenges plea bargaining's onward march, then plea bargaining has
faced remarkably feeble resistance.
VIII. THE BALANCE OF POWER To PLEA BARGAIN
Here the reader might object that at least one twentieth-century
procedural innovation, the non-jury trial, has arisen in the path of plea
bargaining. Until now, I have used "trial" as a shorthand for "jury trial"
because a jury sat in judgment at virtually every trial held in the
intermediate and upper-tier courts of Middlesex County during our
822. State legislatures immediately recognized the risk of burdening defendants' exercise of
their right against self-incrimination, and many of the earliest defendant-testimony laws banned
comment on defendants' silence. See, e.g., Act of May 26, 1866, ch. 260. 1866 Mass. Acts 245.
245 (" [N]or shall the neglect or refusal to testify create any presumption against the defendant.").
Many states, however, imposed no such ban. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 25, 1864, ch. 280, 1864 Me.
Acts 214, 214.
823. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613 (1965).
824. See supra note 468 and accompanying text.
825. See Act of May 7, 1869, ch. 678, § 1, 1869 N.Y. Laws 1597, 1597 (" [Blut the neglect or
refusal of any such person to testify shall not create any presumption against him.").
826. TRAIN, supra note 199, at 161.
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period.827 It is true that on the lowest tier of the Massachusetts judiciary, a
lone magistrate rendered verdicts in the most petty criminal trials. 28 It is
also true that other states provided more broadly for non-jury trials in
misdemeanor cases.2 9 But not until the early twentieth century did more
than a few states give defendants facing felony charges the option to waive
a jury trial and put themselves instead on the judgment of the court. 830
There are two reasons to expect that giving defendants a broad right to
choose non-jury trials might have stalled the plea-bargaining juggernaut.
The most obvious is that non-jury trials appear to eliminate or at least
moderate the main incentives to plea bargain. Because they are relatively
quick, they make the efficiency advantages of plea bargaining shrink in
comparison. Because experienced and savvy judges are less likely to reject
powerful evidence of guilt than are a dozen randomly chosen laypersons,
prosecutors can be less fearful of capricious acquittals and more willing to
go to trial. And because it is difficult to generate reversible error before a
judicial factfinder, judges can be less fearful of reversals and the resulting
damage to their reputations.
The second reason to expect that non-jury trials might have slowed plea
bargaining's rise looks not to the balance of incentives between trial and
plea, but to the balance of power between judge and prosecutor. Raymond
Moley, probably the earliest theorist of the dynamics of plea bargaining,
predicted in 1928 that non-jury trials would reallocate courtroom power in a
way that might cause "an immediate decline in the proportion of pleas of
guilty." 83' "It would seem," he wrote, "that the way to restrict the
discretion of the prosecutor is to give wide powers to the judge."8 ' Non-
jury trials would undermine prosecutors' power to plea bargain in a way
827. Of the several thousand cases I reviewed, exactly one appeared to me to involve a non-
jury trial-and even in that case the record was ambiguous. See Commonwealth v. Artemas G.
Upham, Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book 18 (Feb. 1853) (" [Alfter hearing the witnesses (duly sworn)
and fully hearing and understanding the defence, it appeared to the said Court that the said Upham
was guilty .... ). This case concerned the misdemeanor of selling milk by an unapproved
measure.
828. See supra note 8.
829. Between 1846 and 1893, at least 12 states (not including Massachusetts) acted to permit
non-jury trial in misdemeanor cases. See Susan C. Towne, The Historical Origins of Bench Trial
for Serious Crime, 26 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 123, 149 & n.131 (1982).
830. Although fairly common in some American colonies, non-jury trials in felony cases
virtually died out by the end of the 18th century. They did not emerge except in scattered
instances until the late 19th century, when Connecticut, Louisiana, and Indiana acted to permit
non-jury felony trials. (Maryland already did so.) See id. at 148-50. Only in the 20th century did
the practice spread more broadly. See id. at 123-24.
831. Moley, supra note 47, at 127.
832. Id.
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that no "direct attack upon the practice of prosecutors" coulds' 3-by
investing judges with a competing power to resolve cases efficiently.3
History has proved false all such theories of the impact of non-jury
trials. Within a decade of Moley's prediction, most states permitted non-
jury felony trials, 35 and by 1960, every state did so.' But plea bargaining
marched on and now accounts for a higher proportion of criminal
dispositions than it did when virtually every felony had to be tried by
jury.8 37 Informed by this hindsight, we can see now that there never was
good reason to think that a broader right to non-jury trial would hold back
plea bargaining's progress.
Consider first how the incentives of costs and risks play themselves out
in the typical plea negotiation. If the defendant regards his chances of
acquittal at trial to be, say, thirty percent, 3s8 he normally will demand in
exchange for his guilty plea a deduction of about thirty percent from the
sentence he would have faced had he gone to trial and lost. (Those
defendants who value certainty for its own sake will demand a smaller
deduction, while those who regard immediate prison time as more painful
than future time will demand a larger one.) The prosecutor, who is spared a
thirty-percent risk of loss, normally will be willing to grant this concession
plus a concession that reflects the saved expense and effort of trial. As the
prosecutor normally is willing to give more than the defendant demands,
the parties almost always find common ground. And as the judge is spared
both the time of trial and the risk of reversal, she almost never stands
between the parties and their deal. Trials therefore take place only when the
parties calculate the odds of acquittal differently or something else
interferes with their freedom to bargain. There is no reason the option of a
non-jury trial should alter this calculus greatly. At a non-jury trial, the
defendant still has some chance of acquittal, though smaller, and the
prosecutor still expends time and money, though less. There is every reason
to expect that the prosecutor will continue to offer a discount from the post-
833. Id.
834. See id. ("The fundamental treatment for the tendency which we have discussed in this
article is not a direct attack upon the practice of prosecutors. Their range of methods by which
criminal charges can be disposed of is so great that merely to shut off one practice will open up
others." ).
835. See Alschuler, supra note 2, at 33.
836. See KALVEN & ZEISEI, supra note 460. at 22 & n.18.
837. See Alschuler, supra note 2, at 33. Alschuler suggests that the non-jury trial may have
depressed the proportion of plea bargains, though only for a short time. He reports that in 1936,
after many states had acted to permit non-jury trials, the proportion of plea bargains was lower
than in the 1920s, but then resumed its upward trend and had recovered any loss by 1940. See id
at 33. As the figures he uses reflect state court practice, see id., the end of federal Prohibition
cannot provide a ready alternative explanation for the decline in pleas between the 1920s and
1936.
838. To keep this illustration simple, I will assume the chance of reversal on appeal is
subsumed in the chance of acquittal after trial.
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trial sentence that is greater than the discount the defendant demands-and
so the parties reach common ground about as readily as before.
If the availability of non-jury trials has influenced the rate of plea
bargaining, it is not because non-jury trials have altered the parties'
incentives to deal, but because a small amount of plea bargaining power
now has shifted from prosecutor to judge. Moley anticipated such a power
shift, but because he misperceived the existing dynamic of bargaining
power, he mistook the significance of the shift. His belief that prosecutors
alone drove the plea-bargaining process permitted him to conclude that
judges would restrict plea bargaining if only they could. But as our long
immersion in the records of Middlesex County has made plain, prosecutors
never could conduct much of a plea-bargaining practice on their own.
Absent judges' cooperation, Massachusetts prosecutors of the first three-
quarters of the nineteenth century maintained at best an underground
resistance of plea bargaining, contriving a charge-bargaining practice from
the liquor law's and murder statute's rigid penalty schemes and an on-file
plea bargaining practice from their procedural power to withhold a motion
for sentence. Only after judges came over to plea bargaining's side in the
last quarter of the century did plea bargaining achieve the dominance that
Moley discovered in his studies of the 1920s. Nothing but the full-fledged
participation of judges could explain how the guilty-plea rate in Middlesex
County reached eighty-seven percent by the end of the century. As the vast
majority of these cases arose under statutes that assigned broad sentencing
discretion to the judge, most plea bargains depended on the judge's
confederacy in the cause.
In fact, judges may have grown to be even greater advocates of plea
bargaining-or at least of certain plea bargains-than prosecutors. Both
theory and later practice suggest that judges deployed the new power given
them by non-jury trials not to rein in plea bargaining, but to spur it on in the
face of occasional prosecutorial opposition. Consider the relative interests
that judge and prosecutor bring to the plea-bargaining process. In the
average case, a bargain saves time for both judge and prosecutor, but in
addition hands victory to the prosecutor, and so we are accustomed to think
of the prosecutor as having the greater interest in striking a deal. In many
cases, however, the judge maintains an efficiency-based interest in a plea
bargain (as well as an interest in avoiding the risk of reversal), but the
prosecutor stands opposed. Prosecutors, after all, must face reelection
before a constituency that may regard plea bargaining as a prosecutor's
capitulation to expediency. Even if the public stands indifferent to plea
bargaining in general, it is likely to demand a full measure of punishment in
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certain cases, or certain kinds of cases, that prompt great fear or outrage. 9
In contrast, even those judges who must face the electorate rarely take
responsibility for plea bargains, which the public usually assigns to
prosecutors. On the higher plane of principle, prosecutors trained as
advocates might see the defendant's crime as more vile and might peg the
odds of conviction higher than would the judge and therefore might
consider the case to be "worth" more on a plea. As a consequence, the
judge might be more willing than the prosecutor to offer the defendant an
acceptable concession for his plea.
Normally, such disagreements between judge and prosecutor pose no
obstacle to a successful plea bargain. The judge, after all, controls the
sentence and therefore simply offers the defendant a larger concession than
the prosecutor thinks right. But where the statutory penalty scheme imposes
a harsh minimum sentence for a particular offense, the prosecutor's refusal
to reduce the charge can thwart the judge's desire to deal. Now we see how
the non-jury trial can shift the balance of power decisively toward the
judge. When the judge believes that a plea bargain on the defendant's terms
is appropriate, but the prosecutor withholds the nol pros that could make the
deal possible, the judge has a trump card. She can advise the defendant to
elect a non-jury trial on the understanding, spoken or otherwise, that the
judge will work her own nol pros simply by finding the defendant not guilty
of so much of the prosecutor's charge as stands in the way of the lower
sentence the judge wants to impose.' The prosecutor now confronts a
dilemma: He may persist in his refusal to deal and embark upon a time-
consuming trial with a predetermined result, or he may succumb to the
terms of the bargain and secure the sentence that the judge perceives as fair
without the trial." 1 Overpowered by the judge, the resource-wise prosecutor
submits-and deals.
839. Lynn Mather reports that when the Los Angeles district attorney took up a campaign to
become California's attorney general in 1970, his office forbade prosecutors to engage in a form
of charge bargaining that had been routine in cases of marijuana possession. See MATHER. supra
note 489, at 17-18. "After all, the district attorney is a political animal." one prosecutor explained
to Mather. "Drugs are a very controversial issue right now." Id. at 18.
840. During my tenure as a Middlesex County prosecutor, this situation arose most often in
cocaine-distribution cases. Massachusetts law imposes an escalating series of mandatory
minimum prison terms according to the quantity of cocaine found in the defendant's possession.
Many judges regarded the sentences-3 years for 14 grams (one-half ounce), 5 years for 28
grams, 10 years for 100 grams, and 15 years for 200 grams, see MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 94C.
§ 32E(b)(1)-(4) (West 1997)-as unjustifiably harsh and pressured prosecutors to consider
reducing the charged offense in exchange for a plea, especially when the defendant had no other
criminal record. Our office rigidly enforced a policy against any such reduction. Judges therefore
advised or hinted to defense counsel that they would, on a non-jury trial, find reasonable doubt as
to the weight of the cocaine and find the defendant guilty of possessing a smaller quantity than
that charged.
841. Lynn Mather describes a California adaptation of the non-jury trial that, although not
resulting in a plea bargain, substitutes for a plea bargain in a procedurally ingenious way. I noted
earlier that until the California indeterminate-sentence law was repealed in 1976, judges had no
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In a world in which plea bargaining dominates the mechanisms of
criminal justice, the option of non-jury trials may achieve the best possible
balance of the power to deal. The defendant who wishes to regulate her
risks by striking a bargain can hold out for the best terms that either judge
or prosecutor will offer. The defendant's dealmaking need not be subject to
the whims of either officer because the agreement of one normally is
enough for the deal to proceed. The judge, as I have said, can strike a
bargain even without the prosecutor's compliance. If, on the other hand, the
judge rejects a deal arranged between defendant and prosecutor, the
prosecutor often can limit the judge's options in sentencing by selectively
nol prossing charges or parts of charges to guarantee the defendant a
concession in exchange for her plea. In the end, it is rare that either judge or
prosecutor can scuttle a deal by insisting on a harsher sentence than the
other thinks right.
But two conditions, coming together, can destroy this balance of power.
The first is that the prosecutor have the power to veto a non-jury trial and
insist instead on trial by jury. In our federal system and in many states, the
prosecutor has retained this power. With it, he can exact the full measure of
punishment prescribed by those statutes that impose a minimum
punishment below which the judge may not dip. The second condition is
that there be many such statutes. In our federal system and in those states
that have adopted rigid sentencing guidelines, the entire criminal code now
approaches this form. By assigning a narrow range of sentencing options to
virtually every criminal violation and by giving judges only limited power
to impose a sentence below that range, guideline systems have invested
prosecutors with the power to dictate almost every sentence by choosing
one set of charges over another.
power to dictate the length of state-prison sentences, and so plea bargains often turned on the
distinction between a sentence to the state prison and one to a lesser institution. Cf Act of Sept.
20, 1976, ch. 1139, § 271, 1976 Cal. Stat. 5061, 5139 (giving judges the authority to impose
sentences as prescribed by statute); supra notes 780-785 and accompanying text. The judge often
could not avoid imposing a state-prison sentence, however, unless the prosecutor first reduced the
charged offense. Mather reports that in Los Angeles County, the district attorney often forbade
courtroom prosecutors to reduce charges without clearance from their superiors. To achieve the
same end as the plea bargain without any reduction in charge, the lawyers would agree to a
"submission on the transcript." This was a non-jury trial in which the only evidence presented to
the judge was the transcript of the preliminary hearing. The parties understood that the judge
typically would find the defendant guilty of a lesser offense and avoid sending the defendant to
state prison. Afterward, the courtroom prosecutor could report to her superiors that the judge (and
not she) had reduced the charge. See MATHER, supra note 489, at 19-20, 55-58.
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Though this new imbalance of plea-bargaining power might somewhat
advance plea bargaining's fortunes, 42 we should not expect it to change the
face of plea bargaining in America. It is true that in Massachusetts during
the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century, the prosecutor's power to
dictate penalties by manipulating charges in liquor-law and murder cases
helps explain why plea bargaining emerged first in those contexts. One
might suppose that by converting the entire criminal code to the form of the
old Massachusetts liquor laws, sentencing guidelines would set off a plea-
bargaining frenzy. But times have changed. In the early nineteenth century,
judges did not share the prosecutorial urge to plea bargain. Plea bargaining
took hold in liquor and murder cases because rigid penalty schemes gave
prosecutors the power both to guarantee a sentencing concession should the
defendant plead and to guarantee a harsher sentence should the defendant
choose trial and lose-and to do both without the judge's help. Today,
judges so rarely oppose a plea agreement struck by defendant and
prosecutor that plea bargaining takes place with enormous regularity even
when the governing statute gives the judge a nearly free hand in sentencing.
With or without sentencing guidelines, therefore, plea bargaining is likely
to happen whenever the concession the prosecutor is willing to offer is
greater than the concession the defendant demands-or nearly all of the
time.
We should, however, expect the new imbalance of plea-bargaining
power to weaken the defendant's hand in bargaining. The combination of
842. The numbers tell an odd story. For several years after the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
took effect in 1987, the rate of plea bargaining in federal district courts, measured as a proportion
of adjudicated cases, held almost perfectly steady. Then, for unclear reasons, it began to trend up.
This trend lagged so far behind adoption of the Guidelines that it seems likely that other causes
must have played a part:
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rigid sentencing guidelines and the prosecutor's prerogative to veto non-
jury trials means that the only actor in a federal courtroom with the power
to shorten a sentence the prosecutor demands is the jury. But the jury
normally does not know the sentencing consequences of its actions, and
neither party may appeal to it in those terms. The defendant, who formerly
could sound out both judge and prosecutor and take the best deal offered,
now has but one bargaining partner, and that is the one least likely to look
at things the defendant's way. In fact, though the causes are varied, the
average time served by federal convicts since the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines took effect in 1987 has lengthened considerably. 3
With this odd juxtaposition of the old Massachusetts liquor laws and
our very modern sentencing guidelines, we now can see how far we have
come. Something more than 150 years ago, plea bargaining in
Massachusetts claimed but a tiny beachhead. Supported only by the desire
of prosecutors to manage their crushing workloads and to gain an
occasional effortless conviction, plea bargaining extended no further than
the sentencing power of prosecutors. In liquor and murder cases, the
legislature's perhaps imprudently designed penalty schemes gave
prosecutors the sliver of power they needed to support a meager charge-
bargaining practice. By the middle of the nineteenth century, plea
bargaining had stolen to a larger outpost, the on-file form of plea
bargaining, left exposed to prosecutors by the procedural fluke that judges
could not pass sentence until the prosecutor so moved. There the progress
of plea bargaining might have stalled, for the sentencing power of
prosecutors reached little further.
Then, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, judges found
themselves confronted by an onslaught of new, and newly complex, civil
suits brought on by the ravages of industrial machinery. They saw no
choice but to make terms with the new order in the criminal courts. They
843. The facial length of the average sentence has remained deceptively constant. Between
1982 and 1986 (the last half-decade before the Guidelines took effect), the average length of
sentences handed down by federal district courts ranged from 57.2 months to 64.6 months, with
the figures trending upward. Between 1988 and 1998, that figure ranged from 58.6 months to 69.6
months, with the figure dipping downward in the last three years. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTIcs, supra note 842, at 408 tbl.5.22. But the average defendant nonetheless has fared far
worse. That is in part because the likelihood of getting prison time as opposed to probation has
risen dramatically. In the five years before the Guidelines took effect, prison sentences accounted
for a nearly steady proportion of all sentences of either imprisonment or probation-varying only
from 55% to 57%. In the first I 1 years after the Guidelines took effect, that proportion grew
steadily larger, from 58% in 1988 to 79% in 1998. See id. Moreover, although the facial length of
sentence has stayed almost unchanged, the elimination of parole under the Guidelines has changed
the meaning of the facial sentence considerably. In pre-Guidelines years, before federal parole
was abolished, federal convicts became parole-eligible after serving only one-third of their terms.
See Theresa Walker Karle & Thomas Sager, Are the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Meeting
Congressional Goals? An Empirical and Case Law Analysis, 40 EMORY L.J. 393, 393 n.4. 414
(1991).
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embraced plea bargaining and turned their considerable sentencing power
to its purpose. Sustained now by the two most powerful courtroom patrons,
plea bargaining swiftly became the dominant force in criminal procedure. It
pushed aside the indeterminate sentence, and it supported those institutions,
such as probation and the public defender, that aided its cause. Finally, plea
bargaining grew so entrenched in the halls of power that today, though its
patrons may divide its spoils in different ways, it can grow no more. For
plea bargaining has won.
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APPENDIX A: A NOTE ON THE CASES
Many of my arguments and conclusions rest on an analysis of a large
body of nineteenth-century Massachusetts court cases, drawn mainly from
Middlesex County. In various footnotes throughout the Article, I have
described the records themselves and the protocols I followed in classifying
and counting them. For those who would like to pursue similar research or
to analyze my findings more critically, I will try to gather together the most
important points about the database and my method of analyzing it in this
Appendix.
A. The Records and Where To Find Them
I have relied most heavily on records of the middle-tier courts: the
Court of General Sessions of the Peace through 1803; the Court of
Common Pleas from 1804 through the first two sessions of 1859; and the
Superior Court from late 1859 on.8' For a few years during the 1840s, I
examined the records of the Essex County Court of Common Pleas, held at
the Essex Superior Court in Salem. Otherwise, my research of middle-tier
courts focused exclusively on Middlesex County. The Massachusetts
Archives in Boston houses all records of these courts for 1859 and earlier.
Records for 1860 and later are stored off-site in a warehouse at the
Worcester State Hospital. The record books for most years between 177 1
and 1808 and between 1823 and 1839 may be purchased on microfilm from
the Genealogical Society of Utah in Salt Lake City.
The records of the court's work take three forms. First are the record
books themselves, probably compiled at the end of each session of court,
which lay out all case dispositions in beautiful script (until the advent of
clerk-typists sometime in the late 1880s) and in an organized way. Cases
not disposed of-for example, those continued until the next session of
court-are not mentioned. Typically, the record-book entry for each case
transcribes the indictment or other charging document and lays out the
procedural steps of the case's progress through the court. These include
how the defendant pled, whether the prosecutor nol prossed any charge,
who composed the jury, the jury's verdict, and the judge's sentence. The
record book typically does not say whether the defendant had counsel, who
testified at trial, or what facts were proved. Beginning in the late 1840s,
record books usually include long lists of cases that are identified only by
the defendants' names and are noted, simply, as having been placed on file
or nol prossed.
844. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text (describing the middle-tier courts).
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In the earlier years of this study, the clerk's docket books largely repeat
information contained in the record books. Beginning in 1844, however, the
docket books fill in several missing details. They tell us which cases the
court continued from one session to the next, whether defendants had
counsel, what charges were involved in the "filed" and "nol prossed"
cases listed in the record books, and whether the defendants in these case
pled guilty. They also tally the days consumed by each session of court.
Unfortunately, the docket books are far more difficult to read than the
record books-they are both messier and more abbreviated. Moreover, not
until the last third of the century did the clerk note each case's docket
number in the record books. For earlier years, the task of cross-referencing
those cases that are listed in both books took time.
The files for each case are the richest source of information, but also
the least accessible. They include the original indictment, witness
subpoenas, tables of costs, occasional moving papers submitted by one of
the lawyers, and (very occasionally) other notes or letters to or from the
lawyers. All these are neatly folded together, bundled with ribbons,
hardened with time, and boxed away.
I have read the record-book entry for every case relied on in this study.
For many, I have read the docket-book entry. For several dozen or perhaps
more, I have examined the file papers. For most of the years studied, I have
read every case handled by the court that year. As the century wore on and
the court's caseload grew, I sometimes read only those cases decided at one
or two of the three annual sessions. To extrapolate these partial studies into
totals that represent the whole year's work, I have assumed that the
caseload of each session of court was proportional to the days consumed by
that session. In 1870, for example, I studied only the February session of
court. In that session, a single judge sat for 33 days and disposed of 183
cases. As the June and October sessions of court consumed 48 judge-days
between them, I have calculated the year's total workload as 449 cases:
((33 + 48) - 33) x 183 = 449.
In all, I examined 4142 middle-tier cases in Middlesex. This figure does
not include cases identified in the record books merely as having been nol
prossed or placed on file unless I also examined the docket-book entry for
those cases. Therefore, my case totals are larger for those years for which I
also studied the docket books.
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TABLE 11. CASE DATABASE:
MIDDLESEX COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT AND ITS PREDECESSOR COURTS
Year Number of Cases Court Sessions Docket Books
_ _ Examined Examined?
1789 15 All N/A
1790 8 All N/A
1799 17 All N/A
1800 21 All N/A
1805 21 All N/A
1806 26 All N/A
1809 14 All N/A
1810 20 All N/A
1814 25 All N/A
1815 45 All N/A
1819 24 All N/A
1820 38 All N/A
1824 48 All N/A
1829 41 All N/A
1834 95 All N/A
1839 42 All N/A
1843 101 All N/A
1844 123 All Yes
1849 443 All Yes
1853 482 All Yes
1859 415 All Yes
1864 225 Feb. & Oct. Yes
1870 183 Feb. Yes
1874 153 Feb. No
1880 140 Oct. Yes
1885 105 June No
1890 232 Feb. In Part
1896 144 Oct. No
1900 602 All Yes
1910 294 All No
TOTAL 4142 _
Sources: Middlesex Ct. Gen. Sess. Peace R. Books; Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. & Docket
Books; Middlesex Super. Ct. R. & Docket Books.
In calculating the court's caseload after 1844, I have included only
those years for which I have read the docket books. To maintain
consistency across years, I counted only disposed cases-that is, those
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cases that traditionally had been listed in the record books-and omitted
any case (such as those continued from one session of court to the next)
listed in the docket books but not mentioned in the record books. I believe
these protocols guard against the possibility that the caseload boom of the
late 1840s, depicted in Figure 2, was simply an artifact of the appearance in
1844 of more elaborate docket books.
My study of the business of the Supreme Judicial Court was less far-
reaching. For the early part of the century, before the legislature transferred
jurisdiction over all but capital cases to the Court of Common Pleas,' I
examined the entire business of the high court in several different years. For
these early years, the Supreme Judicial Court's docket books added little or
no useful information to the record-book entries, and I rarely examined
either the docket books or the file papers. As with the middle-tier courts,
the record books for 1859 and before are housed at the Massachusetts
Archives, while those for later years are kept at the Worcester State
Hospital.
TABLE 12. CASE DATABASE:
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT (SITTING IN MIDDLESEX COUNTY)












Sources: Sup. Jud. CL R. Books (Middlesex sittings).
My study of the disposition of capital cases examines the Supreme
Judicial Court's business for the entire state, not merely for Middlesex
County. I drew most of my data not from the court's records, but from the
attorney general's annual reports, which usually stated in greater or lesser
detail (depending on the year) the procedural course of every capital case
heard before the court. The attorney general submitted his reports to the
845. See supra notes 10, 125 and accompanying text (describing this jurisdictional shift).
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legislature, which published them, and so they are widely available in both
hard-bound and microfilm formats. They did not, however, appear before
1832. For earlier years, I have relied on my survey of the Middlesex sittings
of the court as well as on a thorough study of the Suffolk County (that is,
Boston) sittings between 1820 and 1832. 846 For those later years in which
the attorney general either did not exist or produced no useful report (1840-
1848 and 1853), I have examined the court's record books for its sittings in
Suffolk, Middlesex, Bristol, Hampden, Norfolk, and Worcester counties."
This strategy omitted any capital case arising in one of the state's other
eight counties, but I am confident that I have captured the great majority of
the state's capital caseload in these years.
B. Counting Cases and Statistical Protocols
Although some of my research assistants (and in particular Dan Levin)
helped me code cases onto a spreadsheet for analysis and others (Josh
Greenberg and Craig Estes) helped with the technical task of counting
cases, I read every case myself, determined how to classify it, and reviewed
the coding for consistency. All of the middle-tier cases from Middlesex are
on a single document that is available to others for analysis.
I made several decisions about how to count cases. I believe that all of
them are defensible, but few are self-evidently the only right approach.
First, I chose not to count as part of any year's court business those cases
that were adjudicated in an earlier year, whether by trial or by plea, unless
they were re-adjudicated in the year under study. That is, if a case tried in
1858 happened to be disposed of in 1859-perhaps because sentencing was
delayed-the clerk typically would record the entire proceedings in the
1859 record book. In my analysis of the business of 1859, I have omitted
such cases.
Second, when performing any count designed to assess the workload of
prosecutors or judges (as when calculating caseload for Figure 2), 1 counted
each case as one case even if it involved several defendants. When
assessing decisions made by judges, juries, or litigants, however, I followed
a different course. Consider, for example, Figure 4, which represents
defendants' tendency to plead guilty rather than go to trial. If a particular
case had, say, four co-defendants, and if all four went to trial (or all four
pled guilty), then I counted the case as one case. But if three of four
defendants pled guilty while one went to trial, I counted the case as two
separate cases: one that ended in a guilty plea and one that went to trial.
Although others might count such a case as four cases (three that ended in a
846. See supra note 92.
847. See supra notes 97, 99.
1080 [Vol. 109: 857
Plea Bargaining's Triumph
plea and one in a trial), I believe my method is more likely to represent the
reality behind courtroom decisionmaking. With surprising frequency, co-
defendants acted (and were treated by the jury) as a unit, a tendency
perhaps magnified by the frequent appearance of only one defense lawyer
in a case involving multiple co-defendants. As my goal generally was to
examine decisions and not outcomes per se, I believe the number of
different decisions-rather than the number of actors controlled by those
decisions-was the better proxy.
Third, when drawing cross-century comparisons, I often have excluded
both liquor cases and cases placed on file. For reasons I have discussed at
length in the text, these case types were different from the rest, particularly
because the prosecutor possessed far more control over sentencing than he
did in other cases. Because both liquor cases and filed cases were either rare
or absent early in the century, I felt that including them would too greatly
distort any analysis that spanned the century.' For similar reasons, I have
excluded them from most analyses designed to gauge judicial
decisionmaking. As the century wore on, however, prosecutors lost their
peculiar powers in liquor cases84 9 and (to a lesser extent) in filed cases,'
and so for late-century studies of judicial decisionmaking, I sometimes have
included them." In all cases, I have tried to specify which course I took.
Fourth, the distinction between liquor and non-liquor cases was itself
tricky. Because the significance of this distinction was the rigid penalty
scheme that gave prosecutors the unilateral power to charge bargain that I
described in Part I, I have limited "liquor cases" to those cases that arose
under the liquor-license laws or under the liquor-prohibition laws that
sometimes supplanted them. These laws traditionally-and fairly
consistently-maintained mandatory penalty schemes. 3  I therefore
counted drunkenness and common-drunkard cases as "non-liquor cases"
because the penalty schemes governing those crimes granted the judge
considerable discretion and frustrated prosecutorial charge bargaining of the
sort seen under the license law.' After some deliberation, I decided that
the odd category of "liquor nuisance" cases, first created by the legislature
in 1855 and retained throughout the century,"5 fits comfortably under
848. See supra notes 44, 304-312 and accompanying text.
849. See supra notes 164, 173-177, 279-283 and accompanying text.
850. See supra notes 322-325, 370-376 and accompanying text.
851. See, e.g., supra note 503.
852. See supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
853. See supra notes 22, 55, 61, 173, 279, 283 (describing various incarnations of the liquor-
license and prohibition laws).
854. See MASS. REv. STAT. ch. 130, § 18 (Dutton & Wentworth 1836) (providing for a fine
"not exceeding five dollars" for a first offense); Act of Mar. 29, 1834, ch. 61. § 2, 1834 Mass.
Acts 189, 190-191 (providing for commitment of an unspecified length to a house of correction
for being a common drunkard).
855. See supra notes 176, 503 (citing statutes).
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neither "liquor cases" nor "non-liquor cases." Because the nature of the
offense is essentially unauthorized liquor-selling-the same activity
punished by the license and prohibition laws-it seems strained to call
these non-liquor cases. But because the penalty scheme did not closely
resemble the license and prohibition laws' rigid formulas, 56 it would be
wrong to classify nuisance cases as liquor cases. I therefore have excluded
liquor-nuisance cases from both categories, although they are included in
tallies of "total" cases, and they appear as well (for reasons explained
there) in Table 5857 and occasionally in other tallies.858
Fifth, I have tried to distinguish throughout the text between pleas of
guilty and pleas of no contest. At times, however, if the context was clear or
the distinction unimportant, I have used "guilty pleas" as a shorthand to
represent both. The legal distinction between these pleas was almost
insignificant,859 but because a plea of no contest was easier for some
defendants to swallow, this option often smoothed negotiations toward a
plea. Although the earliest clear plea bargains I observed in liquor cases
(those in the 1820s and earlier) always involved pleas of no contest, for
later years I saw relatively few no-contest pleas:
856. One of the penalty provisions of the 1855 act gave the judge a good deal of sentencing
discretion. See Act of May 19, 1855, ch. 405, § 1. 2, 1855 Mass. Acts 803, 804 (providing for a
"fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or... imprisonment... no[t] more than one year" for
maintaining a liquor nuisance). Another gave the prosecutor a good deal of sentencing power by
imposing a minimum sentence. See id § 4, at 804 (providing for a "fine of not less than one
hundred, not more than one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail not less than
thirty days, nor more than six months"). Even this latter provision, however, probably could not
have supported a successful charge-bargaining regime. Although it assured the prosecutor a
substantial minimum sentence, it did not protect the defendant against an unreasonable maximum.
That is, even if the prosecutor and defendant agreed that the defendant would plead guilty to one
count and be fined $100, the judge could imprison the defendant for six months.
857. See supra note 503.
858. See, e.g., supra note 334 and accompanying text.
859. See supra note 34.
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TABLE 13. PLEAS OF No CONTEST AS A PROPORTION OF
ALL PLEAS OF EITHER GUILTY OR No CONTEST:
MIDDLESEX SUPERIOR COURT AND ITS PREDECESSOR COURTS
























Sources: Sources: Middlesex CL Gen. Sess. Peace R. Books; Middlesex Ct. C.P. R- &
Docket Books; Middlesex Super. Ct. R. & Docket Books.
Finally, I have made many other, more minor decisions about how to
count cases. The most important of these is that, unless specified otherwise,
I counted as a "conviction" any case in which the jury convicted the
defendant of any part of the crime charged. I have kept a record of the other
decisions I have made and am happy to share them-as well as any of my
other data-with future researchers.
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APPENDIX B: FERDINAND'S CATEGORY OF
"VICE OR REGULATORY OFFENSES"
This Appendix refers back to note 214, where I deferred an analysis
showing the affinity between what Theodore Ferdinand calls "vice or
regulatory" offenses and what I call liquor-law violations.
Ferdinand tells us that "[r]egulatory offenses include liquor law
violations, offenses against religion (blue law violations), and city
ordinance violations."' ' "Offenses against religion," he then adds,
"consisted basically of violations of blue laws prohibiting taverns from
serving alcoholic beverages on Sunday." 8 61 Section 5 of the 1832 liquor-
license law punished Sunday liquor sales by a mandatory ten-dollar fine for
each offense.862 By assigning a fixed fine to each offense, this provision
gave the prosecutor the same power to engage in multiple charging and
charge bargaining that I described in Part I with regard to the rest of the
liquor-license law.863 Asahel Huntington often charged multiple counts of
Sunday sales just as he charged multiple counts under other provisions of
the license law, and in fact, one of Huntington's preprinted multi-count
forms contained four Sunday sale counts.8
Although Ferdinand does not tell us which city ordinances the category
of "city ordinance violations" comprehends, he does say that
in the late 1830s and early 1840s, arrests for city ordinance
violations, liquor law violations, and offenses against religion
began to climb sharply ... suggesting that all three were part of the
temperance campaign against liquor abuses. When city ordinance
violations took a sharp jump in 1848, the other two declined; and
when liquor law violations spurted in 1850, city ordinance
violations fell back.
865
From this, we can conclude that the substance of the ordinance in question,
like that of "offenses against religion," concerned liquor sales. Without
more, we cannot be sure of the ordinance's penalty scheme, and we cannot
know whether it was suited to prosecutorial charge bargaining. It is fair to
860. FERDINAND, supra note 121, at 59 tbl.2.3.
861. Id. at 75 tbl.3.3.
862. See Act of Mar. 24, 1832, ch. 166, § 5, 1832 Mass. Acts 474, 474-75; see also Act of
Apr. 20, 1837, ch. 242, § 1, 1837 Mass. Acts 279, 279 (raising the statutory penalty for Sunday
sales to $20 per offense).
863. See supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
864. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Thomas Barber, Middlesex Ct. C.P. R. Book 158 (Oct.
1842) (copy on file with the author) (charging four Sunday sales); Commonwealth v. Thomas
Barber, Middlesex Ct. C.P. File Papers (Oct. 1842) (copy on file with the author) (containing the
preprinted indictment form for the previous case).
865. FERDINAND, supra note 121, at 150.
1084 [Vol. 109: 857
Plea Bargaining's Triumph
guess that this city ordinance was punishable by a fine only, though
whether it attached a fixed fine to each offense I cannot say.
"Vice offenses," Ferdinand tells us, "include gambling and
prostitution."' He does not itemize the offenses that fall under
"gambling," and there are several possibilities. First are the "gaming"
offenses addressed by section 11 of the 1832 liquor-license law. The law
punished those who permitted "dice, cards, bowls, billiards, quoits," or
other games on their premises with a ten-dollar fine for each offense and
punished those who took part with a ten-dollar fine. ' Like the rest of the
liquor-license law, this provision gave the prosecutor the power to
manipulate the sentence by manipulating charges. A different gaming
provision also provided for a fixed ten-dollar fine. Other statutes bearing
on offenses that could be labeled gambling, however, supplied no fixed
penalty.869 Without a finer breakdown of Ferdinand's "gambling" category,
it is hard to know whether his findings support or challenge my arguments.
The second of Ferdinand's vice offenses, prostitution, clearly does not
fall within my charge-bargaining paradigm. Ferdinand does not specify the
statute governing the offense in question, but there seem to be only two
possibilities: Being a "common night walker[]" made one liable to
confinement for up to six months," and "keep[ing] a house of ill fame"
carried a penalty of up to two years or $300.' These wide-open penalty
schemes did not permit the kind of charge bargaining I have discussed, and
yet Ferdinand reports some facts suggesting a high incidence of plea
bargaining in these cases. 2 On the other hand, Ferdinand reports that the
overall rate of guilty pleas in prostitution cases was slightly less than that
for the average common-law crime. 3
As prostitution apparently was not prosecuted in the middle-tier courts
of Middlesex County, I cannot apply my own data to the task of explaining
Ferdinand's findings. Of course, a guilty plea by a friendless prostitute
866. Id. at 59 tbl.2.3.
867. § 11, 1832 Mass. Acts at 478; see also Act of Feb. 28, 1787, ch. 68, 1786 Mass. Acts
210, 210 (providing in an earlier version of the same act for a fine of 40 shillings for permitting
gaming and a fine of 20 shillings for taking part).
868. See MASS. REV. STAT. ch. 50, § 18 (Dutton & Wentworth 1836) (punishing playing at
billiards).
869. See id. § 17 (punishing persons not licensed as innholders with fines of up to S100 for
keeping gaming apparatus and related offenses); id. ch. 132. §§ 1-2. 4-5 (punishing various
"lottery" offenses with fines of up to $2000 or prison terms of up to three years).
870. Id. ch. 143, §§ 5, 6.
871. Id ch. 130, § 8.
872. See FERDINAND, supra note 121, at 75 tbl.3.3, 77, 81. 94 (finding it significant that the
practice of switching an initial not-guilty plea to a guilty plea developed earlier in prostitution
cases than in others); id. at 75 tbl.3.3 (showing a striking drop in the rate of not-guilty pleas in
prostitution cases in the mid- and late 1840s); id. at 78 tbl.3.5 (showing that those prostitution
defendants who pled guilty got shorter prison terms than those who went to trial and lost).
873. See id. at 50 tbl.2.2. He reports "l ittle evidence" of plea bargaining among common-law
crimes. Id. at 92.
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might have been as much the product of hopelessness as negotiation-
something I suggested earlier with regard to drunkenness prosecutions. 74
And a judge's compassion for an accused prostitute who showed remorse
by pleading guilty also need not have been the result of bargaining.
Moreover, I cannot tell whether Ferdinand's findings in prostitution cases
represent on-file plea bargaining of the sort I discussed in Part III.
Ferdinand does distinguish cases left on file from those ending in guilty
pleas,s75 but he does not tell us how he counts those cases that were placed
on file after a guilty plea-the mark of an on-file plea bargain.876 On-file
plea bargaining was, as I argue, simply probation by another name, and
John Augustus, Boston's probation pioneer, devoted much of his labor in
the latter part of the 1840s to prostitution defendants. 77 As Ferdinand
reports a near-tripling in the percentage of prostitution cases left on file in
the 1840s," 8 there is a real possibility that he is seeing on-file plea
bargaining and simply failing to distinguish it from other forms. So again,
without more detail, it is impossible to say whether Ferdinand's findings
support or challenge my own.
874. See supra note 236.
875. See FERDINAND, supra note 121, at 59 tbl.2.3.
876. See supra notes 298-299, 357-360 and accompanying text.
877. See AUGUSTUS, supra note 387, at 33-37; see also id. at 78-79 (reprinting an 1848
newspaper item accusing Augustus of keeping "a sort of Magdalen Asylum").
878. See FERDINAND, supra note 121, at 74 tbl.3.2.
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